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Abstract 
In an increasingly interconnected global political sphere, Islamist political actors have undergone a 
process of transformation, notwithstanding the self-referential character of their ideology. The present 
study assesses to what extent international norms have influenced this process. The argument is that 
these norms challenge the self-referential character of Islamism and its communitarian assumptions. 
The thesis initially provides an overview of Islamist political theory with reference to Muḥammad 
ʿAbduh, Sayid Quṭb, Bāqir al-Ṣadr and Ruhollah Khomeini, and argues that Islamism is not a 
particularly original critique of liberalism, but can be considered a form of communitarianism. The 
study then focuses on the case of Hezbollah to substantiate the claim that international norms 
influenced Islamist politics. It conducts an empirical analysis of four instances of Hezbollah’s 
interaction with international norms. The norms in question are non-combatant immunity, human 
rights, and maintenance of international peace, whereas the fourth example provides a more general 
overview on the impact of international norms on Hezbollah’s political language. The case study 
shows that by interacting with international actors and state institutions, and by looking for legitimacy 
for its actions - not only vis-à-vis its community - but also within the international normative system; 
Hezbollah’s political identity was modified by the influence of international norms. International norms 
then challenge the communitarian assumptions underlying Islamist politics. They are important factors 
in the socialisation of Islamist actors within the international normative system and become 
constitutive elements of the political identity of Islamist movements such as Hezbollah. 
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1.1 International Norms and Islamist Politics 
This is a study in International Relations primarily concerned with the influence of 
international norms in global politics. It proposes an analysis of how these norms are 
relevant and which effects they have on Islamism. 
International norms and liberal norms in general, have long been disputed. Political 
ideals that put emphasis on communal affiliation, tradition and particular ethical 
conceptions have constantly challenged the legitimacy of norms and institutions which 
claim international or even universal validity. This study focuses primarily on this issue. 
It frames the relationship between the political activity of Islamist movements and 
international norms in the wider international political theory debate, in particular the 
liberal-communitarian debate, and shows that the Islamist objections to liberalism and 
international norms originate from the same assumptions at the basis of the 
communitarian critique of liberalism. It then proposes an empirical analysis of how an 
Islamist movement interacts with international norms and shows that, notwithstanding 
its self-referential political identity, Islamism is nonetheless subject to international 
norms. 
The study proposed in the following pages combines political theory with historical and 
sociological analysis. To use Fred Halliday’s words, it matches ‘analytical universalism 
with a historical particularism’
1
 and reflects upon the relevance of international norms in 
Islamist politics without being overly distracted by particular historical and social 
phenomena.  
By providing an analysis which takes into account aspects of political theory and 
historical and social processes, this thesis intends to contribute to a better 
                                               
1
 Fred Halliday, Islam and the Myth of Confrontation: Religion and Politics in the Middle East (New edn.; London; 
New York: I.B. Tauris; In U.S. and Canada distributed by Palgrave Macmillan, 2003) p. 15. 
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understanding
2
 of the importance of international norms, their influence in international 
politics, and their potential in advancing a more just and peaceful international society.  
1.2 The Argument of the Thesis 
The thesis begins by showing, with reference to communitarian political theory, that 
international norms and liberalism have been constantly subject to criticism also within 
the western political theory debate. It then proposes a discussion of Islamist political 
theory, especially with regard to its critique of liberal institutions, international norms 
and, in general, modern secular societies. On the basis of a comparative analysis, it 
claims that communitarian and Islamist critiques of liberalism rely on specific 
assumptions about the kind of person we are and the way we live together, whether in 
communities or societies. Both communitarianism and Islamism share these 
conceptions of personhood and community on which they build their critical arguments 
against international norms and liberal society in general. Nonetheless, the empirical 
analysis following this theoretical discussion will show how, in practice, Islamism 
assimilates certain international norms. Occasionally, it even uses these norms to 
legitimate its actions or remains indifferent towards their implementation. 
Notwithstanding the hostile stance of Islamism to international norms and liberal ethics, 
international norms do have an impact on Islamism. 
Three concluding observations are proposed as resulting from this analysis. The first is 
that Islamist politics cannot rely simply on the idea of an isolated and self-referential 
Islamic community. Islamist movements, and the societies in which they operate, have 
increasingly become part of a broader political and social context in which interactions 
among persons, states and societies are regulated by norms and institutions the 
legitimacy of which is not based on Islamic ethics (although they can still be fully 
consistent with it). International norms have a significant role in regulating these 
relations. Following on this first point, Islamism cannot count on a conception of person 
                                               
2
 Referring to Hollis and Smith categories of ‘explaining’ and ‘understanding’ the aim of this research is more 
concerned with understanding the impact of international norms on Islamist politics rather than explaining it. See 
Martin Hollis and Steve M. Smith, Explaining and Understanding International Relations (Oxford: Clarendon, 
1990) pp. 68-91. 
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whose identity and moral value are solely derived from his or her communal Islamic 
membership. The Muslim community is not a barrier to broader social and political 
arrangements and persons become ‘constituted’ not only by their affiliation to their 
respective religious community but take part in broader social environments as national 
groups, global civil society or, even more importantly, in a shared sense of humanity. 
The third observation of this study is related to the definition of this process of transition 
of Islamism within the international relations theory debate and claims that it can be 
understood as a form of international socialisation. Islamist movements, by interacting 
with international norms, are being progressively socialised within the international 
society, rather than remain isolated or even alienated from it. Their interaction with 
international actors produces a progressive assimilation of these norms and their 
underlying liberal assumptions within their political identity, although this process is still 
at an early stage. 
1.3 Methodology: Comparative Theory and Least Likely Single 
Case Study 
In order to justify the argument of this thesis a theoretical comparative discussion of 
Islamism and communitarianism is herein combined with a least likely single case 
study.
3
 The theoretical analysis will argue that Islamism can be considered as a form of 
communitarianism, and based on this theoretical considerations the thesis then 
proceeds with the case study. The case under analysis is the Islamist movement 
Hezbollah and the choice of this case is due to a ‘least-likely’ methodological criterion.
4
 
The strength of a ‘least-likely’ case is that it allows for reasonable generalisations. The 
idea is that if this enquiry succeeds in substantiating the claim that international norms 
influence the Islamist politics of Hezbollah, then the same can be reasonably expected 
for ‘less tough’ cases such as Islamist movements adopting less radical stances.  
                                               
3 
In presenting the methodology of this study I primarily rely on Alexander L. George and Andrew Bennett, Case 
Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 2005). See Chapter 4. 
4
 Ibid., pp. 120-3. 
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Hezbollah is a least-likely case because, being an Islamist movement, by definition its 
political identity refers exclusively to Islamic principles and not to other ethical 
paradigms such as international ethics.
5
 In addition to this, its political identity, 
originally, has been defined in sharp antagonism with external interferences of any sort. 
Its military and political action has been justified exclusively along traditional Islamist 
lines, also resorting to political violence. Its intransigent political profile (even more 
intransigent of other movements such as the Muslim Brotherhood, Hamas, the Islamic 
Action Front etc.) makes it a least-likely case to assess the capacity of international 
norms to influence the behaviour of an Islamist political actor.  
The analysis of the case study is broken down across four instances representative of 
the interaction between international norms and Hezbollah. All these examples 
correspond to ‘before-after’ comparative analyses. This means that each of these 
instances compares Hezbollah’s political identity before and after a process in which 
international norms intervened over its activity. The only exception is Chapter 9, where 
the methodology is not process tracing or historical analysis, but a text analysis. 
Contrarily to what may be expected from an Islamist movement, which relies on 
communitarian assumptions, these examples will show how international norms are 
becoming progressively constitutive of Hezbollah’s political action and challenge its 
conceptions of community and person. 
The choice of these examples of interaction has been deliberately selective towards 
instances that serve the purpose of this research. The selection of these cases has 
been made among historical events in which international actors, such as foreign 
states diplomacies and multilateral organizations as the UN, interacted directly or 
throughout third party mediation, with Hezbollah. This happened in various 
circumstances in which international norms became relevant such as the regulation 
and ending of inter-state conflicts (Chapters 6 and 8) and the implementation of 
legislation and policies consistent with human rights principles or democracy or state 
sovereignty (Chapters 7 and 9).  
                                               
5
 This is a point which will be discussed extensively in Chapters 3 and 4. 
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It might be helpful to briefly consider why other relevant examples of interaction 
between international norms and Hezbollah are not considered in this enquiry.  
Hezbollah’s stance towards Palestinian refugees in Lebanon could have been another 
instance linking international norms and Hezbollah. Nonetheless, this issue has 
broader implications more closely related to Lebanese domestic politics and the 
number of factors involved in this issue would have made the case difficult to handle. 
Also, the occasional swapping of prisoners between Hezbollah and Israel could have 
been an interesting example regulated by international humanitarian law and 
negotiated by multilateral agencies and German diplomacy. This phenomenon is 
nonetheless, rather difficult to investigate because of its secrecy. One particularly 
prominent case could have been the analysis of the Special Tribunal for Lebanon (STL) 
in relation to Hezbollah. Nonetheless this case would deserve an entirely separate 
analysis, and, at the time of writing, was too early to have a sufficiently clear idea about 
how Hezbollah will relate to this institution. Furthermore, the innovative character of this 
international tribunal renders this case not optimal for generalizations over international 
norms. 
There is, then, another important methodological choice to be justified. At least since 
1992, Hezbollah has increasingly normalised its relationship with the Lebanese state 
and society. The phenomenon has been defined by several Hezbollah’s experts as the 
‘Lebanonisation of Hezbollah’
6
 and is rightly considered one of the main trajectories (if 
not the main trajectory) of Hezbollah’s political identity transition. Nonetheless, the 
thesis will reflect on this phenomenon only as far as is relevant for the scope of the 
analysis. As this is an International Relations thesis, the author has privileged the 
analysis of international factors over national dynamics, although admittedly, the two 
dimensions are often overlapping especially in a state like Lebanon where international 
powers constantly interfere with domestic politics. Whenever Hezbollah’s 
                                               
6
 Hezbollah’s Lebanonisation has been discussed extensively by many scholars. See for example Magnus 
Ranstorp, 'The Strategy and Tactics of Hizballah's Current "Lebanonization" Process', Mediterranean Politics, 3/1 
(1998), 103 - 34. Amal Saad-Ghorayeb, Hizbuʾllah: Politics and Religion (London ; Sterling, Va.: Pluto Press, 
2002) pp. 82-3. 
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Lebanonisation becomes relevant as correlated to its ‘internationalisation’ this will be 
highlighted, but no separate discussion of this process is offered herein. 
Finally, the contextual changes in the strategic and social environment in which 
Hezbollah operates, such as the withdrawals of Israel and Syria from Lebanese 
territory or changes in leadership in Iran, are influential factors in Hezbollah’s political 
and military activity. The discussion of these factors will be nonetheless instrumental to 
the overall scope of the argument. For example, Hezbollah’s relations with Iran will be 
discussed with reference to the ideological influence of Khomeinism and Hezbollah-
Syria relations will be mentioned with regard to Syria’s role as international mediator in 
Lebanese and regional affairs. 
The last methodological point regards the gathering of relevant information and data for 
this research. This study relies primarily on bibliographical research especially as 
regards its more theoretical considerations. In the study of Islamist political theory, the 
author has made an effort to refer as much as possible to original texts, rather than 
secondary literature in the attempt of offering a fresher interpretation of this literature.  
The empirical part of the research is based on historical, sociological and international 
relations scholarly publications, as well as interviews and collections of documents 
from sources such as the Lebanese Parliament, the leaked US cables collected in 
Wikileaks, UN reports and occasional consultation with the Hezbollah affiliated 
Consultative Center for Study and Documentation. To access archives and carry out 
interviews, the author has undertaken fieldwork research in Lebanon. Interviews were 
particularly useful in forming ideas and perceptions of the reality on the ground, as well 
as to fill some documental gaps. Whenever appropriate, they have been quoted directly 
in the text or referred to in footnote. 
Occasionally, documents and sources needed to be translated from the original Arabic. 
In some cases, this is my translation, and in other cases, I consulted translations 
available in other publications. 
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1.4   Causation, Constitution and Socialisation 
In presenting the argument and the methodology of this thesis, it is important to clarify 
some conceptual distinctions. This also helps to locate the thesis in the wider 
International Relations theory debate. The argument of this thesis does not intend to 
infer a relation of causation between international norms and Islamist politics. This is to 
say, with reference to the case study of this thesis, that Hezbollah’s changes in its 
policies and its military activity are not necessarily ‘triggered’ by a UNSC resolution or 
by the normative cogency of human rights, to mention two examples which will be 
discussed below. Inferring causality between Hezbollah’s political activity and 
international norms would stretch the argument of this thesis beyond its scope.  
A better framework to locate this thesis in the International Relations literature is 
constitutive theory. According to Mervyn Frost constitutive theory 
focuses attention on how the key actors in international relations are constituted 
as such through the mutual recognition they give one another in terms of a 
standard set of ‘rules of the international game’. More specifically it focuses on the 
ethical background theory which justifies the whole set of rules which constitute 
the practice. […] Constitutive theory is a particularly important mode of analysis 
because it brings to light that actors within a given social practice (or set of social 
practices) are constituted not just as actors but as ethical actors subject to ethical 
conditionalities.
7
 
In the case of this study, then, the actor in question is Hezbollah; the actions of which 
are increasingly ‘conditioned’ by international norms. In this sense, international norms 
do not have a causal function but acquire a constitutive value, which shapes 
Hezbollah’s political identity transition. More generally, constitutive theory dismisses 
the validity of causal thinking in social sciences. Alexander Wendt claims that in 
constitutive theory the “‘Independent variable/dependent variable’ language that 
characterises causal enquiries makes no sense, or at least must be interpreted very 
differently, in constitutive inquiries.’
8
 Consistently with this theoretical approach, this 
                                               
7
 Mervyn Frost, Global Ethics: Anarchy, Freedom and International Relations (London ; New York: Routledge, 
2009) p. 19. 
8
 Alexander Wendt, 'On Constitution and Causation in International Relations', Review of International Studies, 
24/05 (1998), 101-18 at p. 106. 
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thesis does not account for a causal process and shows how international norms have 
become progressively constitutive of Hezbollah’s political and military activity. 
In accounting for this process of integration of international norms in Hezbollah’s 
political identity, a useful concept, which captures this phenomenon, is that of 
socialisation. There are several definitions of this concept in International Relations 
theory. Kenneth Waltz’s neorealist theory refers to the idea of socialisation and argues 
that a way ‘structures work their effects is through a process socialization that limits 
and molds behavior’
9
 of political actors. This nonetheless is a different way of using this 
concept as it widely relies on the distinction between system and structure which is not 
used in this study.  
John Ikenberry and Charles Kupchan offer an analysis of socialisation with reference to 
the Gramscian idea of hegemony. They claim that hegemonic actors in the 
‘international system’ not only cast their influence by means of material power but 
[There] is also a more subtle component of hegemonic power, one that works at 
the level of substantive beliefs rather than material payoffs. Acquiescence is the 
result of the socialization of leaders in secondary nations. Elites in secondary 
states buy into and internalize norms that are articulated by the hegemon and 
therefore pursue policies consistent with the hegemon's notion of international 
order. The exercise of power-and hence the mechanism through which 
compliance is achieved-involves the projection by the hegemon of a set of norms 
and their embrace by leaders in other nations.
10
 
In this sense, socialisation occurs as an exercise of hegemonic power over secondary 
actors inculcating beliefs and norms in other political actors and obtaining their 
acquiescence towards these norms. Ikenberry and Kupchan advance three hypotheses 
on how socialisation occurs. The first is that socialisation results from circumstances of 
war and crisis (external inducement), the second regards the fact that socialisation is 
successful when norms and beliefs are embraced by elites (normative persuasion) and 
                                               
9
 Kenneth Neal Waltz, Theory of International Politics (Reading, Mass: Addison-Wesley Pub. Co, 1979) p. 76. 
10
 G. John Ikenberry and Charles A. Kupchan, 'Socialization and Hegemonic Power', International Organization, 
44/3 (1990), 283-315 at p. 283. 
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the third hypothesis is that socialisation occurs as a result of intervention within 
domestic state affairs (internal reconstruction).
11
 
A different view on socialisation is given by scholars of the constructivist school. Their 
conception is less concerned with power than Ikenberry’s and Kupchan’s, and 
attributes importance to the role of (international) civil society, NGOs and multilateral 
organisations, which they refer to as ‘norms entrepreneurs’.
12
 Constructivists 
understand socialisation as the progressive internalisation of norms (for example 
human rights), resulting from interaction with international institutions, as well as from 
internal oppositions and pressures from civil society organisations.
13
 Socialisation 
amounts to a process that initially begins with ‘instrumental adaptation’
14
 to norms, and 
then turns into a deeper progression where norms begin to define political action from 
within, rather than being mere external constraints. Thomas Risse and Kathryn Sikkink 
describe socialisation as a dialogical process as follows: 
The more they [political actors] ‘talk the talk,’ however, the more they entangle 
themselves in a moral discourse which they cannot escape in the long run. In the 
beginning they might use arguments in order to further their instrumentally defined 
interests, that is they engage in rhetoric […]. The more they justify their interests, 
however, the more others will start challenging their arguments and the validity 
claims inherent to them. At this point, governments need to respond providing 
further arguments. They become entangled in arguments and the logic of 
argumentative rationality slowly but surely takes over. It follows that we expect 
argumentative rationality, dialogue, and processes of persuasion to prevail in later 
stages of the socialisation.
15
   
At the final stage, norms become fully internalised within the political identity of actors 
so that they become constitutive of their identity and institutionalised. The empirical 
analysis proposed in Chapters 6 to 9 will highlight the occasions in which the 
                                               
11
 Ibid., p. 290-2. 
12
 With regard to the concept of socialisation in constructivist theories of norms diffusion see for example Thomas 
Risse-Kappen and Kathryn Sikkink, 'The Socialisation of International Human Rights Norms into Domestic 
Practices: Introduction' in Thomas Risse-Kappen, Steve C. Ropp, and Kathryn Sikkink (eds.), The Power of 
Human Rights: International Norms and Domestic Change (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999) pp. 
1-38. As regard ‘norms entrepreneurs’ a definition can be found in Martha Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink, 
'International Norm Dynamics and Political Change', International Organization, 52/4 (1998), 887-917 at p. 896. 
13
 Risse-Kappen and Sikkink, 'The Socialisation of International Human Rights Norms into Domestic Practices: 
Introduction' pp. 17-35. 
14
 Ibid., p. 12. 
15
 Ibid., p. 16. 
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interaction between international norms and Hezbollah can be understood as form of 
socialisation with reference to the definitions provided above. 
The concept of socialisation, as well as the constitutive and constructivist perspective 
in general, helps also to address one main criticism of the argument of this study, 
which is worth addressing preliminarily also at this stage. Realist and rationalist 
theories of International Relations typically assume that political actors act on the basis 
of a logic of a maximisation of their power to achieve their interests. This may seem to 
justify the claim that international norms’ influence on a movement as Hezbollah does 
not reflect a shift in its political identity, but is instrumental to the maximisation of its 
power. Nonetheless, this is only a partly convincing explanation from a constructivist 
perspective according to which interests and norms are not separate components of a 
political actor, but rather constitute each other. As Wendt says ‘power and interest have 
the effect they do in virtue of the ideas that make them up.’
16
 Thus, the fact that an 
Islamist movement, to a degree, abides by international norms (although these norms 
are extraneous to its ethical foundations) is indicative of the fact that what its interests 
of political actor are about (and then how it exercises its power), is partly informed by 
international norms. As Jeffrey Checkel observes in constructivist theory norms 
‘constitute states/agents, providing them with understanding of their interests.’
17
  
The fact that Hezbollah does not object to human rights legislation, accepts a 
distinction between combatants and non-combatants, or commits to a UNSC 
resolution, is indicative of the fact that its interests are progressively being determined 
not only by Islamist principles but also through international norms.  Whether the 
‘cause’ of this phenomenon is determined by a power-maximising logic is not of 
concern from a constructivist perspective. As it was said, constructivism and 
constitutive theory are not interested in establishing causal links and focus on how the 
interests and the power of an actor come about. 
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1.5 Working Definitions and Key Concepts 
The reader will have noticed how certain concepts are of central importance all along 
this study. For this reason,  it can be useful clarifying a few key concepts which will 
become more precisely defined when used in analysis. 
The concept of international norms has been preferred to international law because the 
object in question, in fact, is not law in a strict sense. Law is characterised by a clear 
legal wording, by being codified in texts usually of a rather precise nature although in 
the international realm hybrid categories as ‘soft law’ or Customary International Law 
challenge this aspect and blur the distinction between norms and law. Nonetheless, 
what is at stake in this study, is not the international legal order, but rather the ethical 
assumptions regulating relations among international actors. The focus of the study is 
on ethics rather than legal orders. This does not preclude the possibility of referring to 
principles of international law as indeed is the case in various chapters of this study. 
The idea nonetheless, is that law remains the surface of a deeper ethical framework 
with which this study is concerned. 
There are several definitions of norms in international relations theory and international 
political theory. Frost’s conceptualisation of international norms as ‘settled norms’ is 
particularly helpful. He ‘regard[s] a norm as settled where it is generally recognized that 
any argument denying the norms (or which it appears to override the norm) requires 
special justification.’ According to the same account, the fact that a norm is violated, 
does not diminish its status as a settled norm.
 18
 The concept of settled norms is fully 
inclusive of several principles regulating international relations and, more importantly, 
includes the norms that are considered in this study. The norms in question are the 
principles established by ius in bello (the Laws of War) and in particular non-combatant 
immunity in conflict,
19
 human rights,
20
 state sovereignty and international peace
21
. 
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Chapter 9 refers to international norms more broadly and, among others, refers also to 
the norms that Frost defines as ‘Modernization Norms’ such as development and 
cooperation.
22
 
The main phrase used to refer to the context of interaction between international actors 
is ‘international society’. There are several, and variously defined, alternative locutions 
as the ‘international system’ or ‘structure’ preferred by neo-realist, or the ‘international 
regime’ of regime theorists as well as ‘empire’ often used by Marxists or the 
‘international community’ usually attributed to cosmopolitans. International society is 
used herein as intended by English School theorists but also by constructivists. These 
theories use the term society as a way of describing relations among states as based 
on shared rules and institutions
23
 and this is indeed the kind of definition which best 
serves the purposes of this study to refer to the context of international politics.  
There is nonetheless one important caveat, the study presented herein is mainly 
concerned with non-state actors, as Hezbollah, and not with states and this may seem 
innovative when referring to the concept of international society, which however, 
conceptualises society as a society of states. This aspect does not seem to raise 
problems of a theoretical or practical kind, as the definition of international society does 
not clash necessarily with the consideration of non-state actors. Quite to the contrary, 
when adopted by constructivists, this concept is widely inclusive of actors as NGOs 
and international NGOs for example. Another important aspect is that the locution 
‘international community’ has been avoided because the study puts emphasis on the 
difference between the concepts of community and society, a point which will be further 
clarified in the following chapters.  
As regards the term Islamism, this embraces the political theories and the practices 
(including paramilitary operations), which find their alleged foundations and legitimation 
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in a certain interpretation of the Islamic tradition. In general, Islamism tends to promote 
an Islamic polity, but what is this about exactly is often left open to interpretation. There 
have been various discussions of which term best captures what is herein called 
Islamism. ‘Fundamentalism’ has been avoided because it has raised objections with 
regard to the fact that this term identified primarily Christian traditionalist movements.
24
 
‘Political Islam’ is not particularly problematic and, although very generic, is 
occasionally used. The discussion of Chapter 3 will provide the reader with a clearer 
idea of how Islamism is understood herein.  
The term ‘community’ will be defined in more detail in Chapter 4 with reference to 
communitarianism and Islamism, but it is important to notice that is not interchangeable 
with ‘society’. There is a long tradition of theoretical distinctions between the concepts 
of community and society (which cannot be fully addressed herein), this refers for 
example to German philosophy and social theory as in the case of Ferdinand Tönnies
25
 
who proposed the distinction between community as defined by shared culture, history 
and values in contrast with society understood as a voluntary association among 
persons regulated by rules. 
As it will be further made clear, communitarians and Islamists envision a political realm 
in which the ethical community plays a central role in various respects, whereas liberals 
associate their political project to the idea of society as a ‘cooperative venture for 
mutual advantage.’
26
 Closely related to this distinction is the way the concept of person 
is delineated in this enquiry. Two main paradigms are at stake. The Islamist and 
communitarian paradigm will be described in more detail in Chapter 4, and refers to the 
idea of person primarily identified as the member of an ethical community. This 
conception is in sharp contrast with the idea of the Kantian moral agent, which is 
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characterised by moral individual autonomy and constitutes a central assumption for 
liberal theory as well as for international norms. 
Finally, an important consideration regards the definition of Hezbollah as a ‘terrorist 
organisation’, whether amateurishly by the press or within legal contexts by 
governments and international organisations. This study will avoid this term, not 
because I am certain that Hezbollah’s activities cannot be considered forms of 
terrorism (whatever the definition adopted), but because the term has acquired a 
strongly politicised connotation.
27
 An unqualified use of the term ‘terrorism’, considering 
its semantic uncertainty and its defaming political use, would mean inevitably to take 
sides in the debate over the morality of political violence in the context in which 
Hezbollah operates. This would exceed the scope of this study, which does not aim to 
propose a discussion of the ethical justifications of political violence. Furthermore, the 
use of this term, terrorism, charged with political meaning and for which no universally 
accepted definition exists, does not provide additional explanatory value to the analysis 
of the events and theories discussed below; quite to the contrary, it seems to produce 
more confusion. Similarly, the identification of Hezbollah as a ‘resistance movement’ 
simply refers to its military activity in generic terms. By this I do not mean to endorse or 
refuse the definition of Hezbollah as a resistance movement or a liberation movement 
as this would deserve a separate discussion of the various historical phases of 
Hezbollah’s activity.  
Notwithstanding this attempt to provide some working definitions, there are plenty of 
examples, which often blur distinctions and differentiations. There are Islamists and 
communitarians, which endorse some aspects of liberalism, persons that see 
themselves as both Kantian moral agents but also members of ethical community, and 
phenomena that are better explained through the lenses of a realist international 
structure rather than constructivists or English School conceptions of international 
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society.
28
 These working definitions should be seen more as Weberian ‘ideal types’
29
 
rather than ontological categories, in the sense that they are analytical instruments, 
which cover only part of a more complex reality.  
1.6 Structure of the Thesis  
This thesis is divided into ten chapters. Chapter 2 proposes a discussion of the 
critiques of liberal norms and institutions including international norms with reference to 
communitarian political theory. It considers the early stages of this critique, the debate 
on domestic political theory (especially with reference to John Rawls’s theory of 
justice), and then moves to the international political theory debate. The point of this 
chapter is to prepare the ground for the comparative analysis proposed in Chapter 4.  
Chapter 3 presents the theories of four key Islamist thinkers: Muḥammad ʿAbduh, 
Sayid Quṭb, Muḥammad Bāqir al-Ṣadr and Ruhollah Musavi Khomeini. The four of 
them are very different in time, space, and also in their respective theories but they all 
share a critical attitude towards the liberal political project and the application of liberal 
norms and institutions within the context of the Islamic community. The choice of 
different thinkers provides an account of Islamism, representative of its internal 
variations but also shows underlying assumptions of Islamism, which cut across the 
whole spectrum of the Islamist political theory paradigm. Reference to al-Ṣadr and 
Khomeini is particularly relevant because anticipates the focus on Shiʿī Islamism, which 
is at the basis of Hezbollah’s political identity.  
Chapter 4 proposes a comparative analysis of the conceptions of person and 
community in Islamist and communitarian political theory and claims that Islamism can 
be understood as a form of communitarianism. It will show that at the roots of the 
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communitarian and Islamist critique of liberalism and international norms there are 
common assumptions on the ideas of person and community. The study, then, will 
highlight the core characteristics of person and community in these theories to which it 
will refer again towards the conclusions of the thesis. 
The focus then shifts from a theoretical discussion to a more historical approach. 
Chapter 5 introduces the rise of Shiʿī Islamism in Lebanon and then presents the 
specific case of Hezbollah on which the rest of the thesis will focus.  Chapter 6 
proposes the first instance in which the approach of Hezbollah to international norms is 
discussed. It refers to the events of the 1996 war and discusses the process that led to 
the adoption of a regime of restraint on warfare on the basis of the non-combatant 
immunity norm.  
Chapter 7 looks at Hezbollah’s involvement in parliamentary politics in Lebanon, and 
proposes a monitoring of the activity of Hezbollah’s delegation in the parliament with 
regard to the implementation of human rights legislation. This occasion shows how 
Hezbollah modified its political profile to adapt to the secular (although 
confessionalised) and quasi-liberal institutions of the Lebanese state and to analyse 
Hezbollah’s approach to human rights legislation. 
Chapter 8 considers again a context of war. This time the focus is on the events of 
2005 and the 2006 conflict in Lebanon. The analysis looks at how UN Security Council 
resolutions impact over Hezbollah’s political identity and its political and military actions 
at a time in which Hezbollah has escalated its participation to politics becoming part of 
the government. This chapter will highlight how international norms such as state 
sovereignty and international peace do not leave Hezbollah unchanged. However, the 
Islamist movement becomes entangled in a process of negotiation and implementation 
of norms which are entirely derived from the international normative system. 
Chapter 9 is somewhat different in its methodology but is an opportunity for a more 
general and conclusive overview of the process presented in the previous chapters. It 
proposes a comparative analysis of the two most important texts published by the 
28 
 
movement: the 1984 Open Letter and the 2009 Political Document. Through this 
comparison in texts’ contents and vocabulary, the chapter highlights the sharp increase 
in references to terms and norms that overlap with liberal and international norms and 
the decrease in Islamic and particular references. The chapter will particularly 
emphasise the focus on person and community as units of analysis in order to lead to 
the conclusions presented in Chapter 10. This last chapter presents the overall 
conclusions of this study, which corresponds to the concluding observations mentioned 
above in Section 1.2 above. 
The thesis is provided with three appendices, two of which are relevant for Chapter 9 
and are working translations of the Open Letter and the Political Document of 
Hezbollah. I have retranslated or edited these texts so that they could be analysed with 
a software
30
 for text analysis. More details regarding these texts can be found in the 
section preceding the appendices. The third appendix is a data collection regarding the 
monitoring of the parliamentary debates on human rights legislation and refers to the 
case discussed in Chapter 7. 
1.7 Style and Transliterations 
In terms of style, this text has been drafted with reference to the Oxford Style 
Manual
31
and in abidance with the indications given by the department and the 
university of affiliation of the author. With regard to the transliteration of Arabic terms 
the author referred to the guidelines suggested by the Oxford Style Manual 
complemented by the indications given by the International Journal of Middle Eastern 
Studies. Most of the Arabic terms have been transliterated including most of the names 
of persons. Terms that have become of common use have been proposed in their more 
common form as accepted in English. 
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The Communitarian Critique of Liberalism 
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2.1 Introduction 
With the end of the Cold War, liberal norms and institutions have witnessed a 
remarkable expansion in the global political sphere, both at domestic and international 
level. The last decades of the Twentieth Century have been considered an 
unprecedented historical opportunity for the expansion of these norms on a global 
scale. Famously, Francis Fukuyama considered this the ‘end of history’, where liberal 
democracy would have become the ‘final form of government’ for all states, whereas 
alternative models (communism and Islamism) were doomed to decline.
1
 The United 
Nations undertook actions and issued declarations in which increasing global 
interdependence and the post-Cold War historical juncture were considered an 
opportunity for freedom, equality, solidarity and peace to spread globally.
2
 The UN 
Secretary General Kofi Annan in 2005 released a report ‘In Larger Freedom’ in which 
he made the case for a major reform of international institutions claiming that: ‘After a 
period of difficulty in international affairs, in the face of both new threats and old ones in 
new guises, there is a yearning in many quarters for a new consensus on which to 
base collective action.’
3
 On this basis, he called for new human rights institutions, the 
reduction of inequality, the affirmation of peace and the increase of international 
security. 
The legitimacy and theoretical assumptions, on which liberal norms and institutions 
rely, nonetheless, have been constantly challenged. This chapter introduces some of 
the most common critiques of liberalism, which developed within the Western political 
theory debate with reference to communitarian political thinking. In brief, liberals have 
elaborated their theories with an idea of the person in mind influenced by the concept 
of the Kantian moral agent. It is argued that, ‘No constitutive attachment, either to state, 
nation, family or cultural group, must trump the claims of individuals and their basic 
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rights and status.’
4
 According to this conception, a person is an autonomous individual 
capable of choosing amongst alternative ways of life primarily through the use of 
reason. This conception informs the idea that a just political order allows persons living 
together in societies that maximise their autonomy and their capacity to achieve their 
personal interests. Liberal institutions as rights, the rule of law, the separation of 
powers, but also state sovereignty and its monopoly over the use of force are based on 
this conception.  
Critics of liberalism, however, see this conception of the person as an autonomous 
moral individual with scepticism. Communitarians in particular rather rely on a 
conception closer to the Hegelian idea according to which the person acquires their 
identity and ethical principles as part of a group of people sharing a tradition and a 
common history.
5
 This group of people is defined as a community and not as a society. 
A community is not exclusively defined by rules for mutual advantage and individual 
well-being, but shares among its members, ethical principles constitutive of the 
person’s ethics. 
This differentiates the idea of community from the liberal idea of society in which 
various ethical conceptions co-exist in mutual tolerance and are all equally valued. A 
community, according to the critics of liberalism, is more assertive towards its members 
on how they should live and which ethical principles should be valued. This inevitably 
compresses the moral autonomy of the individual which is, however, of capital 
importance for liberals. 
This divergence between liberals and their critics regarding the concept of the person 
and how persons live together (whether in communities or societies) has important 
consequences on how they theorise both domestic and international politics as the 
following pages will show. Whereas liberals consider just political institutions 
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maximising individual freedoms, communitarians are keener to identify as just a 
political order that protects and foster the values of the moral community. 
Section 1.2 provides an overview of how communitarian criticism of liberal norms is 
rooted in a long tradition and refers to Edmund Burke’s polemic against the expansion 
of the French Revolution influence in Europe and Karl Marx’s criticism of rights. Section 
1.3 shows how similar forms of criticism remained relevant at a later stage, at a time in 
which liberal democracies and international liberal norms were firmly established in 
western political systems and beyond. This is the case of contemporary communitarian 
political theory which emerged primarily as a reaction to the revival of the Kantian 
liberal tradition initiated by John Rawls’s theory of justice. Section 1.4 highlights how 
the liberal-communitarian debate was projected into international political theory and 
international relations theory. In this case, the source of contention primarily relates to 
the issue of humanitarian intervention, and the universality of human rights. This 
section will focus particularly on the latter. 
The aim of this section and the following chapter is to shed some light on these critical 
views of liberalism and identify the underlying assumptions of the criticism. This will be 
instrumental to the comparative analysis proposed in Chapter 4.  
2.2 Early Critiques: Burke, Marx and Universal Rights Declarations 
The American Declaration of Independence (1776) and the Declaration of the Rights of 
the Man and the Citizen by the French National Assembly (1789) are generally 
considered as historical milestones of the rising importance of the idea of universal 
rights, and more broadly, of liberal institutions. These declarations were the outcome of 
a long intellectual history which peaked with the diffusion of the enlightenment’s 
political culture.
6
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2.2.1 Burke’s Conservative Stance against the French Revolution 
Not coincidentally, it was in relation to these declarations that criticism of liberalism 
began to emerge. Edmund Burke and Karl Marx are representative examples. Both 
proposed a critique of these declarations and more generally of the revolutionary 
events of eighteenth and nineteenth century France. Their criticism anticipated the 
more recent critiques of liberalism. Jeremy Waldron observes that: 
Bentham, Burke and Marx all attack human rights for what they call their 
‘abstraction’; they all focus on the theme of individualism versus community, 
though their respective conceptions of community are of course very different; and 
they all claim that rights of man involve a radically impoverished view of the 
constitution of human society.
7
 
This highlights the central problem of the debate. Critics of liberalism are primarily 
concerned with the way liberals understand the idea of the person and community. If 
we consider Burke’s political theory we will see that: 
Burke’s perspective on international society relates to a prominent debate in 
normative theory between cosmopolitanism and communitarianism. Although 
Burke appealed to a universal natural law applicable to humanity, his emphasis on 
cultural similitude as an underpinning for international society (particularly in 
Europe) parallels communitarianism as a normative approach to international 
relations.
8
 
Burke was an aristocrat asserting the importance of the preservation of the traditional 
political order and its elites because of alleged intrinsic moral value. The French 
Revolution was perceived as a threat to the status quo of the European community and 
Burke claimed that it had to be opposed to preserve the integrity of traditional moral 
values. Most of his intellectual work is in defence of the status quo against the 
revolutionary movement initiated by the French Revolution which he severely criticises 
in Reflections on the Revolution in France (1790). His polemic against the revolution 
and the institutionalisation of a liberal order was particularly directed by the idea of the 
rights of man.  
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Despite the fact that he was a universal moralist, generally committed to a religious 
understanding of natural law, according to Burke the moral legitimacy of norms and 
political orders, as David Boucher observes,
9
 results from a shared communal tradition 
and history embodied in the national and European ethical context. Moral 
righteousness and rights correspond to the ethical principles constitutive of the 
community and these shall not be subverted by the will of an isolated individual 
detached from the communal context. As he argues, ‘The body of the community, 
whenever it can come to act, can meet with no effectual resistance; but till power and 
right are the same, the whole body of them has no right inconsistent with virtue.’
10
 
Chris Brown observes, in this regard, that ‘In opposition to the universal claims of the 
Revolution, Burke posed a different notion of the organic community to that of 
Rousseau or the republicans.’
11
 In Burke’s theory the community is the element 
underpinning the legitimacy of a political order. Consequently, he does not oppose 
indiscriminately the idea of rights (which he recognises within certain limits) but 
criticises their extension beyond the borders set by history and the community on the 
basis of which rights are stipulated.
12
 Since the French Revolution was subversive of 
traditional communal values, Burke criticises this phenomenon as corrupting the moral 
order of Europe and extends this criticism to the declaration of rights. In opposition to 
the idea of ‘man’ as depicted in the rights declaration, Burke proposes a conception of 
the person as a ‘civil social man’
13
 understood as part of a social group whose moral 
understanding overlaps with the principles of the civil community. It is for this reason 
that he was sceptical of the idea of the rights of man as conceived in the French 
declarations.  
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As John Vincent observes ‘the correct way to think about rights, according to Burke, 
was in terms of the ancient and indisputable laws and liberties inherited from our 
forefathers, and this meant particular rights, the rights of Englishmen, not the rights of 
man.’
14
 
2.2.2 Marx’s Critique of Liberal Individualism: the Self-Sufficient Monad 
In On the Jewish Question (1843), Marx provides another example of criticism against 
the idea of the rights of man where he criticises the idea of the person as individual 
self-sufficient beings. As Michael Walzer points out, ‘The writing of the young Marx 
represents one of the early appearances of communitarian criticism, and his argument, 
first made in 1840s, is powerfully present today.’
15
According to Waldron, there are two 
interpretations of the Marxian critique of rights. In the first interpretation, Waldron 
observes, the rights of men declared in the French declarations were for Marx  an 
invention of the bourgeoisie to maintain its privileges using the liberal theory of natural 
rights.  The second interpretation explains that, although in Marx’s critique the rights of 
man are nothing but the invention of bourgeois elites, the rights of citizens can be a 
means of facilitating the constitution of a political community rather than its 
fragmentation.
16
 In this second interpretation, not only the rights of man (as opposed to 
citizenship rights) are instruments for the interests of the bourgeoisie perpetuating the 
injustice of the capitalist society, but they rely on a conception of person in contrast 
with Marx’s idea of the human as a ‘species-being’
17
. This critique emerges when he 
criticises the principle of equality as conceived in the French declaration.  
Equality in this declaration corresponds to the idea that ‘each man shall without 
discrimination be treated as a self-sufficient monad’ according to Marx. His criticism is 
likewise severe with the rights to property that he dubs as the ‘right of selfishness.’
 18
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More generally, he argues that ‘none of the so-called rights of man goes beyond 
egoistic man, man as he is in civil society, namely an individual withdrawn behind his 
private interests and whims and separated from the community.’
19
John Charvet and 
Elisa Kaczynska-Nay observe that in Marx’s critique:  
Political community on this liberal view of man is in effect only an abstract ideal 
framework external to individuals and the only real bond holding them together is 
need and private interest. The political community, while purporting to realize the 
common good, is in actuality degraded into serving the interests of egotistic man.
20
 
As an alternative to this individualist liberal conception, he proposes the idea of a 
person characterised by a communal nature, according to which the person develops 
their life in the political community and is valued as a communal being.
21
 This is why, 
according to certain interpretations, Marx is not entirely hostile to the idea of political 
rights (distinguished from the more general notion of human or natural rights).  
Waldron argues that political rights are consistent with Marx’s ‘species-being’ 
conception of the person, whereas those rights that exclusively safeguard individual 
freedom are not. According to Marx, political rights ‘Are only exercised in community 
with other men. Their content is formed by participation in the common essence, the 
political essence, the essence of the state.’
22
 Differently, for example, the right to 
property is only the result of an individualist conception of the person. However, more 
can be said in this respect considering Allen Buchanan’s discussion of Marx’s theory. 
Buchanan argues that one of the main critical points of Marx is that ‘the concept of 
person as essentially a being with a sense of justice and who is a bearer of rights is a 
radically defective concept that could only arise in a radically defective form of human 
society.’
23
 According to this interpretation, the liberal individualist conception of person 
is the evidence of an unjust social system in which the rights of man perpetuate this 
injustice, while political rights try to rectify, in vain, its deficiencies. Marx’s critique is 
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that rights and justice are futile concepts as they rely on a vision of society that is 
fundamentally faulty.  
Indeed, rights become relevant in conditions in which justice is not possible since the 
modes of production of the capitalist society constitute a form of injustice themselves. 
According to this conception, the relations that we establish with other persons are 
constitutive of justice. Justice is not an external principle but is intrinsic to how society 
and social relations are arranged. According to Marx, it is only in the communist society 
where class and property are abolished, that social relations will be just. In these 
circumstances, rights and justice will become obsolete. As a result, justice is about 
establishing relations regulated by the ideal of socialism and not by recognising 
individual rights.
24
 
It is only in the life of the community (a community based on the principles of 
communism) that the person can achieve actual emancipation. A just political order is 
underpinned by social arrangements in which persons are understood as ‘species 
being’ embedded within a network of equal and just social relations. In this sense, the 
Marxian critique represents a form of communitarianism, because it conceives persons 
primarily as communal beings and community as the source of a just social order. As in 
the case of Burke, the rise of a liberal conception (epitomised by the rights declarations 
of the French Revolution and US independence) prompted a critical reaction by 
theorists endorsing a conception of community and person analogous to that of 
contemporary communitarianism. The rise of liberal norms, such as universal rights, 
provoked an intellectual critical reaction of which Marx and Burke are prominent 
representatives. Both, even though from opposing perspectives, found their views on 
the idea of community as the fundamental source of legitimacy for a certain political 
order. This conception proposed an idea of person as connected with communal 
membership epitomised by Marx’s ‘species-being’ and Burke’s ‘civil social man’.  
In sharp contrast with the Kantian idea of the individual as moral agent, Marx and 
Burke’s conception produced the basis of an enduring theoretical tension between 
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liberals and communitarians that has influenced the political theory debate until the 
present time. 
2.3 Contemporary Communitarian Critique of Liberalism 
In the second half of the twentieth century, liberalism reacquired centrality in the 
political theory debate due to the contribution of scholars who proposed a revised 
version of the Kantian tradition. A Theory of Justice (1971) by John Rawls
25
 is the main 
work that reframed the debate on justice and rights in political theory
26
 revitalising the 
liberal tradition in normative public thinking.  
2.3.1 Sandel’s Critique of Rawls’s Theory of Justice: the Unencumbered Self 
The main aim of A Theory of Justice is reformulating social contract theory, without 
resorting to metaphysical or natural law principles, but rather relying on public 
reasoning and following procedures eventually leading to the achievement of fair 
principles of justice. According to the Rawlsian conception, justice is the primary virtue 
of social institutions and when applied to public life of society, it shall be based on a 
principle of fairness.
27 
In order to come to a definition of which principles should 
underpin a just society, Rawls imagines an ideal condition in which the persons 
involved agree on a set of principles to assess whether the basic institutions of a 
society are just or not.  
This ideal condition is the ‘original position’ in which rational agents agree on two main 
principles. Certain procedural restrictions guarantee the fairness of the result of this 
process. Rawls imagines that the actors involved in the ‘original position’ are behind a 
‘veil of ignorance’ that does not allow them to know their social position, wealth or 
conception of the good life.
28
 On the basis of this ‘mental experiment’ according to 
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Rawls it will be possible to establish the principles to evaluate whether a society is just 
or not. There are certain circumstances on which the ‘original position’ is based, which 
render social cooperation both possible and necessary.
29
 One main condition is that 
different persons, in general, have different conceptions of the good life. Another 
condition is that the world is characterised by a scarcity of goods. These two conditions 
are the circumstances justifying the idea of justice (as conceived in liberal theory) as 
prior to alternative ethical conceptions.  
On the basis of these conditions, the rational actors in the ‘original position’ will 
eventually agree on two principles of justice. The first requires the equal right of a 
person to enjoy as much freedom as possible without limiting the freedom of others. 
While the second principle (the ‘difference principle’) establishes that social and 
economic inequalities are justified only if they maximise the expected benefit of the 
worst-off person and when free and equal access is guaranteed to anyone for any 
social position.
30
 
Rawls’s theory provoked a lasting debate between liberals and communitarians. 
Michael Sandel presents one of the most influential critiques in Liberalism and the 
Limits of Justice.
31
  His main argument is that the priority of justice over the other virtues 
of a social order is based on implausible assumptions. The first assumption to be 
criticised is the priority of the right over the good.
32
 The second assumption is the 
conception of the self as prior and detached from its ends.
33
 
Sandel articulates his criticism mostly with reference to these two elements and 
concludes that the conception of person on which Rawls’s ‘original position’ is based is 
implausible and cannot support the conclusions that Rawls justifies by means of the 
‘original position’. The liberal conception of justice is based on a misrepresentation of 
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the self and an instrumental conception of society that undermines its validity.
34
 Sandel 
disagrees with the idea of justice taking precedence over other virtues since this 
conception is based on unrealistic presuppositions. Rawls’s objective and subjective 
circumstances of justice do not apply in a number of relevant contexts, according to 
Sandel. For example, a family, a tribe but also an established nationalism with a shared 
identity and common purpose.  Here, individuals share common ends on the basis of a 
common ethical understanding rather than being divided along different ethical 
conceptions. This is in contrast with the Rawlsian view whereby individuals in societies 
are motivated on the sole basis of self-interest and mutual cooperation, and then 
undermines the validity of the conditions under which justice (as it is conceived from his 
liberal perspective) enjoys precedence over other virtues.
35
 
Whereas social aggregation for Rawls is merely instrumental, Sandel claims that 
communities have a constitutive function and determine what justice for the members 
of the community entails.  According to communitarianism, it is as members of a 
community constitutive of our moral identity that we agree on what justice is about, and 
not as individual moral agents in an abstract ideal situation. Justice then is the 
substantiation of a particular moral belief and does not rise above different ethical 
beliefs. Liberals reply to this criticism by saying that the circumstances of justice do not 
intend to give an account of reality but rather to reproduce an ideal condition which is 
reasonable in gaining consensus on justice as fairness. 
Nevertheless, this counter-argument is not entirely convincing for Sandel who focuses 
his criticism on the conception of the person (the ‘moral subject’) underlying the 
Rawlsian ‘original position’. According to Sandel, even in the ideal conditions of 
Rawls’s ‘original position’, if the person was a rational, self-interested individual 
deprived of ethical identity through a ‘veil of ignorance’, they would not agree on the 
two principles of justice.  
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Sandel points out that for the person, as conceived in the Rawlsian ‘original position’ 
(i.e. as a moral agent capable of choosing between alternative ends and moral 
conceptions), the actual process of choosing and reasoning cannot take place. Since 
the person is deprived of ethical communal reference throughout the expedient of the 
‘veil of ignorance’ this prevents the subject adopting a substantial ethical perspective 
which in turn renders an inability to operate actual choices.
36
 
This conception of person, which Sandel calls ‘unencumbered self’,
37
 is implausible. He 
argues that a person cannot establish the principles of justice of a political order if not 
on the basis of the moral conception developed as member of an ethical community. 
According to Sandel ‘The assumptions of the ‘original position’ thus stand opposed in 
advance to any conception of the good requiring a more or less expansive self-
understanding, and in particular to the possibility of community in the constitutive 
sense.’
38
 He concludes that:  
Rawls’ conception of the person can neither support his theory of justice nor 
plausibly account for our capacity for agency and self-reflection; justice cannot be 
primary in the way deontology requires, for we cannot coherently regard ourselves 
as the sort of beings the deontological ethic requires to be.
39
 
The point then, very simply, is that the Rawlsian conception of liberal justice as fairness 
does not acknowledge sufficiently the role of the community as the definitional factor of 
the ethical principles of the person. Rawls’s theory is inconsistent; because a person in 
the ‘original position’ would not choose the principle of justice, since the ‘veil of 
ignorance’ renders them incapable of the act of choosing. What really happens behind 
the ‘veil of ignorance’ is the discovery of principles shared by other parties of the 
agreement situated in an identical condition through a process of self-understanding.
40
 
He considers the ‘original position’ a plausible idea only understood as the ‘coming to 
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self-awareness of an inter-subjective being.’
41
The inter-subjective being in question is 
the community from which we acquire our identity. It follows that justice is not prior to 
the idea of good, but is a conception of what good is, shared by the members of the 
community as the constitutive element of their identity. 
Just like Burke and Marx were critical of how the person and community were 
conceived in early declarations of rights for being individualist and disruptive of 
communal values; Sandel is critical of how the person is conceived in Rawls’s liberal 
theory in a similar way. The same criticism was raised by other influential scholars such 
as Charles Taylor and Alastair MacIntyre. 
2.3.2 Taylor’s Atomism and MacIntyre’s Virtue Ethics 
A relevant case is Taylor’s atomist critique of liberal ethics.
42
 According to Taylor, any 
social contract theory is atomist (i.e. individualist) and relies on the primacy of 
individual rights over communitarian obligations and principles of belonging. This is 
true, especially with regard to the theory of Robert Nozick
43
 on which Taylor focuses in 
his Atomism.  The primacy of rights claimed by liberals and libertarians relies, 
according to Taylor, on a misconception of the person as a self-sufficient being isolated 
from the social dimensions of life. From the atomist perspective, the person is an 
individual capable of choosing in autonomy as a self-conscious agent among different 
life plans. It is through the exercise of this capacity that the person realises their 
freedom. Thus, the recognition of rights comes as a result of the atomistic conception 
of the person in order to safeguard their nature of free, individual and capable of 
autonomous choice.  
But Taylor criticises this view, and argues that the capacities of a person and the 
possibility to develop their potential are dependent on the social components of their 
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life. It is as members of a community only that persons acquire the capacities on which 
the alleged primacy of rights is based. According to Taylor: 
The identity of the autonomous, self-determining individual requires a social 
matrix, one for instance which through a series of practices recognizes the right to 
autonomous decision and which calls for the individual having a voice in 
deliberation about public action.
44
  
Thus it is not qua individual persons that we are entitled to rights but as members of a 
liberal community in which rights are valued legitimate norms that we are entitled to as 
a recognition of rights. Taylor points out that a person develops  capacity as social 
being through processes of mutual recognition and socialisation, contrarily to the 
atomistic conception of the person according to which the individual is located above 
his or her social context. 
45
 
MacIntyre’s criticism of liberal theories of rights is delineated in After Virtue (1981)
46
 the 
main argument of which is that moral philosophy is in an age of disorder and cannot 
cope with the actual need of contemporary society since common virtues are shared as 
the basis of an ethical community. MacIntyre develops a critique of Rawls’s and 
Nozick’s theories arguing that both do not adopt any principle of desert in the 
recognition of rights to persons.
47
In these liberal conceptions there is no shared ethical 
understanding establishing a common set of virtues on which it is possible to assess 
what a person deserves from the point of view of justice. This reveals that both Rawls’s 
and Nozick’s theory are based on an individualist conception by which persons have 
different ethical views. He claims that this is the result of an age of moral decay in 
which modern society has become a ‘collection of strangers’.
48
 The main consequence 
of the permanent disagreement on different ethical conceptions is the erosion of the 
ethical community and the reinforcement of a conception of the individual, prior to and 
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independent from, a sense of communal affiliation.
49
 As a result, what we are 
witnessing in the modern age is the detachment of government and politics from the 
ethical principles of community.  
For this reason, MacIntyre argues that modern society needs to revive the idea of 
justice as the embodiment of the virtues of an ethical community. On the contrary, the 
liberal conception of justice and rights as prior to concurrent ethical conceptions
50
 is the 
result of individualist assumptions relegating the role of the community to a secondary 
level.  
In Whose Justice? Which Rationality? (1988) MacIntyre’s criticism refers to how liberal 
ethics relies on assumptions of individualist ‘impersonality’ which cannot constitute the 
foundation of a just society. According to him:  
Those conceptions of universality and impersonality which survive this kind of 
abstraction from the concreteness of traditional or even nontraditional 
conventional modes of moral thought and action are far too thin and meagre to 
supply what is needed.
51
 
MacIntyre argues that liberalism is an ethical conception that cannot justifiably claim 
priority over other ethical conceptions, but should be understood rather as a 
conventional ethical tradition, among many others, in which persons are ‘educated’ to 
be ‘liberal’. In his own words: 
To be educated into the culture of a liberal social order is, therefore, 
characteristically to become the kind of person to whom it appears normal that a 
variety of goods should be pursued, each appropriate to its own sphere, with no 
overall good supplying any overall unity to life. 
52
 
As in the previous cases, the communitarian critics of liberal political theory criticise the 
idea of the person as detached from moral traditions and then the community. 
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According to them, becoming a liberal person is not the result of abstract reasoning but 
rather the outcome of a process of socialisation within a liberal tradition.  
MacIntyre and other communitarians criticise the assumptions of liberal ethics since 
liberalism relies on the idea that a person is prior to communal bonds and can develop 
an ethical understanding in isolation from communalistic and traditional affiliations.   
Sandel, Taylor and MacIntyre have developed an influential and at times convincing 
critique of liberalism. This critique unfolds primarily at a meta-theoretical level, in which 
the object of their criticism is not liberal theory but rather its underlying assumptions 
about persons and community. Notwithstanding the different cultural and historical 
circumstances, the contemporary critique of liberalism is similar to that of Burke and 
Marx who were equally unsatisfied with how liberals conceive the person and 
community in their rights declarations. This kind of disagreement gained momentum in 
another occasion with the emergence of liberal theory in international political theory 
and international relations theory. 
2.4 Implications of Communitarianism in International Political 
Theory 
The liberal-communitarian dichotomy applies in many respects to the international 
political theory debate intended as the political theory scholarship dedicated to 
normative issues in international relations (international justice, humanitarian 
intervention, human rights and so on).
53
 There are two areas, according to Brown, in 
which the liberal-communitarian divide is manifest: the legitimacy of the international 
use of force and issues of global justice, especially human rights and the idea of global 
distributive justice.
54
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A concise overview of the debate on human rights is illustrative of how 
communitarianism is critical of liberal theory and cosmopolitanism also within the 
context of international politics. The main friction between liberal-cosmopolitan theories 
and communitarianism is obvious in the three main areas of the human rights debate: 
their foundations, the relationship of human rights with state sovereignty and the 
divergence between minimalist and extended conceptions of human rights.  
2.4.1 Communitarian Critique of Human Rights Foundationalism 
Considering that communitarians were critical of liberal theories of rights within the 
institutional framework of the state, it is not surprising that the cosmopolitan claims 
about the universal recognition of rights provoked even more radical criticism. 
MacIntyre argues that ‘It would be of course a little odd that there should be such rights 
attaching to human beings simply qua human beings’ and concludes that ‘there are no 
such rights, and belief in them is one with the belief in witches and unicorns.’
55
Taylor 
argues that an unconditional recognition of rights to human beings based on ‘the self-
sufficiency of man alone’
56
 cannot be plausible since the person exercises capacities 
(that are the basis for the recognition of rights) within a social communitarian 
environment. Brown captures the communitarian criticism of universalist human rights 
conceptions as follows:  
Liberal societies of the last 150 to 200 years have indeed been the freest and 
most generally congenial societies known to history, but not because they have 
been constructed on the basis of rights; their success has been based on features 
within them that pointed towards a different, more community and less 
individualist, context for political action. It was because of the existence of this 
context, because these societies were, in certain respects, ethical communities, 
that rights were widely honoured and respected.
57
 
The communitarian concern about the legitimacy of norms, which do not rely on an 
ethical community, applies to universal human rights which are subject to criticism 
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either for their reliance on a faulty conception of person or for the implausible idea of a 
universal liberal community.  
According to communitarians, the foundation of human rights as universal norms is 
problematic because a person can neither be an abstract individual independent from 
local communal allegiances, nor does the international context correspond to a 
universal liberal community. Since these conditions are not met, the universal 
recognition of rights to human beings leans on faulty assumptions.  
2.4.2 Communitarian-Cosmopolitan Syntheses 
Notwithstanding these divergences, as Emanuel Adler observes: ‘In light of the 
problematic dichotomy established by the debate between liberal cosmopolitans and 
communitarians, some scholars have sought a synthesis between the two 
approaches.’
58
 
The case of Andrew Linklater is a good example of liberal-communitarian mediation. 
Linklater proposes a speculation in which he reconsiders the concept of political 
community, claiming that under the influence of globalising factors this cannot be 
considered anymore as necessarily coextensive with the borders of the Westphalian 
state. Accepting part of the communitarian claims over the importance of community, 
but also emphasising the importance of universalist cosmopolitan stances, he claims 
that: 
Far from being antithetical communitarianism and cosmopolitanism provide 
complementary insights into the possibility of new forms of community and 
citizenship in the post-Westphalian era. They reveal that more complex 
associations of universality and difference can be developed by breaking the 
nexus between sovereignty, territoriality, nationality and citizenship and by 
promoting wider communities of discourse.
59
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On this basis he proposes a theory critical to realist and neo-realist conceptions of 
international relations as occurring in a-moral and anarchical systems; and claims that 
international political theory should be able to capture the dynamic evolution of the 
international political community in a ‘post-Westphalian era’.
60
 Although such a short 
account does not do justice to a more sophisticated theory, Linklater basically refers to 
the concept of ‘dialogic community’,
61
 closely related to Habermasian ethics discourse. 
He reflects on the possibility of a universal ethical discourse which may strike 
‘appropriate balances between universality and difference’
62
 thus solving the tension 
between communitarian particularistic claims and cosmopolitan universalist stances. 
Frost’s ‘constitutive theory’ of international ethics is another prominent case of liberal-
communitarian mediation in international political theory. His theory revives the 
Hegelian idea of balance between the state, community and the individual as mutually 
constitutive. It relies on a conception of the person characterised by distinctive 
communitarian features. For example he says that ‘Constitutive theory starts by 
asserting that a person only has value qua individual in a relationship of mutual 
valuation with another person or other people, i.e. within a community.’
63
 He argues that 
individuality is achieved through a dialectical process divided into three stages: the 
person as member of the family, their emancipation as an individual in civil society
64
 
and reciprocal recognition of individuals as rights holders; members of the same 
sovereign state.
65
 A fourth stage regards the recognition of the state as a sovereign 
state in the international context; if a state is not recognised as such, its citizens cannot 
be recognised as rights holders.
66
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According to this approach, then, sovereignty and rights are not antagonistic but 
mutually reinforcing norms. However, this attempt to harmonise the relationship 
between the norm of sovereignty and human rights provokes some perplexities. 
According to Frost’s critics, his notion of human rights is altered by the embedment of 
the individual in the political community. As Peter Sutch points out: 
For Frost our sense of what is to be a free individual is tied up with our sense of 
what is to be a free citizen. Our everyday claims concerning human rights or self-
determination only make sense in relation to these specific modes of existence.
67
 
This reconnects to Marx’s critique of the rights of man as opposed to the rights of 
citizens, but the problem is that in Frost’s constitutive theory, individuals have rights 
only as members of the sovereign state.
68 
This seems to alter the cosmopolitan idea of 
human rights, the meaning of which does not entirely overlap with citizens’ rights, but 
has been specifically developed to detach the idea of rights from affiliation to a specific 
social group. Thus, even though Frost may have found a possible equilibrium between 
rights and sovereignty, his critics point out that this comes at a high cost for the 
concept of human rights.  
Frost replies to his critics by clarifying that different to the traditional Hegelian 
conception, civil society is not limited by state boundaries but extends well beyond 
these: ‘Civil society must be understood as a social form, a form of human 
associational life, which can be understood independently of sovereign democratic 
state, or states.’
69
 In this way the problems raised by the co-extensive character of right 
holders and citizens are at least in part solved, becoming related to a wider social body 
that is the global civil society. 
2.4.3 Communitarian Pragmatism: Anti-Foundationalism 
Other ideas have been proposed in an attempt to solve the theoretical gap between 
communitarians and cosmopolitans. The problem of human rights’ moral foundations 
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has been addressed with what has been defined ‘communitarian pragmatism’.
70
 
Communitarian pragmatism, different to Frost’s constitutive theory and Linklater’s 
Dialogic Community, aims at a reconciliation of the particular-universal duality 
decoupling human rights from the idea of a universal foundation. Taylor, for example, 
argues that, as a condition for an ‘unforced consensus’ on human rights, ‘We would 
agree on the norms while disagreeing on why they are the right norms.’ 
71
 Leaving 
aside the moral reasons underpinning human rights, communitarian pragmatism claims 
that we can still find a shared set of norms, notwithstanding the different ethical 
backgrounds which persons may have as members of diverse communities.  
A further example of communitarian pragmatism is Richard Rorty’s anti-
foundationalism who, claiming that there is no such thing as a universal ‘human 
nature’,
72
 concludes that no morality can guarantee the universal recognition of human 
rights. He argues that by means of a ‘sentimental education’ we can enable persons to 
recognise other persons as human beings; throughout this ‘education’, the human 
rights culture will achieve wider recognition.
73
In addition to communitarian pragmatism 
and Frost’s and Linklater’s mediation attempts, the influence of communitarian theory 
on human rights can also be highlighted with reference to the later works of Rawls and 
certain aspects of David Miller’s theory of nationality. In this case, the debate focused 
not so much on the moral foundations of rights, but concentrated on which rights can 
be recognised universally and which are however limited by the boundaries of ethical 
communities like nations or ethnical identities. 
2.4.4 ‘Thin and Thick’: Minimalist Human Rights Conceptions 
Notwithstanding the fact that Rawls is among the main representatives of the liberal 
tradition, in his study dedicated to the problem of international justice he outlines a 
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theory that is inclusive of certain communitarian aspects. In the Law of Peoples he 
delineates the idea of a ‘well-ordered hierarchical people’, that is, a group of persons 
mostly characterised by a comprehensive ethical conception, but still meeting minimal 
requirements of moral ‘decency’.
74
 According to Rawls, despite the sophisticated 
procedural devices of the ‘original position’, liberals should not expect these peoples to 
abandon their comprehensive conception of the good and embrace international liberal 
principles of justice. The ‘original position’ does not apply in this context, since ‘an 
original position argument for domestic justice is a liberal idea, and it does not apply to 
the domestic justice of decent hierarchical regime.’
75
  
Rawls’s Law of Peoples acknowledges that different and non-liberal ethical 
communities constitute an irreducible limit to the universal acceptance of liberal values. 
This view resembles the communitarian conception according to which liberal 
principles cannot be extended beyond the borders of the liberal community
76
 since it is 
the liberal community itself that provides the basis for the legitimacy of its norms. 
Whereas the ‘veil of ignorance’ and the priority of the right over the good were the 
bases of domestic liberal justice (inclusive of the redistributive component justified by 
the ‘difference principle’), according to Rawls, these procedures do not apply to the 
international political context, because it lacks an overall liberal foundation. Ethical 
pluralism, in the international context, imposes more severe limitations to the effective 
application of the principles of justice that Rawls develops with reference to domestic 
political orders. His law of peoples, for this reason, reduces human rights to a minimal 
list of fundamental rights
77
 and considers distributive justice in global terms inevitably 
arbitrary. 
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Miller’s theory proposes similar considerations but links the ethical community (on 
which the recognition of rights is based) to the idea of the nation. In this case, the 
nation constitutes a community informing the ethical principles of the person. The 
responsibilities of a person are primarily connected to their affiliation to a national 
community and do not extend beyond its borders except for the most serious violations. 
The ‘ethical significance of nationality’ is the basis on which Miller argues that ‘the 
duties that we owe to our compatriots might be more extensive than the duties we owe 
to strangers, simply because they are compatriots’.
78
According to this view, our 
affiliation to a national community entails a minimalist recognition of human rights and 
limits the recognition of a complete set of rights (inclusive of those rights related to 
social and distributive justice) to the members of the same ethical community.  
The political theory debate on human rights is well alive today and the examples 
aforementioned are only a partial representation of a more articulated discussion that is 
also becoming relevant for the norms applied in the use of force in international 
relations.  The theories outlined above, nevertheless, suffice to illustrate how the 
communitarian conceptions of person and community cast their influence also in the 
international political theory debate challenging liberal universalist views. 
With reference to the debate on human rights foundations, communitarian theory 
claims that human rights enjoy legitimacy only when recognised within a particular 
ethical community and not as the result of a universal morality. Communitarian 
theorists influence the international liberal political theory debate is by showing the 
limits of its universality. According to their views, the extension of liberal norms beyond 
the borders of liberal communities is arbitrary, because the international political 
context does not provide the same conditions that can be found in domestic politics.  
Whereas, in domestic politics, norms and institutions as rights can lean on the 
existence of an ethical community as the foundation of their legitimacy; this does not 
apply to the international context because no such community exists. If it exists, its 
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moral substance, according to theorist such as Rawls, Miller and also Walzer
79
 is so 
morally ‘thin’ that it can only legitimate minimalist conceptions of human rights and 
global justice.  
2.5 Conclusions 
In a discussion of the liberal-communitarian debate Walzer claims that: 
‘communitarianism is doomed – it probably is not a terrible fate – to eternal 
recurrence.’
80
Notwithstanding the common perception of an increasingly liberal global 
order; the previous pages have shown that the political theory tradition of liberalism has 
been criticised in its philosophical and normative foundations since its inception, and 
much of this criticism remains very much alive. The examples overviewed in this 
chapter show how this criticism is symptomatic of a particular conception of the person 
and community antithetic to the liberal individualist view.
81
  
Underlying the recurrent communitarian critiques of liberalism; there is a common 
conception of the person. According to this conception, a person’s ethical principles are 
derived from membership to a community which constitute the source of identity; 
contrarily to the liberal conception where the individual, as an autonomous moral agent, 
is fully in charge of his or her life choices. These divergences over conceptions of 
person and community produce different political views. Marx and Burke are critical of 
the emergence of political norms and institutions as universal rights. Communitarians 
have highlighted how the liberal theory of Rawls is unconvincing in its assumptions and 
fails to account for the importance of communal human relations in establishing what a 
just society entails.  
A similar criticism emerges at the international political theory level, where the lack of a 
shared communal affiliation undermines the legitimacy of cosmopolitan claims about 
human rights. At this stage of the debate, communitarians and liberals have tried to 
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reconcile their views seeking a common ground as in the case of Frost or pragmatists 
such as Rorty.  
The next chapter will show how these communitarian arguments are not the sole 
prerogatives of western critics of liberal norms, but the contextualisation of the person 
within history and customs and the consequent moral value attributed to the community 
are also central tenets in the Islamist critique of liberalism. 
 Chapter 3  
 
The Islamist Critique of Liberalism 
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3.1 Introduction 
Having seen how liberalism is subject to criticism within western political theory, this 
chapter presents some influential theories of Islamism and their criticism of liberal 
norms and institutions. Islamism will be presented with reference to Muḥammad 
ʿAbduh (1849-1905), Sayid Quṭb (1906-1966), Muḥammad Bāqir al-Ṣadr (1935-1980) 
and Ruhollah Musavi Khomeini (1902-1989).
1
 These Islamist thinkers have been 
chosen for their influential role in contemporary Islamist politics; for example al-Ṣadr, 
Quṭb and Khomeini are all mentioned in the 1985 Hezbollah’s manifesto which will be 
considered in the following chapters.
2
 
Notwithstanding the differences among them and the diverse political and social 
contexts in which they operated, all of them share the idea of Islam as the exclusive 
source of a just and fair community. Whereas ʿAbduh operated in a context in which 
political engagement aimed at self-determination from colonial rule, Quṭb, al-Ṣadr and 
Khomeini were committed to recovering the Islamic communities from the rule of 
domestic autocratic regimes sponsored by foreign powers. All of them were convinced 
that the Muslim community has become morally and materially corrupt due to the 
imposition of norms and institutions originating from western liberal culture. From this it 
follows that Islam is the only source that can recover the community from its moral and 
material decay and the necessary means to achieve both spiritual and material well-
being for the person. They all envision (although in different ways) the establishment of 
an ‘Islamic system’, a social and political architecture (often vaguely defined) which on 
the basis of its Islamic inspiration guarantees justice and well-being. 
The discussion will now focus on Islamist criticism of liberal institutions and the political 
theories they theorise as alternatives. It will prepare the ground for a comparative 
analysis, proposed in Chapter 4, between the western and Islamist critiques of 
liberalism with reference to concepts of community and the person. 
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3.2 Reason and Islamic Tradition: the Reformism of Muḥammad 
ʿAbduh 
One of the consequences of colonial domination in the Middle East is the diffusion of 
liberal social, political and economic norms within a context that had remained 
substantially isolated from their rise in Europe and the USA. This inevitably affected the 
social reality of states like Egypt which passed from the rule of the Ottoman Empire to 
the control of a colonising state and eventually achieved independence (1922). The 
new situation posed questions about how the tradition of Islam could cope with the 
expansion of modern principles of government such as public administration, the 
establishment of new penal codes, judicial systems, liberal education and capitalist 
modes of production and exploitation, all diverse from the various traditional norms and 
institutions present in the region.
3
 
One of the prominent examples of Islamist scholars investigating the tension between 
modernity and Islamic ethics is Muḥammad ʿAbduh, who studied under the guidance of 
the pioneer of modern Islamism Jamāl al-Dīn al-Afghāny (1838-1897). During his life, 
he covered important public offices, such as heading a reform commission for 
education in the al-Azhar University (the oldest Islamic centre of knowledge) and 
Grand-Mufti of Egypt (the highest legal and religious authority in the country). He was 
exposed to western culture in a number of circumstances
4
 and acknowledged the 
progress of the European society compared to the backwardness of the Egyptian 
context. This experience stimulated interest in investigating the decay and resurgence 
of civilisations. Most of his work, published in an extensive number of volumes, is 
dedicated to theological issues but with implications relevant from political, legal and 
social perspectives. Nevertheless he never produced a systematic political theory.
5
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Most notably, he published a Commentary to the Qurʾān (Tafsīr al-Qurʾān) and the 
theological treatise The Message of Unity (Risālat al-Taw īd) but also took part in 
public life of the Arab world throughout the publication of articles in magazines such as 
al- anār, the leading publication of the Arabic al-Nahḍa (resurgence) movement. He 
was involved in the Egyptian nationalist movement; he endorsed the ʿArabi revolt 
against the rising British rule in Egypt in 1882 and was exiled for this reason to 
Lebanon for three years.  
3.2.1 Modernity and Tradition in a Divided Community 
According to ʿAbduh’s view, the Muslim community was living in an age of decay due 
to the domination of the Ottoman Empire, followed by the imposition of the foreign 
colonial rule. ʿAbduh was also concerned with the uncritical application of Islamic 
principles ignoring the mutated historical circumstances which were surrounding his 
community. For this reason, he not only expressed criticism towards westernisation 
(taghrīb) but criticised the lack of responsiveness of the religious and cultural 
establishment of Egypt.  Egyptian society and its political system needed to be 
reformed to be brought back to its original splendour.
6
  He advocated and partly 
implemented reform projects focussing on education and justice. The guidelines of his 
reformist project were drawn from Islamic principles such as the Islamic juridical 
tradition and references to the acts and sayings of the Prophet of Islam
7
. Innovatively, 
his approach relied on the use of reason as opposed to the uncritical imitation of 
tradition (al-taqlīd). His intellectual aim was to develop a theory which could be 
receptive, to a certain extent, of modern and liberal values; while remaining committed 
to the essence of Islamic principles (the sharīʿa), and more in general the Qurʾanic 
tradition. According to his view, Egyptian society was deeply divided. He observes:  
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I found myself in opposition to the views of the two great groups of which the 
Community is composed: the devotees of the religious sciences and the others of 
their type, and the devotees of modern techniques and their partisans.
8
 
As a consequence, his political project was dedicated to address this social divide to 
‘bridge the gulf within Islamic society, and, in so doing, to strengthen its moral roots.’
9
 
Notwithstanding his reformist views and the importance of the concept of reason, 
ʿAbduh was not an uncritical admirer of liberal institutions. He opposed the idea of a 
secularised Egyptian society and claimed that achievements similar to those of 
European societies can be attained in Egypt only by relying on a unified Islamic moral 
community.
10
 In an article advocating the reform of the education system in al-Azhar, 
ʿAbduh claims that: 
Like all other Eastern nations, Egypt constituted a religious community bounded 
together by the Shariʿa. It had built its ethics and its civilizations on religion. 
Religion is the organizing principle of all its affairs […] Moral conduct will 
disappear when religion collapses. The same thing will happen if religion is 
deformed by introducing into its core any innovations or superstitions. The nation 
will be weakened. 
11
 
The main point of ʿAbduh’s criticism against the modernising project of Egypt was that 
liberal institutions cannot be simply transposed into the Egyptian social context, since 
these would have endangered its foundations.
12
 He proposed to reform the Islamic 
moral community maintaining the commitment to fundamental principles but 
interpreting these through a prism of reason. The modernisation of Egyptian society 
and the application of liberal principles needed to be harmonised with the foundational 
principles of the Islamic community. He argued that Islam is a religion concerned with 
the welfare of its community especially with reference to the principle of masla a
13
. 
Considering the moral and material decay of the Islamic community in his time, he 
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concluded that the mere perpetuation of tradition did not do justice of the promises of 
Islam and thus must be wrong. It is the application of Islamic ethics combined with the 
use of reason that eventually brings about the renewal of the Islamic moral community, 
and it is only on this basis that the Egyptian society can achieve progress and well-
being.
14
 But to what extent reason can actually reshape the application of Islamic 
principles in a more modern and liberal fashion, it is not clear in ʿAbduh’s theory. 
Nadav Safran notes: 
ʿAbduh refrained from basing man’s freedom on any ontological principle and 
founded it on a semiagnostic, pragmatic consciousness in order to avoid the 
complications in which the Mu‘tazilah became involved. In so doing he liberated 
man from the shackles of traditional religion, reaffirmed more emphatically man’s 
moral responsibility and dealt a blow to the spirit of passiveness.
15
 
Safran’s view is only partially convincing; although is true that ʿAbduh expanded the 
freedom of the individual to reinterpret its ethical principles through reason; he was an 
assertor of the sovereignty of God ( ākimiyat  llah). ʿAbduh was convinced that a 
sensible use of reason and an enlightened application of Islamic ethics would converge 
on progress and well-being harmoniously. Individual reason, public interest and the role 
of the rulers would be guided by a unifying common ethical sense that he defines as al-
raʾy al-ʿamm the ‘public opinion’.
16 
 
Notwithstanding, in cases of conflict between Islamic principles and reason, the priority 
has to be given to the ethical principles of Islam. Thus, a fairer assessment of ʿAbduh’s 
theory would conclude that, although he seems to support a liberal idea of individual 
free will and freedom, this is curbed by the limits imposed by his membership to the 
Islamic community. Conflicts between reason and Islam are, according to ʿAbduh, due 
to the incapacity of individual or collective reason to appreciate aspects of the prophetic 
revelation. As Malcolm Kerr points out, in ʿAbduh’s theory ‘the Divine Law makes up for 
the deficiencies in human nature. It confirms reason and lends certainty to its 
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conclusions when reason is right, and corrects and supplements it where it has been 
misguided.’
17
 Even though reason has an important role in ʿAbduh’s theory, its use is 
still embedded within Islamic ethics which establishes its moral orientation.
18
 
3.2.2 Limits to Individual Reason: al-shūrā and al-ijmāʿ 
ʿAbduh qualified the concept of reason arguing not only that the collective interests of 
the community represents a limitation to individual will, but also that community is the 
ultimate source of Islamic ethical principles. Following Kerr’s analysis
19
 of ʿAbduh’s 
theory, let us consider two examples showing how the Islamic moral community 
represents the ultimate reference for a just political order in ʿAbduh’s thought. These 
examples refer to two principles of Islamic ethics and jurisprudence: al-shūrā 
(consultation) and al-ijmāʿ (consensus). 
The concept of ijmāʿ is interpreted by ʿAbduh in a modernist way that revises its more 
traditional conception and incorporates the role of reason. Traditionally the concept is 
based on the  adīth
20
: ‘My community will never agree upon an error’
21
 and, accordingly, 
ʿAbduh claims that what is agreed among the members of the Muslim community is 
always ethically right. It is on this basis that Sunni Islamism
22
 claims that the moral 
righteousness of the community entails its well-being and progress.
23
 However, ʿAbduh 
was puzzled by the fact that the Muslim community was in fact in a condition of moral 
and material decay hence something must have been wrong in its collective 
consensual judgements. For this reason, he criticises the traditional conception of 
ijmāʿ. He claims that the concept is not a dogmatic and ahistorical truth to be derived 
exclusively from the imitation of the life of the Prophet of Islam, but corresponds to the 
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idea that the collective consensus of knowledgeable persons on an uncertain issue 
brings about legal decisions consistent with the Islamic revelation facilitating the 
progress of society.
24
 The uncritical and literal application of the prophetic tradition is as 
problematic as an indiscriminate use of reason that does not takes into account the 
Islamic revelation. The fact that this traditionalist interpretation of ijmāʿ is misleading is 
shown by the fact that it does not support a community’s welfare (masla a) but rather 
perpetuates its backwardness. He then proposes an interpretation in which collective 
consensus is achieved within a group of religious scholars trained in religious exegesis 
(ijtihād ).
25
 This for ʿAbduh is the correct interpretation of ijmāʿ and should prevail over 
both literal traditionalism and a use of reason which does not take into account the 
principles of Islam. 
The second limitation to individual reason and consequently to moral agency, is the 
principle of consultation: al-shūrā. According to this traditional Islamic principle, the 
individual cannot ‘rise above the desires, ambitions, and personal inclinations with 
which he is surrounded, even should he have the will to do so except through the 
cooperation with others.’
26
 The person shall take into account not only individual will 
and reason, but also consult and cooperate with the general interest of the community. 
This principle and its importance in the thought of ʿAbduh can also explain why he was 
critical of the imposition of the Ottoman Tanzimat and European liberal institutions onto 
the Egyptian society without cooperating with the local society. Indeed, ʿAbduh argued 
that the Islamic community can be reformed successfully only from within, consulting 
with its members and in particular its scholars trained in the Islamic disciplines.
27
 The 
shūrā principle also leads to the consideration of the idea of a just political order since it 
not only applies to individuals but also to the ruler, who should consult with his 
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community when making decisions. It then represents a limitation of his power. In more 
recent times, it is also on the basis that certain strands of Islamism claimed the 
legitimacy of democratic political institutions from an Islamic perspective comparing the 
principle of consultation with the electoral consultation typical of democratic 
processes.
28
 ʿAbduh argues that, even though the head of the executive power must be 
a Muslim and legislation shall be based on the respect of the sharīʿa, neither the ruler 
enjoys a privileged relationship with God nor has he a preeminent position in the 
community of the believers in religious terms.
29
 If the head of the government 
implements policies at odds with Islamic principles, he must consult with the Islamic 
community and in consultation, rectify these decisions. In this regard, Kerr points out 
that ʿAbduh’s conception of the political order are closer to a ‘divine-law nomocracy’ 
rather than a theocracy.
30
 
ʿAbduh’s theory relies widely on the idea of the Islamic community and its importance 
as the necessary element underpinning a thriving reformist project. The person, an 
individual capable of autonomous thinking, shall take into consideration the interests 
and the teaching of the Islamic ethical community no matter whether he is the ruler of 
the community or simply a member. ʿAbduh’s interpretations of ijmāʿ and shūrā 
exemplify the idea of combining reason with traditional Islamic principles and confirm 
the Islamist character of his political and social theory. Leonard Binder notes, with 
reference to ʿAbduh’s conceptions of ijmāʿ and ijtihād, that ‘according to the Sunni 
view, the Islamic community remained divinely guided, not by caliphs so much as 
through the immanence of divine will in that community itself.’ 
31
 Thus, not only Islamic 
principles have the last word on issues that cannot be determined forthrightly, but 
ʿAbduh also resorts to the Islamic vocabulary when theorising the ideal moral order of 
the community and substantially revisits its traditional meaning. 
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The role of the community as guaranteeing the moral righteousness of its members 
and its political structure is also noted by Charles Adams. Reporting ʿAbduh’s 
commentary to a sūra
32
 of the Qurʾān, Adams observes that according to ʿAbduh ‘no 
people can exist as an independent entity unless there be some bond that binds them 
together and gives them unity, so that they become a living community, as though they 
were a single body.’
33
  
ʿAbduh’s contribution to Islamist political theory then can be described as that of a 
moderniser concerned with the reunification of the Islamic community under its 
traditional unity throughout the incorporation of a modern and, to a certain extent, 
liberal conception of reason. He proposed the revision of traditional norms and 
institutions of Islam in light of new social conditions which were emerging in Egypt as a 
reaction to the impact of western rule. His theory will be greatly influential and will 
produce a number of followers trying to harmonise the relationship between modernity, 
its liberal foundations and Islam.
34
 
3.3 The Radicalisation of Islamist Theory: Sayid Quṭb 
Two main ideological trends gained central importance as a reaction to western 
domination in the Middle East. The first is nationalism, epitomised in Egypt by the 
establishment of the al-Wafd (the Delegation) party inspired by liberal principle.
35
 The 
second is Islamism, which became a politically and socially organised reality with the 
foundation of the Society of the Muslim Brothers (Jāmʿa al-Ikhwan al- uslimīn) in 
1928. 
In the nationalist and independent struggle, freedom and political legitimacy were 
attached to the independence of the nation, whereas the Islamic component seemed to 
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only have secondary importance.
36
 Egyptian nationalism leaned towards liberal ideals, 
which it failed to deliver.
37
Islamism, however, critical towards the influence of western 
liberalism and concerned with the re-establishment of an Islamic community, 
developed an increasingly self-referential character. The main thinker and political 
activist in this field was one of ʿAbduh’s students Rashīd Riḍa (1865-1935) whose 
intellectual circle was frequented by Ḥasan al-Bannā (1906-1949) the founder of the 
Muslim Brotherhood.
38
 In the subsequent decades, the Brotherhood was subject to a 
pattern of radicalisation which culminated in the Sixties with the figure of Sayid Quṭb 
whose thought and execution by the Nasserite regime will be the seed for the rise of 
Islamist factions such as Islamic Jihad, al-Takfīr wa al-Hijra and al-Qāʿida.
39 
 
Part of this process was in connection with the emergence of similar transnational 
patterns of radicalisation taking place in other Muslim societies. A particularly relevant 
figure, which influenced the Islamist political debate in the Arab Middle East whose 
intellectual contribution cannot addressed herein, was Abu ʿAla al-Mawdudi (1903-
1979) in Pakistan, who had contacts especially through his students also with Islamist 
activists as Quṭb and was the founder of the Jamat-e-Islami the main Islamist political 
organisation in Pakistan.
40
  
3.3.1 Quṭb’s Early Intellectual Stage 
Quṭb’s theory is neither linear nor systematic but unfolds in a pattern of progressive 
radicalisation culminating during his detention period in the Egyptian gaols (1954-
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1964).
41
 His earlier intellectual production is dedicated to literary criticism and the study 
of aesthetics and includes an autobiographical story Child from the Village, (1946) 
reporting his modest origins from the Egyptian rural region.
42
 Ibrahim Abu-Rabiʿ notices 
this formative period is an integral part of Quṭb’s intellectual formation.
43
 In 1948 he 
undertook a two year visit to the United States where he attended courses in education 
and English.
44
 This experience deepened his criticism of western society on the basis of 
his observations of US lifestyle and culture. During or soon after this time abroad, Quṭb 
began to work on social and political topics along with the study of the Qurʾān. A few 
months after his return to Egypt, he developed closer ties with the Muslim Brotherhood, 
with which he will become associated in the 1950s.
45
 Social Justice in Islam (1949) is 
his first publication dedicated to political and social questions.
46
 Quṭb published several 
revised versions of this book and, as William Shepard notes, each of these is indicative 
of the radicalisation of his views.
47
 
3.3.2 Social Justice in Islam 
Quṭb argues that justice, and in particular social justice, can only be achieved by 
establishing an Islamic moral community. His theory relies on the principle that a just 
political order can only be founded on the precepts of Islam which is conceived as a 
complete and self-sufficient ethical system. As he says: ‘Islam has one universal theory 
which covers the universe and life and humanity, a theory in which are integrated all 
different questions; in this Islam sums up all its beliefs, its laws and statutes, and its 
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modes of worship and work.’
48
 
 
Thus, Islamic justice means justice in a material as well 
as spiritual sense and recognises what is owed to the person as well as what is owed 
to God. 
Differently from the more receptive attitude of ʿAbduh (who was sympathetic towards 
certain liberal aspects), influences that are not authentically Islamic are criticised by 
Quṭb, thus highlighting the self-referential stance of his political conception.
49
 Most of 
his discussion of Islamic social justice relies on a comparison with European society 
and the communist conception of justice. Western liberalism and communism are seen 
as morally flawed from an Islamic point of view because they only prove the need of 
the person exclusively in material terms.
50
 
The principles of social justice, according to Quṭb, are absolute freedom of conscience 
(limited by the exclusive and incontestable sovereignty of God) human equality 
(including a certain understanding of gender equality)
51
, and mutual responsibility in 
society. This last principle entails a limitation of individual freedom especially when 
conflicting with the interest of the community towards which the individual is 
responsible for its welfare.
52
 The concept of social responsibility (al-takāful al-ijtmʿaī) in 
Islam according to Quṭb establishes the priority of the community over the freedom of 
the individual. As he says: 
There can be no decent life if every individual seeks to enjoy his absolute freedom 
without limit, nourished by his awareness of the absolute liberation of his inward 
soul from all pressure and absolute equality unlimited by any ties or conditions, for 
such an awareness is guaranteed to destroy both society and the very individual. 
Society has higher interest which must limit the freedom of the individual, and it is 
in the individual’s own interest to have definite limits to his enjoyment of freedom.
53
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In his theory then, social justice is the result of a harmonious cooperation among the 
members of the Islamic community based on the implementation of Islamic principles 
that, although acknowledging a degree of individual freedom, privilege the general well-
being of the community. The analysis then proposes a review of the Qurʾanic principles 
that regulate justice in Islam especially with reference to the practice of almsgiving to 
which Quṭb refers to as source for social redistribution.
54 
  
Social Justice in Islam is also the first publications in which he outlines his conception 
of an Islamic political system. According to this account, Islam represents a political 
system which, although resembling certain western institutions, is self-sufficient in its 
political structure and does not rely on external sources.
55
 He does not mention the 
Caliphate and points out that the Prophet did not nominate anybody as a descendent.
56
 
The main role of a ruler in Quṭb’s theory is guaranteeing the justice of the community 
considering the opinion of its members thus referring to the shūrā principle. He also 
declares that the relationship of the ruler with God is equal to that of other Muslims. All 
Muslims (including the ahl al-dhimma) are entitled to the same rights. Quṭb stresses the 
egalitarianism of Islamic political theory along with its foundation on a common moral 
conscience, and its universal applicability. Furthermore, whenever the ruler does not 
guarantee the respect of Islamic justice or is not guided by the principles of Islam his 
subjects have the right not to recognise his authority. His theory fundamentally relies 
on the concept of ‘sovereignty of God’ ( ākymiyat  llah) which he develops further in 
his later works and to which he opposes the blasphemous idea of the sovereignty of 
man. As he says:  
The theory of government in Islam is based on the testimony (shahādah) that 
there is no god but God, and when one confesses that divinity belongs to God 
alone he hereby confesses that sovereignty ( ākymiyyah) in human like belongs 
to God alone; and God (S) exercises sovereignty in human life on one hand by 
directly controlling human affairs by His will and determination (qadar) and on the 
other hand by establishing the basic order of human life and human rights and 
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duties and relationships and mutual obligations by His Shari‘ah and program 
(manhaj). Any other theory would be idolatry (shirk) and unbelief (kufr).
57
 
At this stage, he also characterises jihād primarily as a defensive activity,
58
 in this 
respect he will develop more radical views later in his life. Quṭb’s discussion proceeds 
with the analysis of more technical economic aspects and, having outlined a brief 
history of Islamic political systems, concludes with a reflection over its contemporary 
condition. He observes that: 
Islamic society today is not Islamic in any true sense. […] In our modern society 
we do not judge by what Allah has revealed; the basis of our economic life is 
usury;
59
 our laws permit rather than punish oppression; the poor tax is not 
obligatory, and is not spent in the requisite ways. We permit the extravagance and 
the destitution of which the Messenger once said: whatever people anywhere 
allow a man to go hungry, they are outside the protection of Allah, the blessed and 
exalted.
60
 
This criticism widely echoes ʿAbduh’s concern of a divided and morally declining 
Muslim community also to be found in the rest of Islamist theory. The sense of a lost 
Islamic morality in the Egyptian society will subsequently become one of the 
fundamental aspects of Qutbist thought.  
Quṭb considers the influence of western culture as the main cause for the decay of the 
Islamic community and criticises the Arab ‘liberal thinkers and accurate scholars’
61
 who 
facilitated this process.  
3.3.3 Critique of Modernity in ‘the West’ and in the Muslim Society 
Quṭb generally criticised capitalism and Marxism as only partially providing for the well-
being of the person. As Abu-Rabiʿ points out, Quṭb shows his dissatisfaction with 
capitalism because of its individualism and the attribution of an absolute freedom to the 
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person. According to Quṭb: ‘The capitalist system emerged on the basis of 
emancipating the individual, making of individual freedom an ideal, and giving the 
upper hand to individual interests.’
62
 He explains that the emergence of individualism 
and capitalism was as a result of the withdrawal of the Christian church from public life 
due to the affirmation of secularism in the western society. On this basis, he also 
directs his criticism towards the Kemalist revolution in Turkey, which he considers the 
sign of how modern liberal principles are penetrating the Islamic community, 
undermining its moral foundations.
63
 Quṭb’s concern is that this process will eventually 
lead to the same decadence as witnessed in the West. 
As regards Marxism, Quṭb’s criticism is related to its materialism and the conception of 
man as exclusively entangled in relations of an economic nature thus neglecting 
spiritual life. Materialist ideologies, in his view, reduce human well-being to a material 
dimension, whereas Islam guarantees spiritual well-being mediating a relationship with 
God which is absent in liberal and communist societies.
64
  
Another aspect of his criticism is directed towards the Islamic clergy in Egypt. His idea 
is that ‘the way to establish the rule of Allah on earth is not to give some consecrated 
people - the priests- the authority to rule, as was the case with the rule of the Church, 
nor to appoint some spokesmen of Allah as rulers, as is the case in a “theocracy”.’ 
65
 
Along with the rise of liberalism and socialism, Quṭb considered the subservience of the 
Islamic religious establishment as another factor bringing about the moral decay of the 
Islamic community. 
3.3.4 Quṭb’s Radicalisation: Jāhiliyya 
In one of his most influential publications, Quṭb begins by claiming that:  
                                               
62
 Quṭb in Al-Islām wa Mushkilat al-Ḥaḍāra [Islam and the Problem of Civilisation], quoted in  Abu-Rabiʿ, Origins 
of Islamic Resurgence p. 160. 
63
  ibid., pp. 143-4. 
64
  ibid., pp. 159-60. 
65
 Sayyid Quṭb, Milestones, trans. M.M. Siddiqui (Indianapolis: American Trust, 1990) p. 40. 
71 
 
Humanity today is standing on the brink of an abyss, not because of the threat of 
annihilation hanging over his head –for this is just a symptom of the disease and 
not the disease itself- but because humanity is bankrupt in the realm of “values”, 
those values which foster true human progress and development.
66 
 
Milestones (1964) is the publication in which he presented his most radical views.
67
 The 
book is in three parts;
68
 the first is captured by the quotation above and criticises 
contemporary society as affected by moral decay resorting to Islamic traditional 
terminology. The key term is jāhiliyya which literally means ‘ignorance’. In Islamic 
scholarship this term identifies the historic period preceding the revelation of the 
Qurʾān and refers to a lack of knowledge of the message of Islam as revealed to the 
Prophet Mohammad.
69
 Quṭb projects the meaning of this term onto contemporary 
circumstances of modern Egyptian society. The main manifestation of this condition is 
that human beings are subject to the sovereignty of other human beings, whereas the 
fundamental predicament of an Islamic system (al-niẓām al-islāmῑ) is  ākimiyat  llāh 
that it is the ‘sovereignty of God’. Having replaced the sovereignty of God with the 
sovereignty of man, the community fell in moral decay and, notwithstanding the 
material progress of western societies; its moral status is that of ignorance.  
A fundamental distinction emerges within the society between the believer and the 
apostate (kāfir) who has abandoned or betrayed the faith in Islam to embrace the false 
gods of modernity. In this respect, Quṭb sees a relevant portion of the Muslim 
community falling into apostasy (kufr). 
The second part of Milestones is dedicated to the methodology (manhaj) throughout 
which the society of jāhiliyya can be reconverted into the authentic Islamic moral 
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community. An Islamic community is the only basis that can guarantee the justice and 
welfare of the person by establishing an Islamic order (al-niẓām al-islāmῑ). Two key 
concepts are at the core of this methodology: hijra and jihād. The first refers to the idea 
that the most pious members of the Muslim community within the modern society need 
to isolate and migrate (hijra)
70
 to rebuild a ‘vanguard community’ based on the 
leadership of God and the teachings of the Prophet as they were understood when he 
was alive.
71
 This experience of isolation from the society of jāhiliyya allows the 
vanguard to acquire its moral Islamic status and then, in a gradual manner, returns to 
the society to promote the establishment of the al-niẓām al-islāmῑ (Islamic order).
 72
 
Two procedures can be legitimately implemented to establish al-niẓām al-islāmῑ: jihād 
bil-saīf (struggle through the sword) and jihād bil- ujja wal-lisān (struggle through 
argumentation and language). Quṭb explains, not without contradictions, that jihād is of 
a defensive nature but this does not mean passive acceptance of the status quo. 
Whenever social and political circumstances hamper the possibility of the person to 
embrace and practice Islam, this legitimises jihād in its more radical meaning. Jāhiliyya, 
in which the sovereignty of man over other men replaces the sovereignty of God, 
corresponds to this kind of circumstance thus justifying jihād. According to Quṭb: 
When they have no such freedom, then it becomes incumbent upon Muslims to 
launch a struggle through individual preaching as well as by initiating an activity 
movement to restore their freedom, and to strike hard at all those political powers 
that force people to bow to their will and authority, defying the commandments of 
Allah, and denying people the freedom to listen to the message of Islam, and to 
accept it even when they wish to do so. After annihilating the tyrannical force, 
whether political or racial tyranny, or domination of one class over the other within 
the same race, Islam establishes a new social, economic and political system in 
which all men and women enjoy real freedom.
73
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The practice of jihād is, thus, legitimate not only in the form of predication but also 
through social activism. The aim of jihād, nonetheless, is not the forceful imposition of 
religious belief over other persons since the Qurʾān clearly states that there is no 
compulsion in religion. Jihād bil-saif might be applied against the apostates (kuffar) 
according to Quṭb, but its main task is creating the conditions by which Islam can be 
freely announced and practiced as the human being is only free in these 
circumstances. The first stage for the vanguard community, before resorting to any 
other means, is predicating Islam and its values within the society, and not to 
undertake premature actions. This aspect remains ambiguous. Quṭb will eventually 
become the mind of a secret organisation allegedly related to the Brotherhood and 
found in possession of weapons (although the purpose of the arms remains obscure) 
and his involvement in this activity will eventually lead to his second arrest and 
subsequent execution.
74
 
The third part of Milestones is related to the final aim of the process of reconversion 
from jāhiliyya to Islam that is the establishment of al-niẓām al-islāmῑ. Quṭb eventually 
called for the establishment of an Islamic political order (al-niẓām al-islāmῑ) on the basis 
of what he already theorised in Social Justice in Islam. The structure of this system is 
outlined only vaguely, also because Quṭb did not think that its realisation would have 
taken place in the near future. The fundamental principle on which it relies is the 
‘sovereignty of God’ ( ākimiyat  llāh) to which everyone is subject including the ruler.
75
 
This concept is rather obscure in its actual meaning and provoked several discussions 
about its interpretation.
76
 Quṭb considered  ākymiya as the ‘exclusive prerogative of 
God who alone is qualified to fashion principles appropriate to the proper functioning of 
a social, political and economic order.’
77
 On the basis of this principle, the ruler of an 
Islamic political system would have derived the legitimacy of his rule from applying the 
principles of Islam given by God (primarily the sharīʿa). If this condition is missing, no 
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obedience is due to the ruler because he is not acknowledging the sovereignty of God. 
An Islamic political system can take any form or institutional arrangement so long as it 
acknowledges the priority of God’s law over any alternative principle. According to 
Quṭb, the election of the ruler is acceptable but it is not this which confers legitimacy to 
him, but the fact that the he abides to the principles of sharīʿa when exercising his 
authority.
78
 
This conceptualisation of an Islamic political system, although vague, constitutes a 
basis for opposition to the Nasserite regime which was harshly repressive towards 
Islamists. The radicalisation of Quṭb’s theory (especially of jihād) and its advocacy for 
the foundation of an Islamic political system deteriorated the relationship with the 
government who arrested and executed him with the charge of being involved in armed 
activity against the regime and for being part of a secret organisation linked with the 
then outlawed Muslim Brotherhood.
 79
  
Quṭb’s ideas of Islamic social justice, his criticism of contemporary society as jāhiliyya, 
his manhaj (method) including hijra, jihād and the aim of establishing an Islamic system 
(al-niẓām al-islāmῑ) became the central tenets of Islamist thought in the entire region 
after his death. His execution rendered his message even more powerful elevating him 
to the status of martyr (shahīd) becoming an example for many to follow.
80
 
3.4 The Case of Shiʿī Islamism: Muḥammad Bāqir al-Ṣadr 
Quṭb’s critique of contemporary society spread widely in the entire region and beyond, 
including in Iraq which, similar to Egypt, was under an authoritarian regime and, under 
Saddam Hussein, witnessed the rise and repression of Sunni as well as Shiʿī Islamist 
groups.  
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A branch of the Muslim Brotherhood was active in the country gathering consensus 
mainly among Sunnis, but the experience of the Brotherhood and the teachings of Quṭb 
were influential also in the mobilisation of the Shiʿī community in the southern region. 
Interestingly, it was ʿAbd al-Salām ʿArif, a post-monarchy Iraqi ruler, who asked to 
Nasser to pardon Quṭb on occasion of his first arrest in 1964 thus confirming how his 
influence was far reaching.
81
 The most prominent Islamist organisation which emerged 
out of the Shiʿī mobilisation was Ḥizb al-Dʿawa (the Party of the Call);
82
 founded in 
Najaf in 1958 following the fall of the monarchy. As Faleh Abdul-Jabar claims: ‘the first 
sources of indoctrination for the Dʿawa’s activists were drawn from the works of 
Egyptian thinkers like Hassan El-Banna, Sayid Qutb, Muhammad Al-Ghazali and 
others.’
83
 As we will see in Chapter 5, some of the members of Dʿawa migrated to 
Lebanon under duress of Saddam Hussein’s repression and constituted the first 
nucleus of Hezbollah with the support of Iran.   
The key intellectual figure of the Dʿawa was Muḥammad Bāqir al-Ṣadr (1935-1980) 
whose thoughts had major influence also in the theorisation of the Wilāyat al-Fāqih (the 
Governance of the Jurisprudent) which later emerged in Iran.
84
 Al-Ṣadr received a 
classical religious education provided in the  awza system of Najaf,
85
 the renowned 
Shiʿī cultural centre of Iraq and, eventually, his intellectual and religious leadership 
brought him to the highest rank in the Shiʿī clerical hierarchy i.e. Ayatollah.
86
 Different 
from the traditional religious establishment of Najaf, which was prevalently quietist, Al-
Ṣadr was a keen political activist. 
He took part in the foundation of the Dʿawa, the primary concern of which was the 
promotion of Islamic values within the Shiʿī community of Iraq and beyond. Al-Ṣadr 
published extensively in cultural magazines of the Society of the ʿUlamāʾ (Jāmaʿat al-
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ʿUlamāʾ) often in collaboration with another notable Shiʿī intellectual: Muḥammad 
Ḥusayn Faḍlallah
87
 
 
who will later have a central role in Lebanon and nearby region 
(see Section 5.4).
88
 His relationship with the religious establishment of the  awza in 
Najaf was nonetheless problematic. After an internal dissent with the leadership of the 
Society of the ʿUlamāʾ he took distance from it, and while ascending the religious 
hierarchy of marjʿaiyya he isolated himself from political activism since a direct political 
role was considered incompatible with religious leadership.
89
 Notwithstanding this, most 
of the Dʿawa sympathisers kept looking at him as a guide and, contextually with the 
Iranian revolution, his opposition to Saddam Hussein’s regime became manifest along 
with his support for regime change in Iran.
90
 
3.4.1 Al-Ṣadr’s Islamist Critique of Capitalism and Socialism 
Al-Ṣadr published three main works: Our Philosophy (1959), Our Economics (1961), 
and Islam Leads Life (1979).
91
 Our Economics is one of the most popular and is an 
extensive inquiry in which he criticises both capitalist and socialist models and 
theorises an Islamic economic system. The work shares the same topics and approach 
discussed by Quṭb in Social Justice in Islam.
92
 Nonetheless, as Chibli Mallat claims, al-
Ṣadr’s work enjoys a higher qualitative standard compared to that of Quṭb.
93 
In Our 
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Philosophy the substance of the argument is analogous to Quṭb’s, but al-Ṣadr’s 
criticism towards capitalism and communism unfolds philosophically with reference to 
authors such as Marx, Kant and Locke.  
The prologue of Our Philosophy echoes the words of Quṭb on the concept of jāhiliyya 
and, more generally, the Islamist concern on the integrity of the Muslim community: 
After the Muslim world fell into the hands of colonialists, a stream of Western 
thought based on these colonialists’ cultural principles and notions concerning the 
universe, life and society swept through it. This helped colonialism gain continuous 
ideological expansion in the battle it launched to abolish the existence of the 
Muslim nation [Umma] and the secret of its nobility of descent represented in 
Islam.
94
 
Al-Ṣadr shares the sense of decay of the Islamic community which already was 
denounced by other Islamists and in Our Philosophy the aim is to restore the primacy 
of Islamic thought over the influence of western capitalist and communist theories. This 
is also the principle motivating his activism in the Dʿawa, the ultimate aim of which was 
to establish an Islamic polity over the Islamic community and rule according religious 
revelations of Islam. As he says:  
The Islamic state has two functions. The first is to educate mankind in accordance 
with the [its] ideological principle, and to impress its own character on their 
tendencies and feelings. The second is to observe them externally, and to bring 
them back to the principle if they deviate from it in practice.
95
 
Al-Ṣadr’s argument, then, follows the Islamist canon outlined with reference to ʿAbduh 
and Quṭb. He argues that capitalist democratic systems and communist ideology are 
based on a materialist conception of the person to which he directs his criticism. 
Starting from premise widely resembling the Hobbesian state of nature he claims that 
human coexistence requires ‘guidance and organization.’
96
 According to al-Ṣadr, social 
theories share a common quest about: ‘which system is good for human beings and 
provides them with a happy social life?’
97
 He reviews four possible answers to this 
question which he classifies as democratic capitalism, socialism, communism and the 
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Islamic system. Only the latter can be successful in guaranteeing guidance and 
happiness for human beings.  According to al-Ṣadr: ‘Capitalistic democracy is based on 
unlimited confidence in the individual, and in the fact that the individual’s personal 
interests naturally ensure the interests of the society in various areas.’
98
 However, this 
assumption is not realistic; capitalist democracy fails to deliver promises of well-being, 
according to al-Ṣadr, because materialism does not promote any particular ethical or 
metaphysical view but focuses on the material well-being of the person: 
Because the capitalistic system was filled with the spirit of materialism, morality 
was removed from the picture. It was nowhere to be found in the system. Put more 
correctly, its notions and criteria underwent a change. The individual interest was 
declared as the highest objective, and all kinds of freedom as means for fulfilling 
that kind of interest. This resulted in most of the severe trials, catastrophes, 
tragedies and misfortunes that the modern world has experienced.
99
  
Al-Ṣadr’s criticism of capitalist democracy incorporates aspects echoing the Marxian 
critique of capitalism, pointing out how the system facilitated the polarisation between 
rich and poor throughout an unlimited recognition of the right to property. Rather than 
being genuinely democratic, al-Ṣadr argues, the capitalist system represents a rule of 
the elite and not of the people. If the problem with capitalist democracy is materialist 
individualism, materialism in the case of communism has the opposite effect. The 
person, abandon their self-interest, and is assimilated within an undistinguished social 
aggregate. Although the same criticism could be directed towards his own theory, al-
Ṣadr argues that individual freedom would be completely denied in socialism. In his 
own words:  
Even if the individual acquires full insurance and social security for his life and 
needs because the social wealth supplies him with all of this at the time of need, 
nevertheless, it would be better for him to obtain this insurance without losing the 
breath of righteous freedom, without melting away in fire as person, and without 
drowning in a stormy social sea.
100
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This is why Jabar considers al-Ṣadr a ‘liberal Islamist’ especially if compared to other 
Islamist thinkers.
101
 Nonetheless, this assessment is only partially convincing. Also in 
the case of ʿAbduh, the person was recognised a degree of individual freedom but the 
limitations related to Islamic ethics seriously compromise the possibility of looking at 
Islamism as a form of liberalism.  Islamism is characterised by a substantial ethical 
conception, whereas liberalism aims to be neutral towards all the conceptions of the 
good, rendering the idea of Islamist liberalism contradictory. 
In addition to this, al-Ṣadr observes that the coincidence between collective and 
individual interests, which he understands as the core of communist theory, is a 
utopian view that cannot be possible without religious guidance. He believes that both 
the democratic-capitalist and communist systems are utopic and do not reach their 
actual ends. Contrarily to this, the Islamic system (al-niẓām al-Islāmῑ) historically 
existed during the life of the Prophet Muḥammad, thus being realistically achievable. 
For its achievement, it is necessary for a modification of the conception of human life: 
Islam established a system in which the individual is not considered as a 
mechanical tool in the social system, nor society as an organization established 
for the sake of the individual. Rather, it gave to each –the individual and society- 
their rights and insured the individual both his spiritual and material dignity.
102
 
According to this view, the Islamic system would promote a form of public morality on 
the basis that: ‘Human beings begin to appreciate moral values and the ideals that 
religion teaches them to respect’ 
103
 thus harmonising the interests of the individual with 
the collective interests of the Islamic community. His conception of the person as an 
individual socially bound to the Islamic community sharing its ethical principles 
reproduces the conception according to which the person develops their ethical 
understanding, not as an isolated individual, but as part of the Islamic community. As in 
communitarian theory, it is the constitutive value of the community that informs the 
ethical identity of the person and harmonises the conflict between personal and 
communal interests.  
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3.4.2 Al-Ṣadr’s Ideal of an Islamic System: the Wilāyat al-Faqῑh 
Different from the case of Sunni Islamism, Shiʿī Islamism developed a more defined 
conception of Islamic polity reflecting the theory outlined above, but also 
institutionalising certain aspects of traditional clerical hierarchy typical of Shiʿism. Al-
Ṣadr presents the institutional architecture of an Islamic state in the same months in 
which the Iranian Islamic revolution was unfolding.
104
 He provides an exegesis of a 
verse of the Qurʾān (5. 44), which refers to a story of Jewish people asking for 
judgement over a contentious issue. The Prophet replies that the Jews should apply 
their own law as God dictated in the Torah and then indicates judicial-religious 
hierarchy to which al-Ṣadr refers to as a source in theorising a political order. 
According to al-Ṣadr’s interpretation, however, at the top of the hierarchy is the 
judgement of the prophets, second there is that of the Imams
105
 and, at the third level, 
there are the religious jurisprudents. Al-Ṣadr interprets this hierarchy as the source of a 
constitutional hierarchical system. The Prophet of Islam is not there anymore and, after 
the disappearance of the twelfth Imam, the Islamic community has been deprived of 
the guidance of the rightly guided Imams until the Imām al-Mahdī will reappear. 
Responsibility in administering justice, then, falls onto the third category: the 
mujtahid
106
, who achieved his title in Islamic Shiʿī schools ( awza) such as those of 
Qum (Iran) and Najaf (Iraq).
107
  
Those mujtahidūn achieving higher prominence through a large following in Shiʿism 
attained the qualification of marjʿa
108
 or grand-ayatollah (ayatu-Allāh al-ʿuẓmā). The 
institution of marjʿaiyya (that is the religious leadership of the marjʿa) assumes in Shiʿī 
Islamism a political connotation. According to this view, the marjʿa, from being the head 
of a juridical-religious hierarchy, becomes ‘the objective criterion to the community from 
the point of view of Islam… not only as to the fixed elements of legislation in the Islamic 
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society, but also to the changing temporal elements. [The marjʿa] is the supreme 
representative of the Islamic ideology.’
109
 
Jabar claims that al-Ṣadr’s political system establishes a separation between the role 
of the marjʿa and the executive and legislative branches of the Islamic state, but this 
does not always seem convincing. The marjʿa, in al-Ṣadr’s political theory, is in charge 
of rectifying incorrect rulings and providing guidance to the community from an Islamic 
point of view, thus overruling the role of executive and legislative powers. It is under the 
leadership of the marjʿa, whose knowledge guarantees infallibility in its juridical-
religious judgements, that the ‘vice regency of mankind’ (khilāfat al-insān) can become 
the surrogate of the prophetic testimony (shahāda al-ʿanbiyya) which was only possible 
when the Prophet or one of the twelve Imams revered by Twelver Shiʿism were alive.
110
 
On the basis of these premises, al-Ṣadr prefigures the constitutional architecture of the 
Islamic state in the third part of his Islam Leads Life (1979). Mallat argues that his draft 
of the Islamic constitution is one of the most influential documents in the drafting of the 
constitution of revolutionary Iran a few months after the publication of Islam Leads 
Life.
111
 Al-Ṣadr attributes to the marjʿa supreme authority in the state hierarchy. Among 
these, the marjʿa declares war and peace, approves the candidates for president, 
appoints the highest members of the judiciary, and the jurists who sit in the Council of 
the Guardians i.e. a qualified assembly whose members are distinguished scholars. 
Another important function of the marjʿa is deciding on the (Islamic) constitutionality of 
laws approved by parliament. As we shall see,
112
 the constitutional arrangement that al-
Ṣadr theorises will be incorporated into the post-revolutionary Iranian institutional 
framework with few modifications. 
Al-Ṣadr, nonetheless, will not witness the realisation of this project in Iran. His political 
activism; the relationship with the Iranian revolutionary leadership; and the long-lasting 
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opposition to Hussein’s regime, eventually led him to imprisonment and execution in 
1980. His political theory remains, nonetheless, influential and was powerfully amplified 
by the success of his colleague, as well as competitor in religious leadership, Khomeini 
with whom he had a difficult relationship. Even Hezbollah in Lebanon in its Open Letter 
of 1985 condemns Hussein’s repression against the rise of political Shiʿism in Iraq and 
acknowledges al-Ṣadr’s contribution referring to him as a mujāhid ʿālim: a ‘militant 
ʿālim’.
113
 
3.5 Political Shiʿism in Practice: Khomeini’s Iran 
Up until this stage, the experience of Islamism has been characterised by constant 
frustrations. None of its reformist or revolutionary attempts were successful. 
Repression, combined with the influence of foreign powers was too strong in all the 
countries of the Middle East to allow the realisation of Islamist aspirations. The Iranian 
Revolution (1979), was a surprising phenomenon that shook the region and upset the 
entire regional political balance and established the first regime inspired by Islamist 
principles. Its theoretical foundations were primarily theorised by Ruhollah Musavi 
Khomeini (1902- 1989), an Iranian born cleric highly trained in Islamic jurisprudential 
doctrine and with a powerful charisma. 
The Iranian revolution (and Khomeini) intertwines with the Najaf networks described in 
the previous section. Khomeini lived in exile in Najaf from 1965 to 1978 and during this 
period elaborated most of his political theory.
114
 The degree of influence of Iraqi 
scholars over his work remains disputed, since his figure was rather isolated from the 
scene and in competition with other religious leaders including al-Ṣadr. His lectures in 
Najaf, nonetheless, are of central importance among its political publications.
115
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3.5.1 Khomeini’s Islamist Critique of Modern Society  
Khomeini’s critique of the West and its liberal institutions is not particularly original and 
fully overlaps with the previous cases. As ʿAbduh, Quṭb and al-Ṣadr, Khomeini claims 
that constitutional arrangements based on principles extraneous to the Islamic tradition 
are lacking in moral legitimacy.  He is harshly critical of the imposition of liberal and 
western norms on the Islamic community, the decline of which was determined by its 
indiscriminate westernisation imposed by colonial powers and their local allies. 
He accused the West for its attempts to deprive the Iranian people not only of their 
material goods but also of their ethical foundations. His criticism was directed against 
the constitutionalism imposed in Iran by local supporters of modernisation and their 
foreign patrons.
116
 In his own words: 
They have removed from operation all the judicial processes and political laws of 
Islam and replaced them with European importations, thus diminishing the scope 
of Islam and ousting it from society. For the sake of exploitation they have installed 
their agents in power.
117
 
According to Khomeini, the implementation of non-Islamic policies to rule over the 
Islamic community altered the moral integrity of its individuals. In his view ‘a believing, 
pious, just individual cannot possibly exist in a socio-political environment of this [non-
Islamic] nature and still maintain his faith and righteous conduct.’
118
 A person’s morality 
is fully constituted by the social environment in which is embedded, (see Chapter 4). 
Khomeini proposes a reassessment of the Islamic concept of al-insān al-kāmil (the 
perfect/complete human) and proclaims the need for an Islamic social and political 
system as a condition for the person to achieve moral perfection. As Hamid Dabashi 
observes:  
When translated into political terms, the idea of “the perfect man,” perfectly 
harmless in its mystical context, necessitates a total, final, and absolutely 
unconditional program of moral and ideological righteousness upon which Islam, 
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as a social and metaphysical order, teaches, regulates, guides, and controls every 
conceivable move and manner of a Muslim individual.
119
 
The need for an Islamic revolution and the establishment of an Islamic government are 
dictated by the necessity to recover the moral community and the person from the 
decay determined by the spreading of western moral values under the rule of Pahlavi’s 
monarchy, which forcefully implemented highly modernist and secularised reforms. 
According to Khomeini: 
all non-Islamic systems of government are the systems of kufr [apostasy], since 
the rules in each case is an instance of taghut [tyranny], and it is our duty to 
remove from the life of Muslim society all traces of kufr and destroy them. It is also 
our duty to create a favourable social environment for the education of believing 
and virtuous individuals, an environment that is in total contradiction with that 
produced by the rule of the taghut and illegitimate power.
120
 
Non-Islamic regimes inspired by the liberal principles of western constitutional 
arrangements correspond to kufr (apostasy), one of the most serious sins of Islam 
which corresponds to the denial of the truth of Islam. The abolition of these oppressive 
regimes and the foundation of an Islamic state are necessary to redeem the Islamic 
community from its moral corruption. In one of his lectures, Khomeini observes that:  
In the past we did not act in concert and unanimity in order to establish proper 
government and overthrow treacherous and corrupt rulers. Some people were 
apathetic and reluctant even to discuss the theory of Islamic government, and 
some went so far as to praise oppressive rulers. It is for this reason that we find 
ourselves in the present state. The influence and sovereignty of Islam in society 
have declined; the nation of Islam has fallen victim to division and weakness; the 
laws of Islam have remained in abeyance and been subjected to change and 
modification; and the imperialists have propagated foreign laws and alien culture 
among the Muslims through their agents for the sake of their evil purposes, 
causing people to be infatuated with the West.
121
 
The quotation shows Khomeini’s concern for the decline of the moral community of 
Islam because of the interference of western norms and institutions in its organisation. 
Similarly to Quṭb and al-Ṣadr, Khomeini’s Islamist project relies on a critique of the 
western liberal model and he refuses to compromise with norms and institutions not 
fully derived from the tradition of Islam. Although western societies have developed 
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material conditions of welfare and produced scientific progress to the point of landing 
on the Moon, Khomeini claims that this is not true progress. He says: 
Let them go all the way to Mars or beyond the Milky Way; they will still be deprived 
of true happiness, moral virtue, and spiritual advancement and be unable to solve 
their own social problems. For the solution of social problems and the relief of 
human misery requires foundations in faith and morals; merely acquiring material 
power and wealth, conquering nature and space, have no effect in this regard. 
They must be supplemented by, and balanced with, the faith, the conviction, and 
the morality of Islam in order truly to serve humanity instead of endangering it.
122
 
It is exclusively with reference to Islamic norms that a just political system can be 
realised. Western values and institutions cannot enjoy legitimacy in the regulation of 
the affairs of the Islamic community since they are in contradiction with its founding 
precepts. In his view: 
At the beginning of the constitutional movement, when people wanted to write 
laws and draw up a constitution, a copy of the Belgian legal code was borrowed 
from the Belgian embassy and a handful of individuals […] used it as the basis for 
the constitution they then wrote, supplementing its deficiencies with borrowings 
from the French and British legal codes. True, they added some of the ordinances 
of Islam in order to deceive the people, but the basis of the laws that were now 
thrust upon people was alien and borrowed. […] They are all opposed to Islam; 
they violate the system of government and the laws of Islam.
123
 
These considerations then justify the need to eliminate external westernising influences 
on the Islamic community to establish an Islamic government providing for the well-
being of the person in a comprehensive manner. 
3.5.2 Khomeini’s Islamic Government  
Khomeini vaguely sketched his political theory in The Revealing of Secrets (1943-4)
124
 
and then developed it further in Islamic Government (1971).
125
 According to him, the 
Islamic government is constitutional in a different way from other forms of government:  
It is constitutional in the sense that the rulers are subject to a certain set of 
conditions in governing and administering the country, conditions that are set forth 
in the Noble Qur’an and the Sunna of the Most Noble Messenger. It is the laws 
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and ordinances of this of Islam comprising this set of conditions that must be 
observed and practiced. Islamic government may be defined as the rule of divine 
law over men.
126
 
The sharīʿa only, nonetheless, is not enough to guarantee the just order of the Islamic 
community and has to be complemented by an Islamic authority since it is only under 
the guidance of Islamic scholars that the Islamic community can guarantee the actual 
well-being of the person.
 
This aspect introduces the concept of the Wilāyat al-Faqῑh 
(the governance of the religious jurisprudent) according to which the faqῑh (a legal-
religious expert of the rank of a marjʿa characterised by moral integrity and excellence 
in theological, ethical and juridical disciplines) is at the top of the state hierarchy. The 
faqῑh is the repository of supreme ethical and legal knowledge and decides over the 
rightful application of the sharīʿa in the public and private lives of Muslims. This is an 
important difference between Islamist Shiʿī theory and its Sunni counterparts in which 
the clergy were not given any particular leading role. 
Most of Islamic Government is dedicated to the explanation and interpretation of 
Qurʿanic verses and  adīth justifying the attribution of political responsibilities to the 
ʿulamāʾ.
127
 Also in Khomeini, as in al-Ṣadr, the fact that no religious authority of the 
status of the Prophet or one of the twelve Imams is present on earth confers political 
and legal authority to the Islamic jurisprudent (the faqῑh) as the highest-ranking 
religious figure.
128
 
The Wilāyat al-Faqῑh in Khomeini’s theory remains, nonetheless, a vague concept in 
terms of institutional structure, which he will amend in various respects in the course of 
his intellectual and political career.
129
 It is also for this reason, that al-Ṣadr’s 
constitutional proposal (Section 3.4.2) is considered particularly innovative compared to 
Khomeini’s vague conceptualisation. The ‘righteous and proper organs of 
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government’
130
which Khomeini advocated, became in part a reality in the form of the 
Iranian constitution in December 1979 which incorporates the idea of a religious 
leadership overseeing the work of the legislative, executive and judiciary branches, 
with the capacity of vetoing decisions that are deemed in breach of Islamic ethics.
131
 
With the establishment of the Islamic Republic in Iran, these institutions began to be 
shaped throughout a troubled constitutional process in which several elements of 
Khomeini’s theory were eventually integrated.
132
  
The office of the Walī al-Faqῑh was established at the highest hierarchical level of the 
state, a position which was filled by Khomeini himself. The second most important 
institution was the Council of the Guardian, an assembly of knowledgeable scholars 
with the function of licensing major legislative decisions from an Islamic point of view. A 
Council of Experts elected by the people was also established with the main role of 
appointing the Walī al-Faqῑh. These religious institutions were complemented by a 
presidential-like apparatus
133
, which established a President of the Republic elected 
directly by the people along with the Parliament. All these institutions were nonetheless 
under the watchful control of the Walī al-Faqῑh and the Council of the Guardian.
134
  
In its original conception the Wilāyat was not limited to rule over the Iranian people 
only, but aimed to be influential over the entire Islamic community regardless of 
national borders. As it will be seen, this was also the case for Hezbollah, which was a 
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fundamental pawn in the process of ‘exporting the revolution’ 
135
 and which will declare 
submission to the authority of the Iranian Faqῑh in its declarations.
136
 
Despite its appeal for tradition and authenticity, Khomeini’s theory and consequently 
the Iranian institutional system was widely innovative from the point of view of religious 
orthodoxy. Said Saffari observes that in the Shiʿī tradition the believer has always been 
free to choose his marjʿa al-taqlῑd. Nonetheless, the institutionalisation of the faqῑh as a 
unique authority eliminates this possibility and forces the recognition of one marjʿa that 
corresponds to the faqῑh.
137
 Halliday observes that: 
Khomeini’s ideas were fundamentalist in their claim to derive everything from 
sacred texts, but they were not fundamentalist or traditional if these terms are 
meant to imply that Khomeini’s views are inherited from the past. Both the ideas 
themselves, and even more so, the political and social effect they had, were novel 
ones, dependent upon modern social conditions and modern political debates 
upon which they drew quite freely without attribution.
138
 
The ideal institutions theorised by Islamism had to be ‘bent’ or reinterpreted to fit a 
reality different to the Islamic ideal and inevitably introduce innovations.
139
 In addition, 
the fact that the clergy would have become politically active and considered (at least de 
facto) infallible
140
 was discontinuous with the tradition of Shiʿism which has been 
characterised by quietism and generally recognised infallibility only to the Prophet and 
the twelve Imams. This shows a fundamental limit of the Islamist project. 
Notwithstanding its claims of completeness and moral superiority, the implementation 
of Islamic political institutions in Iran shows the limits of the Islamic traditions as a 
source for political institutions and the need to innovate and integrate Islamic principles 
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with other non-Islamic norms to fill the numerous gaps not covered by Islamic 
orthodoxy. 
3.6 Conclusions 
As Fawaz Gerges points out, the relationship between Islam and the western political 
and cultural sphere has been historically conflicting well before the rise of western 
powers in the Middle East in modern times.
141
 The social transformation experienced in 
this region, resulting from the impact of western political models, has facilitated the rise 
of Islamism although it may not be the only cause.  
Islamists theorise a political project advocating for the resurgence of an Islamic moral 
community in alternative to the diffusion of liberal and secularist norms. The previous 
pages have outlined the core tenets of four key Islamist thinkers, showing how they are 
all concerned with the moral decay that the Islamic community is witnessing as a result, 
in their opinions, of the impact of western liberal doctrines. They see as the roots of the 
problem of the Islamic community the impact of liberal norms such as secularism, 
reforms of the juridical system, education and, more generally, the rise of individualism. 
They claim that this situation is due to the imposition of norms and institutions that are 
avulse from the Islamic tradition and therefore argue for the establishment of political 
institutions based on Islamic norms as a panacea.  
Their interpretation of Islam is the only legitimate source throughout which this situation 
can be addressed to restore the moral integrity of the community and its well-being. 
They call for the restoration of virtues predicated by Islam within the Muslim community 
through reform or revolution, as a necessary condition for a return to spiritual as well as 
material well-being. 
Based on this discussion it is possible to proceed with a comparison between the 
Islamist critique of modern liberal principles and the communitarian critique of 
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liberalism presented in Chapter 2. Notwithstanding the different cultural and historical 
contexts in which western and Islamist critiques of liberalism have developed, a 
common argumentative basis cuts across these two stances. If we live aside the 
historical particularity and cultural specificity of Islamism, the Islamists’ claims 
epitomised by the thinkers above can be interpreted as part of the broader 
communitarian tradition, which has always been critical of liberal ethics. The Islamist 
emphasis on community, tradition, and moral virtues as opposed to individualism, 
autonomous moral reasoning, and the ‘society of interests’; is suggestive of the 
possibility that common assumptions underlie the reasoning of both communitarians 
and Islamists. 
The following chapter will propose a comparative enquiry of these common 
assumptions. It will claim that communitarianism and Islamism do not share the sole 
fact of being critical of liberal norms and institutions as endangering the moral integrity 
of the community; but their criticism is based on shared assumptions about the 
concepts of the person and community. 
  
Chapter 4   
 
Islamism as Communitarianism: 
a Comparative Analysis 
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4.1 Introduction 
The claim of this chapter is that underlying the communitarian and Islamist critiques of 
liberal norms and institutions presented in Chapters 2 and 3, there is a shared way of 
thinking about the community and the person. 
To recapitulate in an overly simplistic manner, liberalism, and those international norms 
derived from it, leans on the Kantian individualist tradition according to which a person 
is a moral agent capable of autonomously choosing their life path independently from 
its relations from others.
1
 However, communitarianism and Islamism rely on a 
conception of the person, according to which their ethical principles are defined in 
relationship with the community of which the person becomes a part of. Whereas 
liberalism understands persons as autonomous moral agents (and on this basis 
postulates norms and institutions as rights, democracy and liberal statehood which are 
primarily concerned with the protection of the status of moral agent), this chapter 
shows that communitarians and Islamists rely on the idea of community as constitutive 
of the person’s ethical principles. As Charvet and Kaczynska-Nay argue, 
communitarians think that ‘an individual self is not an inherently separate and 
independent rational entity but a being embedded in the thick fabric of a particular 
communal life.’
2
 
The differences in these assumptions have an important explanatory value in 
understanding how international relations and norms are theorised by Islamists and 
communitarians and how they think these norms are relevant for their political projects. 
The following pages isolate a few key aspects which Islamist and communitarian 
conceptions of community share. These are:  
 The community is constitutive of the ethical principles of the person and has an 
intrinsic value. 
 Is conceived as a self-referential entity characterised by autonomy in defining 
its constitutive principles. 
 Is the exclusive source of legitimacy for a political order. 
                                               
1
 See Chapter 2.  
2
 Charvet and Kaczynska-Nay, Liberal Project pp. 298-9. 
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In addition to this, the chapter identifies three elements that Islamist and communitarian 
political theories have in common with regard to their conception of the person. 
 The person acquires their identity and ethical principles through a process of 
identification within the community. 
 The achievement of freedom and the complete realisation of human potential 
are determined by the identification of the person with the principles of the 
ethical community. 
 The person is bound by loyalty and responsibility towards the ethical community 
as the source of their identity. 
In the following pages each of these aspects will be explained and justified by a 
comparative analysis of the texts and debates presented in the previous chapters. This 
will form the basis upon which the rest of this study will assess the impact of 
international norms on Islamist politics by considering Islamism as a form of 
communitarianism.
3
 
4.2 Community as Constitutive of the Person’s Identity 
According to the conception of community as constitutive, the community is the source 
of the ethical understanding of its members. Sandel says that:  
community describes not just what they [persons] have as fellow citizens but also 
what they are, not a relationship they choose (as a voluntary association) but an 
attachment they discover, not merely an attribute but a constituent of their identity. 
In contrast to the instrumental and sentimental conceptions of community, we 
might describe this strong view as the constitutive conception.
4
 
The constitutive nature of community becomes evident if contrasted with the 
instrumental conception of society typical of liberalism. An example in this regard is 
Rawls’s theory in which the society is conceived as ‘a cooperative venture for mutual 
advantage’ and its members decide to cooperate because this ‘makes possible a better 
life for all.’
5
 Communitarians however argue that becoming part of a society is a more 
complex process in which ‘our identity is always partly defined in conversation with 
                                               
3
 The author has published elsewhere a condensed and slightly different version of this and the previous 
chapters. See Filippo Dionigi, 'Islamism as Communitarianism: Person, Community and the Problem of 
International Norms in Non-Liberal Theories', Journal of International Political Theory, 8/1-2 (2012), 74-103. 
4
 Sandel, Liberalism p. 150. 
5
 Rawls, Theory of Justice pp. 6 and 9. 
94 
 
others through the common understanding which underlies the practice of our society.’
6
 
It is as part of a community that the person defines their ethical principles and thus 
recognises the legitimacy of institutions such as rights or state sovereignty. The idea 
that this process can take place in abstraction from social relations is disputed by 
communitarians. 
A similar conception can be found in Islamism. In the cases of Quṭb, ʿAbduh, al-Ṣadr 
and Khomeini, the community (that in this case corresponds to the Islamic community) 
is the main target of their reformist or revolutionary projects. Islamism attempts to re-
establish the unity and morality of the Islamic community which is seen to have been 
corrupted by the influence of western modernity and liberal values, but also by the 
incapacity of the traditional religious establishment to tackle its challenges. Ira Lapidus 
claims that Islamists ‘oppose consumer and individualistic gratification as social values 
in favour of moral commitment and community loyalty […] Islamist movements are an 
important force for creating a viable community life.’ 
7
 Talal Asad captures convincingly 
the difference between ʿAbduh’s idea of community and the liberal model of society 
when he says that: 
The theological concept of Umma that Abduh employs, has the sense of a 
collective body of Muslims bound together by their faith in God and the Prophet - a 
faith that is embodied in prescribed forms of behavior. It is therefore quite different 
from the idea of a society made up of equal citizen governing themselves 
individually (through conscience) and collectively (through the electorate). 
8
 
As seen, ʿAbduh, Quṭb, al-Ṣadr and Khomeini were all aware of the moral decay of 
their society. ʿAbduh for example observed the fracture between an uncritical 
endorsement of modernity and a blind application of tradition, and Quṭb referred to the 
concept of jāhiliyya to describe the moral decay of the contemporary society. In this 
respect, Roxanne Euben claims that there is similarity between Quṭb’s critique of his 
society and Macintyre’s description of contemporary ethics as emerging from the ruins 
                                               
6
 Taylor, 'Atomism' p. 209. 
7
 Ira M. Lapidus, 'Islamic Revival and Modernity: The Contemporary Movements and the Historical Paradigms', 
Journal of the Economic and Social History of the Orient, 40/4 (1997), 444-60 at p. 447. 
8
 Asad, Formations of the Secular p. 230. 
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of a ‘moral catastrophe’.
9
 Al-Ṣadr similarly observed how Iraqi society needed to be 
recovered from the influence of liberal secularist views and communist ideology. 
Khomeini claimed that ‘a favourable social environment for the education of virtuous 
individuals’
10
 is necessary for Muslims not to fall into the domain of unislamic modes of 
life.  
This Islamist impulse of calling for the restoration of an Islamic moral community comes 
from the assumption that community has a constitutive value for the moral status of the 
person and is the foundational basis to achieve personal well-being. Islamist and 
communitarian stances against the liberal individualist political ideal share the 
theoretical premise according to which the community constitutes the source of 
morality for its members. The community is the source of ‘a good life’ for persons who 
otherwise would be perceived as morally unsubstantiated. As a consequence, it is by 
means of community membership that a person acquires morality. It is not a 
coincidence that the reformist attempts of ʿAbduh were mostly focused on public 
education. He considered this the most effective instrument to reconstruct the moral 
texture of the community and to establish a shared ethical understanding through 
education. This is confirmed by him when he says that:  
the form of civil order in a society is only the image of the substance of the 
characteristics its members have acquired through the habits and customs that 
have grown in them whether praiseworthy or reprehensible. The different laws 
they have had in their period of rise and decline cannot be detached from these 
characteristics, no matter how much those laws have changed in form or subject 
matter. This has been recognized by those wise persons who have striven first of 
all to change people’s characteristics and manners, whenever they wanted to 
establish a well-defined order in the society.
11
  
Similarly Quṭb, claims that:  
Our method realizes the establishment of well-integrated educational, ethical, 
economic, social and political systems which in turn, help in creating man with a 
                                               
9
 Euben, Enemy in the Mirror pp. 135-6. 
10
 Khomeini, Islam and Revolution p. 48. 
11
 Quoted in Kerr, Islamic Reform, p. 135. 
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complete personality- a man who has been weakened by contemporary life and its 
followed criteria
12
. 
Also according to al-Ṣadr’s view, it is Islam that has the role of redeeming the person 
from moral corruption throughout the recreation of the Islamic moral community. 
According to al-Ṣadr: 
[Islam] assaulted the materialistic notion of life and posited, instead, a new notion 
of life. On the basis of this new notion, Islam established a system in which the 
individual is not considered a mechanical tool in the social system, nor society as 
an organization for the sake of the individual. Rather, it gave to each –the 
individual and society- their rights and insured for both his spiritual and material 
dignity.
13
 
It is the relation that the person establishes with the community that constitutes their 
moral identity; and when this relation is regulated by the principles of Islam then, al-
Ṣadr argues, the person realises their full spiritual and material well-being.  The 
constitutive value of the Islamic community appears also in the thoughts of the eminent 
Shiʿī scholar Muḥammad Ḥusayn Faḍlallah
 14
 who claimed that ‘Islam, by virtue of its 
divine and comprehensive legal system, embodied an unsurpassed normative code 
and practical set of values, which together provided the basis for refining individual 
behaviour and reforming social relations.’
15
 
4.3 Community as Self-Referential 
By self-referentiality is intended the idea that only the principles and norms which 
traditionally and historically identify the ethical community are considered legitimate by 
its members. Unless there is overlapping, heteronomous ethical conceptions infringing 
upon traditional communal norms cannot be recognised as legitimate.  
As seen, communitarians do not see the plausibility of the idea of ‘stepping out’ from 
the particular situations and communities in which the person develops their moral 
                                               
12
 Quṭb from al Islām wa  ushkilat al-Ḥadāra (Islam and the Problem of Civilization), quoted in Abu-Rabiʿ, 
Origins of Islamic Resurgence p. 162.  
13
 al-Ṣadr, Our Philosophy p. 26. 
14
 On the importance of this scholar, especially with regard to Hezbollah, will be referred further below. See 
Section 5.4. 
15
 Jamal Sankari, Fadlallah: The Making of a Radical Shi'ite Leader (London: Saqi, 2005) p. 138. 
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reasoning. There is neither such a thing as an ‘original position’ nor an ideal speech 
situation (as Rawls and Habermas respectively suppose) which justify abandoning the 
communal ethical views of a person in favour of abstract reasoning. As Charvet and 
Kaczynska-Nay observe communitarians argue that the ‘general standpoint from which 
apparently objective claims are made are themselves aspects of a community’s system 
of beliefs and anyone making such claims will not be distancing himself from his 
community but will remain embedded in it.’
16
 
Islamists have equally argued that Muslims shall not give up their identities of religious 
persons submitted to Islam to accept liberal norms and institutions, because this 
endangers their identity as Muslims, corrupts the integrity of their community and, 
ultimately, compromises their relationship with God. It is not difficult to observe in what 
sense the community is self-referential in communitarian theory, for example if we 
consider the significance of sovereignty emphasised as an international norm 
protecting the self-determination of communities. This was strongly asserted in the 
debate about human rights universality where state sovereignty was conflated with the 
protection of the ethical community of the state. Equally, the relevance attributed by 
communitarians to the borders of communities as a limitation to our ethical obligations 
is another sign of the self-referential nature of community.
17
 More importantly, the idea 
of the community as the exclusive legitimate foundation of norms such as rights, 
testifies that external sources would not be recognised as legitimate, from the 
communitarian point of view, because their origins are extraneous to the community 
itself.  
Self-referentiality is evident also within Islamist thought. Quṭb considers the Islamic 
community a morally superior entity compared to European and US societies as well as 
the communist modern society. As Paul Berman observes Quṭb ‘wanted to show that 
Islam was self-sufficient –that Islam did not need the thinkers of the West, could rely on 
its own spectacular resources of the past, was all-inclusive, independent, and fully 
                                               
16
 Charvet and Kaczynska-Nay, Liberal Project p. 303. 
17
 See for example in this regard David Miller and Sohail H. Hashmi, Boundaries and Justice: Diverse Ethical 
Perspectives (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2001). 
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adequate.’
18
  It is a consequence then, that the Islamic moral community represents not 
a source for the legitimacy of a political order and its institutions, but the only source 
valid to play this foundational role.  
The idea of a community as self-referential does not mean that the Islamic community 
shall not be permeable to innovations. Indeed Quṭb repeatedly points out that natural 
sciences and technology can be studied and developed within the Islamic community, 
as these can ameliorate the welfare of the society as in the societies of jāhiliyya. 
Nonetheless, external influence cannot be accepted on the moral grounds of the 
community.  Quṭb claims on several occasions that only the Islamic moral community 
can guarantee well-being to the person; alternative moral conceptions are flawed either 
because of their individualism and their idolatry of the human (capitalist society) or 
because of its materialism (communist society and atheism). For example he states 
that:  
Only Islamic values and morals, and Islamic teachings and safeguards, are worthy 
of mankind. These provide a permanent and true measure of human progress. 
Islam is the real civilization and Islamic society a truly civilized community.
19
  
Community self-referentiality is also to be found in ʿAbduh. Even though ʿAbduh’s 
Islamism, and in general modernist Islamism, is receptive of the external influences 
and despite the fact that ʿAbduh is deeply conscious of the mutual influences among 
different ethical communities, his theory is that only with reference to the Islamic ethical 
tradition, a political order can be legitimised. Indeed, it is this assumption that justifies 
his reformist intents towards the Islamic community rather than an uncritical 
endorsement of modern, Western values and institutions. He criticises the sectors of 
Egyptian society that abandoned Islamic traditions to embrace external moral 
conceptions uncritically based on this self-referential conception of community. As 
Samira Haj observes:  
Locating the disease of backwardness in the moral degeneracy of the Muslim 
community, ‘Abduh deemed a revived Islam (rather than its demise or 
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 Paul Berman, Terror and Liberalism (New York, N.Y.: Norton, 2003) p. 77. 
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 Quṭb, Milestones p. 76. 
99 
 
confinement) a constitutive feature to Muslim advancement. As against the 
Europeans and the Europeanized Arab intellectuals who were adamant that 
breaking away from Islam, in particular, was necessary to become modern and 
find equal footing with Europe, ‘Abduh maintained that a reconfigured Islam in light 
of the confusion produced by colonial modernity was the only solution for faithful 
Muslims seeking advancement.
20
 
Both ʿAbduh and Quṭb believed in the renewal of the moral Islamic community from 
within and with reference to its traditional principles. Both were concerned with 
providing an understanding of Islamic ethics consistent with the historical challenges to 
which their community was subject to. Whereas they internalised certain aspects, such 
as a modern use of reason and natural sciences, they claimed that well-being, justice 
and progress can only be Islamic justice, well-being and progress. 
Community self-referentiality is common also in Shiʿī Islamist theory. The very fact that 
an Islamic political project such as the Wilāyat al-Faqῑh is put forward as an alternative 
to liberal and communist models by al-Ṣadr and Khomeini, testifies the idea that 
Islamic norms are seen as alternative to other ethical conceptions rather than 
complementary. Khomeini’s harsh condemnation of the influence of liberal political 
models on the Iranian constitutional process, seen in Section 2.5.1, further reinforces 
this. His criticism of the westernisation of the Islamic community substantiates the claim 
that it is only with reference to the Islamic tradition that legitimate political institutions 
can rise. Equally, Faḍlallah claims that ‘Islam, as a divinely revealed and organic 
system of existence, does not need to borrow, much less incorporate, alien terminology 
and foreign concepts, tenets and theories.’
21
 Declarations of this kind, asserting the 
idea that the Islamic model is self-sufficient and it does not need or accept external 
interference, confirm how also in Islamism, community is conceived as a self-referential 
entity over which external influences are only arbitrary impositions lacking a basis of 
legitimacy.  
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4.4 Community as Source of Legitimacy 
The idea that the concept of community has a fundamental role as a source of 
legitimacy for political norms and institutions comes as a consequence of the two 
previous points on its constitutiveness and self-referential character. As the community 
is constitutive of the moral principles of persons and as the exclusive source of moral 
principles, it then becomes the only basis to acknowledge the legitimacy of political 
institutions and norms. On the contrary, if norms and institutions do not reflect the 
principles of the ethical community, these will be challenged as illegitimate by its 
members whose moral reasoning and ethical parameters are derived from the 
traditional community.  
Indeed, the members of the ethical community identify themselves with these principles 
because these are constitutive of their identity and consequently they would recognise 
the legitimacy of a political order, its norms and institutions only if this order reflects 
such principles. Consider for example Taylor when he describes an ideal 
communitarian polity. He claims that the viability of this kind of institutional system can 
be based either on coercion or on participation. Coercion is not an option and he 
continues by saying that: 
In order to have a free society, one has to replace this coercion with something 
else. This can only be a willing identification with the polis on the part of the 
citizens, a sense that the political institutions in which they live are an expression 
of themselves. The ‘laws’ have to be seen as reflecting and entrenching their 
dignity as citizens, and hence to be in a sense extensions of themselves.
22
 
For political institutions to be legitimate, they have to be an ‘extension’ of our personal 
moral identity and reflect the norms and values that we have acquired as members of 
an ethical community. If this is not the case, then legitimacy is undermined, because is 
not derived by our moral sense. The role of community as a source of legitimacy can 
be observed also with regard to the debate on the universality of human rights. Let us 
consider again Brown’s view on human rights and the western liberal tradition: 
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 Charles Taylor, 'Cross-Purposes: The Liberal-Communitarian Debate' in Charles Taylor (ed.), Philosophical 
Arguments (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1995) p. 165. 
101 
 
Liberal societies of the last 150 to 200 years have indeed been the freest and 
most generally congenial societies known to history, but not because they have 
been constructed on the basis of rights; their success has been based on features 
within them that pointed towards a different, more community and less 
individualist, context for political action. It was because of the existence of this 
context, because these societies were, in certain respects, ethical communities, 
that rights were widely honoured and respected; a successful rights-based politics 
is parasitic on features of the polity that have nothing to do with rights- indeed, that 
may even be inimical to rights thinking.
23
 
This conception relies on the idea that it is the existence of an ethical community and 
its contextual historical tradition, which grants the basis of legitimacy for norms and 
institutions such as rights. International norms as human rights cannot be considered 
legitimate if they are not derivatives of our communal moral principles and traditions.  
The argument unfolds in a similar manner, although in different historical 
circumstances, within Islamist political theory. Concerned about the decay of the 
Muslim community of Egypt, Quṭb argues that: 
The cure for this situation was not to leave our comprehensive religion in a corner 
for devotion only. Nor was to rush off to draw our laws from French legislation, or 
our system of government from western political theories, or our social system 
from materialistic theories, before we had demonstrated the unsuitability of this 
Shari‘ah as a basis for modern society! For the natural organic growth of a 
[political] system in any environment makes it more suitable in relation to this 
environment - at least- than an arbitrarily adopted system that is foreign to the 
nature of this environment and has not grown up in it in a gradual organic way.
24
 
This is an indicator of how only traditional ethical communities provide the moral 
grounding for the legitimacy of political institutions, also in the case of Islamist theory. 
Equally, ʿAbduh discusses in detail the ground of legitimacy of a political order pointing 
out how uncritical endorsement of external norms and political institutions lacks a moral 
basis of legitimacy. He claims that ‘the form of civil order in a society is only the image 
of the substance of the characteristics of its members.’
25
 The link between the ethical 
community and political order becomes evident in ʿAbduh’s legal and political theory 
with regard to his conceptions of shūrā and ijmāʿ as have been presented above.
26
 In 
his view, a just political order shall exercise power within the limits established by 
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consultation (shūrā) with the community and in particular its Islamic scholars in order to 
be legitimate. The principle of ijmāʿ further reinforces this aspect. Whenever there is a 
moral and political question whose ethical righteousness is in doubt, the final word 
remains with the community.
27
 The principle is derived by the Islamic  adīth which 
states ‘My community will never agree upon an error’
28
 which establishes that 
consensus (ijmāʿ) or disagreement of the community corresponds to its moral 
righteousness or immorality.   
A similar way of thinking is also present in Shiʿī political theory, although is articulated 
differently from the Sunni case because of its particular hierarchical organisation 
through the tradition of the marjʿaiyya and consequently the Wilāyat al-Faqῑh. In this 
case the community of believers constitutes the basis of legitimacy for the leader of the 
community (the marjʿa) and in the case of Khomeini’s Wilāyat al-Faqῑh for the Walī al-
Faqῑh. As Khomeini claims, it is the duty of the community to acknowledge the 
legitimacy of the authority of a religious expert, as the only legitimate authority from an 
Islamic point of view. The central importance of community in granting a licence of 
morality to political decisions confirms how Islamists see the community as a central 
source of legitimacy for political institutions in a way that shares many similarities with 
the communitarian conception. 
4.5 Conception of the Person as Community Member 
The way community is understood in Islamism and communitarianism directly 
influences how the person is conceptualised. The first aspect is that in 
communitarianism and Islamism the person is described as developing their moral 
identity by relating to the other members of the community, which is a direct 
consequence of the constitutive function of the community. Communitarian theory 
offers several examples highlighting this aspect. Taylor argues that:  
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The identity of the autonomous, self-determining individual requires a social 
matrix, one for instance which through a series of practices recognizes the rights 
to autonomous decision and which calls for the individual having a voice in 
deliberation about public action.
29
   
On this basis, the communitarian person develops their identity in a symbiotic process 
with the community. The Sandelian critique of the liberal ‘unencumbered self’ further 
clarifies this aspect. Referring to the idea of a liberal rational actor detached from 
communal relations, he points out that: 
To imagine a person incapable of constitutive attachments such as these is not to 
conceive an ideally free and rational agent, but to imagine a person wholly without 
character, without moral depth.
30
  
The idea of the person as abstract from moral and communal relations as it is theorised 
for example in Rawls’s original position, is considered an implausible assumption to 
which opposes the idea that we as persons can only be plausibly conceived as part of 
a wider ethical context that is the community.  
A similar conception of the person as a component of a wider relations framework 
emerges in Islamist theory. As Abu-Rabiʿ notes with reference to Quṭb, Islam is 
conceived as a religion that cannot be lived and practiced as individuals. Persons shall 
become part of a social environment on the basis of which his or her moral life is 
based. As Quṭb Says:  
Without this environment the life of the individual becomes impossible, or at least 
extremely difficult. Therefore whoever wishes to be a Muslim should know that he 
cannot devote himself to his practice of Islam except in a Muslim environment 
dominated by Islam. He is mistaken if he imagines that he can realize his Islam as 
an individual lost in the midst of a society ignorant of divine guidance.
31
 
Furthermore Abu-Rabiʿ comments on Quṭb’s conception of person and comes to the 
conclusion that according to him:  
Man is that complex structure of body, emotions, passions, fears, and hopes that 
are subject to social conditions and relationships. Qutb warns against treating man 
as an abstraction or as a speculative construct. Man should be taken as a 
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complete whole and, above all, should be considered within a historical and social 
context.
32
 
Such a conception is then similar to the kind of conception that can be found in 
communitarianism 
The fact that the person is conceived in Islamism as part of a relational communal 
network in which acquires their moral understanding is also present in ʿAbduh as it is 
reported for example by Charles Adams in a quotation already mentioned above. In his 
discussion of ʿAbduh’s commentary to the Qurʾān, Adams observes that:  
one of the principles of society, he [Abduh] says in introducing his comment,  is 
that no people can exist as an independent entity unless there be some bond that 
binds them together and gives them unity, so that they become a living 
community, as though they were a single body.
33
 
Haj further confirms this, and points out:  
‘Abduh presumed, as any Muslim would, that religious duties (‘ibadat), as 
embodied practices, were constitutive of social relations, and he took for granted 
that interactive transactions (mu‘amalat) were  integral to the constitution of a 
Muslim subject. Accordingly, the understanding of a Muslim subject as a 
constitutive part of the collective community is bound to be different than the 
liberal understanding, in which a clear distinction is drawn between ethics and law, 
and ethics and religious belief are delineated as private and interior.
34
 
ʿAbduh’s conception of the person is then in contrast with the liberal conception, his 
communal nature can be deducted from his own words:  
God has created us as social beings desirous of creating social bonds with one 
another; these bonds start in families and branch out to other parts of the society 
until they are rooted in the nation and the larger Community of Muslims.
35
 
Also in Islamist Shiʿī thinking a similar conception of the person as deeply embedded in 
communal relations emerges. al-Ṣadr claims that: 
the basic distinguishing feature of the Islamic system is represented in its being 
basis on spiritual understanding of life and a moral sense of life. A major point of 
this system is the taking into consideration of both the individual and society, and 
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the securing of a balance between life of the individual and social life. The 
individual is not considered the central principle in legislating and governing, nor is 
the large social existence the only thing to which the state pays attention and for 
whose sake it enacts its laws.
36
 
Al-Ṣadr’s view on the ultimate aim of moral righteousness in Islamic life and the 
balance between social and individual existence, mirrors the communitarian conception 
of the integration of the person within a network of social relations characterised by 
shared moral principles and providing the basis for their realisation. As he further 
makes clear:  
[Religion] builds a link between personal motives and the paths leading to good in 
life. It also modifies the interest of individuals in such a way as to make individuals 
believe that their personal interests and the real general human interests –as 
defined by Islam- are interrelated.
37
 
A strong connection between the person and the social and historical context in which 
is embedded is then of cardinal importance, and confirms how communitarianism and 
Islamism have in common a similar view on persons as deeply related to their 
communal environment. The person acquires moral principles and develops moral 
reasoning on the basis of the relationship that establishes within the community and 
not in abstraction from it. 
4.6 Personal Realisation through Community Membership 
In liberal theory the person achieves freedom and personal realisation primarily as a 
result of a process of emancipation in which the exercise of individual autonomy is the 
decisive factor limiting the influence of heteronomous principles. Both Islamism and 
communitarianism purport a different picture. According to these theories the person 
achieves full liberation and realisation (and in the religious context, their salvation) 
adhering to the ethical principles on which the community is based and not 
emancipating from it. As Buchanan notes with reference to communitarian theory:  
If I am a member of a community I share goals and values with other members. I 
and they conceive of these as our goals, not just as goals which we each have as 
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individuals and that happen to be the same for all of us. […] In activities that are 
the life of a community, individuals think of themselves primarily as members of 
the group, and of their values as the values of the group.
38
 
According to communitarianism the boundary between individual and communitarian 
identity is permeable and individual autonomy does not represent a limit to the adoption 
of communitarian principles within the ethical principles of the individual. 
As Taylor states, even presuming the existence of a liberal self, independent from the 
network of social relations in which one is embedded and provided with rights: 
The identity of the autonomous, self-determining individual requires a social 
matrix, one for instance which through a series of practices recognizes the rights 
to autonomous decision and which calls for the individual having a voice in 
deliberation about public action.
39
  
As seen, Sandel is equally critical of the possibility of conceiving persons as moral 
agents dissociated from the context in which they are educated, raised and where they 
establish their social relations.
40
 It is for this reason that communitarianism relies on an 
idea of the person according to which freedom and realisation are to be achieved, not 
by means of emancipation from communal bonds, but rather through establishing a 
deeper connection with the ethical community. This aspect further confirms the analogy 
between the underlying assumptions of communitarianism and Islamism. 
Quṭb for example claims that freedom and realisation of the person can be achieved 
only when embracing the moral life of Islam. Berman observes that ‘Freedom in liberal 
society seemed to Quṭb no freedom at all. That kind of freedom was merely one more 
expression of the hideous schizophrenia –the giant error that places the material world 
over here, God over there.’
41
  In one of his most influential works he argues that:  
Only in the Islamic way of life do all men become free from the servitude of some 
men to others and devote themselves to the worship of Allah alone, […] This 
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concept and the way of life covering all the practical aspects of man’s life is the 
vital message that mankind lacks. 
42
 
Both Quṭb and Khomeini, theorise an idea of the person as al-insān al-kāmil: the 
perfect or complete human.
43
 According to this conception the person achieves status 
of virtuous moral being by fully endorsing the precepts of the Islamic community. 
On a similar basis, ʿAbduh’s attempt to restore a moral Islamic community in Egypt and 
the reform of education relies on the idea that it is only as members of the Islamic 
community that the person can achieve well-being and realise their freedom. In The 
Theology of Unity, for example, he dedicates an entire chapter entitled, Religion and 
Human Progress: their Culmination in Islam. He points out that:  
human society reached a point at which man came to his full stature, helped by 
the morals of the earlier vicissitudes. Islam supervened, to present its case to 
reason, to call on mind and intelligence for action, to take emotion and feeling into 
partnership for man’s guidance to both earthly and heavenly blessedness.
44
 
Similar statements dominate the discourse of al-Ṣadr. Also in this case, the relationship 
between the person and moral life of the Islamic community is a fundamental 
component for the liberation and realisation of the full potential of humanity, and 
eventually leading to salvation. According to al-Ṣadr ‘the basic distinguishing feature of 
the Islamic system is represented in its being based on spiritual understanding of life 
and a moral sense of life.’
45
  
As much as we need to be part of a liberal community to become liberal persons 
according to communitarians, in Islamism we can realise our potential as human 
beings only as members of an Islamic community. The dependency of the person on 
the moral community of which they are part, is also to be found in Islamism then, and 
confirms the argument that Islamism and communitarianism share similar assumptions 
regarding the conceptions of person and community. 
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4.7 Moral Responsibility towards the Community 
A final consideration linking communitarianism to Islamism is that, in both theories, the 
person is responsible of protecting the integrity of the community. Whereas liberalism 
emphasises the recognition of rights to persons as norms protecting them from external 
unwanted interferences, Islamist and communitarians emphasise the responsibility of 
the person towards the community. 
According to communitarian thinking, the person develops a sense of loyalty and a 
correlated sense of responsibility towards the community. Both Taylor and Sandel, 
develop a thorough criticism of liberal conceptions and argue that persons do have 
rights but these rights are counterbalanced by the responsibility to preserve the 
community on which these rights are based. For example, Taylor argues that: 
The incoherence of asserting the primacy of rights is even clearer if we imagine 
another way in which the conflict could arise: that, in destroying the society, I 
would be undermining my own future ability to realize this capacity.
46
 
It is for this reason that communitarianism emphasises the importance of the 
responsibilities and obligations of persons to abide to ethical principles of the 
community in order not to undermine the bases of their lives.  According to 
communitarians, we first become members of a community and then responsible 
towards it and eventually we acquire entitlements such as rights and freedom. The idea 
of a fully autonomous being which, on the basis of rights, can neglect or deny the 
importance of the moral values of the community of which they are part, is criticised by 
communitarians.  This is because the person is conceived as responsible towards the 
community since it is the origin of personal moral principles and identity. This aspect 
can also be found in Islamism. 
ʿAbduh argues for the importance of personal responsibility in various occasions. For 
example, although he claims that reason is a component of his Islamist theory, 
nonetheless this cannot overcome the interests and the judgements of the community. 
Principles of consultation (shūrā) and consensus (ijmāʿ) shall prevail over the claim of 
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individual reason. The interest and well-being of the community (masla a) shall 
overcome the interests of isolated individuals especially when in contrast with collective 
interests. Quṭb’s case is even more radical in this respect and he points out repeatedly 
that, while the community is responsible of preserving the rights and welfare of its 
members, this also applies vice versa to the person. As he says:  
every individual is charged in the first place conscientiously to perform his own 
work; for the results of individual work are in the long run advantageous and 
beneficial to the community. […] No individual, then can be exempt from this care 
for the general interest, but everyone must have a constant care for the 
community.
47
 
Furthermore, for Quṭb the sense of individual responsibility is embedded in a 
communitarian perspective to the point of becoming coextensive with collective 
responsibility. According to him:  
every individual will be held responsible for evil-doing in the community, even if he 
has had no part in it. For society is a unity which is harmed by any evil-doing, and 
the duty of every individual is to guard and to protect it.
48
 
Also in the case of Shiʿī Islamism, the sense of responsibility of the individual towards 
the community is predicated as a factor of utmost importance. One example is 
Khomeini who argues that the Muslim has a duty to undertake action to protect their 
community from the external interferences that harm its moral integrity. This duty is 
based on a cardinal Islamic principle that is ‘enjoining the good and forbidding the evil’. 
As Khomeini says, ‘he who enjoins the good and forbids the evil actively calls men to 
Islam by remedying injustice and opposing the oppressor. Enjoining the good and 
forbidding the evil has been made a duty primarily for the sake of accomplishing these 
high aims.’
49
 
Quite the opposite of the liberal conception of the person according to which the priority 
is their emancipation from ascribed ethical conceptions and norms; communitarianism 
and Islamism purport the idea of the person who has distinct responsibility towards the 
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community of which they are part. The close relationship with the community and the 
ethical importance that communitarians and Islamists attach to it entails an idea of 
persons responsible for the preservation of the integrity of the community. 
4.8 Conclusions 
In Enemy in the Mirror, Euben observes that: 
the extent to which modern Islamic thinkers from Afghani to ‘Abduh to Qutb are 
engaged with the problems and dilemmas of Western political thought suggests 
that, in a colonial  and postcolonial world in particular, questions that define 
political theory have ceased to be, if they ever solely were, Western.
50
  
This is a key point for this study which explains how comparing western and Islamist 
critiques of liberalism establishes a relationship between ways of political thinking 
connected by the same phenomenon: the rise of liberal values in the western world and 
their expansion in the Middle East. Halliday goes even further, and with regard to 
Euben’s observation, claims that: 
[this] may not only lessen the claim that the radicalism of the Islamic world is the 
enemy in the post-Cold War mirror, but also suggests that it is rather part of a 
broader challenge to Western domination found in Chiapas and Beijing, in 
Baghdad and Delhi, as much as in Cairo and Qom: Euben at times comes close to 
conceding this but, if this is so, then Islamism is not so philosophically distinct.
51
 
Indeed, the analysis proposed in this chapter shows that Islamism is ‘not so 
philosophically distinct.’ I have argued that Islamism and communitarianism share 
analogous conceptions of person and community upon which they develop their 
criticism of liberalism. It is on this basis that is possible to understand Islamism as a 
form of communitarianism in analytical terms.  
The concept of community was defined as self-referential and constitutive of the 
person’s ethical identity. Conversely, it was pointed out how the person is not an 
individual moral agent (as liberals would argue) but is the member of a community, 
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which in turn is the source of his or her moral beliefs, which then defines on which 
principles a just political order should be based. The impact of liberal norms has 
provoked the reactions of thinkers (Marxist, conservatives, Catholics
52
, Islamists and so 
on) who perceive the ‘liberal project’
53
 as a threat to the moral status of the community, 
inevitably leading to its decay into a morally unsubstantiated society of individuals.  
This then leads to the next stage of the study which will assess how international 
norms have changed these conceptions, especially with regard to Islamist movements. 
Are Islamist conceptions of the person and community tenable? Is the ontological 
status of the person and community as conceived by Islamists plausible, or is the 
Islamist political project founded on unrealistic assumptions?
54
 
I will claim that the assumptions of Islamism are being profoundly challenged by the 
increasing importance of liberally inspired norms as international humanitarian law, 
human rights and UN Security Council resolutions based on state sovereignty and 
international peace.  The idea of a self-referential community, constitutive of the identity 
of the person, is confronted by a process of socialisation of Islamist political actors in 
the international society in which liberal norms are predominant. 
The following chapters are dedicated to the study of this process with reference to the 
case of Hezbollah. The study eventually comes to a concluding assessment on the 
impact of international norms on Islamist politics in Chapter 10. Prior to that, Chapter 5 
will introduce an historical perspective of the emergence of Shiʿī Islamist politics in the 
region, and in particular, in Lebanon. 
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5.1 Introduction 
The previous chapters provided a theoretical overview of how liberalism has been 
criticised by Islamist thinkers and how this criticism relies on the same assumptions of 
the communitarian critique of liberalism. The study now turns to the empirical analysis 
of the case study of Hezbollah.
1
 This chapter will bridge the theoretical analysis of 
Islamism with the empirical enquiry into Islamist politics and international norms. As 
Section 5.5 will show, at its inception, Hezbollah’s Islamist identity fully aligns with the 
political discourse theorised by Islamists as Quṭb, al-Ṣadr and Khomeini.
2
 Reflecting 
entirely the parameters of Islamism then, the case of Hezbollah is useful for the 
argument that this thesis intends to propose.
3
 After the presentation of the origins of 
Hezbollah and its foundation in Lebanon, the following chapters will discuss the impact 
of international norms on its political identity, especially pointing out how its Islamist 
profile has been revised on various occasions in a way that increasingly converges with 
liberal principles. 
Before that, the following pages explain how the experience of Shiʿī Islamism in Iraq is 
central in the development of political Shiʿism and in particular for Hezbollah. Iranian 
Shiʿism is also fundamental for Hezbollah and although the most relevant facts in this 
respect are mentioned in Section 5.5, the reader should also refer to Section 3.5 for a 
discussion of Khomeinism.  
The Iraqi repression, the Iranian Revolution, the Iraq–Iran War and Israel’s invasion of 
Lebanon all contributed to the birth of an Islamist alliance in Lebanon among Shiʿī 
scholars and activists. From this nucleus, with the fundamental contribution of Iran, 
eventually Hezbollah was born. Before Hezbollah’s foundation, as Section 1.3 shows, 
Shiʿism in Lebanon was already being mobilised at a social and political level by the 
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charismatic figures of Mūsā al-Ṣadr (1928–1978),
4
 Muḥammad Mahdī Shams al-Dīn 
(1936–2001) and Muḥammad Ḥusayn Faḍlallah (1935–2010). Key factors of this 
process were the Israeli invasion of the country and the long-standing marginalisation 
of the Shiʿī community from the centres of power in Lebanon. Section 5.4 will illustrate 
these aspects to then look into the historical events related to the inception of 
Hezbollah in Section 5.5.  
The final section will outline the contents of Hezbollah’s first political manifesto, which 
will help define the political identity of Hezbollah as an Islamist movement.
5
 
5.2 Political Shiʿism in Iraq: Foundations and Exile 
The origins of Shiʿism in Iraq are centuries old, but its politicisation in modern times 
becomes a relevant phenomenon for the scope of this study at the end of the 1950s 
with the formation of Ḥizb al-Dʿawa of which Muḥammad Bāqir al-Ṣadr was among the 
main ideologues.
6
 
In 1958, Iraq was in an unstable political situation. The Hashemite monarchy, 
established in 1920, was overthrown by a military coup enacted by ʿAbd al-Kārīm 
Qāsim who adopted an ideological framework mixing pan-Arab, nationalist and 
communist components clashing with Shiʿī tradition. Tribal rivalries and the fact that 
most of the Iraqi political leadership was Sunni exacerbated the antagonism between 
the newly established regime and the Shiʿī community. 
The Dʿawa drafted a foundational document (circa 1960) with three items: founding a 
modern organisation for the dissemination of the party’s political vision, deciding a 
political agenda for the implementation of the goals of the party and asserting the need 
to establish an Islamic political system in Iraq as its final aim.
7 
 According to Jabar, the 
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foundation of the Dʿawa is to be understood as part of a renascent intellectual life in the 
Shiʿī context, epitomised by the figure of al-Ṣadr.
8
 Amatzia Baram argues that the 
foundation of the party was due to the concerns of the Shiʿī clergy about the decline of 
the Shiʿī community which, under Qāsim’s regime, was increasingly exposed to 
atheism and communism as alternative ethical paradigms threatening the moral 
integrity of the community.
9
 Hanna Batatu observes that:  
It was not a reviving Islam or an ascendant Shi‘ism that prompted elements within 
the hawzah al-ʿilmīyah (the circle of ʿulamaʾ) at Najf to organize ranks in the late 
1960s and set on foot the D‘awa party. On the contrary, they were moved by the 
growing sense that the old faith was receding, that scepticism and even disdain for 
the traditional rites were rife among the educated Shī‘īs, that the belief of even the 
urban Shīʿa masses was not as firm, and their conformism to ancient usages not 
as punctual or as reverent as in times past, and that the ʿulamaʾ were losing 
ground and declining in prestige and material influence.
10
 
In a way that is similar to the rise of Sunni Islamism in Egypt; the foundation of the 
Dʿawa resulted from the convergence of a movement of renaissance in religious–
political thought with the emergence of social circumstances perceived as threatening 
the integrity of the Muslim community. 
Exactly who the founders of Dʿawa were is not clear. Jabar says that al-Ṣadr was the 
author of the foundational document, while Baram claims that Muḥammad and Mahdī 
al-Ḥakīm (the sons of the Iraqi Ayatollah Muḥsin al-Ḥakīm) had an important role in the 
foundation of the Dʿawa, thus breaking the tradition of quietism
11
 endorsed by their 
father. Batatu claims that the Dʿawa’s original leadership was represented by both 
Iranian and Iraqi religious scholars inspired by al-Ṣadr’s intellectual work.
12
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The Dʿawa was not the only Islamist phenomenon emerging in Iraq. In 1960 the 
ʿulamāʾ of Najaf
13
 constituted the Jamʿat al-ʿUlamāʾ (Society of the ʿUlamāʾ), which 
aimed to contrast the decay of Shiʿism by means of cultural promotion, education and 
welfare provision. The Society included the most prominent religious figures of Shiʿism 
in Iraq and among its younger ranks Muḥammad Bāqir al-Ṣadr, Muḥammad Ḥusayn 
Faḍlallah and Muḥammad Mahdī Shams al-Dīn stood out. The last two of them will 
escape to Lebanon where they will later have a prominent intellectual and political 
role.
14
 Differently from the Dʿawa, the Jamʿat al-ʿUlamāʾ was not politicised and 
maintained the profile of a socially oriented organisation. 
In addition to the Dʿawa and the Society of the ʿUlamāʾ, there was the Shirāziy Group 
(1962), a political faction led by Ḥassan Shirāziy and his brother Muḥammad Ḥusayn 
Shirāziy who challenged the primacy of Dʿawa as the main Shiʿī Islamist movement in 
Iraq. According to Jabar, the dispute was due to intellectual divergence and to tribal 
and city rivalry. The Shirāziy Group criticised the fact that the Dʿawa was not under the 
authority of a marjʿa. It is not a coincidence that Khomeini, who promoted the idea of 
marjʿa as leader of the Islamic state, was more sympathetic to the Shirāziy Group 
rather than the Dʿawa and Bāqir al-Ṣadr.
15
  
Around 1968 the informal organisation of the Shirāziy movement was upgraded by 
Muḥammad Taqiy al-Mudarrisiy and Hadiy al-Mudarrisiy to a more formal organisation 
known as al-Ḥaraka (‘the movement’). After the Iranian revolution, al-Ḥaraka changed 
its name to become the Munaẓamat al-ʿAmal al-Islāmῑ (The Islamic Action 
Organisation). In the meantime, the Dʿawa became progressively more nationalised 
and particularistic under the new leadership of Ṣubḥiy al-Dakhil in 1961. 
A turning point for Shiʿī activism was 1968 with the ascent to power of Saddam 
Hussein who, differently from his predecessors adopted a Baʿathist ideology. The rise 
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of Hussein into power escalated the tension with the Shiʿī community. From 1972 to 
1974 the regime began to arrest and execute the leadership members of the Dʿawa. In 
1972 al-Dakhil was executed while al-Ṣadr was released from arrest under pressure of 
popular movement.  
We have already looked at occasions highlighting the impact of the Iranian revolution in 
the region, but what matters for this account is that in Iraq the Iranian revolution 
produced the conditions for even harsher repression against Shiʿites. Al-Ṣadr 
expressed enthusiasm and support for the revolution in Iran, though his relationship 
with the new Walῑ al-Faqῑh, Khomeini, was rather cold. As a consequence a consistent 
part of the Shiʿī population supported the revolution. Al-Ṣadr’s endorsement of the 
Iranian revolution provoked the reaction from the Iraqi regime which, in 1980, arrested 
and executed him. According to Saʿad Jawad the detention and execution of al-Ṣadr 
(1980) was facilitated by the fact that Khomeini sent telegrams or letters to him that 
were intercepted by Iraqi intelligence, which confirmed his contact with the Iranian 
leadership, a fact which Khomeini almost certainly was aware of.
16
 
Membership to the Dʿawa was declared illegal and punished with death, and a number 
of its adherents expatriated. Some of them went to Lebanon where they joined the 
ranks of the rising local Shiʿī movement and would eventually become founding 
members of Hezbollah.
17
 
A similar situation characterised the other Shiʿī political groups. The Munaẓamat al-
ʿAmal al-Islamiy of al-Mudarrisiy was involved in a bombing campaign including the 
attempt on the life of the foreign minister, Tāriq ʿAzīz in April 1980. Ḥassan Shirāziy 
(one of the Shirāziy brothers) was killed in 1980 in Beirut. His brother, Muḥammad 
Shirāziy, became one of the leaders of the Shiʿī community in Kuwait, and Muḥammad 
Taqiy al-Mudarrisiy also became a leading marjʿa. As observed by Laurence Louër, 
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Shiʿism was becoming a prominent transnational phenomenon with ramifications all 
across the region also as a consequence of the repressive Iraqi regime.
18
 
Tension between Iraq, its Western allies and Iran erupted in the Iraq–Iran conflict 
(1980–88). Within this context, Iran began to play an even more influential role in the 
Shiʿī Iraqi scene and more broadly in the Shiʿī community at a regional level. A new 
organisation trying to unify the Iraqi Shiʿī movements was born in 1982 in Tehran under 
the leadership of Muḥammad Bāqir al-Ḥakīm. The Supreme Assembly of the Islamic 
Revolution in Iraq
19
 (SAIRI) was the organisation in which a great part of the Islamist 
Shiʿī activists, including some Dʿawa members, converged under the influence of Iran. 
The idea of a unified Shiʿī opposition group to the Iraqi regime was, nonetheless, 
constantly challenged by internal antagonism, and by the conflicting souls of Arabism 
and Shiʿism. Shiʿism was a solid transnational bridge linking Iraqi Shiʿites with Iranian 
Shiʿites, but their Arab heritage was at odds with Iran and its Persian (ʿajamiy)
 20
 roots. 
Nonetheless, with the powerful backing of the Iranian Islamic Republic and relying on 
its wide transnational network, political Shiʿism was soon to spread in the region and 
Lebanon was a particularly fertile ground in a key geo-strategic location. 
5.3 Shiʿī Islamism in Lebanon: Mūsā al-Ṣadr, Shams al-Dīn and 
Faḍlallah 
The Lebanese connection with the broader Shiʿī community passes through a few 
thinkers and ayatollahs who reawakened the centuries-old Shiʿī tradition of Lebanon.
21
 
All of them are strictly related to the transnational Shiʿī network that was illustrated 
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above. In this respect, Mūsā al-Ṣadr (1928–1978),
22
 Mahdi Shams al-Dīn (1936–2001) 
and Muḥammad Ḥusayn Faḍlallah (1935–2010) are the three key religious figures 
along with many others active at the local level.
23
 
Of the three thinkers, Faḍlallah and Shams al-Dīn were members of the Society of the 
ʿUlamāʾ of Najaf where they were in contact with Bāqir al-Ṣadr and with whom they 
had a friendly and intellectual relationship. While Faḍlallah and Shams al-Dīn were 
Iraqi Arabs (with Lebanese ancestors), Mūsā al-Ṣadr (also with roots from Jabal 
ʿĀmil)
24
 was born in Iran. All of them were students of two Grand Ayatollahs Muḥsin al-
Ḥakīm and Abu al-Qāsim al-Khuʾy and received their official titles of religious scholars 
in the  awza of Najaf, in the same cultural environment in which Bāqir al-Ṣadr and 
Khomeini operated.
25
 Mūsā al-Ṣadr was the cousin and brother-in-law of Bāqir al-Ṣadr,
26
 
and in 1959 accepted to take over the position of fāqih (religious judge) in the 
Lebanese city of Tyre.
27
  
As reported in Fouad Ajami’s biography of Mūsā al-Ṣadr,
28 
his charismatic figure had 
the most important role in reviving the Shiʿī tradition in Lebanon. Mūsā Al-Ṣadr 
recovered the Shiʿī community from the social, economic and political marginalisation 
to which they had been relegated in the Lebanese state dominated by the Christian 
and Sunni Muslim communities since its inception. Initially he mobilised the Shiʿī 
community at the social level without interfering politically. At a later stage (1969) he 
promoted and obtained the foundation of the Higher Islamic Shiʿī Council in Lebanon 
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(al-Majlis Al-Islāmiy al-Shiʿa al-ʿAlā), which, within the sectarian system of Lebanon, 
institutionalised the role of the Shiʿī sect to a higher degree and established a more 
centralised authority.
29
 His political involvement became more prominent when he 
founded the Movement of the Dispossessed ( arakat al-ma rumiyn), announced in 
1974 in Baʾalbek after months of public rallies denouncing the social condition of 
Shiʿites in Lebanon.
30
 The birth of the Movement of the Dispossessed marked the 
culmination of Mūsā al-Ṣadr’s mobilisation of the Shiʿites in Lebanon. He advocated 
the need to attain a more incisive political role for the Shiʿī community and urged the 
state to address the problems of social and economic justice of the Shiʿī people.  
A few months later in 1975, a political and paramilitary formation under the acronym 
Amal
31
 was born under his auspices. Amal represented at least in part the interests of 
the Shiʿī community and participated in the conflict against Israel (but also against the 
Palestinians in Lebanon) and in the Lebanese civil war. Nonetheless, though Amal 
adopted Mūsā al-Ṣadr as its spiritual guide (murshid al-ru iy), he was never directly 
involved in its affairs as it is customary for Shiʿī religious leaders not to embrace a 
political faction. Conversely, Amal did not adopt a religious–political agenda, instead 
focusing on being a predominantly secular movement. This gave Shiʿī Islamists the 
opportunity to carve out their political space as a separate force. In 1980, Mūsā al-Ṣadr 
disappeared in obscure circumstances during a visit to Libya.  
Despite personal friendship and esteem, Faḍlallah’s stance was different from Mūsā al-
Ṣadr’s and he occasionally disagreed with the Iranian-born ʿālim, whose prestige 
became so high that he was also called imām by his followers. Faḍlallah moved from 
Najaf to Lebanon in 1966, at a time in which the Iraqi repression was harsh on Islamist 
Shiʿī figures,
32
 but also because he was involved in the foundation of Dʿawa.
33
 His 
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presence in Lebanon was soon to be noticed when he began predicating and taking 
part in the cultural and religious life of the country.
34
 He became one of the most 
prominent minds of Shiʿism in the world with a prolific publication activity including 
poetry, theology and public ethics. In 1995 he was recognised as marjʿa and this 
strained his relations with the Iranian leadership, which claimed the monopoly over the 
religious leadership throughout the authority of the walī al-fāqih.
35
  
Faḍlallah’s early thinking publicly supported the typical Islamist arguments about the 
decay of the Muslim community and exhorted for a mobilisation of society in order to 
redeem the umma from this decay. His public discourse widely reflects the concerns 
about the ethical integrity of the community and consequently that of its members, as 
observed in Chapters 3 and 4. Even before his arrival in Lebanon, Faḍlallah focused on 
the idea of the individual as an organic part of the ethical Islamic community as a first 
step in the reconstruction of the umma. According to Faḍlallah: 
The engendering of conscious and committed Muslim individuals in society would 
constitute the first phase in creating a true Islamic society, through the nurturing of 
fraternal Islamic ties and the insemination in the collective psyche of Islamic 
precepts and values, such as social justice, equality and solidarity.
36
 
He became the promoter, in the Lebanese context, of the Islamist discourse endorsing 
Islam as an alternative to the value system imposed by the interference of Western 
ideologies within the Islamic community. In one of his sermons in 1972 he argued that: 
‘Islam, by virtue of its divine and comprehensive legal system, embodied an 
unsurpassed normative code and practical set of values, which together provided the 
basis for refining the individual behaviour and reforming social relations.’
37
 His Islamist 
views then widely overlapped with the political project of the Dʿawa and basically 
reproduced the conditions for its re-foundation in Lebanon. 
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 Faḍlallah’s commitment to Islamic reform of the community is another element that 
partly distinguishes him from Mūsā al-Ṣadr. While Mūsā al-Ṣadr’s Movement of the 
Dispossessed was characterised by a variety of internal political and not necessarily 
religious components, for Faḍlallah this was not the case. His social action was Islamic 
in nature and acted throughout a network of Islamic charitable institutions. This process 
gave birth to the wide network of social and welfare organisations that even today 
characterises Lebanese Shiʿī politics and social action but also established a 
connection between Faḍlallah and the emerging political Shiʿī movements. 
Initially, the link was between Faḍlallah and the Lebanese branch of the Dʿawa. At a 
later stage, in correspondence with the Iranian revolution and the execution of Bāqir al-
Ṣadr, the Dʿawa members joined the ranks of the emerging formation of the Islamist 
Shiʿī movement, which eventually would have contributed to the formation of 
Hezbollah.
38
 As Nizar Hamzeh observes, future leaders of Hezbollah such as ʿAbbās 
al-Mūsawī
39
 and Ṣubḥiy al-Ṭufaiylī were indeed coming from the ranks of the Dʿawa.
40
 
Faḍlallah became the leading figure of the Islamist Shiʿī mobilisation in Lebanon. As in 
the cases of Bāqir and Mūsā al-Ṣadr, his affiliation to a political organisation was 
neither direct nor formalised, although certain scholars unconvincingly tend to 
associate him officially with Hezbollah.  
The Iranian revolution further reinforced the already radical Islamist views of Faḍlallah, 
who saw the revolution as an inspirational model and a demonstration of the possibility 
for Islamism to achieve its ends. Differently from other Shiʿī leaders, Faḍlallah thought 
that political action and religious belief should be combined to rescue the Islamic 
community from its decay and the Iranian revolution strengthened this belief. This point 
was not as obvious as it may seem, since leading figures of the Islamist Shiʿī 
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community such as Grand Ayatollah Muḥsin al-Ḥakīm and his successor Abu al-Qāsim 
Khʿui were both quietists, and defended the idea that there is no religious authority that 
can legitimately replace the Disappeared Imam until he returns to earth.
41
  
His colleague Shams al-Dīn took a softer position in this respect. Nonetheless, 
Faḍlallah made clear in one of his publications (Islam and the Logic of Force, 1976) 
that the field of action of Islam interested both religious ethics as well as politics. The 
theory of the Wilāyat, as conceived by Khomeini, sparked a debate within the Shiʿī 
community in Lebanon which, at that point, was also represented by Shams al-Dīn. 
Shams al-Dīn was keener on the kind of social mobilisation path inaugurated by Mūsā 
al-Ṣadr in Lebanon. The more moderate intellectual stance of Shams al-Dīn was 
confirmed by the fact that he succeeded Mūsā al-Ṣadr at the head of the Lebanese 
Supreme Shiʿī Council. He was not as convinced regarding the Wilāyat al-Faqῑh as 
Faḍlallah. Both Mallat and Jamal Sankari indicate how he expressed rather pragmatic 
concern due to the fact that in a country characterised by sizable Christian, Druze and 
Sunni communities, the Wilāyat would not have been feasible if not throughout forced 
imposition.
42
 It was a position that, at a later stage, would have persuaded the most 
radical factions of the Lebanese Shiʿī community. The alternative concept presented by 
Shams al-Dīn was that of al-dymuqraṭiyya al-taʿadudiyya (pluralist democracy) 
reproducing the idea of a democratic participatory system but preserving the role of 
communities. Faḍlallah, however, maintained a more radical position claiming that the 
Wilāyat represented the ideal Islamic state to which the Muslim community should 
aspire. Such a position was endorsed by Hezbollah in 1985, in his Open Letter to the 
Downtrodden of Lebanon and the World. As mentioned below, the letter recognised the 
leadership of Khomeini and auspicated the establishment of a central Islamic state.
43
    
The debate on the Wilāyat, and generally on the perspective of an Islamic polity in 
Lebanon, assumed more nuanced shades contextually with the more peaceful period 
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of post-1989 Lebanon once the civil–sectarian conflict was sedated. At this stage, 
Faḍlallah implicitly recognised the utopic nature of the Wilāyat, when applied to the 
case of Lebanon, and developed the concept of dawlat al-insān (the human state). The 
idea of the ‘human state’ corresponds to the notion of ‘non-confessionalist democratic 
institutional mechanisms of electoral representation and public accountability, religious 
inclusivism, and social and economic justice.’
44
 This marks the beginning of a more 
moderate view on Islamic statehood which is also reflected in Hezbollah’s choice of 
participating in the political life of Lebanon and promoting the project of an Islamic state 
more as a political ideal rather than the starting point of a revolutionary political 
process.
45
 The ‘human state’ is a sort of middle base towards forms of more strictly 
Islamic statehood, which is recognised by Faḍlallah as a necessary compromise to 
cope with the social circumstances of Lebanon. 
The Shiʿī community of Lebanon did not lack reasons of internal dissent in various 
theoretical respects, but one fundamental element was common to all its internal 
components: the principle of resistance against the Israeli occupation and more 
generally against the Israeli state. All the Shiʿī leaders mentioned thus far shared the 
most hostile views towards Israel and Israeli policy in the region. With Lebanon subject 
to Israeli occupation and attacks, this further radicalised the situation. Mūsā al-Ṣadr 
expressed his hostility to Israel and support for the Palestinian cause in times when this 
was not even popular in south Lebanon and despite being among the moderate minds 
in the spectrum of Shiʿī thinking. His successor Shams al-Dīn condemned Israel even 
more harshly when he was the head of the Supreme Shiʿī Council at a time in which 
Lebanon was undergoing invasions and attacks from Israel. He was the issuer of an 
important fatwā that sanctioned the religious duty among the Shiʿites of Lebanon of 
civil disobedience and resistance against the Israeli occupier after the clashes between 
Shiʿī believers and the Israeli army during the ʿ shūraʾ procession in 1983.
46
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Faḍlallah’s position was the same, if not even more radical, as he gave religious 
justification for the struggle against Israel.
47
  
Throughout the tenures of Mūsā al-Ṣadr, Shams al-Dīn and Faḍlallah, the transnational 
network of Shiʿī activism emerged prominently on the Lebanese scene. Most 
importantly, the impact of the Iranian revolution and its foreign policy in the region, the 
common cause of opposition to Israel and the social marginalisation of Shiʿites in 
Lebanon provided the ideal conditions for the rise of Shiʿī Islamism in Lebanon. It is the 
combination of these factors that produced the conditions for the foundation of 
Hezbollah, as discussed in the section below. 
5.4 Historical Context of Hezbollah’s Foundation 
The first public document signed by Hezbollah attesting its official existence is the 
Open Letter to the Oppressed of Lebanon and the World (al-Risālat al-Maftu a 
Lilmustaḍʿafiyn fī Lubnān wa al-ʿĀlim) announced in 1985. However, its announcement 
and the formalisation of Hezbollah’s existence were preceded by several intricate 
events. 
Some sources date the original foundation of Hezbollah to 1982 but its origins can be 
traced back to 1978.
48
 Nʿaῑm Qāsim, a founding member of Hezbollah and its Deputy 
Secretary-General since 1998, claims that the first appearance of an Islamic resistance 
front is testified by the publication of the ‘Document of the Nine’ (Wathīqa al-Tisʿa). The 
manifesto, endorsed by three religious men from each of the Shiʿī regions of Lebanon 
(the South, Biqʿa Valley and the Beirut’s peripheral area), relies on three points: belief 
in Islam, opposition to Israel through jihād, and acknowledgment of the Wilāyat al-
Faqῑh as the only legitimate leadership.
49
 Not by coincidence, the same principles 
became the ideological backbone of Hezbollah. According to the same account, in the 
seven years preceding the Open Letter of 1985, a Consultative Council (majlis al-
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shūrā) was secretly operating as the most prominent forum in which religious Shiʿī 
leaders planned resistance activities against the Israeli occupation. 
Along with the social and intellectual mobilisation presented in the previous section, the 
newly established leadership in Iran was a fundamental factor in the formation of a 
religious Shiʿī resistance in Lebanon in ideological as well as logistical terms. Iran 
became a model of revolutionary Islamic regime for the Shūrā, and acted as a 
promoter for the formation of a religiously inspired Shiʿī armed group in Lebanon. The 
popularity of the Iranian revolution favoured the formation of factions further 
challenging the leadership of Amal within the Shiʿī community, already weakened by its 
ambiguous approach to the issue of a Lebanese–Israeli peace of 1983. A seceded 
branch of Amal, the Islamic Amal (Ḥarakat Amal al-Islāmiyya) emerged under the 
leadership of Ḥusayn al-Mūsawī
50
 one of the signatories of the Manifest of the Nine. 
The second Israeli invasion of Lebanon in 1982
51
 escalated the internal conflict 
between Amal (with the backing of Syria) and the Palestinian Liberation Organisation. 
This was the effect desired by Israel but also favoured by Syria, which deployed its 
army in Lebanon in 1976
52
  and intended to control the expansion of the Palestinian 
movement and did not want to be marginalised by the Palestinian Liberation 
Organisation in the negotiations with Israel. Initially, the Israeli army was greeted with 
enthusiasm in the villages of the south
53
 but a few months later the situation radically 
changed. A probably unexpected consequence of the 1982 invasion was the Iranian 
intervention in Lebanese affairs. In the surroundings of the city of Baʿalbek, Iran 
deployed about 1,500 Guardians of the Revolution with the aim of training a local 
resistance whose main priority was fighting the Israeli invasion and establishing an 
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Islamic state.
54
 Furthermore, Nicholas Blanford reports that the Iraqi members of Dʿawa 
formed a network of armed cells called Qassām, the members of which would have 
eventually joined the Islamic Resistance (al-Muqāwama al-Islāmiyya) i.e. Hezbollah’s 
armed wing.
55
  
Another account is given by one of the masterminds of the exportation of the Iranian 
revolution in the Levant and the creation of Hezbollah, ʿAlῑ Muḥtashimῑ (Iran’s 
ambassador to Syria from 1982 to 1985 and then Iran’s Interior Minister). He claims 
that Iran deployed a number of elite troops in Lebanon to counter the Israeli invasion 
within the broader framework of the Iran–Iraq war.
56
 The choice, nonetheless, turned 
out to be logistically unsustainable and for this reason Khomeini decided to instead 
provide training to the local Shiʿī population. In this respect, Gerges observes that the 
Iranian deployment in Lebanon was busier indoctrinating and Islamising the local Shiʿī 
population rather than fighting directly against the Israeli occupying troops.
57
  
The leader of Amal, Nabih Berri, joined the National Salvation Committee (20 June 
1982) set up by the president Ilyas Sarkis to deal with the Israeli Invasion and the 
presence of the PLO in Lebanon.
58
 The committee appeared to be more concerned with 
the withdrawal of the PLO rather than the Israeli occupation and, even though Berri left 
the committee, his participation produced an alienation of its constituency that turned to 
the project of an Iranian-inspired Islamic resistance against the Israeli occupation. In 
the meanwhile, a Multinational Force (MNF) composed by the USA, France and Italy 
was deployed to escort the evacuation of the PLO from Lebanon. The ambiguous 
relationship of Amal with the invading forces of Israel and its openness to negotiations 
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were the reasons for the deep fracture between Amal and the Islamist factions of the 
Shiʿī community, which eventually split and founded Islamic Amal. 
Within this framework, the newly trained Islamist forces became fully operative 
between the end of 1982 and 1983. After the withdrawal of the PLO under the 
supervision of the MNF (23 August 1983), the new Lebanese president Bashīr 
Jumayel, endorsed by Israel and the US, was elected by what was left of the 
parliament with the expectation of establishing a pro-Israeli regime in Lebanon, and 
striking a peace deal in a few months between the two countries.
59
  
Jumayel was killed a few weeks later and succeeded by his brother Amin. His 
assassination was then followed by the massacres of Sabra and Shatila in south Beirut 
(15, 16, 17 September 1982). The massacres took the lives of more than 1,000 
Palestinian refugees and internally displaced persons and were carried out by factions 
of the Christian militias under the eyes of the occupying Israeli army a few days after 
the MNF left the country.
60
 Under pressure due to the rage in international public 
opinion, the MNF was redeployed but only to become the new target of the Islamic 
factions and their foreign patrons: Syria and Iran.  
On 11 November 1982, the first ‘martyrdom operation’ was carried out against an 
Israeli-occupied building in Tyre. The Islamic guerrilla against the occupation was 
becoming a painful reality for the occupying forces. The suicide bomber, Aḥmad 
Kassīr, remained unknown for years and was only later revealed and endorsed by 
Hezbollah as the first shahīd istishahādiy,
61
 a martyr who is consciously going to die 
carrying out a jihād operation. The attack killed 75 Israeli and 15 others, among them 
Palestinians and Lebanese.
62
 With the unfolding of further clashes among the sectarian 
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militias but also against the Israeli occupier, the MNF was drawn into the conflict thus 
dissipating its already limited credibility of impartial force. On 18 April 1983 a suicide 
attack was carried out against the American Embassy during a meeting of CIA agents 
killing 63 people. The attack was claimed by Islamic Jihad, an obscure organisation 
associated with the emergence of Islamic armed activity in Lebanon, though more 
precise identification is difficult.
63
 
In September 1983, Israel withdrew its troops from the Shuf, the mostly Druze area in 
which Christian militias were fighting against the Druzes led by Walīd Junblāṭ. The 
withdrawal had ominous consequences for the Christian minority and it was at that 
point that the MNF, especially the US, intervened in the conflict inevitably risking the 
impartiality that was at the basis of their mission. On 23 October 1983, a marines’ base 
and a French paratroopers’ building were hit by two simultaneous suicide operations. 
The attacks killed 241 marines and 54 French soldiers
64
 and were claimed again by 
Islamic Jihad. Hala Jaber describes the attacks as the result of collaboration among 
Syrian and Iranian intelligence with the participation of members of the Lebanese Shiʿī 
militias; nonetheless the attacks took place at a stage when Hezbollah did not have the 
means to carry out this kind of operation.
65
 Fisk reports an interview with Ḥusayn al-
Mūsawī (the leader of Islamic Amal) in which he declared his support for the attacks 
but he did not claim responsibility.
66
  
A few days before the attacks against the marines and the French soldiers, another 
landmark event took place in Nabatiyya (south Lebanon) where, during a ʿ shūraʾ 
celebration, an Israeli military convoy tried to pass through the procession enraging the 
crowd and killing two people. The event provoked the reaction of the Higher Islamic 
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Shiʿī Council presided by Shams al-Dīn who issued a fatwā calling for civil resistance, 
thus officialising with a religious edict the Shiʿī opposition to the Israeli occupation.
67
 
In 1984, the tension in Lebanon was still high. In April the MNF withdrew completely 
while the Israeli army reduced the occupation area but maintained control over the 
southern region.
68
 On 2 February 1984, one of the most prominent leaders of the 
Islamic resistance and a student of Faḍlallah, Sheikh Rāghib Ḥarb, was killed. The 
killing was blamed on the Israelis and further consolidated the consensus around the 
resistance. The constant status of occupation, the continuous threat from the 
occupying forces and the enormous damages to the agricultural economy
69
 of the south 
Lebanon exasperated its population producing internal displacement and migration 
towards Beirut as well as creating fertile ground for the Islamic activism to grow. 
On the first anniversary of the death of Rāghib Ḥarb (16 February 1985), an official 
spokesman of Hezbollah, Ibrahim Amin al-Sayyid, announced the Open Letter to the 
Oppressed of Lebanon and the World.
70
 The text was signed by Hezbollah thus 
marking the existence of a paramilitary entity operating under this name. It was within 
this context of military confrontation involving international forces, Israeli military 
occupation, Palestinian factions and internal sectarian militias that Hezbollah emerged 
as the epitome of Shiʿī Islamism in Lebanon. Its motto was a verse of the Qurʾān 
saying ‘God’s party [Ḥizbuʾ  llāhi] is sure to triumph’
71
and on its flag appeared the 
definition ‘The Islamic Revolution in Lebanon’.
72
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5.5 Hezbollah’s Open Letter 
The Open Letter is the subject of a more detailed analysis in a comparative perspective 
in Chapter 9, but for now it is sufficient to identify its central themes as the definitional 
elements of Hezbollah’s political identity and to observe how these are consistent with 
the definitions of community and person, as proposed in Chapter 4. Hezbollah can be 
identified as a religious Islamic community (the ‘umma of Hezbollah’)
73
 committed to the 
principles of Islam, abiding by the decisions of the walῑ al-faqῑh
74
 and aiming at 
liberating Lebanon from external interferences, military occupation and promoting an 
Islamic reform of Lebanese society and institutions. The letter says that  
We, the sons of Hezbollah's umma, consider ourselves a part of the umma of 
Islam in the world; which is facing the most tyrannical and arrogant assault from 
both the West and the East – an assault intended to deprive it of the content of the 
Message with which God has blessed it.
75
  
This places Hezbollah clearly in the mainstream Islamist discourse which sees the 
Islamic community as threatened by the influence of external powers and values and in 
need of defending itself. Its exclusive reference to the Islamic tradition, highlighting the 
self-referentiality of Hezbollah, is evident if we consider for example the part in which it 
declares that ‘the fundamental sources of our culture are the venerable Qurʾān, the 
infallible Sunna, and the decisions and fatwā made by the Faqῑh our marjʿa al-taqlīd.’
76
 
Hezbollah aligns its political identity with Islamism by asserting the need to reform the 
community and its members. It declares so with reference to Quṭb’s concept of 
jāhiliyya
77
 and states that ‘it is time for us to realise that all the western ideas 
concerning human origin and nature cannot respond to his aspirations or rescue him 
from the darkness of misguidedness and jāhiliyya (ignorance). Only Islam can bring 
about human renaissance, progress, and creativity.’
78
 The person then, in Hezbollah’s 
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project, needs to embrace Islam and the principles of sharῑʿa to achieve his or her full 
realisation and salvation.  
These principles inform an individual’s responsibility towards the community, including 
the duty to resort to jihād if necessary to defend the moral and material integrity of the 
community. The letter states that ‘each of us [members of Hezbollah] is a combat 
soldier when the call of jihād demands it and each of us undertakes his task in the 
battle in accordance with his shariatic duty within the framework of action under the 
guardianship of the Wilāyat al-Faqῑh.’
79
 Eventually the letter exhorts all the Muslims of 
the world to be aware of their moral responsibility and support the cause of Hezbollah. 
The same text confirms how only Islamic principles can be the source of legitimacy for 
a political order when it says that ‘we do not hide our commitment to the rule of Islam 
and that we call to choose the Islamic system (al-niẓām al-islāmῑ) that alone 
guarantees justice and dignity for all and prevents any new imperialist attempt to 
infiltrate our country.’
80
 Hezbollah is nonetheless adamant at this early stage in stating 
that the implementation of an Islamic polity in Lebanon can only be the result of free 
choice from the Lebanese people and that it should not be imposed.
81
 
The document then presents a number of considerations strictly from an Islamist 
perspective and related to the historical and social circumstances in which Hezbollah 
was operating at the time. It denounces the practices of Western imperialism especially 
in relation to the US, France and its regional allies (primarily Israel but also the other 
Arab regimes enjoying the support of Western states). It declares Hezbollah’s aims of 
eliminating Israel, and fighting its occupation of Lebanese soil. Consequently Hezbollah 
is also hostile towards Israel’s Lebanese allies, the component of the Christian 
community operating under the banner of the katāʾeb.
82
 It also denounces the 
corruption of Lebanese statehood as well as its imbalance in the distribution of power 
in favour of the Christian component. It finally calls for a renewed sense of 
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responsibility for the Islamic community, the umma, to join the struggle against these 
forms of injustice as a duty dictated by belief in Islam. Quoting extensively from 
Khomeini’s appeal to the Muslim ʿulamāʾ to mobilise, the letter ends by calling them to 
undertake action and join the ranks of the Islamic revolution mentioning Bāqir al-Ṣadr 
and Musa al-Ṣadr as examples of paramount virtue.
83
 
5.6 Conclusions 
This chapter has presented the contexts in which Islamist Shiʿī political ideas 
developed within Iraq, Iran and eventually focused on the case of Lebanon, where 
Hezbollah was founded and operates. 
It has been highlighted how the case of Iraq is important as the intellectual cradle of 
Islamist Shiʿism, from where it subsequently spread to the rest of the region including 
Lebanon. The overview above shows a direct connection with the experience of Bāqir 
al-Ṣadr (who is mentioned in the Open Letter) and the rise of Hezbollah in Lebanon via 
the diaspora of Iraqi-trained ʿulamāʾ who found refuge in Lebanon and politically 
mobilised its Shiʿī community. The case of Iran is also fundamental. It constitutes the 
inspirational source of emulation for Hezbollah as the example of an accomplished 
Islamic revolution but also as the basis of the Wilāyat al-Faqῑh to which the movement 
fully commits in the Open Letter. Iran plays also a fundamental role as the regional 
strategic ally for the movement, providing material assistance in the military sector as 
well as in Hezbollah’s social services. At a later stage Syria also became part of this 
alliance. 
Hezbollah becomes a relevant case study for this analysis and will be used to 
understand to what extent international norms influence Islamist politics. Since its 
inception, Hezbollah earned a reputation for a particularly hard-lined Islamist 
movement which defended its stance and implemented its politics without hesitating to 
use force and relying on aggressive rhetorical action. This renders its permeability to 
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international norms unlikely. The self-referentiality and sense of self-sufficiency of this 
Islamist political actor and the foundational assumptions (as they were presented in the 
previous chapters) on which its political identity is based render implausible the 
possibility that international norms may influence its behaviour. If we consider the 
content of the Open Letter as well as its actions; it is hard to imagine that, a few years 
later, Hezbollah would have fielded its candidates in elections in Lebanon, or that it 
would have internalised certain principles of international humanitarian and human 
rights law, or that would have accepted the implementation of UN Security Council 
resolutions directly concerning its range of action. 
In an attempt to challenge this presumption, the following chapters present different 
instances in which Hezbollah interacted with international norms. The cases presented 
below highlight how, contrary to what may be reasonably presumed, the political 
identity of Hezbollah has been altered by international norms. This will bring to the 
conclusion that Islamist politics are not as immune to the influence of liberal norms as 
they claim to be, rather international norms act as means of socialisations of Islamist 
movements within the wider framework of international society challenging the 
communitarian assumptions upon which Islamism relies. 
Chapter 6  
 
Non-Combatant Immunity and Israel-Hezbollah Wars: 
the Case of the April Understanding 
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6.1 Introduction 
The first case to consider for interaction between Hezbollah and international norms is 
the norm of non-combatant immunity in conflict. The concept is of central importance in 
International Humanitarian Law (IHL) and, above all, in the corpus of norms that 
regulates armed conflict.
1
 As Hezbollah was involved in international conflict, it 
inevitably became exposed to the influence of this norm. 
The task for this analysis is to investigate to what extent and in which respects the 
definition of a person as ‘non-combatant’ was capable of modifying Hezbollah’s 
warfare. This chapter shows that even if Hezbollah initially did not distinguish between 
non-combatants and combatants among Israelis, at a later stage the distinction 
emerged as a parameter regulating its warfare as a result of its interaction with 
international political actors. The shift is representative of how an international norm is 
able to influence the identity of the Islamist actor, although it does not indicate 
necessarily a genuine commitment to international norms.
2
 
The events to which this phenomenon is related refer in particular to the 1996 conflict 
between Israel and Hezbollah and especially with regard to the Qānā Massacre. After 
the events of Qānā, Hezbollah became part
3
 of an unsigned agreement (the April 
Understanding) regulating the conflict on the basis of a combatant/non-combatant 
distinction. Although the historical process leading to the April Understanding began in 
1992 with the killing of Hezbollah’s Secretary-General ʿAbbās al-Mūsawī, the events of 
1996 constitute a watershed after which the adoption of non-combatant immunity 
became official. By this I do not intend to claim that after 1996 Hezbollah always 
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respected this principle but that its military strategy was revised also on the basis of 
this principle as it will become clearer on the basis of the following analysis. 
The following pages introduce Israel’s wars in Lebanon (Section 6.2), then report the 
events of Qānā (Section 6.3) and the subsequent diplomatic negotiations (Section 6.4). 
Section 6.5 discusses Hezbollah’s principles of Islamic warfare and Section 6.6 shows 
how they changed with regard to the April Understanding.  The conclusion will be that 
the adoption of non-combatant immunity by Hezbollah is indicative of an initial stage of 
socialisation in the international normative framework and that this challenges the 
Islamist concept of attaching moral value to the person in relation to their communal 
affiliation as well as the self-referential idea of the community typical of Islamist theory 
(Section 6.7). 
6.2 Israel’s Wars in Lebanon  
Israel has been operating militarily in Lebanon at least since 1968.
4
 The first major 
operation (preceded by various clashes with the Palestinian factions based in south 
Lebanon) was in 1978, when the Israeli Army invaded its northern neighbour for the 
first time (Operation Litani). The main aim, at this early stage, was to eliminate the 
Palestinian factions, and in particular Yaser ʿArafat’s PLO, which were using south 
Lebanon as the platform for their attacks against Israel. As seen in the previous 
chapter, in June 1982, Israel embarked on a full-scale invasion (Operation Peace for 
Galilee) reaching Beirut with the objective of eradicating the Palestinian presence in the 
country to then establish a friendly Christian-led regime. Eventually, the PLO left 
Lebanon (although many Palestinian factions remained) in August 1982 but Israel’s 
occupation lasted until May 2000.
 5
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138 
 
In 1985, the Israeli army partially withdrew maintaining its presence south of the line of 
the Litani River, establishing an area under its control and under the control of its proxy 
militia, the South Lebanon Army (SLA).
6
 The area was to become known as the 
‘Security Zone’ and intended to be a buffer between Israel and Lebanon. Allegedly, it 
would have enhanced the security of Israel isolating it from the rocket attacks 
originating from south Lebanon. Nonetheless, it did not deliver the expected results. It 
soon became a battlefield in which the Lebanese resistance against the Israeli occupier 
practised its war of attrition.
7
 According to Nizar Hamzeh’s research, the Islamic 
Resistance
8
 carried out about 6,000 operations from 1985 to 2000 including direct 
attacks on military personnel, mortar shelling, Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs), 
ambushes and, at a later stage, the shooting of Katyusha rockets.
9
 Domestically as well 
as internationally, the Israeli presence in Lebanon was often questioned, especially on 
the basis of the frustration of its goals, the human losses and its illegality.
10
 
On three occasions the war of attrition with the guerrilla factions grouped under the 
National Resistance escalated to high-intensity conflicts. Israel engaged in full-scale 
military operations with Hezbollah, which had the lion’s share in the guerrilla activity in 
July 1993 (Operation Accountability), in April 1996 (Operation Grapes of Wrath) and in 
July 2006 (Operation Change of Direction).
11
 The aim of all these operations was to 
annihilate Hezbollah but regularly failed to do so. Israel’s strategy in these wars, as well 
as in the occupation of Lebanon, proved to be ill-conceived and indeed the strategy 
was often judged as a failure.
12
 The then Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin described the 
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1993 operation as an effort to undermine the popular support of the Islamic Resistance 
in south Lebanon. The strategy was to displace the civil population by targeting civilian 
areas, infrastructure and Hezbollah’s bases.
13
 The displacement of civilians, allegedly, 
not only would have undermined Hezbollah’s support, but would have also pressured 
the Lebanese government into dealing with the problem of south Lebanon in a more 
resolute way. According to Itamar Rabinovich:  
Its principal component was a broad-scale expulsion of the Lebanese civilians 
from the southern part of the country north towards Beirut. In this fashion the 
Israeli authors of the operation expected to generate pressure on the Lebanese 
government of Rafiq Hariri and ultimately on the latter’s Syrian patrons.
14
 
However, the 1993 operation did not achieve these aims. 350,000 civilians evacuated 
part of the area migrating north of the Litani, but part of the population simply did not 
have another place to go nor the means to evacuate. Furthermore, the operation did 
not damage Hezbollah. Despite suffering casualties, the movement was even more 
active after the conflict and its popular support was as robust as before, if not more.
 15
 
The seven-day conflict of 1993 also had disproportionate consequences between the 
parties involved in terms of casualties. The Israeli army lost nine men (two of them 
immediately before the beginning of hostilities), whereas 147 Lebanese died in the 
attacks, most of them confirmed as civilians. In the same operation, about 75 Lebanese 
villages were destroyed along with other infrastructure.
16 
After six days of war, 
 
on 31 
July 1993, the US Secretary of State Warren Christopher brokered a ceasefire 
agreement in which the parties involved agreed on mutual restraints in military 
operation (July Agreement).  
The July Agreement did not cease the hostilities completely, but set up a regulatory 
regime for their continuation within restraints. According to this unwritten pact, 
Hezbollah would not fire rockets into Israel and Israel would stop targeting Lebanese 
                                               
13
 David Hirst, Beware of Small States: Lebanon, Battleground of the Middle East (New York: Nation Books, 
2010) p. 250. 
14
Itamar Rabinovich, The Brink of Peace: The Israeli-Syrian Negotiations (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University 
Press, 1998) p. 103.  
15
Norton and Schwedler, '(in)Security Zones' p. 71.  
16
 Ibid. 
140 
 
villages.
 
As August Norton and Jillian Schwedler observe: ‘Implicitly, the parties agreed 
that attacks inside the “security zone" that did not target civilians fell outside of the 
ceasefire agreement.’
17
 Between 1993 and 1996, the conflict continued at a 
substantially lower intensity within the restraints established by the informal agreement. 
The 1996 operation was a continuation of Israel’s 1993 strategy with the same 
outcomes. Operation Grapes of Wrath began on 11 April 1996
18
 after weeks of 
escalation on both sides in breach of the 1993 informal accord.
19
 Israeli military 
engagement aimed at dislodging civilians and targeted Hezbollah’s bases. As 
Rabinovich says: ‘at the core of the operation lay the notion that Israel could achieve at 
least some of its goals by exerting pressure on the government of Rafiq Hariri through 
destroying some economic targets and through causing the population in the south to 
flee to Beirut.’
20
 The engagement rules of the Israeli army reflected this strategy. For 
example they established that the civilian population travelling towards the north, thus 
evacuating the area, should not have been targeted whereas engagement was allowed 
with anyone travelling south, thus discouraging the repopulation of the area.
21
 The 
operation continued until 26 April when the parties agreed to a ceasefire. This time, the 
agreement was written and it became known as the April Understanding. The 
suspension of hostilities and their further regulation was principally due to the Israeli 
shelling of a UN compound which killed 104 civilians. What subsequently became 
known as the Qānā Massacre is analysed in more detail in the following section.
22
 It 
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was inevitable that these wars, in which civilians were cruelly used ‘like pawns’
23
 for 
strategic purposes, would have eventually caused damages of these proportions. 
6.3 The Massacre of Qānā 
The events of Qānā are a turning point in the Israel–Hezbollah conflict.
24
 The human 
suffering caused by the conflict and the reputational costs for both actors involved in 
this event, provoked a rethinking of the rules of engagement and more generally of the 
conflict. On 18 April 1996, south Lebanon was for the seventh consecutive day under 
the attack of Israeli military forces. To these attacks, the Islamic guerrilla group along 
with other armed formations responded by targeting Israeli military outposts in the 
Security Zone, and shooting rockets into northern Israeli territory in retaliation.  
On that day, a Hezbollah squad shot about eight rockets and five mortar rounds 
against Israeli military targets. The mortar rounds fell close to an Israeli patrol which 
was unharmed and reacted by asking for rescue fire. Hezbollah’s fighters used an area 
surrounding a UN compound under the command of the UNIFIL mission as the launch 
pad for their attack. According to the observation of the subsequent investigation, the 
rockets and mortar rounds were shot from positions at a distance varying from 600 to 
200 metres from the south side of the UN compound in breach of the laws of war.
25
 In 
the UN base, more than 800 people took refuge from the hostilities.  
The Israeli army engaged in the rescue fire called for by its troops and the 
consequences were a disaster. Once identified, the coordinates of the location from 
where the Hezbollah attack was launched and orders were sent to an artillery battalion 
located on the Israeli/Lebanese border. Having noticed the proximity to the UN-
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inhabited area, the battalion asked for confirmation on the target which was 
subsequently given by the central command. Two artillery batteries then fired on the 
targets indicated by the orders.
26
 The facts reported by the subsequent investigation of 
the massacre show that the shelling of the Israeli artillery focused on two areas, the 
second of which did not match with the area from where Hezbollah was previously 
shooting. The first concentration of impact was south of the UN compound, roughly 
corresponding to the site where the Hezbollah mortar was located. But the second area 
of impact corresponded with the UN compound. Almost all the proximity-fuse
27
 
ammunitions fell on the second target area, killing more than one hundred refugees 
who were taking shelter in the UN premises. 
According to some testimonies, some of the members of the Hezbollah brigade who 
were shooting in the proximity of the compound entered the premises after firing the 
mortars.
 28
 It is not established whether this happened before, during or after the Israeli 
shelling of the compound. Nonetheless, the shelling of UN facilities was a violation of 
the laws of war and even the presence of combatants in the building, if ever confirmed, 
would not have justified the shelling.
29
The massacre provoked an international reaction 
for the level of barbarity which the conflict had reached. The grim images of the victims 
became immediately public throughout the world’s media. As the target of the shelling 
of a UN facility, the Qānā events immediately assumed an international relevance. The 
UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali sent his Military Adviser Major-General 
Franklin van Kappen to Lebanon to report on these events. Israel’s military strategy
30
 
                                               
26
 At a later stage it was discovered that an Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) was flying over the area, along with 
other helicopters as testified by a video recorded by an international observatory in a nearby UN basis. 
27
 These are ammunitions that explode not on the contact with the target but in its proximity. Their use is related 
to specific strategic reasons such as targeting a moving object or others. 
28
 Blanford, Warriors of God p. 168. The same was also confirmed to the author as a possible although 
unconfirmed hypothesis by Fisk. 'Author's Interview with Robert Fisk, Middle East Correspondent for the 
Independent', (Beirut, Lebanon: 9 September 2009).  
29
 A double-effect principle argument to justify the shelling of the UN facility is dismissed by the disproportionate 
cost in human lives, and almost null strategic value of the target. In addition to this, the UN compound was 
clearly signed, reported on maps and the UN previously alerted Israel to the presence of refugees in the 
compound.  
30
 It has to be noted that the Qānā Massacre is only one of the incidents involving civilian victims in this conflict. 
For a more complete overview of the war’s events which involved civilians see: Amnesty International (1996) 
'Israel/Lebanon Unlawful Killings During "Operation Grapes of Wrath"', Human Rights Watch (1997) 
'Israel/Lebanon: "Operation Grapes of Wrath" - the Civilian Victims'. 
143 
 
and Operation Grapes of Wrath in general became a source of criticism and 
condemnation inconvenient for Israel and its allies. In a frank page of his memoire, 
Rabinovich observes with regard to the strategic thinking of Grapes of Wrath that:  
If the flaws in this kind of thinking were not self-evident, they should have been 
realized by any Israeli who studied the lessons of Operation Accountability. The 
prospects of actually achieving the operation’s goals were limited, while Israel was 
bound to be cast in the role of the heartless, powerful state venting its rage and 
massive military power on innocent and helpless civilians.
31
 
Even more problematic was the fact that van Kappen’s investigation excluded almost 
categorically the accidental nature of the Qānā events. Different elements brought him 
to the conclusion that the shelling of the UN compound could have not been a mistake 
although the motivations of this action are not very clear.
32
 
The shelling of the UN building was not the result of involuntary overshooting of the 
guns according to the military investigation of van Kappen. Further doubts were raised 
by the contradictory declarations of Israeli officials during van Kappen’s investigations, 
for example as regards the presence of helicopters during the bombing. At a later 
stage, a tape recorded by a Norwegian troop not far from Qānā shows the presence of 
a helicopter and a drone in the area of the shelling while the shelling was ongoing, a 
fact denied by Israeli officials. Van Kappen’s report listed a number of circumstances 
showing the implausibility of the accident thesis put forward by the Israeli authority, and 
concluded that: ‘while the possibility cannot be ruled out completely, it is unlikely that 
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the shelling of the United Nations compound was the result of gross technical and/or 
procedural errors.’
33
  
A different opinion is advanced by Louis Rene Beres, who defends the legality of 
Israel’s shelling of Qānā. He claims that ‘responsibility for this tragic Israeli artillery 
bombardment of UN-protected civilian refugees in Lebanon lies pre-eminently with 
Hizbullah and its Islamic state mentors, Syria and Iran, as well as with Lebanon.’
34
 He 
defends this opinion on the basis of the alleged fact that Hezbollah was committing a 
‘perfidious act’ engaging in military activity in the proximity of a UN basis,
35
 and that 
Israel shelled the UN compound due to a mistake in mapping the location.
36
 
Van Kappen’s report was eventually submitted to the Secretary-General, and rendered 
the situation embarrassing at the diplomatic level for Israel and its allies.
37
 In a meeting 
with van Kappen, Madeleine Albright (then US Ambassador to the UN) asked him 
whether he was sure about the report’s contents and made clear that she was ‘upset’ 
about it.
38
 Pressure was exerted on the UN in order to keep the report confidential; 
further, the tape recording the events was not to be made public but eventually the 
report was adopted and made public by the Security Council.
39
  
6.4 The Diplomatic Negotiations of the April Understanding 
The events of Qānā encouraged the acceleration of the diplomatic efforts to end the 
hostilities and rendered Israel’s position in the negotiations most unfavourable. As 
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Rabinovich says, ‘the ensuing wave of international and Arab indignation and 
condemnation made Israel’s position practically untenable.’
40
  The actors involved in the 
diplomatic initiative were Israel and the US along with European countries, such as 
France. Syria acted as the patron of the resistance in Lebanon. Lebanon, at the time 
under Rafīq al-Ḥarīrī’s premiership, was under the pervasive influence of Hāfeẓ al-
Asad’s rule and was supportive of the National Resistance. Iran kept a low but decisive 
profile in giving the green light to the final agreement.  
Two main diplomatic tracks were in competition; on the one hand there was the US 
channel, on the other the France minister of foreign affairs, Hervé de Charette, was 
engaged in a different negotiation. According to a report of that time, ‘their efforts 
devolved into competing shuttle diplomacy with the two of them following each other 
back and forth between Jerusalem and Damascus in an effort to broker an agreement 
between Israel, Lebanon, and Lebanon’s de facto suzerain, Syria.’
41
 The USA was 
looking for an agreement that would have imposed the disarmament of Hezbollah by 
the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) or Syria. After three months in which there were no 
attacks against the Israeli army or shooting of rockets, then there would have been a 
possibility to start negotiating the withdrawal of Israel from Lebanon.
42
 This was a 
proposal that had been around since the 1993 crisis.
43
 Three years later, and in a 
weaker bargaining position, the same proposal was turned down. 
France was pursuing an agreement referring to UNSC Resolution 425 and thus 
demanding the withdrawal of Israel from Lebanon without asking for Hezbollah’s 
disarmament or the cessation of its activity in the security zone.
44
The two plans 
overlapped in their intent to protect civilians thus resuming and ameliorating the non-
written conditions of the 1993 July Agreement. On 26 April, the parties reached an 
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agreement over an unsigned document, the so-called April Understanding. The 
Understanding contained various clauses, but importantly included an absolute 
prohibition of targeting non-combatants as it was established by the international norm 
of non-combatant immunity. The Understanding goes as follows: 
The two parties commit to ensuring that under no circumstances will civilians be 
the target of attack and that civilian populated areas and industrial and electrical 
installations will not be used as launching grounds for attacks .
45
 
A forum of participating countries (Israel–Lebanon Monitoring Group) would have 
supervised the abidance or violation of the terms of warfare established by the 
document.
46
 Eventually, the mechanism established a code of practice for the 
continuation of hostilities incorporating the principle of non-combatant immunity and 
establishing an absolute prohibition to target civilians and civilian property. The 
members of the Israel–Lebanon Monitoring Group (ILMG) were France, the US, Syria, 
Lebanon and Israel. Since then, tensions on the border have often run high although 
no major clashes occurred until 2006 when the July War erupted. Eventually, 
Hezbollah invoked the April Understanding as a condition for a ceasefire for the 2006 
conflict.
47
 
6.5 Military Jihād and Islamic Warfare 
The events presented above had a significant impact on Hezbollah’s military action 
against Israel, shaping its warfare in a way that increasingly (although not in a definitive 
manner) internalised the principle of discrimination between combatants and non-
combatants in relation to Israeli targets as well. Although principles regulating the use 
of force are present in Islamic warfare tradition and in Hezbollah’s practices as well, the 
integration of an absolute
48
 principle of non-combatant immunity within Hezbollah’s 
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religious warfare is an innovation that came about progressively as a result of the 1996 
events.  
Jihād is the basis of legitimacy for Hezbollah’s military activity.
49
 This is confirmed by 
Qāsim’s account of Hezbollah’s pillars in which jihād figures among the most 
prominent.
50
 The concept of jihād also appears in various occasions in the 1985 letter.
51
 
According to Qāsim, military jihād is conceived as defensive (al-jihād al-difʿaī) by 
Hezbollah and with the purpose of liberating occupied territory or as a defence to 
aggression against the community. Offensive jihād (al-jihād al-ibtidʿaī) is not allowed in 
the absence of the Prophet or before the return of the twelfth vanished Imam (Imām al-
 ahdī), and therefore Hezbollah considers only defensive jihād to be legitimate.
52
  
Thus, the foundation of Hezbollah’s jihād against Israel is based on the idea that Israel 
is an illegitimate occupying entity and thus jihād against Israel is a just war as it is 
defensive against an oppressive occupier.
53
 The problem is that the theory of religious 
warfare regulated by jihād is subject to interpretation with regard to the immunity of 
non-combatants and this uncertainty leaves open a discretionary margin of 
interpretation. Whereas jihād provides relatively clear indications with regard to ius ad 
bellum the regulation of conflict (i.e. ius in bello) is more problematic. As John Kelsay 
notices ‘there is a paucity of attention in contemporary Islamic discussions of the jus in 
bello concerns, and […] this points to the difficulty of keeping a moral tradition “up to 
date” when its interaction with military and political matters is limited.’
54
 A growing 
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literature recently tried to clarify the regulation of conflict according to Islamic principles 
but, as it is regularly the case, discussions of Islamic interpretations are hardly 
conclusive.
55
 The sources of sharῑʿa, whether the Qurʾān or the  adīth, are subject to 
interpretations and various legal schools, traditions and opinions of sheikhs, ayatollahs 
or ʿulamāʾ differ in various respects with none having the last word. 
There is general agreement, however, that in Islamic warfare women, children and 
elders shall be immune from the consequences of belligerent actions. This confirms 
that a principle of non-combatant discrimination applies to some extent, as in IHL.
56
 
Sohail Hashmi observes that: 
The Qur’an provides the basis for ius in bello considerations: ‘and fight in God’s 
cause against those who wage war against you, but do not transgress limits, for 
God loves not the transgressors’ [2:190]. The ‘limits’ are enumerated in the 
practice of the Prophet and the first four caliphs.
57
 
Nonetheless, various problems arise, for example with the interpretation of the concept 
of aggression and defence, especially with regard to foreign occupation or towards 
oppressive and authoritarian regimes. This led to interpretations authorising attacks 
against authoritarian regimes in the past (as seen in the case of Quṭb), Israeli non-
combatants or the use of suicide bombing as forms of resistance.
58
 Furthermore, non-
combatant immunity in Islamic warfare is limited by derogations as the ‘double-effect 
principle’, or cases of necessity or non-intentionality as in IHL.
59
 
In the case of Hezbollah, the fatwā issued by Shiʿī Grand Ayatollahs in Lebanon and 
from the Walī al-Faqῑh Khomeini and his successor Khamenei confirmed the religious 
obligations (wājib sharʿī) of jihād. As already discussed, one example of this is Shams 
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al-Dīn’s fatwā of 1983 in which ‘civil resistance’ to the Israeli occupation was religiously 
sanctioned.
60
 However, Qāsim refers repeatedly to the declarations of Khomeini and 
Khamenei as a source justifying jihād against Israel. He makes clear that:  
The jihad decision is tied to the Jurist-Theologian [Walī al-Faqῑh], upon whom rests 
the duty of diagnosing the situation and categorizing it as falling under the banner 
of defensive jihad or not. He is entrusted with defining the fundamentals and 
guidelines of confrontation. The responsibility for blood is great, and fighters 
should not be consigned into any battle without identifying that which is in 
harmony with the duty and objectives of jihad.
61
 
Thus, no matter what interpretations could be available, the last word in Hezbollah’s 
regulation of warfare is in the judgements and decisions of the Walī al- Faqῑh.
62
  
6.6 Non-Combatant Immunity in Warfare against Israel 
The actual rules of engagement in conflict and the definition of lawful targets remain 
vague and often decided on a circumstantial basis. Let us consider a key example. The 
first operation carried out by Hezbollah (or its original nucleus) against an Israeli 
military target in Tyre sheds some light in this respect. Targeting a military facility of an 
occupying force was legitimate from the point of view of Islamic warfare as interpreted 
by Hezbollah, but things were complicated by the fact that the facility was also the 
place of detention of many Muslims.
63
 According to Jaber this raised serious moral 
dilemmas in Hezbollah.  
When the Shiite radicals met at the time to discuss the bombings of the two IDF 
[Israeli Defence Force] bases, they were faced with an acute moral dilemma. Torn 
between their desire to attack Israel at the hearth of its operations in Lebanon and 
their Islamic teaching and upbringing which condemned the killing of their fellow 
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Muslims, the fighters realized that what they needed was not just a military 
decision, but a religious edict, fatwa, from a scholar.
64
 
Hezbollah eventually obtained a religious ruling legitimising actions in which Muslims 
were killed if they were used as human shields by the enemy or anyway if the enemy 
casualties were higher than the Muslims killed.
65
 This case shows that the criterion for 
engaging in bellicose activity took into account the minimisation of harm to the non-
combatant population, but on the basis of the ‘Double-Effect Principle’
66
 or assessing 
the general benefits of this operation against its costs. The operation was therefore 
eventually authorised notwithstanding its high cost in innocent lives.
67
 Ayatollah 
Faḍlallah also confirms this logic in an interview in which he declares that doing 
injustice to an unbeliever is forbidden and the hijacking of means of transport 
containing civilians or kidnapping non-combatants is in violation of Islamic principles, 
but these principles can be derogated for pragmatic reasons: 
Some issues have to be viewed in a wider context. Otherwise, how can one justify 
wars, where there are many innocent casualties? If harming an innocent is 
categorically wrong, then warfare is categorically wrong. Islamic values do not 
exist in abstraction, suspended in mid-air, as it were; they are human values that 
apply to real situations in the real world. A negative value may be transformed into 
a positive value if it serves the public good.
68
 
As in the case of International Humanitarian Law, the prohibition of killing non-
combatants is not unconditional, and can be suspended if the strategic benefits of its 
violation are proportionate to its collateral damage. Hezbollah primarily carried out 
attacks against military targets and in general avoided or minimised the involvement of 
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non-combatants, but when necessary or strategically advantageous, non-combatants 
could also have been involved in an attack. This does not apply when the non-
combatants in question are Israelis. Indeed Hezbollah deliberately targeted civilians 
and civilian property in Israel, disregarding the principle of non-combatants’ immunity, 
especially through the use of Katyusha rockets.  
Israel’s assassination of Hezbollah’s Secretary-General ʿAbbās al-Mūsawī (1952–
1992) was the event that initiated Hezbollah’s deliberate attacks on civilians.
69
 Al-
Mūsawī was killed on the 16 February 1992 along with his wife and his children by an 
Israeli helicopter gunship. The assassination enraged Hezbollah, which promptly 
replaced al-Mūsawī with Hasan Nasrallah. The killing of al-Mūsawī inaugurated 
Hezbollah’s ‘balance of terror’ doctrine (tawāzun al-rʿab), on the basis of which it would 
have reacted to Israeli attacks with attacks targeting northern Israel using Katyusha 
rockets.
70
 This widened its military objectives from targeting the Israeli military in 
Lebanon to aiming at Israelis in the north of Israel. Katyushas are rudimentary and 
ballistically inaccurate weapons, they do not allow precise targeting and differentiation 
between military or civilian targets and consequently they amount to deliberate attacks 
on civilians.
71
 
The effectiveness of these actions is inferior if compared to the damage caused by 
Israeli operations.
72
 Nonetheless, its terrorising effects over the civilian population and 
the causation of internally displaced persons are accounted as violations of the laws of 
war. The issue of Hezbollah’s alleged involvement in terrorist attacks targeting civilians 
outside of Israel, in the same period, also deserves brief consideration. In 1992, the 
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Israeli Embassy in Buenos Aires was bombed
73
 and in 1994 the Israeli–Argentinian 
Mutual Association in the same city was also attacked.
74
 The responsibility for these 
acts has been attributed by the Argentinian prosecutor to Hezbollah among others, but 
Hezbollah has always denied accountability.
75
 If Hezbollah’s responsibilities for these 
terrorist attacks were to be ascertained, it would further confirm Hezbollah’s selective 
commitment to non-combatant immunity according to which Israelis or Zionists are not 
considered immune.
76
  
Amal Saad-Ghorayeb elaborates that Hezbollah has made its war with Israel a 
founding commitment prior to any other, and that it sees Israel as an undistinguished 
‘monolithic society’ in which all its members are a potential target for Hezbollah.
77
 She 
accounts for Hezbollah’s justification of attacks on Israeli civilians on the basis of three 
factors: as a self-defence policy, a strategic measure and as the result of the belief that 
all Israelis are Zionist enemies, hence legitimate targets.
78
 Hezbollah’s warfare, then, 
allowed for deliberate targeting of non-combatants and non-combatants property in 
Israel, differently from the other cases in which restraints applied in the case of non-
combatants. This selective application of the non-combatant immunity principle is not 
only to be found in Hezbollah’s case but is consistent with wider Islamist moral thinking 
on warfare against Israel.  
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One of the most notable examples is that of Yūsuf al-Qarḍawῑ, a prominent Sunni ʿālim 
who proposes a similar line of thought.
79
 His argument is that since Israel is a country in 
which men and women are supposed to serve in the army and remain liable to be 
recalled as reservists, then the distinction between combatants and non-combatants 
does not apply because all of them are potential enemies.
80
 In this perspective, attacks 
against Israelis are legitimate even when they do not discriminate between combatant 
and non-combatant targets, as happened in certain attacks carried out by the 
Palestinian resistance in Israel.  
The argument was similarly exposed by Nasrallah in a speech of 2001 at a time in 
which the April Understanding was suspended.
81
 Nasrallah claims that ‘there are no 
citizens [madaniyin] in the Zionist entity [as] all of them are aggressors and participants 
in the onslaught against the [Palestinian] people.’
82
 Furthermore Ghorayeb quotes 
Hezbollah’s high ranking member Husain al-Mūsawī saying that ‘the Israeli soldier in 
Lebanon has a mission to expand occupation; the Israeli civilian in Israel is a 
confirmation of that occupation. They both serve one aim and both considered 
enemies’
83
 thus confirming how Israelis are undifferentiated objectives for Hezbollah’s 
military activity. It is then legitimate to conclude that, although Hezbollah applied the 
principle of non-combatant immunity, it did so selectively and not with regard to the 
Israelis who are considered an undistinguished group of enemies. With the July 
Agreement of 1993 but above all after the April Understanding of 1996, things 
changed. After then, admittedly, there were various occasions in which Hezbollah did 
target non-combatants in Israel as retaliation to Israeli actions targeting non-
combatants in Lebanon, but this strategy of retaliation was based on a distinction 
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between combatants and non-combatants within Israelis, which was previously absent 
in Hezbollah’s military action. 
The event of Qānā of 1996 and the high costs in civilians’ lives of the war overall 
prompted a rethink. At this stage non-combatant immunity became influential in 
redefining the rules of the conflict and introduced the distinction between combatants 
and non-combatants with regard to Israeli population. Qānā was a tremendous shock 
for the local population and, notwithstanding the fact that Israel was responsible for the 
massacre, Hezbollah, with its fighters shooting in proximity of the UN compound, bear 
relevant responsibilities which did not pass unnoticed to the local population.
84
  
The cost in human lives and, in particular, the human lives of innocent non-combatants 
became unacceptable under any principle from the point of view of international law or 
in a cost–benefit perspective. Self-restraint came, then, as a consequence to put an 
end to the use of civilian lives and deaths as the instrument of a cruel game on both 
sides. Under the pressure of international actors, eventually, the parties agreed on 
rules regulating the conflict contained in the April Understanding. The new rules were 
clearly drawing a distinction between combatants and non-combatants within Israel’s 
population, changing the selective non-combatant immunity principle adopted by 
Hezbollah into an absolute non-combatant immunity principle. Rules decided on the 
basis of International Humanitarian Law prevailed over various interpretations of 
Islamic warfare. In commenting on the April Understanding on the 30 April 1996, 
Nasrallah, Secretary General of Hezbollah, declared that: 
Our second objective is the protection of civilians: before the July Understanding 
[the unwritten agreement of 1993] no one bothered about the Lebanese civilians - 
neither America, France, Russia, the European Union, the Arab League, or the 
United Nations. It was nobody’s business; we never heard condemnations of 
civilian massacres in the south. The resistance used Katyushas in order to put 
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pressure on the Israelis, and tell them that when Lebanese civilians are in danger, 
your civilians will also be in danger.
85 
 
Hezbollah then moved from a view of the enemy in which all Israelis were potential 
targets to a concept in which a distinction between civilian and non-civilian became 
relevant.  
Although the April Understanding imposed the absolute prohibition of targeting 
civilians,
86
 Hezbollah’s doctrine of the ‘balance of terror’ remained active in the sense 
that when Israel violated the Understanding by targeting Lebanese civilians, retaliatory 
action was implemented on a regular basis by Hezbollah. Violations of the April 
Understanding occurred, but until the Understanding was effective,
87
 its rules 
significantly curbed hostile activities on both sides. According to Adir Waldman: 
While civilian casualties did continue in the wake of the April Agreement, the 
parameters of the conflict in southern Lebanon did in fact change under its 
operation. The parties to the Agreement understood that firing at civilians or firing 
from civilian areas was now outside of the code of accepted behavior and that 
there would be repercussions from such actions.
88
 
What is relevant for the sake of this analysis is that, although the Understanding was 
violated on certain occasions by resuming ‘the balance of terror’ strategy, they 
nonetheless introduced a distinction between non-combatant and combatant that was 
previously absent in the case of Israeli targets. As Daniel Sobelman observes: 
The rules of the game which co-evolved between the sides defined the nature and 
the scope of the confrontation, containing and restraining the intensity of the 
conflict. Perhaps the most pivotal of all the rules of the game was the guiding 
principles calling for the exclusion of targeting civilians on both sides of the 
border.
89
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In a more general perspective, the practice of targeting civilians became more explicitly 
condemned by Hezbollah. For example, Hezbollah condemned the attacks against the 
Christian monks in Algeria (1996), tourists in Egypt (1997)
 90
 and the attacks on the 
‘Twin Towers’ (but not the Pentagon, considered a military target) in 2001.
91
  
This process of assimilation of an international norm within the activity of an Islamist 
movement can be interpreted as an indicator of its socialisation within international 
society. Hezbollah’s warfare originally relied exclusively on Islamic premises but by 
interacting with international actors and on the basis of dramatic historical 
circumstances, the international norm of non-combatant immunity acquired importance 
introducing differentiation between combatants and non-combatants within the Israeli 
population.  
6.7 Conclusions 
The need to regulate the conflict with Israel in light of the disastrous events at Qānā 
and the human suffering that was imposed on the civilian population of Lebanon 
modified the principles of Hezbollah’s hostile activity. With the April Understanding, 
Hezbollah’s moral thinking on the rules of warfare shifted from a merely Islamist 
interpretation to an idea that combined the duty of jihād against Israel with the 
international normative distinction between combatants and non-combatants, until then 
not applied to Israelis.  
This has some implications with regard to the considerations presented in Chapter 4 on 
person and community which anticipate part of the observations presented in Chapter 
10.
92
 The fact that international norms influenced the behaviour of an Islamist political 
actor is an indicator that Islamism is not as self-referential as it claims to be and signals 
a phase of socialisation in international society in which, by interacting with 
international political actors, international norms increasingly acquire a constitutive 
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 Saad-Ghorayeb, Hizbullah pp. 101-2. 
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value for its political identity. The indeterminacy of Islamic principles of warfare (Section 
6.5) leaves a margin of discretion that allows international norms to influence their 
interpretation, for example extending the definition of non-combatants to all persons, 
notwithstanding their religious or national affiliation. This is the sign of an increasing 
susceptibility of an Islamist actor to the influence of international norms and also an 
indicator of its progressive socialisation within the international normative framework. 
Furthermore, this chapter has shown that although Hezbollah considered all Israelis as 
combatants, with the implementation of the April Understanding, Israeli non-
combatants acquired the same moral value as other non-combatants and then became 
entitled to immunity from belligerent activity. This shift not only shows that an Islamist 
actor is indeed subject to the influence of international norms, but also its concept of 
person as strictly defined by communal affiliation is challenged. As Hugo Slim says: 
The civilian idea argues for what social psychologists call a ‘super-ordinate 
identity’ – a belief that all of us, no matter what side we are on, have a greater 
common identity as human beings than the particular identities that war bestows 
on us as ‘enemies’ or ‘allies’. Belief in the idea of the civilian turns, therefore, on 
issues of personal identity and social relationship. It requires us to allow people a 
fundamental and vulnerable human identity that is not determined by their 
immediate relationship with politics, economics or social structure of war. Their 
human value transcends their social connections with the war.
93
  
Slim captures well the importance of the recognition of persons as non-combatants 
which has been described in this chapter. With the extension of the category of non-
combatant to include Israelis, Hezbollah has implicitly (and probably not entirely 
cognisant) acknowledged a moral value attached to their humanity that was absent 
before, when the Israelis were considered an undistinguished enemy.  
This amounts to a change in the way Hezbollah looks at persons not only as members 
of a certain community as Muslims, Christians or Zionist Jews for example, but entails 
a recognition of their human status and consequently of their moral value independent 
from their contextual communal affiliation. As much as the idea of an isolated self-
referential community is challenged by the events of 1996, the Islamist idea of person 
                                               
93
 Hugo Slim, 'Why Protect Civilians? Innocence, Immunity and Enmity in War', International Affairs, 79/3 (2003), 
481-501 at p. 483. 
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is altered in favour of an emerging concept of humanity in which the moral value of the 
person is independent from contextual and communal characterisation. As the 
following chapter shows, similar patterns of transition in Hezbollah’s political identity 
can be traced with regards to other occasions in which it interacts with international 
norms.
Chapter 7  
 
Hezbollah and Human Rights Legislation in the 
Lebanese Parliament 
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7.1 Introduction 
Having looked at the first case which highlighted the dynamics of Hezbollah’s 
interaction with IHL, this chapter analyses Hezbollah’s approach to the legislative 
process in relation to human rights laws. In 1992, Hezbollah decided to take part in 
parliamentary politics in Lebanon after a lengthy discussion within its ranks regarding 
this decision and its effects on its political identity (Section 7.2). For this reason, it was 
necessary to rethink how an Islamist movement could have dealt with norms and 
institutions not founded on Islamic principles but rather inspired by liberal norms such 
as the sovereignty of a parliament elected by the Lebanese people. Even more 
problematic was the fact that the parliament could approve laws that may not have 
been Islamic in their inspiration and sometimes may even be in open conflict with 
Islamic principles.  
Section 7.3 illustrates how Hezbollah makes decisions in this regard. What is 
interesting to notice is that its approach to law making allows for the adoption of 
legislation that is not Islamic and sometimes may contravene Islamic principles. In 
order to assess how international norms influence this process, this chapter looks at 
how legislation informed by human rights principles was addressed by the members of 
Hezbollah’s delegation in the parliament.  
Three patterns can be discerned. The first is the most common, and amounts to 
Hezbollah’s neutrality towards human rights legislation. Having analysed about 50 laws 
concerned with human rights from 1992 to 2006, in almost all these cases Hezbollah 
does not raise issues of fundamental relevance against the approval of these laws in 
the Lebanese Parliament (Section 7.4). 
The second pattern is a form of selectivity that sees Hezbollah active in supporting a 
solution for certain human rights issues (examples given here refer to detainees in 
Lebanon protestors’ rights in Bahrain and the issue of the offensive movie against the 
Prophet of Islam). But this more proactive stance is noticeably limited to social groups 
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with which Hezbollah shares a particular sense of loyalty due to a common sectarian 
identity (Section 7.5). 
Finally, there are issues in which the more conservative and Islamist outlook of the 
movement still prevails over the influence of international human rights principles. As 
Section 7.6 illustrates, this is the case particularly for those human rights laws which 
aim at reforming the conservative personal status law system of Lebanon and more 
generally in the Middle East. In this respect Hezbollah, along with the other Islamist 
factions of the parliament and in agreement with religious authorities, does not seem to 
be open to compromise.  
On the basis of this analysis, the chapter then concludes that Hezbollah’s integration in 
the Lebanese parliamentary system since 1992 increasingly exposed it to the influence 
of international norms (although mediated through national legislation) and facilitated 
its socialisation within the international normative system, in particular with regard to 
human rights legislation. As in the previous example with regard to non-combatant 
immunity, the self-referentiality of Islamism is strongly challenged and an Islamist 
political actor like Hezbollah is forced to revise aspects of its political identity to fit into 
the wider framework of norms and institutions of Lebanon, but also of the international 
human rights system. 
7.2 Hezbollah’s Participation in Parliament 
The decision to take part fully in Lebanese politics came as a consequence of the new 
social and political circumstances emerging from the end of the civil war and the Ṭāʾif 
Agreement of 1989
1
 and was the result of a heated debate within Hezbollah. There 
have been various interpretations from scholars about the nature of the debate and the 
internal dynamics of this discussion between various views within Hezbollah, and most 
                                               
1 
The Ṭāʾif Agreement brought to an end the Lebanese civil war (1975–90). It modified the distribution of 
parliamentary seats between Christians and Muslims attributing half of these to the former and the other half to 
the latter. It also called for the progressive abolishment of the confessional system. Until when abolishment of the 
sectarian system is not accomplished, nonetheless, governments are required to be representative in their 
composition of all the Lebanese sects. The same agreement, maintained the distribution of powers at the 
executive level (a Christian president, a Sunni Prime Minister and a Shiʿī Chair of the Parliament) but gave more 
powers to the Prime Minister, thus reducing the capacity of the President.
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accounts refer to an internal struggle between Hezbollah’s factions but the subject 
remains the object of speculation.
 2
 What is relevant, however, is to notice the 
theoretical implications of this move. 
The primary concern was how Hezbollah could retain its Islamic political values while 
interacting with norms and institutions that have foundations which are disconnected 
from Islam.
 
It is not a coincidence that the movement experienced its first internal split 
in these circumstances with the departure of one of its most hard-line members, Subḥῑ 
al-Ṭufaylῑ, who became an outspoken critic of Hezbollah’s post-1992 policies.
3
 Qāsim 
reports that a commission of notables of Hezbollah was asked to discuss various 
questions in this respect. One of the fundamental issues was: ‘would participation be 
considered a form of acquiescence to the political system’s reality, including the 
responsibility of adopting and defending such a system and abandoning the Islamic 
vision?’ Another question was: ‘would participation lead to a reorganization of priorities 
of the type that would result in abandoning the cause of the resistance in favour of 
taking part in the internal political game?’
4
 
Hezbollah was fully aware of the impact that integration within Lebanese politics may 
have had over its Islamic identity and consequently adopted measures to contain these 
effects. Eventually, the decision to take part in politics was granted by a ta kῑm (ruling) 
of the then Walῑ al-Faqῑh Khamenei.
5
 
A central concern in the debate was whether a political actor, whose legitimacy was 
derived from the interpretation of Islamic principles, can become part of a non-Islamic 
political system. The moral integrity of the movement could have been undermined by 
the secular nature of the state and by the malpractices diffused in its administration, 
such as its symptomatic corruption and its patron–client relations. To tackle this issue, 
                                               
2 
The most informative accounts on the internal Hezbollah debate on participation in Lebanese politics can be 
found in Harik, Hezbollah pp. 47-62, Saad-Ghorayeb, Hizbullah pp. 47-58. Ranstorp, 'The Strategy and Tactics 
of Hizballah'.  
3 
Hamzeh, In the Path of Hizbullah p. 111. The departure of al-Tufayli is also explained as being due to internal 
competition over leadership offices within the movement hierarchy. Saad-Ghorayeb, Hizbullah p. 47. 
4 
Qassem, Hizbullah p. 314. 
5
 Ibid., p. 320.  
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Hezbollah reconfigured its internal hierarchical structure, to which it added a Council of 
Parliamentary Activity (Majlis al-ʿAml al-Nῑābī) distinguished from the Political Council 
(Majlis al-Siyasī) of the party.
6
 The Council of Parliamentary Activity was subordinate to 
the Shūrā Council (Majlis al-Shūrā), the top decision-making assembly of the 
movement and which obeys the authority of the Walῑ al-Faqῑh. Any decision taken by 
the Council of Parliamentary Activity is then under the scrutiny of an Islamic authority 
and the same, in turn, happens with the decisions of the members of Hezbollah’s 
parliamentary delegation whose members are nominated by the Shūrā Council.
7
 It is 
through this mechanism that Hezbollah tried to contain the effects of its inclusion in the 
parliament. Another measure of self-restraint to avoid contamination with Lebanese 
institutions was to limit participation only to the legislative activity not taking part in the 
government, at least until 2005. 
Whether these adjustments were effective remains disputed. In fact, as we shall see in 
the following sections, Hezbollah’s participation in parliamentary activity exposed it 
considerably to external influence. Ghorayeb argues that Hezbollah’s participation in 
parliamentary politics represents a major shift in its relations with the Lebanese state. 
Until the Ṭāʾif Agreement of 1989, Hezbollah considered the state to be illegitimate in 
many respects. Among these, there was the hegemony of the Maronite community, its 
sectarian system and the ambiguous stance of the Maronite-led state towards Israel.
8
 
These points were made clear in the 1985 Open Letter, which defined the Lebanese 
state as ‘rotten’ and condemned it harshly as illegitimate.
9
 More generally (as observed 
in Chapter 3) Islamist political theory does not recognise the legitimacy of institutions 
that are not entirely founded on Islamic principles and Lebanese institutions are not 
among these. 
                                               
6
 Qāsim reports that ‘the Council of Parliamentary Activity includes the party MPs, and follows up on the affairs of 
the Loyalty to the Resistance Bloc, and is concerned with the legal studies and the law proposals presented in 
the parliament’. Naʿem  Qāsim, Ḥizbu  llāh: Al-Manhaj, Al-Tajriba, Al-Mustqbal [Hezbollah: Method, Practice and 
Future] (Beirut: Dar al-Hadi, 2004) p. 88. Author’s translation. 
7
Hamzeh, In the Path of Hizbullah p. 68.  
8
 Saad-Ghorayeb, Hizbullah p. 30. 
9
 See Section 5.5 and Chapter 9.  
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Nonetheless, the Ṭāʾif Agreement established the possibility of the abolition of 
sectarianism, it revised the allocation of seats on confessional criteria in the parliament 
leading to equal distribution between Muslims and Christians and reduced the power of 
the President of the Republic  in favour of the of the Prime Minister.
10
 Despite the call 
for the disbandment of militias, Hezbollah was allowed to keep its arms, while Syria 
would keep its role of patron over the country on the basis of the Brotherhood 
Agreement signed in 1991.
11
  
These new conditions lessened the friction between Hezbollah and the Lebanese 
institutional system and rendered political participation both an opportunity to matter 
politically and a necessity to cope with the regional and domestic changes determined 
by the end of the civil war. 
7.3 Accommodation of Islamist Principles in Secular Law Making 
If political opportunity and necessity explain Hezbollah’s integration in the political 
system, a fundamental question remains. How can Hezbollah become part of a secular 
political system if Islamist political actors acknowledge legitimacy exclusively to Islamic 
institutions? 
ʿAbdallah Balqazῑz notes that Hezbollah’s commitment to Islamic Shiʿī political theory 
clashes with participation in political institutions that are not legitimated by the authority 
of an imam. Further, he claims that this choice was informed by the circumstances in 
which Hezbollah was operating and by its ‘sense of reality’.
12
  
Joseph Alagha and Faḍῑl Abū al-Naṣr observe that Hezbollah’s participation in the 
legislative process marks a significant turn. Originally, Hezbollah did not consider 
                                               
10
 The office of the President of the Republic is traditionally reserved for a Christian while the Prime Minister is 
always a Sunni Muslim. 
11
Traboulsi, History of Modern Lebanon pp. 240-6. 
12
 Abd al-Ilāh Balqazīz, Ḥizb  llāh min al-Ta rīr Il  al-Radʿ, 1982-2006: Nuskhah Muwassaʿah li- itāb al-
 uqāwamah wa-Ta rīr Janūb Lubnān [Hezbollah from Liberation to Deterrence: 1982-2006] (al-Ṭab ah 1. edn.; 
Bayrūt: Markaz Dirāsāt al-Waḥdah al- Arabīyah, 2006) 45-8. 
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positive law
13
 (al-qanūn al-wadʿiya) legitimate from an Islamic point of view.
14
 But with 
its co-optation in the parliament, Hezbollah became inevitably enmeshed with the 
process of sanctioning laws which derive their legitimacy from the sovereignty of the 
parliament and not from the opinion of a religious jurist. According to Alagha: 
Hizbullah became satisfied with al-qawānīn al-wad‘iyya [positive laws] and even 
contributed to their legislation through its members of parliament. Hizbullah 
stressed that although the Qur’an, Sunna and the Shari‘a are the sources and 
bases of legislation, some issues in life could be referred to other sources.
15
 
Al-Naṣr investigates in more detail how Hezbollah tried to harmonise the approval of 
non-religiously mandated laws with its religious commitment. In his interview with 
Hezbollah’s head of the parliamentary delegation Muḥammad Raʿad, this is clearly 
pointed out.
16
 In case of inconsistencies between positive legislation and the juridical 
principles of Islam there is a methodology on which Hezbollah relies to make decisions 
in this regard. Raʿad describes this as follows:  
for this issue we rely on the following rules: as regards what is entirely in 
opposition to what is haram [prohibited] according to the sharῑʿa (including its 
deductions) and what is against what is halal [permissible] in the sharῑʿa (including 
its deductions and rectifications) and what falls within the field of the permissible; 
we strive to find the form that is more just according to our view of religion. We 
may face a project of law in which there is a big damage according to our view, 
and it may not be possible that we abrogate it on the basis of the rules of the 
democratic game if not throughout the presentation of another project of law which 
is less damaging and may not realize what is requested. All this is based on two 
rules: 
The first rule: Warding off the cause of evil (darʾ al-mafsada) takes precedence 
over bringing the general good (al-maṣla a).   
The second rule: Comparing (tazā um) between the greater evil and the lesser 
evil.
17
 
These principles establish the criteria used by Hezbollah to decide on the legislation 
presented in parliament. What is worth noting is that, aside from the limitations they 
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 Intended as legislation approved by a secular parliament. 
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 Faḍīl Abū al-Naṣr, Ḥizbu  llāh: Ḥaqā iq wa- b ād [Hezbollah: Facts and Dimensions] (Bayrūt: al-Sharikah al-
 Ālamīyah lil-Kitāb, 2003), Joseph  Alagha, '‘Wilāyat Al Faqīh and Hizbullah’s Relations with Iran', Journal of 
Arabic and Islamic Studies, /10 (2010 2010), 24-44.  
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 Alagha, 'Wilāyat Al Faqīh' p. 38. 
16 
The parliamentary group to which Hezbollah’s members are associated is the Loyalty to the Resistance Block 
( utila  Wafʿa al- uqāuwama). 
17 
Abū al-Naṣr, ḤIzballāh p. 132.  
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pose, they still allow for the implementation of legislation on the basis of considerations 
of opportunity and not only on a religious basis. As Raʿad acknowledges, the ‘rules of 
the democratic game’
18
 may compel the approval of legislation that is not Islamic. The 
role of Hezbollah in the parliament minimises the impact of even more anti-Islamic 
legislation.
19
 Furthermore, he observes that ‘the principle of jurisprudence (faqihiyya) on 
which we rely in our discussions of positive legislation allows for a wide margin of 
participation and influence’
20
 thus admitting how the political identity of an Islamist 
movement does not clash necessarily with its inclusion in the parliamentary politics of a 
secular state.  
A similar point was referred to the author in a conversation with a Hezbollah member 
who indicated how various aspects of positive legislation are substantially disconnected 
from Islamic jurisprudential tradition (his example referred to penal law) and, as such, 
Hezbollah takes decisions in this respect which are consistent with Islamic ethics but 
not dictated by it.
21
 In an interview with the author, Hezbollah’s MP ʿAlῑ Fayyāḍ
22
 further 
expanded in this respect. Consistently with the principles indicated by Raʿad, Fayyāḍ 
suggested that two concepts of Shiʿī jurisprudence play a fundamental role in decision-
making over legislation. The first is that of al-maṣla a al-ʿamma, basically a principle of 
public interest,
23
 the second concept is tazā um.
24
 The latter is a sort of reflective 
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scholar trained in social sciences and the former director of the Consultative Center for Studies and 
Documentation, an archive and research centre associated with Hezbollah. He is also the author of a study on 
the concept of authority in contemporary Shiite thought. 'Author's Interview with ʿAlῑ Fayyāḍ, Member of 
Parliament, Republic of Lebanon (Loyalty to the Resistance Block- Hezbollah)', (Beirut, Lebanon: 29 September 
2011),  Alī Fayyāḍ,  aẓarīyāt  l-Sulṭah fī al-Fikr al-Siyāsī al-Shī ī al- u āṣir [Conceptions of Authority in 
Contemporary Shiite Political Thought] (Bayrūt: Markaz al-Ḥaḍārah li-Tanmiyat al-Fikr al-Islāmī, 2008).  
23
 This concept is not exclusively Shiite but cuts across much of the Islamic and Islamist tradition. The reader will 
remember for example that the concept of maṣla a is also central in Muhammad Abdu’s theory. It was also 
mentioned with regard to decision-making in relation to the immunity of non-combatants in war in Chapter 6. For 
an analysis of this concept, its potential use as a source of reformation and its relation to the idea of human 
rights see David  Johnston, 'Maqāṣid Al-Sharīʿa: Epistemology and Hermeneutics of Muslim Theologies of 
Human Rights', Die Welt des Islams, 47/2 (2007), 149-87 at p. 162.  
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assessment in which the jurisprudent, on one hand, weighs the effects of an action (in 
this case a law) in terms of public interest and, on the other hand, assesses to what 
extent this action infringes upon Islamic judicial principles. When the action greatly 
benefits the general interest, tazā um allows for the derogation of certain Islamic 
principles. This principle therefore allows for the approval of legislation that may be in 
contradiction with Islamic jurisprudence, but its approval avoids an even greater evil 
from an Islamic point of view. 
Fayyāḍ provided an example in this regard looking at the case of a boy who is 
drowning. To save his life it is necessary to pass through the private house of a person. 
Islamic jurisprudence imposes the obligation of asking for authorisation from the owner 
of the house to access the property. Nonetheless, this would inevitably lead to the 
death of the boy. Here is where the principle of tazā um allows for an assessment of a 
situation from the point of view of public interest. Since public interest in this case (i.e. 
saving the life of a human being) greatly supersedes the importance of the Islamic 
principle requiring authorisation to enter the property of a person, then bypassing this 
principle is granted by the jurisprudent. This derogation suspends the validity of the 
principle of property in order to preserve the greater interest of saving the life of the 
boy. At the apex of this process of decision-making over legislation is Hezbollah’s 
Majlis al-Shūrā. Asked whether the Walῑ al-Faqῑh has a role in this process, Fayyāḍ 
declared that this happens very rarely and that he could not remember any example. 
He further pointed out that the authority of the Walῑ al-Faqῑh is recognised as a religious 
reference (marjʿa) only by those believers who voluntarily submit to his authority.
25
 
Hezbollah harmonises its adherence to Islamic jurisprudence with its participation in 
the drafting of positive laws in a secular institution throughout this method of 
assessment, which allows them to cope with the tension between Islamic ethical 
principles and secular legislation.  
                                                                                                                                         
24 
The word literally means ‘mutual competition’ and is also used in the second principle mentioned by Raʿad in 
the quotation above. 
25
 'Author's Interview with ʿAlῑ Fayyāḍ, Member of Parliament, Republic of Lebanon (Loyalty to the Resistance 
Block- Hezbollah)', (Beirut, Lebanon: 29 September 2011).  
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When asked about instances of legislation exemplifying this kind of tension, Fayyāḍ 
mentioned three cases. One referred to the regulation of banking in Lebanon (a key 
sector of the country’s economy). This kind of legislation is in some cases inconsistent 
with Islamic principles
26
 but such principles are reconsidered under the lenses of the 
benefit that non-Islamic legislation can bring to the public interest. On the basis of 
these considerations, an exception is made as regards the relevant Islamic principles in 
favour of the public interest principle. Another instance relates to the regulation of 
production, consumption and marketing of alcoholic products in Lebanon. Here the 
general interest is associated with the idea of preserving the ‘social pluralism’ of 
Lebanon, characterised by different attitudes towards the consumption of alcohol. 
Lebanon is a society characterised by ‘social pluralism’, so goes Fayyāḍ’s argument, 
so Hezbollah tolerates an exception as regards permissive legislation on alcohol even 
though is not compliant with Islamic principles. The principle of respect of social 
pluralism is considered a ‘general interest’ and thus overrides the Islamic principle 
prohibiting alcoholic products. In another example, Fayyāḍ pointed out how gambling is 
a prohibited activity by Islamic ethics and, as such, when Hezbollah had to vote over 
the legislation regulating the activity of the Casino du Liban it voted against it but ‘did 
not care’
27
 about the outcome of the vote.
28
 The fact that the parliament would have 
passed a law in contradiction with Islamic principles did not limit the possibility of 
Hezbollah continuing to be part of it.  
Thus, Hezbollah does express preferences over legislation on the basis of Islamic 
principles and tries to limit the impact of legislation which it deems to be in contradiction 
with Islam. But the fact that such legislation can be approved by the parliament, 
notwithstanding its opposition, does not mean that Hezbollah cannot take part in its 
works. Either this legislation can still be beneficial in relation to the general well-being 
(maṣla a), or the violation of certain Islamic principles can be neglected in light of the 
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overall benefit which a law may bring. A more proactive stance opposing legislation 
that allegedly interferes with Islamic principles intervenes only on occasions in which 
the stakes are higher such as the reform of the personal status law or situations in 
which opposition to Israel is disputed. 
Thus, considering the fact that Hezbollah developed a methodology that is partially 
receptive towards non-Islamic sanctioned principles, it is reasonable to expect that 
human rights legislation may not necessarily be problematic for Hezbollah’s delegation 
in the Lebanese parliament. 
7.4 Hezbollah and Human Rights Legislation: Neutrality 
The analysis of the parliamentary debate related to the approval of human rights 
legislation shows that Hezbollah only rarely raise fundamental objections to the 
approval of human rights legislation. In fact, in most of the cases
29
 its parliamentary 
delegation (the Loyalty to the Resistance Block) has been neutral towards this kind of 
legislation. Considering that Hezbollah’s recognition of the legitimacy of parliamentary 
institutions in Lebanon already represents a significant change, it is even more 
remarkable to observe how its involvement in the legislative process of international 
norms for human rights does not raise major reasons of conflict.  
In order to identify human rights legislation, the analysis focused on laws considered 
problematic by international human rights organisations. For example, the human rights 
reports and the Universal Periodic Review of the UN Human Rights Council
30
 were 
sources for this selection. In addition to this, the analysis has also kept track of the 
approval of legislation relating to the ratification of international and regional human 
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 Out of the fifty laws analysed (see Appendix 3) only in rare cases has Hezbollah commented or objected to 
these laws which are directly derived from injunctions of international human rights bodies or treaties. See below 
for more details. 
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 It may be interesting to note how MP Fayyāḍ was part of the delegation that took part in the UN Universal 
Periodic Review of Lebanon. UN Human Rights Council 'Report of the Working Group on the Universal Periodic 
Review: Lebanon' (A/HRC/16/18: 12 January 2011). Other UNHRC reports considered are: UN Human Rights 
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Council 'Summary Prepared by the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights: Lebanon' 
(A/HRC/WG.6/9/LBN/3/Rev.1: 28 October 2010). 
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rights treaties and legislation whose human rights relevance has been highlighted by 
non-governmental organisations.
31
 
The first stage of the analysis identified human rights legislation approved in the 
Lebanese assembly, going through al-Jarῑdat al-Rasmiyya (the Official Gazette) which 
contains all the legislation approved by the parliament from 1992 to 2006.
32
 Once a 
significant portion of this legislation was isolated,
33
 the analysis focused on the 
parliamentary debate related to the approval, amendment or rejection of these laws in 
order to understand how Hezbollah’s members acted in response to the parliamentary 
debate on legislation that was strictly related to human rights.  
This latter stage of the analysis was problematic. Parliamentary proceedings are 
published in the Ma āḍir Jalasāt Majlis al-Nuwāb (Proceedings of the Lebanese 
Parliament Sessions) but they are only partially accessible
34
 and the voting procedures 
used in Parliament are not recorded in the proceedings if not in their final outcome. The 
assembly votes by raising hands, in spite of the fact that an electronic voting system is 
available. Once a law is voted, the chair of the parliament declares the approval or 
rejection of the law but no official count of the votes is recorded in the proceedings 
(apart from a few exceptions in the more recent records).
35
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In addition to this, UNDP is engaged in a process of cooperation with the Lebanese Parliament which includes 
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specialised committees and in particular the CEDAW Committee, ICERD Committee, ICESCR Committee, CRC 
Committee. The full list of the reports can be found in the Reports Section of the Bibliography.  
32
 The author also considered later issues regarding more recent legislation whenever it was relevant from a 
human rights point of view. 
33 
Appendix 3 reports about 50 laws as relevant in this respect, the survey nonetheless claims to be only a 
representative sample not a complete overview. 
34
 The author had access to the complete collection covering parliamentary sessions from 1992 to 2006 through 
the kind collaboration of a member of parliament who granted access to the Library of the Lebanese Parliament. 
Notwithstanding the common belief among Lebanese and also officials, parliamentary proceedings are publicly 
available and not subject to confidentiality or authorisation by authorities.  
35
 On one occasion at least, MP Ghassan Moukhaiber asked the chair of the parliament Nabih Berri to adopt the 
use of electronic voting in the assembly, though the request did not seem to be successful. Republic of Lebanon 
(2004) 'Maḥāḍir Jalasāt Majlis Al-Nuwāb [Proceedings of the Session of the House of Representatives]' (Beirut: 
Government of Lebanon). 
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The deficiencies of these parliamentary procedures are a serious issue for democratic 
accountability, but do not affect entirely the possibility of monitoring the parliamentary 
activity on which this section relies. In most of the cases, if a draft law is problematic, 
MPs intervene in the debate sessions proposing amendments, abrogation, 
observations for the records or draft laws alternative to the law proposal in question. 
These interventions are recorded by name and then render the proceedings a source 
for monitoring parliamentary works. On the other hand, the fact that a law does not 
provoke discussion in the parliament is an indicator of the fact that the members of 
parliament fundamentally agree or are indifferent to its approval. Intervention in 
parliamentary debate is more common in cases in which the law has not been 
previously discussed in the parliamentary committees, although it is still possible to 
present observations in this case.
36
 
The monitoring of human rights legislation with reference to Hezbollah contained in 
Appendix 3 shows that Hezbollah has almost never raised objections of a fundamental 
nature against the great majority of human rights legislation. From what is possible to 
observe, between 1992 and 2006, no objections criticising human rights as 
incompatible with Islam or as undermining the alleged traditional values of the Islamic 
community have been raised in opposition to the approval of legislation that was 
informed by human rights principles. The same applies to legislation ratifying 
international human rights treaties.
37
 Out of about 50 human rights laws considered 
from 1992 to 2006 (and a few others at a later stage), Hezbollah intervened only 
occasionally and proposed somewhat technical comments rather than criticising the 
fundamental nature of the law itself.
38
  
                                               
36 
In other cases (especially as regards the ratification of international treaties), the law proposal often contains 
the reports of the relevant committees in which the ratification law has been discussed and only rarely is further 
discussion held. The parliamentary committee transcripts are kept confidential apart from the final report drafted 
by the secretary of the committee, which is rather uninformative apart from essential information. As confirmed to 
the author by an officer of the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, the ratification of treaties in 
Lebanon is often a rather bland process over which not much parliamentary scrutiny applies, apart from 
occasions such as the CEDAW. 
37 
As we shall see in the next two sections, critical stances of a kind emerged more recently in relation to rights of 
women. 
38 
There are only a few exceptions to this, which are further illustrated below or are highlighted in Appendix 3.   
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Dalal El-Bizri points out that, even in the few occasions in which human rights 
legislation provoked criticism from Hezbollah, such criticism was rather bland. She 
mentions two examples in addition to the ones considered in Appendix 3. The first
39
 
relates to a law introducing a compulsory medical certificate as a precondition to 
marriage; against this, Hezbollah MP ʿAlῑ ʿAmmār argues that: ‘Civilian authorities do 
not have any role in marriage affairs in Lebanon’ and that: ‘for Shiites this question is of 
competence of the man of religion.’ The second example
40
 refers to a law that gives the 
possibility to women to start businesses without the consent of the husband. Despite 
initial criticism, el-Bizri then reports that Hezbollah’s position ends up being favourable 
to the law as she quotes Muḥammad Fnaysh
41
 saying that the law will be accepted on 
‘the condition that it will not be in contradiction with the personal status law.’
42
 As further 
discussed in Section 7.6, the question of personal status law is central for Hezbollah as 
for all the other political forces and constitutes the only example in which human rights 
legislation raised some issues. 
Let us consider a few other examples which further corroborate the thesis of 
Hezbollah’s neutrality towards human rights legislation. As regards a proposed law 
concerning the prohibition and limitation of labour for minors, Fnaysh observed that the 
law did not contain certain specifications regarding the kind of work that can be done 
by minors. To this observation, the reply stated that the said specifications were agreed 
upon by the ministry of labour and eventually the law passed with the majority of the 
votes in the parliament.
43
 
Similarly, Fnaysh also intervenes over a matter of administrative nature in the debate of 
the law establishing a National Committee for Lebanese Women commenting on who 
                                               
39
 Law 334 of 1994. 
40
 Law 380 of 1994. 
41 
Muḥammad Fnaysh is a Hezbollah MP trained in social sciences and economics who became a Minister in 
2005 and was the first member of Hezbollah to become a member of the executive. 
42 
Dalal  el-Bizri, Islamistes, Parlementaires et Libanais Les Interventions À L'assemblée Des Élus De La Jama'a 
Islamiyya et Du Hizb Allah (1992-1996) [Publié Par Le Centre D'études et De Recherches Sur Le Moyen-Orient 
Contemporain] (Beyrouth Paris: Centre d'études et de recherches sur le Moyen-Orient contemporain, 1999) p. 
15. 
43
 Law 536 of 1996. Republic of Lebanon (1996) 'Maḥāḍir Jalasāt Majlis Al-Nuwāb [Proceedings of the Session of 
the House of Representatives]' (Beirut: Government of Lebanon). See Appendix 3. 
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should establish the wage of its administrative staff. The concern relates to how the 
wages of its administrative members should be decided and, once the request to 
abrogate this article was approved, the law is passed by majority vote.
44
 On another 
occasion, Ibrahīm al-Sayyd asked for clarifications as regards the specification of the 
minimum working age in another law project regarding the prohibition of child labour.
45
 
Hezbollah MP ʿAbdullah Qasir intervened in the debate on the amendments of the 
penal procedural code proposing some changes related to the validity period of 
indictment after arrest.
46
 Law 463 of 2002, introducing the reduction of penalties for 
minor crimes and on the basis of good conduct is widely debated in its details. 
Hezbollah intervenes with Raʿad in the debate who declares the endorsement of the 
law as it was drafted by the government. Subsequently Fnaysh intervenes in an 
attempt to mediate between different views over the wording of an article of the law 
proposal relating to the selling of drugs.
47
 
The analysis of a significant part of the human rights legislation approved in the 
parliament allows us to conclude that Hezbollah’s parliamentary delegation over the 
years has not raised prejudicial objections to the approval of this legislation amounting 
to a blanket denial of its legitimacy.
48
 Notwithstanding the wide-ranging issues over 
which this legislation touches upon, including the equal treatment of women in terms of 
social and economic rights, the prohibition of child labour exploitation, the provision of 
services and facilities for disabled persons, the reform of the penal procedure code and 
the ratification of a number of international and regional treaties directly and indirectly 
connected to human rights, in none of these cases has Hezbollah presented any of the 
arguments common to Islamist movements even though this legislation originated 
primarily from principles of human rights ethics and not from Islamic jurisprudence. 
                                               
44 
Law 720 of 1998. Republic of Lebanon (1998) 'Maḥāḍir Jalasāt Majlis Al-Nuwāb [Proceedings of the Session of 
the House of Representatives]' (Beirut: Government of Lebanon). See Appendix 3. 
45 
Law 91 of 1999. Republic of Lebanon (1999) 'Maḥāḍir Jalasāt Majlis Al-Nuwāb [Proceedings of the Session of 
the House of Representatives]' (Beirut: Government of Lebanon). See Appendix 3. 
46 
Law 349 of 2001. Republic of Lebanon (2001) 'Maḥāḍir Jalasāt Majlis Al-Nuwāb [Proceedings of the Session of 
the House of Representatives]' (Beirut: Government of Lebanon). See Appendix 3. 
47 
Law 463 of 2002. Republic of Lebanon (2002) 'Maḥāḍir Jalasāt Majlis Al-Nuwāb [Proceedings of the Session of 
the House of Representatives]' (Beirut: Governemnt of Lebanon). See Appendix 3. 
48
 An exception to this, about which more below, is the case of certain women’s rights. Another interesting case is 
Hezbollah’s objection to the ratification of the International Treaty to Ban Cluster Munitions (law 127 of 2010). 
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Three concurrent explanations help us understand this phenomenon. First, it is 
reasonable to assume that Hezbollah’s neutrality towards this legislation can be 
explained as a result of the principles and methodology that have been mentioned by 
Raʿad and Fayyāḍ such as maṣla a and tazā um. Regardless of the fact that it is non-
Islamic legislation and originates primarily from the principles of international human 
rights ethics, most of it does not seem to raise concerns from an Islamic point of view 
with regard to its compatibility with Islamic ethics. Hezbollah’s neutrality has also been 
facilitated by two other factors: its overall low profile in the parliament, and the fact that 
its Islamist character is not prominent in the way it operates in parliament, although it is 
strong in other respects such as opposition to Israel and criticism towards regional and 
global politics. 
Hezbollah’s Loyalty to the Resistance Block kept a low profile, in the sense that it 
limited itself to echoing the fundamental stances of the movement, especially in relation 
to resistance and opposition to Israel as the central aspects of its parliamentary 
participation. Raʿad assessed the activity of Hezbollah’s delegation as follows: 
Its performance is acceptable and reasonable, but we did not attain the exemplary 
level to which we aspire as if we were ‘swimming against the flow’. Despite this, 
the Loyalty [to the Resistance] Block
 
achieved a number of positive results at the 
best of its capacity. Even though the party cannot give concrete form to its views 
in the laws [related to the public well-being], it can play an obstructive role for law 
projects informed by private interests.
49
  
He describes primarily an oppositional role in the parliament where Hezbollah is mainly 
acting as the voice of dissent over legislation it deems unacceptable. This leads to the 
fact that no active initiative to promote an Islamist political agenda has ever emerged 
prominently in Hezbollah’s parliamentary activity. The Islamist character of its 
parliamentary policy is more apparent, although barely detectable, in the refusal of 
legislation that is deemed to openly challenge the authority of religious institutions, as 
will be seen in Section 7.6. 
However, the methodology described in the previous section leaves a wide margin of 
discretion for Hezbollah to adopt or not oppose legislation that is also human rights 
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Interview to Muḥammad Raʿad in Abū al-Naṣr, ḤIzballāh p. 131. 
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legislation. Nonetheless, no draft laws or reform projects restructuring the institutional 
architecture of the Lebanese state in an Islamist sense, for example promoting sharῑʿa, 
forms of theocracy such as the Wilāyat al-Faqῑh, have ever been advanced. 
The harshest political stance of Hezbollah in parliament relates to the opposition to 
Israel, the denunciation of international interference in Lebanese political affairs, and 
the condemnation of corruption, patron–client social relations and uneven economic 
development of the country. Also in these cases, as el-Bizri confirms, the Islamic 
character of Hezbollah can barely be traced in its parliamentary discourse. On the 
basis of monitoring Hezbollah’s parliamentary activity between 1992 and 1996 
compared with the activity of the Jamaʿa Islāmiyya (the Lebanese branch of the Muslim 
Brotherhood), el-Bizri notes ‘how few are the references to Islam in general, the 
absence of stances based on the sharῑʿa and the omission of the basmala (the formula 
that has to be pronounced by believers before starting to speak) in the discourse of 
Islamist deputies.’
50
According to el-Bizri, the Islamist character emerges more 
prominently in the political discourse of the Sunni Jamaʿa Islāmiyya rather than in the 
case of Hezbollah.
51
 
The final aspect explaining Hezbollah’s neutrality towards human rights is that the 
Lebanese parliament tends to deal with legislation addressing only part of the actual 
human rights agenda of the country and avoids the most controversial issues. The 
legislation that reaches the stage of parliamentary discussion is primarily legislation 
that does not produce political tensions.  
Potentially controversial problems such as the rights of the thousands of Lebanese 
disappeared during the civil war,
52
 the reform of personal status laws and crucial 
aspects related to rights of women have not been on the parliamentary agenda (apart 
from minor exceptions) in the time frame under analysis. Further, the approval of the 
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 el-Bizri, Islamistes, Parlementaires et Libanais p. 15. Author’s translation.  
51
 Ibid., p. 17.  
52
 In an interview, the journalist and criminal law expert ʿUmār Nashabe claimed that Hezbollah tends to neglect 
the issue of disappeared persons in Lebanon so as not to embarrass its concurrent Shiʿī party Amal, the 
involvement of which in the civil war events easily raise the suspect of possible responsibilities. 'Author's 
Interview with ʿUmar Nashābe, Al-Akhbār Newspaper', (Beirut, Lebanon: 9 September 2011).   
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Convention for the Elimination of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW) has been 
ratified with the vote of the parliament, and its ratification occurred with major 
reservations, for example as regards the possibility for women to pass their nationality 
to their children. This has likely eased Hezbollah’s attitude towards human rights 
legislation as in the case of all the other parliamentary groups. 
Overall it has maintained a neutral approach, fundamentally acquiescent towards most 
of this legislation. The most accredited hypothesis explaining Hezbollah’s approach to 
law making leaves open the possibility for the approval of legislation that is not Islamic 
but is also not in opposition to Islamic principles; a significant part of the human rights 
legislation that has been debated in the Lebanese parliament seems to be compatible 
with this approach. 
7.5 The Question of Rights of Detainees: Instances of Proactive 
Selectivity 
Among the most prominent issues addressed in the human rights debate in the 
Lebanese parliament is the condition of detainees in prisons.
53
 The conditions for 
inmates caused criticism from international organisations but, above all, prompted 
severe protests within prisons including mutinies and hunger strikes by inmates, which 
have drawn the attention of MPs over this issue.  
The case is interesting because it represents an instance in which Hezbollah shifted 
from a neutralist stance, as described in the previous section, towards a proactive 
stance, actively supporting the implementation of certain human rights principles to 
guarantee the human rights of detainees. This includes for example promoting certain 
legislation and engaging with the works of the Human Rights Committee of the 
Lebanese Parliament. Indeed the issue has been repeatedly addressed by the 
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One of the central issues is the prison of Rūmīa, the biggest detention centre in the country. 
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Committee
54
and
 
Hezbollah took part regularly with high-profile members such as Nawāf 
al-Mūsawῑ and Fnaysh.  
The question of the conditions of detained persons was of central concern for the 
Committee at least from 2010, but also prior to then, and the parliament has passed 
laws reducing penalties or granting amnesties often ‘justified’ on the basis of the poor 
conditions of detention.
55
 On various occasions, the Minister of Justice and the Minister 
of Interior were summoned by the Committee to discuss the situation of Lebanese jails. 
More recently, Lebanon has joined the Convention against Torture and later its related 
Optional Protocol
56
 on the basis of which an international committee has visited 
detention facilities for assessment.
57
 It is difficult to establish how the issue of prisons 
became so prominent in a political agenda crammed with several other human rights 
issues. Among the relevant factors certainly there are the protests of inmates 
themselves and the fact that the issue can be addressed without disruptive 
consequences in political terms.
58
 As the Rapporteur of the Parliamentary Human 
Rights Committee declared to the author, inmates and their relatives have been 
‘particularly efficient in making their voice heard.’
59
  
What is of interest in this case is the fact that Hezbollah has been particularly 
vociferous on this issue, which is another factor that facilitated its mainstreaming in the 
political debate. Hezbollah’s parliamentary delegates were always present at the 
                                               
54
 According to the records available, the Committee discussed the issue of prisons at least on nine occasions in 
2010 and 2011. This parliamentary committee was founded in 1995 and deals specifically with human rights 
issues often in conjunction with the government and in some cases with civil society organisations. 
55 
See for example UN Committee on the Rights of the Child 'Second Periodic Reports of the States Parties Due 
in 1998: Lebanon' (CRC/C/70/Add.8 26 September 2000). 
56
 Ratification through Law 185 of 2000, the Optional Protocol establishment of the convention was ratified by 
Law 28 in 2008. 
57
 The content of the report remains confidential as established by the rules of the convention; acceptance of this 
special procedure remains an indicator of the importance of the situation from a human rights perspective. 
58
 In a conversation with MP Ghassan Moukhaiber, Rapporteur of the Human Rights Committee, he pointed out 
how the issue became relevant from the point of view of democratic accountability but also in terms of relations 
among Christian political groups and Muslims, where the Christians benefitted from amnesties 
previously.'Author's Interview with Ghassān Mukhaīber, Member of Parliament, Republic of Lebanon', (Beirut, 
Lebanon: 14 September 2011). 
59
 Ibid. 
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sessions dedicated to this topic
60
 and, as mentioned above, legislation about the reform 
of the penal code drew the attention of Hezbollah’s MPs on more than one occasion. 
Its commitment to this specific human rights issue becomes evident if we look at the 
records of the Human Rights Parliamentary Committee. For example, MP Nawār al-
Sahilī, a member of Hezbollah and member of the committee, released a declaration 
for the records over the urgency of this matter. The declaration came in 
correspondence with the calling for a hunger strike by the detainees of the largest 
Lebanese detention centre in Rūmīa.
61
  
We will call for the solution of this issue, and we hope for the application of Article 
108 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, so that there is a release of as much as 
possible detainees held for minor felonies.  With regard to the question of those 
detained for crimes, some of the judges are worried about the fact that they may 
not return [if released] to the trial. Therefore, the prisoners who apply for release 
from jail they need to know that there is an on-going trial and that they will need to 
return to the court. As regards the issue of prison overcrowding, what we can do is 
to put the judiciary at work and begin to discharge detainees for minor felonies and 
those detained for more than two or three years. 
62
 
Al-Sāhilῑ points out the urgency of the matter using the human rights committee and 
indeed human rights principles as the platform for his appeal. He calls for the 
application of the penal procedures of detention with reference to Article 108 of the 
Code of Penal Procedure. This article establishes that pre-trial detention can be 
protracted for a maximum of one year under specific circumstances,
63
 after this period 
any detained person who has not being tried shall be released. Many of the detainees 
in prison
64
 are held in breach of this law and its application would also be favourable for 
the issue of overcrowding which is among the most pressing problems. 
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 Reports of the sessions of the Human Rights Parliamentary Committee can be found on the website of the 
Lebanese Parliament. The actual content of the committees’ meetings are kept confidential. Parliamentary 
Human Rights Committee (Parliament of Lebanon), 'Reports of the Parliamentary Committee on Human Rights', 
<http://www.lp.gov.lb/NodesAr.Aspx?id=3794>, accessed 1 December 2011. 
61
 At the time of writing the situation is far from being solved. Political mobilisation in this respect is high and the 
families of detainees have taken their protests to the street on several occasions. 
62
 Parliamentary Human Rights Committee (Parliament of Lebanon), 'Report of the Parliamentary Human Rights 
Committee on 10 May 2011', <http://www.lp.gov.lb/NewsPage3Ar.Aspx?id=8081>, accessed 1 December 2011.. 
63
 For example, in cases of serious crimes such as terrorism or homicide. 
64 
Official statistics are difficult to access in this regard, but we are in the order of thousands of persons with a 
significant percentage of juveniles. 
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It remains to be understood which factors shifted the policy of neutrality towards this 
proactive stance adopted specifically with reference to the rights of detainees. First of 
all, a genuine interest in the protection of the rights of persons under investigation or 
detained in conditions that do not respect standards of human dignity shall not be 
excluded. Hezbollah has often been involved in the issue of prisoners of wars and their 
detention on various occasions and this might have created a particular sensitivity in 
this respect. 
Answering a question regarding this, Fayyāḍ made the point that the issue is given 
importance by Hezbollah as a matter of justice. According to Fayyāḍ, ‘the suffering of 
people in the Lebanese prisons is a real disaster and we [Hezbollah] regret this.’
65
 A 
genuine moral commitment relating to the minimisation of suffering of persons is a 
factor that, at least nominally, explains this phenomenon. But Hezbollah’s proactive 
stance as regards the rights of prisoners is also related to other aspects. As sources 
confirm, the great majority of persons detained in Rūmīa are young males primarily 
from the area of the Biqʿa, and thus Shiʿites.
66
 One of the reasons for this is that Biqʿa 
is the centre of production of drugs such as hashish. It consequently became a centre 
of criminality in which the rule of law is barely existent and to which many poor and 
unemployed young individuals resort to alleviate their critical social and economic 
situation. This explains why prisons like Rūmīa are populated by a majority of Shiʿites 
and gives some explanation for Hezbollah’s proactive stance regarding detainees’ 
rights.  
Hezbollah perceives a particularly close connection with its Shiʿī constituency, a factor 
confirmed by Fayyāḍ, who said that Hezbollah has a responsibility to represent its 
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 'Author's Interview with ʿAlῑ Fayyāḍ, Member of Parliament, Republic of Lebanon (Loyalty to the Resistance 
Block- Hezbollah)', (Beirut, Lebanon: 29 September 2011). 
66
 This aspect has been mentioned to the author by different sources including an officer of the UNOHCHR, a 
member of parliament and a journalist. None of them was in a position to release official statistics on the 
sectarian or regional affiliation of inmates as they all think these are sensible data, as it is often the case in 
Lebanon with demographic and statistical data. 'Author's Interview with Ghassān Mukhaīber, Member of 
Parliament, Republic of Lebanon', (Beirut, Lebanon: 14 September 2011), 'Author's Interview with Lana Baidas, 
Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, Lebanon', (Beirut, Lebanon: 12 September 2011). 
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Biqʿa constituency in the parliament.
67
 In addition to the neutral stance that interests the 
majority of human rights legislation, there are signs of more proactive policies towards 
issues in which human rights principles converge with ideological principles and 
sectarian loyalties. The case of prisoners’ rights is clearly indicative of this. On the 
issue of prisoners there is a convergence of factors that are a genuine moral concern 
for the minimisation of suffering, Hezbollah’s sectarian loyalty
68
 and its commitment to 
issues of social concern. Framing this matter within the human rights discourse is a 
way for Hezbollah to gather more political consensus nationally. 
Analogous cases of selectivity can be mentioned with respect to the rights of Bahrainis 
(who are in majority Shiʿites) to protest during the 2011 events in the region. In various 
circumstances, Hezbollah voiced solidarity with the cause of the Bahraini protesters. To 
mention one, Hezbollah protested against the measures adopted by the regime against 
female protestors. Amnesty International equally voiced concerns over ill-treatment and 
torture in the same circumstances.
69
 Hezbollah declared that: ‘these kinds of abusive 
practices resemble the American terrorist practices in Guantanamo and Abu Ghraib, 
they are subject of condemnation from all the living forces, entrusted with conscience 
and liberals all over the world.’
70
 The selectivity of this stance can be easily noticed if 
we consider that the repression of Bahraini protestors was taking place at the same 
time in which the regime of Bashār al-Asad was violently repressing anti-regime 
protests in Syria. Whereas Hezbollah condemned repression of Bahrainis by their own 
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 This aspect is indeed consistent with the principles seen in Chapter 6 with regard to non-combatants’ 
immunity, and which attached a special moral value to the security of persons on the basis of their religious 
affiliations. 'Author's Interview with ʿAlῑ Fayyāḍ, Member of Parliament, Republic of Lebanon (Loyalty to the 
Resistance Block- Hezbollah)', (Beirut, Lebanon: 29 September 2011). 
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Amnesty International, 'Torture Fears for Bahraini Women and Girls in Detention', 
<http://www.amnesty.org/en/news-and-updates/torture-fears-bahraini-women-and-girls-detention-2011-09-26>, 
accessed 8 July 2012. 
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'Hezbollah Press Statement 29th of September 2011 ', 
<http://ar.moqawama.org/essaydetails.php?eid=21898&cid=199>, accessed 29 September 2011. Similarly, in its 
2009 Political Manifesto Hezbollah mentions again the cases of Guantanamo and Abu Ghraib as human rights 
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regime, they nonetheless voiced support for al-Asad’s regime despite its violent 
repressive measures.
71
 
More recently, Hezbollah has (for the first time, to the knowledge of the author) referred 
to the concept of human rights (huqῡq al-insān) thus marking a further step in the 
assimilation of these norms in its political vocabulary in of its declaration. In September 
2012, a film released on the internet with offensive content towards the figure of the 
Prophet Muḥammad sparked a wave of violent protests in the Arab world. In this 
respect, Hezbollah released the following declaration, claiming that this film: ‘is an 
immoral action which represents the highest grade of aggression of the most important 
right among human rights, that is the respect for religious belief, sanctity not to mention 
religious feelings.’ 
72
 
The movement furthermore calls on the United Nations to issue laws prohibiting these 
offensive actions: ‘The UN today is bound to issue laws that condemn this kind of 
actions in a way similar to the laws that prohibit anti-Semitism.’
73
 The declaration further 
confirms Hezbollah’s approach to human rights and its proactive stance towards these 
norms under certain favourable circumstances. 
In certain scenarios then, the neutral stance of Hezbollah towards human rights shifts 
towards a form of proactive selectivity as in the cases of detainees, Bahrainis and the 
offences against religious sensibility. As seen in the previous chapter, a selective 
approach to certain norms is not new for Hezbollah. For political issues, which are 
important on the basis of sectarian loyalty or ideological commitments, the language of 
rights is used by Hezbollah in order to favour the political legitimacy of the movement 
and its actions.  
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7.6 Personal Status Law and the Claims of Religious Authenticity 
If the concurrency of political and human rights interests can produce a selectively 
proactive policy towards human rights, Hezbollah’s generally neutral stance towards 
human rights reforms can also shift into criticism when human rights are perceived as 
undermining values and principles that Hezbollah considers fundamental and on which 
it does not seem to accept compromises.  Among these, there is the protection of 
religious authority in the regulation of family affairs which is institutionalised in Lebanon 
as in the rest of the Arab world with the personal status law system.
74
 This seems to be 
the case of the debate over the rights of women and the related penal legislation in 
Lebanon, which were opposed in 2011 on the basis of legal technicalities but also 
relied on a classical Islamist claim of authenticity. Although Hezbollah does not seem to 
have particular reservations over the extension of social and economic rights to 
women,
75
 the situation is more complicated when the protection of women’s rights 
interferes with aspects of personal status law, which is sharῑʿa based and is often 
conservatively interpreted by religious scholars.  
Article 562 of the Lebanese Penal Code is particularly problematic in this respect.
76
 This 
article states that a non-premeditated act of violence against a woman who is caught in 
adultery or in some kind of extramarital intercourse can benefit from mitigating 
circumstances in its penal condemnation.
77
 The article condones the so-called ‘’honour 
crimes’ that are acts of violence ‘justified’ as reactions to the offence of the honour of 
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the family.
78
 This kind of legislation has been the target of human rights organisations 
but also of international human rights monitoring institutions.
79
 A draft law for the 
abrogation of article 562 was proposed in parliament and approved in 2011. Its 
abolition was connected to a wider campaign in which civil society organisations were 
promoting the abolition of reservations on CEDAW, and the approval of a draft law for 
the protection of women against family violence (of which more below).
80
  
In the parliamentary debate,
81
 members of both Sunni and Shiʿī parties found an 
unprecedented common ground in opposing the proposal to abolish article 562. The 
draft law was discussed as the last item of the session, and MP Buṭros Ḥarb (a 
member of Tayyār al-Mustaqbal)
82
 began the debate complaining sarcastically that the 
consideration of this law at the late stage of the session would have been a violation of 
the rights of the members of parliament. This was an indicator of how the Sunni 
component of the March 14 coalition would have opposed the law, thus opposition to 
this law was far from being exclusively Hezbollah’s prerogative. Another member of 
Mustaqbal, MP Samῑr al-Jisr, declared that he was opposing the abrogation of Article 
562, then followed by Imād al-Hut a member of the Jamʿat Islāmiyya (the Lebanese 
branch of the Muslim Brotherhood) who declared that article 562 does not refer to 
‘honour killing’ but introduces mitigating circumstances for non-premeditated crimes, 
and therefore should not be abolished.  
On the other hand, the proponents of the law  were claiming that Article 562 cannot 
exist in the twenty-first century, condoning what de facto is honour crime and that 
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opposition to the March 8 coalition comprising Hezbollah, Amal and the Free Patriotic Movement. 
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failing to abrogate it would have brought Lebanon back to the Middle Ages.  Eventually 
Hezbollah’s MP Fayyāḍ declared opposition to the abrogative law proposal and asked 
for its referral to the competent committee. Notwithstanding the opposition, the law was 
eventually passed with a majority, thus abolishing Article 562.  Fayyāḍ maintained that 
there is a difference between premeditated violence and non-premeditated violence 
and such difference should be reflected in the penal code. He defended the idea that 
the two situations deserve different legal considerations from a penal point of view and, 
for this reason Hezbollah opposed the abrogation of 562. His explanation, then, did not 
refer to Islamic principles but rather reflected concerns over the dimension of crime 
intentionality.
83
 He also pointed out that on other occasions Hezbollah opposed, 
customary forms of violence, for example the practice of vendetta in the more 
traditional sectors of Lebanese society, a fact that is also reported by Hamzeh.
84
  
This seems to indicate that Hezbollah’s members do not defend an unqualified form of 
traditionalism (according to which any practice that has been carried out in the past 
deserves to be protected from change); but rather aim at preserving values that are 
considered specifically Islamic according to its interpretation.
85
 Fayyāḍ defended the 
idea of a form of ‘specificity’ of the local ethical traditions to which it should be given 
priority over external ethical claims such as human rights. In a wider perspective, he 
clarified that legal questions related to marriage, divorce, custody of children and 
alimony are all within the religious sphere of jurisdiction with which no other ethical 
traditions should interfere.
86
 
Whereas his explanation for opposing the abrogation of article 562 was merely of a 
technical character and did not invoke any Islamic principle, personal status law 
remains a limit against which Hezbollah does not intend to go in terms of political 
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reform, a stance that is common to the other religious communities in the country.
87
 The 
principles of maṣla a or tazā um or the margin of negotiability of certain aspects of 
Islamic jurisprudence find an insurmountable obstacle when it comes to the regulation 
of private relations among persons within the religious community.  
Another case confirming this issue is related to the proposal of a law criminalising 
domestic violence and discussed in a joint meeting between Dār al-Fatwā
88
 and Deputy 
Secretary-General of Hezbollah Sheikh Qāsim. The delegation addressed a law 
proposal aiming at criminally penalising domestic violence, including marital rape thus 
filling a major legal loophole in the Lebanese system. The draft law was proposed by a 
coalition of human rights organisations, approved by decree in 2010 by the government 
and then passed to the parliament for approval.
89
 This campaign and its related law 
proposal raised criticism of Hezbollah’s leadership. The declaration of Qāsim at the 
meeting with Dār al-Fatwā relies on two lines of argument. The first is that domestic 
violence against children and women is an issue which needs to be urgently and 
efficiently addressed judicially. According to Qāsim: 
It is necessary that we deal with the problems that afflict the family and especially 
women and children, and we shall not close our eyes to these, and it is necessary 
that we find solutions that can guarantee for the two following principles: respect 
for the rights of women and children within the family, non-use of violence within 
the family, protect the privacy of the conjugal life from external interferences, the 
quicker implementation of the legal provisions of the sharῑʿa, and not to slow down 
the tribunals in dealing with the complaints over which they are judging.
90
 
The second aspect is that this problem should not be dealt through civil law (al-qanūn 
al-mudunī) but should be under the exclusive jurisdiction of religious courts. In Qāsim’s 
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opinion the law proposal drafted by civil society organisations will affect the integrity of 
the family. According to his declaration to the press, the law proposal: 
is far from ending family violence, and closer to destroying the family from within, 
and for this issue details are set out in the reports that have been drafted by the 
specialists in these things. This topic is also completely remote from political 
stances, but is exquisitely religious, ethical and humane.
91
  
Qāsim and the Sunni Lebanese religious authorities expressed their concerns over the 
impact that such legislation could have on traditional family values and denounced the 
interference of civil courts into what has been traditionally the realm of religious 
authority. 
A similar case took place in 1998 when the then President Elias Hrawi proposed a law 
to introduce civil marriage within the framework of an optional civil personal status law 
to be added to the other personal status laws. Qāsim analyses this case and criticises 
this law in the respect that the rights and responsibilities that are established by it are 
different from the rights and responsibilities that Islamic legitimate (sharʿiy) marriage 
establishes, for example with regard to inheritance, alimony, the regulation of adoption 
and the husband’s duty to support the wife and the children. His position is clear in this 
respect when he claims that ‘what is  alāl (permissible) from the shariatic point of view 
is  arām (forbidden) from the point of view of civil law and vice versa.’
92
 
These more recent developments regarding personal status laws and human rights 
indicate that, in addition to neutrality and selectivity, Hezbollah also resorts to critical 
stances towards certain aspects of human rights legislation. It is worth noting that this 
is only a more recent development in the human rights debate in Lebanon. Qāsim’s 
argument does not seem to condone family violence but is concerned with protecting 
religious family values and with the preservation of religious legal authority, although 
human rights standards clearly require criminal legal provisions for these forms of 
violence. The preservation of the jurisdiction of religious courts was also confirmed by 
                                               
91 
Ibid. 
92
 Qāsim, Ḥizbu  llāh: Al-Manhaj, Al-Tajriba, Al-Mustqbal [Hezbollah: Method, Practice and Future] p. 320. 
Author’s translation. 
187 
 
Fayyāḍ, who made clear that no human rights principles infringing upon the integrity of 
personal status law will be accepted by Hezbollah.
93
 
Thus, whereas Hezbollah is generally neutral to most of the human rights legislation, 
the implementation of legislative reforms that alter personal status laws
94
 and 
consequently the authority of religious courts have been opposed in the parliament and 
the civil society debate. 
7.7 Patterns of International Socialisation 
The analysis in this chapter has shown how Hezbollah adapted to new political 
circumstances. Its integration in the political system prompted a rethinking of how it 
should administer relations with non-Islamic institutions and norms. The patterns of 
neutrality and selective proactivity discussed in Sections 7.4 and 7.5 indicate how 
Hezbollah is far from appealing to fundamental incompatibility at least towards certain 
human rights normative principles, a fact that shows a departure from the self-
referential Islamist conception and its fundamental criticism towards liberal norms seen 
in Chapters 3 and 4. These patterns of neutrality and proactivity can be understood 
though constructivist lenses as indicators of an early stage of socialisation in 
international society. Whereas the case of authenticity claims (Section 7.6), however, is 
indicative of a degree of resiliency of the Islamist political identity of Hezbollah. 
A constructivist perspective highlights that there is a shift in the moral reasoning of 
Hezbollah and that this process of interaction with international norms is not only about 
rational calculation of political interests in dealing with human rights. Sections 7.2 and 
7.3 have shown that beyond Hezbollah’s adaptation to parliamentary law making there 
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is a moral reasoning which attempts to harmonise Islamist principles of jurisprudence 
with positive law. Constructivism considers moral reasoning an element in which 
persuasion, in addition to instrumental rationality, plays an important role.
 95
 In our case, 
instrumental adaptation seems to be partly relevant. The mutated circumstances of 
post-civil war Lebanon motivated Hezbollah’s choice to take part in the parliamentary 
life of the state so that it could continue to operate within the Lebanese context without 
being excluded from the parliamentary process. 
This, nonetheless, is only part of the picture, because the kind of reasoning that 
Hezbollah adopts in evaluating the legislation that it supports in parliament described in 
Section 7.3 shows how Hezbollah had to justify its participation in a process that was 
sanctioning positive law and not Islamic law, including human rights. The principles 
enunciated by Raʿad and Fayyāḍ regarding Islamic jurisprudence concepts amount to 
considerations of moral legitimacy and justification and not to mere political calculus. 
Risse-Kappen and Sikkink refer to this stage of norm socialisation as forms of moral 
discourse. According to them, ‘moral discourses in particular not only challenge and 
seek justifications of norms, they also entail identity-related arguments. What I find 
morally appropriate depends to some degree on who I am and how I see myself.’
96
 The 
principles illustrated by Raʿad and Fayyāḍ to evaluate abidance with Islamic 
jurisprudence and balancing it with public interest are, in fact, considerations about 
what Hezbollah may find morally appropriate from an Islamic perspective. In this 
respect, the rational calculation of interests leaves room for moral considerations in 
which the political actor attempts an assessment of legislation from the point of view of 
Islamic morals. 
This way of reasoning on legislation corresponds to a process of moral argumentation 
which in certain occasions fails to come to a conclusion in favour of human rights 
principles, whereas in other circumstances leaves Hezbollah neutral and in other cases 
informs a proactive stance towards human rights principles. This latter case is perhaps 
                                               
95
See Section 1.4 and Risse-Kappen and Sikkink, 'The Socialisation of International Human Rights Norms into 
Domestic Practices: Introduction' p. 5. 
96
 Ibid., p. 14. 
189 
 
the most striking, signalling a higher degree of socialisation in which international 
norms become part of Hezbollah’s policy. Hezbollah became a proactive supporter of 
principles of human rights, as seen with the case of detainees’ rights, Bahrainis 
protesters or articulating its demand for the respect of religious sensibility as a human 
rights claim. In this latter case, Hezbollah would be identified in constructivist terms as 
a ‘norm entrepreneur’ raising awareness over an alleged human rights violation. 
It is throughout this process of moral argumentation that political actors become 
increasingly socialised within the international normative discourse according to 
constructivists. Instrumental adaptation eventually brings about moral arguments
97
  and 
in the long term can bring the socialisation of an Islamist movement within the 
international normative framework. 
7.8 Conclusions 
The participation of Hezbollah in Lebanese parliamentary activity has exposed it to a 
law-making process which inevitably altered its profile of Islamist political actor. This 
chapter focused in particular on the case of human rights legislation, which is relevant 
because not only is this legislation processed through fundamentally secular 
institutions, but also its sources are based on the international normative framework. 
The chapter has isolated three patterns that Hezbollah follows in relation to human 
rights law: neutrality, selectivity and authenticity.  
It has been shown that the first pattern interests the great majority of the human rights 
laws that were passed in the parliament (Section 7.4) and that there are cases in which 
Hezbollah uses human rights to articulate its political stances domestically and 
internationally (Section 7.5). There was also consideration of cases in which Hezbollah 
criticised human rights laws as violating the sphere of autonomy of the religious 
community and its judicial authorities (Section 7.6).  
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More generally, as in the previous case of non-combatant immunity, interaction with 
international norms as human rights has brought about a reconsideration of Islamist 
principles in relation to the law making process of the Lebanese Parliament. It was 
finally observed (Section 7.7) that, from a constructivist perspective, the changes in 
moral reasoning related to this process show that this is not a mere instrumental 
adaptation but also produces a shift in the way Hezbollah relates to international 
norms. This signals a degree of socialisation of Hezbollah within the international 
normative framework, where international norms are progressively internalised in its 
political activity as in the cases of rights of detainees, Bahrainis   protesters and the 
respect for religious dignity mentioned in Section 7.5 when Hezbollah refers to human 
rights principles to substantiate its political demands. The next chapter will consider 
another instance in which interaction between Hezbollah and international norms 
further attests its international socialisation. 
Chapter 8  
 
State Sovereignty, Self-Defence and International 
Peace: Hezbollah and UNSC Resolutions 1559 and 1701 
  
192 
 
8.1 Introduction 
As the previous chapter has shown, Hezbollah’s participation in Lebanese politics has 
been purposely limited to parliamentary activity. But the withdrawals from Lebanon of 
Israel in 2000 and Syria in 2005 changed the political and military scenario regionally 
and domestically. Contextually Hezbollah escalated its role in Lebanese politics, taking 
part in the Lebanese government for the first time in 2005. The removal of Israel from 
almost
1
 the entire Lebanese territory in 2000 was celebrated as the final victory for the 
Resistance in Lebanon but also questioned the justification of the continuation of 
Hezbollah’s paramilitary apparatus.
2
 A serious source of troubles was Hezbollah’s 
disarmament, which the movement staunchly opposed even resorting to the use of 
force in May 2008 when the country came to the brink of internal conflict.  
The political void left by the Syrians in 2005 was to be filled by Hezbollah’s increased 
role in the political scene. The work that was previously done by Syrian-backed security 
officials and pawns in the government was now done by Hezbollah and its allies, 
especially Amal. Nonetheless, this newly acquired role was not to leave Hezbollah 
unchanged as this chapter intends to show with reference to the events of 2005 and 
2006. The following pages will discuss to what extent the implementation of two UNSC 
resolutions approved in 2005 and 2006 changed the political identity of Hezbollah. 
UNSC Resolution 1559 primarily required the disarmament of militias in Lebanon and 
was approved by the Security Council in 2004.
3
 UNSC Resolution 1701
4
 was approved 
in 2006 after the July War and enforced a ceasefire through the deployment of the 
Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) backed by a newly reinforced peacekeeping military 
contingent under the framework of the UNIFIL mission.
5
 Both resolutions drew upon 
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fundamental international norms: state sovereignty, right to self-determination and self-
defence, to mention the most important.
6
 
Three aspects are particularly indicative of how international norms, mediated by 
UNSC resolutions, begin to affect the political identity of Hezbollah and further 
determine its international socialisation as suggested in the previous chapters. The first 
is that Hezbollah, as a member of government, became involved in international 
negotiations to a new and unprecedented degree. For this reason its accountability to 
international norms becomes more direct rather than being mediated by other actors as 
in the case of the April Understanding (Section 8.4.1).  
The second aspect is that Hezbollah changed the paradigm throughout which it 
constructed its legitimacy of resistance movement (Section 8.4.2). We know that 
originally its justification for military and political action was primarily Islamic,
7
 but at this 
stage it became framed within the parameters of international norms as self-
determination and self-defence, somewhat marginalising its religious dimension.  
The third aspect is that, with its participation in the executive and by accepting the 
fundamental demands of UNSC res. 1701, Hezbollah changed its relationship with the 
state and the LAF. Accepting the deployment of the LAF in the south of Lebanon, 
Hezbollah acknowledged its authority of state army and hence the authority of the state 
as the monopolist of force in Lebanon (Section 8.4.3). This latter aspect is more 
problematic because, at the time of writing, Hezbollah has not disarmed, challenging 
the state monopoly of force, but the formal recognition of the legitimacy of the LAF 
deployment in south Lebanon is still a meaningful step which ‘locks in’ Hezbollah’s 
rhetoric in the international normative discourse of state sovereignty. 
In the following pages I reconstruct the process related to the implementation of UNSC 
Res. 1559 (Section 8.2) and in the negotiations of UNSC Res. 1701 (Section 8.3). This 
will show how Hezbollah was capable of imposing its conditions over the international 
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negotiations of these resolutions and their implementation. On the other hand, this 
newly acquired role of Hezbollah made its political identity increasingly subject to the 
influence of the norms that it attempted to control. 
State sovereignty, right to self-defence and right to self-determination all became 
norms significantly shaping the political and military activity of Hezbollah and the way it 
justified its military activity, differently from its previous exclusive focus on Islamic 
principles. 
8.2 The Crisis over UNSC Resolution 1559 
On April 2005 the government of Syria informed the UN of the withdrawal of its military 
and intelligence apparatus from the Lebanese territory.
8
 The withdrawal was the result 
of a long period of pressure against the Syrian regime which peaked with the approval 
of UNSC Res. 1559 of 2004.
9 
The resolution, strongly supported by the US and France, 
requested the Syrian withdrawal and the disarmament of Lebanese and non-Lebanese 
‘militias’. 
After the assassination of the former Prime Minister Rafīq al-Ḥarīrī on 14 February 
2005 pressure against Syria, the primary suspect behind the assassination, created the 
circumstances under which the regime of al-Asad had to withdraw its forces. Prominent 
in this process (branded as the ‘Cedar Revolution’) was the emergence of the March 
14 movement, named after the rallies held a month after the killing of al-Ḥarīrī and led 
by a coalition of parties sharing their opposition to Syrian interference in Lebanese 
affairs.
10
 This coalition enjoyed the sympathy and support of the Western powers 
(especially the US, France and the UK) and Saudi Arabia.  
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In opposition to this movement, the March 8 coalition emerged, named after the 
demonstrations held in a show of solidarity to Syria and expressing gratitude towards 
its alleged role of pacifier in Lebanon. In the March 8 coalition, Hezbollah had a 
prominent role in alliance with Amal. After February 2006 the Free Patriotic Movement 
(FPM) led by the Christian Michel ‘Aoun joined this coalition.
11
 The main patrons of this 
coalition were Syria and Iran with some indirect backing at the Security Council by 
China and Russia. 
While the country was experiencing these profound changes, the polarisation of its 
society between pro- and anti-Syria camps grew wider. At the same time, an 
international body for investigation over the killing of al-Ḥarīrī was set up to collaborate 
with local authorities to produce the basis for a judicial process against those 
responsible for this assassination and the related crimes.
12
 Between May and June of 
the same year, parliamentary elections were contested. The March 14 coalition won 
the majority of parliamentary seats and was then in charge of forming a new 
government inclusive of representatives from all Lebanese religious sects as required 
by the Ṭāʾif Agreement.
13
 In the same elections, eleven Hezbollah members were 
elected in the parliament along with three non-Hezbollah allies. 
A national unity government led by the March 14 leader Fuʾād al-Sinyūra was formed 
and included, for the first time,
14
 members of Hezbollah or representatives trusted by its 
leadership. Ṭrād Ḥamāda (a Hezbollah ally) and Muḥammad Fnaysh, a member of 
Hezbollah, became respectively Minister of Labour and Minister of Energy and Water. 
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Another key figure was Fawzī Ṣallūkh nominated foreign minister and enjoying the 
support of Hezbollah although not an official member. 
Interestingly, whereas the participation in parliamentary politics was a divisive issue 
which needed to be approved by the Walī al-Faqῑh,
15
 there is no evidence that 
Hezbollah’s participation in the government required approval by the Iranian 
leadership. The need to counterbalance Syria’s withdrawal from Lebanon overrode 
doctrinal considerations. A member of Hezbollah describes the reasons for its 
participation in the government as follows: 
Syria’s withdrawal left a strategic void in the state’s administration, altering the 
relative size of the various forces, revealing some of the key choices in State 
policies and exposing Lebanon’s vulnerable position in the regional equation. As 
regional factors lost some of their weight in the political equation, the domestic 
forces and trends expanded to fill the political space, according to their size, and 
reposition themselves in a new political constellation. In Hezbollah’s view, it was 
no longer possible to pursue the resistance project and correct the State-building 
process from outside the structure of power. These goals constituted two major 
reasons for entering the government.
16
 
Thus, Hezbollah took part in the government to counterbalance the increasing role of 
March 14 and its foreign patrons and to continue its mission of resistance movement, 
even giving its confidence vote to the government.
17
 
8.2.1 The ‘Militia’ Vs. ‘National Resistance’ Issue 
Reflecting the social tensions of that period, the political process was characterised by 
the harsh contraposition between the two political coalitions. Among the most 
controversial items on the government agenda were the implementation of the 
resolutions related to the prosecution of the al-Ḥarīrī assassination, and the enactment 
of the points requested in UNSC Resolution 1559, which demanded the disarmament 
of all ‘militias’ in Lebanon. But the situation was further exacerbated by the campaign of 
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political assassinations targeting high-profile political and intellectual figures critical of 
Syria also after the killing of al-Ḥarīrī and Syria’s withdrawal from Lebanon.
18
 
On 12 December 2005, Gibrān Tuynī a journalist, political figure and outspoken critic of 
Syria was one of the victims of this bombing campaign, increasing the pressure on the 
members of March 14 and in general the opponents to Syrian interference in Lebanese 
affairs. In the hours subsequent to the killing, Prime Minister al-Sinyūra called for an 
emergency cabinet meeting. He demanded a vote to approve a letter to be sent to the 
UN Secretary-General asking for the extension of the mandate of the international 
investigation on al-Ḥarīrī’s assassination and the establishment of an international 
tribunal to try those responsible for this act and the connected crimes.
19
 The decision 
was taken with a majority vote rather than consensus, and infuriated the March 8 
component of the council of ministers, which stepped out of the cabinet and left the 
government until February 2006, although no official resignations were made. 
This was the first time in which Hezbollah’s ministers and their allies took advantage of 
their presence in the government to undermine its executive capacity. There are two 
ways through which this can be done according to the Lebanese constitution. The first 
is the resignation of a third of the members of the cabinet. According to article 69(1b) of 
the Constitution, the executive is considered resigned when it loses at least a third of 
its members. This is because according to art. 65(5) of the Constitution, the legal 
quorum required for a meeting of the cabinet is two thirds of its members.
20
 The second 
way is through the resignation of the entire component of a religious sect. Art. 95 of the 
constitution establishes a procedure for the abolition of confessionalism  but the same 
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clause also says that while confessionalism is not abolished, the government shall be 
representative of all the Lebanese sects recognised by the state to be legitimate.  
Therefore, when a delegation of ministers that is representative of an entire sect 
resigns, the government is considered unconstitutional. It is controversial whether this 
kind of suspension of the cabinet activity actually poses a question of constitutionality 
over its decisions but, as a matter of fact, the cabinet remained paralysed due to the 
boycotting of its March 8 component. 
The reasons for such a strong reaction from the March 8 component of the cabinet are 
not entirely clear. At this stage, Hezbollah was not completely against an investigation 
over the al-Ḥarīrī killings
21
 posing certain conditions over its implementation but not 
opposing it as a matter of principle. Investigating the truth behind the killing of al-Ḥarīrī 
was even a point in Hezbollah’s political programme of the 2005 elections, which 
committed to ‘facilitate the mission of the UN’s team investigating Hariri’s 
assassination.’
22
 
Nonetheless, al-Sinyūra’s letter to the UN Security Council came at a point that was 
highly emotionally charged for Lebanon and at a time in which Syria was held 
responsible, by a great deal of the public opinion, for the al-Ḥarīrī killing and the killing 
of Syrian critics.
23
 Blocking the works of the cabinet in these circumstances was then 
favourable for Syrian interests and showing that Syria was still capable of controlling 
Lebanese politics through its proxies even after its withdrawal from Lebanon. 
Hezbollah’s concern was also related to the procedural aspect of majority vote rather 
than consensus. Art. 65(5) of the constitution established that the Council of Ministers 
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‘makes its decision by consensus. If that is not possible, it makes its decisions by vote 
of the majority of attending members.’
24
 Hezbollah was a minority component of al-
Sinyūra’s government and establishing a precedent of a decision adopted by majority 
would have diminished Hezbollah’s capacity to control the decisions of the government.  
The issue was serious for Hezbollah, because the implementation of UNSC Res. 1559 
of 2004 demanding the disarmament of militias (read Hezbollah and the Palestinian 
factions) was pending on the cabinet agenda. A majority vote would have established a 
precedent for the approval of governmental measures related to UNSC Res. 1559.  
Hezbollah, by no means, could have been part of a cabinet sanctioning its own 
disarmament. Furthermore, there are reports saying that Hezbollah’s vote of 
confidence for al-Sinyūra’s government and its commitment to its decisions were under 
the condition that important decisions in the cabinet would have been taken exclusively 
on a consensual basis, thus rejecting the adoption of important measures on a majority 
basis.
25
 The approval by majority vote of the governmental declaration to the Security 
Council which prompted the crisis in December 2005 was probably seen as a violation 
of the principle of consensual decision and a risk for the continuation of Hezbollah’s 
armed activity under international pressure.
26
 
Hezbollah MPs had already questioned the commitment of the Prime Minister to UNSC 
Res. 1559.
27
 The Prime Minister made clear in the governmental statement 
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inaugurating the legislature his endorsement of the national resistance declaring it a 
‘national right’. According to the statement: 
The government considers the Lebanese resistance a sincere and natural 
expression of the national right of the Lebanese people to liberate their land and 
defend their dignity in the face of attacks, threats, and Israeli ambitions, and the 
factor to complete the liberation of Lebanese territory.
28
 
Even though al-Sinyūra’s commitment was sufficient to obtain Hezbollah’s confidence 
vote in parliament in July 2005, at a later stage and as a consequence to the majority 
vote adopted in December’s cabinet session, the relations between the majority and 
the opposition entered a phase of crisis. 
8.2.2 Conclusion of the Political Crisis over UNSC Resolution 1559 
Hezbollah looked for further reassurance that no decisions by the government would 
have been implemented to forcefully disarm it. They demanded the approval of a 
ministerial letter to the Security Council in which it was explicitly identified as a ‘national 
resistance movement’ and not as a ‘militia’. The distinction was important because in 
UNSC Res. 1559 both the Palestinian factions and Hezbollah were identified with the 
term ‘militia’.
29
 Being identified otherwise (i.e. as a national resistance) would have 
allowed them to circumvent the requirements of the resolution. 
The condition for the government to be reactivated was then to obtain an official 
acknowledgment of Hezbollah as a national resistance movement. However, this was 
only partially met. Hezbollah did not obtain a letter to the Security Council but at the 
end of January 2006 (at a time in which violent protests were spiralling in open street 
violence) al-Sinyūra gave a speech in parliament declaring that the government will 
never refer to the resistance with terms other than national resistance, thus excluding 
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Policy Statement of Al-Sinyūra’s Government announced to the Lebanese Parliament on 19tuly 2005. 
 Government of the Republic of Lebanon, 'Policy Statement of the Government Led by Fuʾad Al-Sinyūra', 
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the possibility of deferring the issue of Hezbollah’s arms to the Security Council with 
respect to UNSC Res. 1559.
30
 
In a conversation between the US Ambassador in Beirut and PM al-Sinyūra, the latter 
described the solution to the political stalemate as a result of a concerted effort 
between Amal’s leader Berri and March 14 forces. Al-Sinyūra made clear to Berri that 
he did not have the possibility of denying the definition of Hezbollah as a militia and the 
only thing he could do was to reiterate the formula of Hezbollah as national resistance 
that was adopted in the inaugural statement of its government. That would have been 
enough to obtain the support of Amal’s component in the parliament who gave a 
standing ovation to the declaration. Hezbollah then had to recognise the declaration as 
a sufficient guarantee to return to the cabinet, since divergence with Amal would have 
meant the end of Shiʿī unity, which is a priority.
31
 
With al-Sinyūra’s declaration, the boycotting ministers returned to the cabinet and the 
government was back on track. Hezbollah, its allies and Syria flexed their muscles with 
their presence in government showing off their political weight. Backed by the terror 
spread by the bombing campaign taking place in Lebanon against Syrian critics, al-
Asad’s regime demonstrated that, notwithstanding its withdrawal from Lebanon, it was 
still capable of interfering with Lebanese politics hampering the approval of government 
acts which would have been against its interests. The Lebanese political agenda had 
plenty of controversial items for Syrian interests, among these were the establishment 
of the Tribunal for the al-Ḥarīrī assassination and the nomination of a new President of 
the Republic following the end of the term of the pro-Syrian Emīl Laḥūd.
32
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 Al-Sinyūra’s ministerial statement is further analysed in Section 8.4. Republic of Lebanon (2006) 'Maḥāḍir 
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This war of words between ‘militia’ and ‘national resistance' continued for a few more 
months. At a later stage, al-Sinyūra participated in a Security Council meeting in April 
2006 addressing the Middle Eastern situation. At the meeting the Prime Minister 
reviewed the situation of Lebanon and stated that Hezbollah’s disarmament was an 
internal affair: 
While there is consensus throughout Lebanon of the important role that the 
resistance, spearheaded by Hezbollah, played in forcing Israel’s withdrawal from 
the south in May 2000, as well as on the fact that the south-eastern corner of the 
country, namely the Sheb‘a farms, remains occupied, the future role of 
Hezbollah’s weapons in defending Lebanon is a matter of national debate. That 
debate will be carried out in the context of the strategy agreed by all Lebanese 
concerning how best to defend Lebanon, against the backdrop of the provisions of 
the Ṭāʾif Agreement of 1989, United Nations resolutions regarding Lebanon and 
the continued occupation of the Shebaʿa farms, as well as the long history of 
incursions and violations of Lebanese territory by Israel.
33
 
But a month later another resolution was adopted by the Security Council (UNSC Res. 
1680)
34
 again referring to Hezbollah as a ‘militia’ but lacking effectiveness. 
Hezbollah used its participation in the Lebanese government to void the effectiveness 
of UNSC res. 1559. Its boycotting of the cabinet served its interest of ‘preserving the 
resistance’ and the interests of its ally Syria, but this also altered certain aspects of its 
political identity as discussed in Section 8.4. Before that, other major events were 
influential in shaping Hezbollah’s political and military behaviour in relation to the 
implementation of UNSC resolutions. 
8.3 The July War of 2006 and UNSC Resolution 1701 
The withdrawal of Israel in 2000 boosted Hezbollah’s popularity in Lebanon and in the 
region but also questioned its definition of ‘resistance movement’. In addition to this, 
the wave of anti-Syrian sentiment of 2005 brought its ally Hezbollah to one of the 
lowest levels of popularity in the same year. Things were bound to change as a result 
of Israel’s military campaign against Hezbollah in July 2006, which had the effect of 
reaffirming its legitimacy as a ‘resistance movement’ in the eyes of the Lebanese but 
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 UN Security Council '5417th Meeting' (UN Doc. s/pv.5417: 26 April 2006). 
34
UN Security Council 'Resolution 1680' (S/RES/1680: 17 May 2006). 
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not only. The focus of this section is mainly on the negotiation of UNSC Resolution 
1701 and the role played by Hezbollah as a member of government in this regard. 
The casus belli of 2006 was a Hezbollah operation
35
 held on 12 July 2006 in which two 
Israeli soldiers were kidnapped across the southern ‘Blue Line’ border with Israel to be 
used as bargaining chips for the release of Lebanese prisoners in Israel.
36
 The 
operation was entirely a Hezbollah initiative and the government was not informed 
about it. The military reaction of Israel killed at least 1,200 civilians and damaged the 
civil infrastructure of the country worth billions of dollars.
37
 Military operations included a 
devastating bombing campaign, a blockade of ports and airports and, at a later stage, a 
ground invasion of the south of Lebanon. Israel reportedly suffered 120 casualties in 
the war.
38
 Hezbollah retaliated by shooting rockets into the north of Israel and fought on 
the ground against the invading Israeli troops. Hezbollah’s casualties were between 
300 and 400 fighters, whereas its military capacity was allegedly damaged between 25 
and 50 per cent.
39
 
8.3.1 The Negotiations of UNSC res. 1701 
The war finished with the approval of UNSC Resolution 1701.
40
 1701 was the result of 
long negotiations, during which the international community acted reluctantly to find a 
solution to the crisis. Two main drafts for the resolution were negotiated through a 
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single diplomatic channel.
41
 One draft was proposed by the Lebanese government (the 
‘Seven-Point Plans’) whereas the other proposal was a US initiative with intermittent 
support from France.
42
 
The US initiative is to be understood within the wider framework of the Middle Eastern 
conflict, which Halliday defined as the ‘West Asian crisis’. It was part of the triangular 
dispute that sees: ‘Iran and its radical allies on one side (Syria, Iraqi Shiite parties, 
Hizballah, Hamas), the forces of the radical Sunni insurgency in Iraq and al-Qaeda, on 
the second side, the US and its regional allies.’
43
 The parties primarily involved in the 
2006 conflict are the first and the third alliance. The outcry of the Arab region against 
Israel’s war on Lebanon was defined by Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice as ‘the 
birth pangs of a new Middle East.’
 44
  This definition approvingly referred to the Israeli 
operations in Lebanon and outraged sectors of public opinion for its negligence of the 
human suffering caused by a full-scale war.  
On the other hand, the Lebanese government was immediately active in negotiating a 
ceasefire but some of the political opponents and allies of Hezbollah cynically saw the 
war as an opportunity to weaken its domestic role. At the initial stage of the war, part of 
the Lebanese political elite judged it a favourable event which, presumably, would have 
weakened the political and military capital of Hezbollah. March 14 MP Boutros Ḥarb
45
 
was quoted in a US diplomatic cable saying: ‘if we are convinced that Israel can finish 
the job, then we can allow a few more weeks.’
46
 According to this view, politically 
Hezbollah would have been held responsible for bringing Lebanon into a disastrous 
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conflict; militarily the Israeli army was seen as being in a position to annihilate 
Hezbollah’s fighting capacity.
47
 In another quote reported in a US diplomatic cable, 
Hezbollah’s ally Berri compared Israel’s military activity to honey saying: ‘I like a little bit 
of honey but if you eat the whole jar you get sick!’ Thus concluding that targeting 
Hezbollah for a limited amount of time would have been beneficial to its weakening but 
it should not last for too long.
48
 This proved wrong in both military and political respects. 
Militarily, Hezbollah was not irremediably damaged and was also capable of inflicting 
serious losses to the Israeli army, whereas politically the war allowed Hezbollah to 
regain and increase the popularity lost in the previous months and years. Despite these 
cynical calculations by certain sectors of the Lebanese political elite, the Lebanese 
government was nonetheless working on a plan to obtain international support for an 
immediate ceasefire at the UN Security Council.
49
 On 19 July 2006, PM al-Sinyūra 
called for an immediate ceasefire and on 26 July the Seven-Point Plan was proposed 
at an international peace conference in Rome to facilitate the adoption of a UNSC 
resolution calling for a complete ceasefire.
50
 This plan was the basis of the Lebanese 
diplomatic initiative and would have been eventually influential in informing Resolution 
1701.
51
 The main aim was defending the national interest bringing to an immediate end 
the conflict and limiting its devastating effects. 
                                               
47
 In another leaked US cable there are reports of a conversation with MP members of the March 14 coalition. 
The US ambassador conveys the content of the conversation as follows: ‘They fear a ceasefire coming too early, 
with an admittedly weak central Lebanese government then forced prematurely to deal with a resurgent 
Hizballah. Claiming to reflect PM Siniora's private thoughts, several of the assembled leaders urged that 
Hizballah be given a “real pounding” by the Israelis to the point that the group would be “soft enough to listen to 
reason.”’ According to Boutros Harb, ‘if we are convinced that Israel can finish the job, then we can allow a few 
more weeks,’ ibid. 
48 
Berri said that the operation should not have lasted for more than four to five days at that point (17th of July). 
'US Diplomatic Cable 06beirut2407', <http://wikileaks.org/cable/2006/07/06BEIRUT2407.html>, accessed 4 
October 2011. 
49
 In a later speech by Nasrallah in 2010, he claimed that the entire international community and the Arab 
delegation at the UN were delaying the achievement of a solution to the conflict. Miṭrī, acting Foreign Affairs 
Minister at that time, strongly denies this as much as he denies any amicable approach to US Ambassador to the 
UN John Bolton as described by Nasrallah. Naṣrallah, 'Speech on Al-Manar Channel', (Mideastwire.com, 2011: 
31 October 2011). 'Author's Interview with Ṭāreq Miṭrī , Delegate for the Republic of Lebanon to the Security 
Council During the 2006 War and Member of Cabinet', (Beirut, Lebanon: 27 September 2011).   
50
'B3. Lebanese Prime Minister Fuad Siniora, Seven-Point Plan for Ending the War in Lebanon, Beirut, 7 August 
2006', Journal of Palestine Studies, 36/1 (2006), 177-78 at p. 177.  
51 
The resolution explicitly refers to the plan in its preamble.  
206 
 
The plan asked for an immediate ceasefire to be followed by the complete withdrawal 
of Israeli troops from Lebanese territory, the deployment of the Lebanese Army in the 
entire area of south Lebanon and an increase in the military capacity of UNIFIL. Al-
Sinyūra’s plan was negotiated in a way to guarantee government unity and then 
responded at least to some of the requests from Hezbollah. The day before the Rome 
Conference, Nasrallah declared with reference to the negotiation of a ceasefire that:  
We can never accept any condition that will humiliate our country, people or 
resistance. Nor will we accept any formula that could come at the expense of 
national interests, sovereignty, independence, especially after all these sacrifices 
no matter how long the confrontation would last and regardless of the great 
sacrifices we will offer. Our true and basic motto is: dignity first.
52
 
Importantly, even though some of its requirements were accepted by Hezbollah 
reluctantly, the Seven-Point Plan was unanimously adopted by the Lebanese 
Government, including Hezbollah’s members and its allies at least in the cabinet 
meetings held on 27 July and 12 August. 
Ṭāreq Miṭrī (at that time a member of the cabinet) described a two-hour long cabinet 
session on 27 July in which Prime Minister al-Sinyūra was determined to achieve a 
unanimous consensus over the conditions for a ceasefire. Al-Sinyūra was aware that 
non-consensual decisions would have thrown the cabinet into another crisis, with 
disastrous consequences for the country at a time in which it was under attack. 
Apparently, President Laḥūd was concerned primarily with the deployment of the LAF 
in south Lebanon in proximity with the Israeli–Lebanese border, even though it is not 
clear why this should have been problematic. Hezbollah, through Fnaysh, its emissary 
in the government, expressed concern over the deployment of an international force in 
the south especially as regards its nature as a Multinational Force or as a continuation 
of the UNIFIL peacekeeping mission. Only after a discussion over the exact wording 
defining this force and some phone calls did Fnaysh express agreement over the 
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Seven-Point Plan, which would have been the subject of negotiations at the Security 
Council to achieve a ceasefire resolution.
53
 
But the Lebanese proposal was opposed by some of the permanent members of the 
Security Council. It was not deemed conducive to a lasting ceasefire especially by the 
US. Both the US and France had another ending to the conflict in mind which 
constituted the alternative proposal they were pursuing to solve the crisis. Their 
proposal aimed at the approval of two different resolutions under Chapter VII, which 
would have authorised the deployment of a multinational force in south Lebanon (most 
likely a NATO contingent) to disarm Hezbollah. In addition to this, the draft resolution 
agreed between France and the US did not mention a call for an immediate ceasefire 
but only a cessation of hostilities. The cessation of hostilities was also curiously 
qualified by an unprecedented distinction between defensive and offensive activities on 
the behalf of Israel.
54
 
Miṭrī, who was at the head of the diplomatic delegation in the UNSC, reports that 
France was particularly keen for a Chapter VII resolution whereas the US was 
particularly resistant over the inclusion of the issue of the Shebaʿa farms in the 
resolution.
55
 According to Michael Williams (at the time the UN Special Coordinator for 
the Middle East Peace Process and then Special Coordinator for Lebanon), France 
was even asking for the deployment of ground to air missiles to protect Lebanese 
airspace, a proposal that was staunchly opposed by both the USA and Israel.
56
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Table  8.1 Comparison of the Lebanese and US–French proposals for ceasefire 
 
Lebanese Government Proposal  
(Seven-Point Plan) 
USA and France
57
 Proposal 
1 
One resolution with strong wording but not under 
Chapter  VII 
Two resolutions, the second under Chapter VII  
2 Exchange of prisoners between Lebanon and Israel 
Encouraging efforts over the issue of Lebanese prisoners 
and emphasising the need for unconditional release of 
abducted Israeli soldiers 
3 Withdrawal of Israel beyond the ‘blue line’ 
Strong support for territorial integrity respect for the blue 
line. Elimination of foreign forces in Lebanon without the 
consent of its government 
4 
Deployment of Lebanese Armed Forces in the 
South 
UN mandated force to support the Lebanese Armed 
Forces 
5 
Reinforcement of the international peacekeeping 
force under UN mandate 
Deployment of a multinational force for the disarmament 
of Hezbollah (NATO) and to prohibit its rearmament 
sealing the borders of the country 
6 
Complete cessation of hostilities on both sides and 
commitment to definitive ceasefire 
Call for cessation of all attacks from Hezbollah and 
offensive military operations of Israel. Support for a 
permanent ceasefire and a long-term solution 
7 
Administration of Shebaʿa and Kfarshouba 
territories under international authority 
Provision of maps of landmines in south Lebanon 
from Israel 
Provision of landmine maps from Israel to the UN 
8 
International commitment for Lebanon’s 
reconstruction 
Call to international community for humanitarian 
assistance  
The Lebanese government was against the Franco–US plan. It opposed the idea of a 
multinational force
58 
under Chapter VII claiming that the deployment of the Lebanese 
army, assisted by an upgraded military force of UNIFIL, would have been better and 
more easily accepted by all the parties in Lebanon (read Hezbollah). Furthermore, 
whereas the stronger resolution sponsored by the US wanted to seal the borders of 
Lebanon in order to prohibit the rearmament of Hezbollah, the Lebanese government 
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was only concerned with deploying its forces in the South and prohibiting weapons 
under the line of the Litany river.  
According to Miṭrī, achieving a shared agreement within the government over the 
seven points was already a considerable result.
59
 Nothing more than what was already 
achieved could have been attained without the risk of the government’s collapse. 
Furthermore, the government was critical of a resolution under Chapter VII and the 
two-phase implementation suggested by the US proposal. 
At a later stage, a further issue was raised regarding the explicit request of the 
withdrawal of Israel from Lebanon. The Lebanese government was obviously 
requesting it as an essential condition, while the US diplomatic initiative was trying to 
pass a resolution which would have allowed the Israeli occupation of the South for an 
indeterminate time.
60
 Because of these divergences, negotiations were still far from an 
agreement while Israel was continuing its bombing campaign which, as it was not 
successful, was supplemented by a ground invasion. 
8.3.2 The Cessation of Hostilities 
The diplomatic negotiations were increasingly diverging over their aims. On 25 July 
four members of the UN Truce Supervision Organisation (UNTSO) mission were killed 
by an Israeli precision bomb while based in a well signed UN post. According to a US 
diplomatic cable, the UN Secretary-General Special Representative in Lebanon Geir 
Perdersen conjectured that the reason for this deliberate attack was to discourage 
foreign nations from offering troops for a peacekeeping force.
61
 Another major accident 
took place on 30 July; Israel hit a civilian building in Qānā (the same village of the 1996 
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massacre) killing more than 28 people (of which 13 children) in one round.
62
 US 
Secretary of State Rice was supposed to visit Lebanon then but at that point al-Sinyūra 
declared that there was no other negotiation to be held before agreeing on an 
immediate ceasefire.
63
 These were just two of the many occasions in which non-
combatants were involved in the war on the Lebanese side rendering the negotiations 
increasingly difficult and squandering precious time to reduce the effects of the conflict. 
Throughout this kind of action, causing hundreds of thousands of internally displaced 
persons, devastating civilian infrastructure and failing to achieve significant military 
results, the war did not bring about any of the results expected by Israel and its allies. 
Quite the contrary, whereas Hezbollah at the beginning of the war was held 
responsible for precipitating Lebanon in a destructive war and was surprised by the 
scale of the conflict it had to deal with, its capacity to contrast the Israeli army on the 
ground and the suffering imposed on the Lebanese population by Israel tilted the 
balance in Hezbollah’s favour in the second phase of the war. 
The US and France were no longer in a position to impose their conditions on the 
ceasefire. The situation began to reveal the political, military and intelligence 
miscalculations that were at the basis of the conflict. Resolution 1701, finally calling for 
a ceasefire, was approved by the Security Council on 11 August.
64
 The resolution was 
not under Chapter VII and did not call for a multinational force, both crucial demands 
from the US and France. It established the deployment of the LAF in the south (but not 
on the Syrian borders) with the collaboration of a newly reinforced UNIFIL military force 
towards which various Western countries (including a reluctant France) contributed.
65
 
1701 only mentioned the possibility of a follow-up resolution (as it was prospected in 
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the two-phase plan sponsored by the US) and called for the complete withdrawal of the 
Israeli army even though the US was probably interested in a protracted Israeli 
presence in south Lebanon.
66
 
Among the other requests there was the demand to fully implement the provisions of 
the Ṭāʾif Agreement: ‘that require[s] the disarmament of all armed groups in Lebanon, 
so that, pursuant to the Lebanese cabinet decision of 27 July 2006, there will be no 
weapons or authority in Lebanon other than that of the Lebanese state.’
67
 This time the 
term ‘militia’ was not used (differently from resolution 1559). The drafters adopted 
different wording (‘armed groups’) making the resolution relevant for Hezbollah 
disarmament and escaping the issue of defining it a ‘militia’.
68
  
UNSC Res. 1701 welcomed the efforts of the Prime Minister of Lebanon about the fact 
that ‘there will be no weapons without the consent of the Government of Lebanon and 
no authority than that of the Government of Lebanon’.
69
 But in this way, Hezbollah 
would have only needed the consent of the government to retain its weapons which 
they had officially obtained in the governmental statements a few months before. Even 
more significantly, the resolution did not inform any cogent mechanism to implement 
Hezbollah’s disarmament, but established only measures to prohibit the acquisition of 
further weapons. This latter point was sternly pushed for by the US. Surveillance over 
the implementation of 1701 as regards the rearmament of Hezbollah was to be 
implemented by the unequipped LAF under the supervision of the UNIFIL military force. 
The resolution was, then, more receptive towards the demands of the Lebanese 
government (including Hezbollah) than the conditions imposed by the US. Hezbollah 
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was capable of maintaining its arsenal and its status of resistance movement 
notwithstanding the war, the resolution, and the subsequent political pressure 
eventually leading to the civil unrest of May 2008. UNSC Res. 1701 was, in conclusion, 
a compromise mainly reflecting the requests of the Lebanese government’s diplomatic 
initiative which in turn was under the influence of Hezbollah’s conditions. The 
devastating war of 2006 and its consequences underpinned the legitimacy of the 
resistance and the retention of its weapons. In this respect, Williams confirmed that by 
participating in the government, Hezbollah achieved the best resolution that it could get 
for its strategic interests.
70
 Points 1, 3, 4, 5 and 7 of Table 8.1 prevailed over the 
alternatives proposed by the US. Hezbollah member Fayyāḍ assesses the 
achievement of 1701 as follows: 
Just as Israel had failed miserably to achieve goals set for its aggression, the 
resolution 1701, in its current version, seems to be a Lebanese achievement 
comparing with all attempts to impose projects under Chapter VII on Lebanon, as 
well as the American–French or American projects that David Welch brought with 
(sic) to Beirut. This is also a first degree achievement based on the result of the 
battle, which reduced many of the political risks that were involved in other 
decisions.
71
 
In the subsequent analysis, I will illustrate that despite the success of Hezbollah in 
influencing certain aspects of the resolution, its close involvement in the negotiation of 
the resolution due to its governmental role also influenced its political identity. 
8.4 UNSC Resolutions as a Factor of International Socialisation 
The previous pages have shown that, by accessing the government, Hezbollah was 
capable of influencing the process of negotiation and implementation of UNSC 
resolutions limiting their impact over its action. UNSC Res. 1559 drew upon two main 
international norms. The first is the principle of state sovereignty demanding the 
withdrawal of Syria and the disarmament of factions challenging the state’s monopoly 
of force. The second is maintenance of international peace, understood as related to 
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the disarmament of Hezbollah. Similarly, UNSC Res. 1701 relied on the same 
principles of 1559 demanding the withdrawal of Israeli troops, full deployment of the 
LAF, reinforcement of the UNIFIL mission and disarmament of Hezbollah. 
Even though these resolutions were largely ineffective in constraining it, Hezbollah was 
nonetheless influenced by their implementation. Its participation in the government was 
a two-way process. On the one hand, Hezbollah influenced certain aspects of the 
resolutions. 1559 was neutralised, forcing the government to renew its 
acknowledgment of Hezbollah as a national resistance entity and not as militia; 
whereas 1701 was drafted in a way that was certainly different from how Hezbollah’s 
enemies wanted it to be. On the other hand, its newly acquired governmental role 
made Hezbollah accountable towards the choices of the state in relation to 
international norms and exposed it to their implementation to an unprecedented 
degree.  
As in the previous cases, Hezbollah’s interaction with international norms can be 
understood as a case of socialisation in which Hezbollah became directly accountable 
towards international normative principles contained in UNSC resolutions, modified its 
Islamist political profile by accepting norms (state sovereignty and international peace) 
which were previously not acknowledged to the same extent and justified its actions not 
only as an Islamist actor, but as an international actor referring to international law. 
Socialisation in this case seems to take place as ‘external inducement’
72
 as Ikenberry 
and Kupchan define it, considering the fact that military force is central to this process 
although highly unsuccessful. As a result of the same process, nonetheless, ‘normative 
persuasion’ can be seen when considering that, not only does Hezbollah partly abide 
by the norms imposed by the resolution but it even begins to use these norms as a 
source of legitimacy for its action. 
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8.4.1 Government Participation and Accountability 
Hezbollah took part in the government in an attempt to contain the effects of a changed 
regional scenario. As part of the government, it was capable of influencing the drafting 
of UNSC Res. 1701 in the way discussed in Section 8.3.2. Sources confirm how the 
rest of the cabinet was forced to partly accept Hezbollah’s conditions to avoid falling 
into another governmental crisis.
73
 Hezbollah’s political weight is shown for example in 
a conversation held by PM al-Sinyūra with the ambassadors of the countries involved 
in the drafting of the resolution when discussing alternative options to the Seven-Point 
Plan of the Lebanese government. According to a US diplomatic cable:  
While Siniora did not state that the GOL [Government of Lebanon] would definitely 
reject the current draft if passed, he hinted at growing disagreement within the 
Cabinet over the terms of a ceasefire deal, and that his government could collapse 
over it. While he will not rule out taking a ‘creative look’ at the proposal in order to 
make it work, he stated clearly that ‘Hizbollah is not going to comply’ with the 
resolution if passed as is, and that this would increase Sunni–Shia tensions while 
providing the pretext for continued Hizballah militancy and Syrian meddling.
74
 
This confirms how Hezbollah was in a position to blackmail the cabinet and potentially 
cause its collapse. In contrast though, Hezbollah’s direct involvement not only allowed 
it to pose conditions over the content of 1701 but in turn made it responsible towards its 
content. This made the dismissal of the validity of the resolution more difficult, because 
Hezbollah was regularly consulted in its negotiation as part of the cabinet, as seen 
above. Whereas Hezbollah’s participation in the government gave it a greater 
bargaining power the same process made it more accountable for its commitments.  
At least two of these commitments requested by the resolution (i.e. accepting the 
deployment of the LAF and the UNIFIL peacekeeping force) were formally sanctioned 
by governmental decisions, but in fact were not ideal for Hezbollah. These had to be 
accepted as a condition for the achievement of a ceasefire. Direct influence over the 
negotiation of 1701 came with direct responsibility over its implementation which was 
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also confirmed by the outspoken commitment of Nasrallah to the core aspects of the 
resolution.  Nasrallah raised various critical points in relation to biases in 1701, for 
example observing that ‘the resolution is unfair and unjust when it tries to blame the 
resistance which conducted a limited military operation despite the lies we heard 
yesterday at the UN Security Council's session by the US Secretary of State and the 
Israeli envoy.’ He further pointed out that:  
[1701] did not even make any mention of anything related to Israel's aggression, 
horrific massacres, the killing of over 1,000 civilians in Lebanon, and the killing of 
women and children in Qana, Al-Shayyah, Al-Qa, Al-Brital, Akkar, Sarifa, and in 
many and countless Lebanese towns where massacres were committed within 
this aggression, where the Lebanese infrastructure was destroyed, and where war 
crimes were committed. All these acts were not even mentioned in the resolution. 
Some even considered these acts as a natural right for Israel. This is certainly 
unjust and unfair.
75
  
Despite this, Nasrallah declared commitment to the crucial points of 1701 related to the 
LAF and UNIFIL deployment: 
In the past, through our political stand and our presence in the Lebanese 
government, we said that we agree on the idea of deploying the Lebanese Army 
backed by the UNIFIL troops. This is our stand, and we are committed to it. When 
the deployment of the army and the UNIFIL troops is decided, they will see all 
required co-operation, facilitation, and preparedness by the resistance, God 
willing.
76 
 
Hezbollah’s commitment and the elements of criticism which were raised by Hezbollah 
were also confirmed to the author by Williams, who from 2008 to 2011 was in charge of 
reporting to the Security Council on the implementation of 1701. Williams confirms a 
rather cooperative attitude from Hezbollah’s cadres in this respect, and observed a 
rational and prudent attitude from Hezbollah with regard to the measures and the 
restraints imposed by this resolution.
77
 The inclusion of Hezbollah in the government 
and consequently in the negotiations of 1701 facilitated its commitment even to 
conditions that were accepted only reluctantly. This has been partly recognised in 
Hezbollah’s assessment of the situation, for example Fayyāḍ claims: 
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The resolution has introduced essential modifications to the strategic scene in 
Southern Lebanon, but they are not fundamental, for they didn’t put an end to the 
previous phase nor recreate a new strategic reality. What actually happened was 
the inclusion of new strategic facts but they did not turn into new strategic reality. 
Hezbollah has exceeded its reservations, and the Secretary-General [of 
Hezbollah] openly said that these are the national bounds which they can’t go 
beyond. Later on, Hezbollah announced its commitment to the government’s 
decision towards resolution 1701, though it is unjust and unfair.
78
  
The above then confirms how participation in the government was a double sided 
process, which has entailed the unprecedented commitment (although reluctant) of 
Hezbollah to a UNSC resolution.  
8.4.2 The Shift in the Legitimacy Paradigm 
Because of its increased accountability in government and internationally, Hezbollah’s 
Islamist political profile was also affected. Whereas before its legitimacy of resistance 
movement widely relied on reference to Islamic ethics, this shifted towards a 
progressive inclusion of international law principles as the founding source of 
legitimacy for its actions. The move is not an isolated phenomenon, but reflects what 
Innis Claude noted. According to Claude, international political institutions 
progressively developed a ‘function of legitimisation in the international realm’
79
 and 
Hezbollah seems to take full advantage of this function. According to Claude:  
While statesmen have their own ways of justifying their foreign policies to 
themselves and their peoples, independent of external judgements, they are well 
aware that such unilateral determinations do not suffice. They are keenly 
conscious of the need for approval by a large and impressive body of other states 
as may be possible, for multilateral endorsement of their position – in short for 
collective legitimization.
80
 
This view is useful in understanding the issue related to UNSC Res. 1559 which was a 
resolution imposing an identity which Hezbollah did not intend to accept. The resolution 
entailed its identification as a ‘militia’ and to avoid this vilifying label, Hezbollah had to 
find an alternative definition with a higher legitimacy status. Resorting to Islamic norms 
would not have helped, since these do not enjoy the same degree of legitimacy of 
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international norms in international society but only apply to the Islamic community. 
Within the international context, a non-state actor carrying weapons can only be 
defined as a terrorist or criminal organisation or a national movement for self-
determination. Hezbollah interfered in the political process to make sure that the 
second definition would have prevailed in a governmental declaration to neutralise the 
attempt at being identified as a militia or generically a terrorist organisation.  
Once recognised by the Lebanese government as a national resistance, Hezbollah 
legitimated its existence and action referring to principles of international law as the 
right to self-determination and self-defence and not with reference to Islamic principles 
with which Hezbollah is more traditionally associated. Referring to the concept of 
national resistance, Hezbollah aims to fall into the definition of an armed group 
operating on the basis of principles established by international law and then enjoying 
more legitimacy internationally and domestically. The most common reference in this 
regard is Art. 1 (4) of the 1977 Additional Protocol to the Geneva Conventions of 1949. 
This article says that the conventions codifying the principles of international 
humanitarian law apply also to:  
armed conflicts in which peoples are fighting against colonial domination and alien 
occupation and against racist regimes in the exercise of their right of self-
determination, as enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations and the 
Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and 
Co-operation among States in accordance with the Charter of the United 
Nations.
81
 
Even though the notion is highly contentious among scholars, the inclusion of non-state 
actors in the Geneva Conventions establishes the lawful status of an armed group 
carrying weapons against alien occupation as an exercise of the right to self-
determination. Under the pressure of UNSC Res. 1559, Hezbollah adapted its political 
identity to the definitions used by international norms. As observed by Ian Johnstone, 
the role of the interpretation of legal aspects within the Security Council is crucial in 
producing the outcomes of its resolutions and their implementation and the same 
applies to this case. With its governmental role, Hezbollah was capable, at least 
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domestically, of favouring an interpretation of international law that would have 
acknowledged it as a national resistance movement rather than a militia and then as a 
legitimate entity in the framework of international law.
82
  
It is for this reason that the war of words of 2005 between ‘militia’ and ‘national 
resistance’, discussed in Section 8.2, acquired such capital importance and became a 
condition for Hezbollah to return to the cabinet. The declarations and events 
considered with reference to UNSC Res. 1559 confirm this hypothesis. The ministerial 
statement of 2005, voted by Hezbollah in parliament, stated that ‘the Lebanese 
resistance is a sincere and natural expression of the national right of the Lebanese 
people to liberate their land and defend their dignity in the face of Israeli attacks, 
threats and ambitions, and the factor to complete the liberation of Lebanese territory.’
83 
 
The same is confirmed in a second occasion after Hezbollah and its allies boycotted 
the government for weeks and returned to the cabinet under the condition of another 
declaration by al-Sinyūra. The declaration was another statement defining the political 
identity of the movement as a national resistance and not as a militia. Al-Sinyūra made 
clear that: ‘We, mister chairman, never called the resistance with any other name 
different from resistance, and that is a national resistance and we never used other 
expressions to describe it other than the expression national resistance.’
84
 By being 
identified as ‘national resistance’, Hezbollah escaped the vilifying label of ‘militia’ and 
(supposedly) acquired international legitimacy grounded in international law, but at the 
same time it also abandoned its Islamist definition at least in the public political sphere.  
Hezbollah’s identity was framed in a way that rendered it immune to the application of 
1559 and traced a distinction between a militia and a national resistance movement. 
Nevertheless, Hezbollah’s manoeuvring to acquire this status also made it an actor 
whose political principles are not determined by traditional Islamic norms but by 
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international normative concepts. The change is evident if we contrast this definition 
with the traditional definition of resistance as an Islamic religious duty. Consider for 
example the definition of Hezbollah given in its 1985 Open Letter: 
The main sources of our culture are the venerable Qurʾān, the infallible Sunna, 
and the decisions and fatwās made by the Faqīh our marjʿa al-taqlīd. These 
sources are clear, uncomplicated, and accessible to all without exception and they 
need no theorization or philosophy. All they need is abidance and application. As 
to our military power, nobody can imagine its dimensions because we do not have 
a military agency separate from the other parts of our body. Each of us is a 
combat soldier when the call of jihād demands it and each of us undertakes his 
task in the battle in accordance with his ‘shariatic’ duty within the framework of 
action under the guardianship of the Wilāyat al-Faqīh.
85
 
The kind of process that has been described in this chapter shows how in this 
transformation the inclusion of Hezbollah in the government and its exposition to 
international norms such as UNSC Res. 1559 compelled a redefinition of its identity 
from being exclusively defined in Islamic terms to an identity that relies on international 
norms as a source of legitimacy. 
Whether Hezbollah can actually be defined as a resistance movement in 2005 remains 
disputable (especially considering that the occupying force of Israel had almost totally 
withdrawn from Lebanon), what really matters is that, at this stage, its raison d'être is 
not only Islamist, but widely relies on international norms as a source of legitimacy. As 
a member of government and acting within the framework of international norms, 
Hezbollah had to accept the underlying assumptions of the international normative 
system in which its exclusively religious identity could not be used to legitimise its 
existence as a resistance movement. 
The same kind of transition in Hezbollah’s paradigm of legitimacy can be traced with 
reference to 1701 and the July War of 2006. Hezbollah’s declarations during the war 
show how international norms were instrumental in legitimising its activity also in this 
case. At the beginning of the 2006 conflict, for example, Nasrallah needed to justify the 
kidnapping operation that prompted Israel’s reaction in front of the Lebanese public. It 
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did so by framing this operation in the broader military activity of the movement and 
referring to the aforementioned governmental statement of al-Sinyūra: 
The government statement, on the basis of which we participated in the 
government, talks about the Lebanese government’s endorsement of resistance 
and its national right to liberate the land and the prisoners. How could a resistance 
liberate prisoners? Go to George Bush for example? I cannot and will not go to 
George Bush. When you talk about the resistance’s right, you are not talking about 
the Foreign Ministry’s right. You talk about an armed resistance, and you establish 
in the government statement its right to liberate the land and the prisoners.
86
 
Operation ‘truthful promise’ then was framed as an operation which, according to 
Hezbollah’s leader, enjoyed legitimacy as a right to national liberation of land and 
prisoners. Legalistic thinking in terms of international law becomes relevant because 
the kidnapped Israeli soldiers were not on Lebanese soil when they were assaulted, a 
point which was contested within Hezbollah’s ranks as a violation of the same 
international principles throughout which Hezbollah justified its military activity.
87
 To this 
objection, Nasrallah commented as follows in an interview, showing once more the 
relevance of international norms in informing the activity of the movement: 
Nothing depends on this point when there is an occupied territory. You can refer to 
the legal opinion by the late professor Edmond Naim. The legal viewpoint is clear. 
Under international law, if one inch of our land is occupied, we have the right to 
carry out operations in Tel Aviv. […] there is no difference from the legal point of 
view if we take them prisoners in Shabaʿa farm, the border, near the barbed wire, 
or a few hundred meters beyond the borders. This is our right in international law. 
We should not forget that they are holding Lebanese prisoners, claiming they are 
prisoners of war.
88
 
For the scope of this analysis, it is not relevant to discuss whether Nasrallah’s legal 
opinion would hold in an international legal court (as it seems hardly the case); the 
point is that Hezbollah is not justifying its actions strictly with reference to the Islamic 
ethical paradigm but referring to an interpretation of international law. 
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Furthermore, international norms are not only instrumental to the legitimacy of 
Hezbollah’s action but are also instrumental to the condemnation of Israel’s military 
activity. Reference to the concept of ‘war crime’ in Nasrallah’s speeches is indicative 
and reiterates the issue discussed in Chapter 6 regarding the protection of civilians in 
conflict:
89
 
The killing of civilians, including men, women and children, is taking place 
deliberately […] Are these not war crimes? Is not the killing of children and women 
a war crime? Is not the demolition of vacant buildings that are distant from the 
battlefield and which are not used in any way and have nothing to do with 
Hezbollah’s leaders and fighters considered a war crime?
90
 
An interesting anecdote was reported by Williams.
91
 In one of his meetings regarding 
1701 with Hezbollah’s Minister Fnaysh, Williams was subject to the demands from 
Fnaysh to release a press statement in public, despite the fact that he did not have any 
intention to do so. Fnaysh’s demand was due to the fact that Hezbollah wanted to be 
seen as being involved and as part of the process of negotiations and implementation 
of 1701. Entertaining relations and meeting at a high level with the UN was becoming 
part of Hezbollah’s public role and image and needed to be fully boasted by media. 
As in the case of Resolution 1559 in which Hezbollah had to define itself as a national 
resistance, the events related to the July war of 2006 and the adoption of UNSC Res. 
1701 also had the effect of constraining Hezbollah to justifications referring to 
international norms. International institutions and then international norms were used 
as sources of legitimisation for political actors as Claude prefigures.
92
 Exposed to 
hostile international pressure, menaced by a regional conflict and with the responsibility 
of acting as member of government, Hezbollah could not justify its mission of 
resistance as an Islamic duty only, but had to defend its legitimacy resorting to 
international norms.  
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 It has been widely reported that Hezbollah also attacked civilians deliberately in the 2006 war even though the 
number of reported casualties (43) is far lower if compared to the 1,200 Lebanese civilian casualties. See   
Human Rights Watch (2007) 'Civilians under Assault: Hezbollah’s Rocket Attacks on Israel in the 2006 War' (19: 
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This further attests the process of socialisation of Hezbollah within the international 
normative framework described by constructivist social theory considered also in the 
previous chapters.
93
 The initially reluctant interaction of political actors with the 
international normative system progressively brings about the regulation of domestic 
and international relations on the basis of international norms. Kathryn Sikkink and 
Martha Finnemore mention how political actors are socialised as the result of a 
demand of legitimacy as in this case for Hezbollah. According to them: 
An important condition for domestic receptiveness to international norms is a need 
for international legitimation. If legitimation is a main motivation for normative 
shifts, we might expect states to endorse international norms during periods of 
domestic turmoil in which the legitimacy of elites is threatened. 
94
 
The above also applies to a non-state actor such as Hezbollah, the legitimacy of which 
could not be explained with exclusive reference to the Islamic normative paradigm 
anymore, and needs then to be underpinned by international norms.  
8.4.3 Towards a Normalisation of State–Hezbollah Relations? 
A final observation to be advanced is that, particularly as a consequence of UNSC Res. 
1701, Hezbollah had partially to normalise its relations with the state authority or, at 
least, acknowledge symbolically that it could not depict itself as alternative to state 
sovereignty but rather as a complementary element. The main indicator confirming this 
is the deployment of the LAF in the southern region of Lebanon along with the 
reinforcement of the international peacekeeping force, UNIFIL. Williams reports that 
Hezbollah would have never admitted it in public, but the deployment of the LAF in 
south Lebanon was an act that restated the authority of the state over a territory from 
which it was virtually absent for 30 years.
95
 Hezbollah had to accept (reluctantly) the 
deployment of thousands of Lebanese troops in an area controlled by the Shiʿī 
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 Also the idea of normative persuasion here seems to fit the case. G. John Ikenberry and Charles A. Kupchan, 
'Socialization and Hegemonic Power', ibid.44 (1990), 283-315 at p. 290. 
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movement. More generally, in relation to Hezbollah’s commitment to the Seven-Point 
Plan of al-Sinyūra, Fayyāḍ notes that:  
There is no doubt that Hezbollah’s stance submitted to critical circumstances that 
arose from the domestic division, and the will of Hezbollah to provide a minimum 
of internal solidarity and national unity in the face of aggression and Western 
hegemony dominating the international institutions.
96
 
The deployment of the LAF was previously considered unacceptable, as Nasrallah 
declared in one of his speeches: 
Yes, in the past, we objected to the deployment of the army along the borders, not 
because we had suspicions about the army, may God forbid. This is a national 
army and for years we have been praising it, […]. When we objected to, or had 
reservations about, this deployment, it was not out of fear of the army, because 
this national army can never be a source of fear for its people. The fact is that we 
objected out of fear for the army through its deployment along the international 
borders. The question is clear. Deploying a regular army along the international 
borders directly face to face with an enemy that might at any time transgress is 
like placing this army in the mouth of a dragon.
97
 
Despite this, Hezbollah eventually accepted the deployment of the LAF along with the 
international peacekeeping force.
98
 From a non-state actor Hezbollah was eventually 
being forced to progressively accept the authority of the state even within a territory 
over which it claimed control. It is hard to imagine that this would have happened 
without the imposition of a UNSC resolution demanding the recognition of state 
sovereignty by Hezbollah through the deployment of the LAF in the south.  
Furthermore, Hezbollah accepted the deployment of UNIFIL, which is an even more 
crucial indicator of change since, thus far, opposition to foreign interference (especially 
on military grounds) has been among the central pillars of Hezbollah. The United 
Nations in general have always been considered an irremediably biased institution not 
to be trusted by Hezbollah as clearly stated in its 1985 Open Letter.
99
 There are 
limitations to the confirmation of this last hypothesis. Indeed, the army was never 
capable of carrying out the disarmament of Hezbollah over which no political 
consensus was reached due to the staunch opposition of Hezbollah and its allies in the 
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months following the war. In addition the UNIFIL contingent had some tense phases 
during its operations in south Lebanon.  
Nonetheless the deployment of the army in South Lebanon with the approval of 
Hezbollah was a major step forward achieved through a UNSC resolution which 
progressively contributes to normalising state–Hezbollah relations by promoting state 
sovereignty. Although forced on to Hezbollah, the LAF deployment could be considered 
as socialisation through ‘external inducement’ according to which a political elite has 
been forced to accept a policy, but also adapts to it. With Ikenberry and Kupchan’s 
words: ‘the normative principles underlying the hegemon’s policies come to be 
embraced as rightful by the elites’, in this case by Hezbollah, which declared itself to be 
willing to cooperate with the deployment of UNIFIL and the LAF. 
8.5 Conclusions 
As observed in the previous cases with regard to international humanitarian law and 
human rights, Hezbollah’s interaction with international norms as UNSC resolutions 
also brings about a modification of its political identity of Islamist movement and 
facilitates its international socialisation. 
This chapter has analysed the events of 2005 and 2006 during which Hezbollah 
became part of the Lebanese government for the first time. At the time, Lebanon was 
under the scrutiny of international political actors and subject to two major UNSC 
resolutions based on fundamental international norms such as state sovereignty and 
maintenance of international peace. It shows how Hezbollah played all its cards in the 
political process of negotiation and implementation of these resolutions to minimise 
their impact but in turn was also drawn into the international normative system. 
Sections 8.2 and 8.3 have provided an analysis of this process and shown the political 
role of Hezbollah as a member of government. In Section 8.4, it was argued that even if 
Hezbollah was indeed efficient at influencing the implementation of these resolutions, 
this did not happen without costs for Hezbollah’s political identity.  
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Its inclusion in the government has produced the conditions for direct international 
accountability over its commitment to these resolutions. Furthermore, with its 
exposition to the international normative system, Hezbollah was forced to account for 
the legitimacy of its actions on the basis of international norms and not in terms of 
Islamist values, thus changing the founding paradigm over which its activity was based. 
Finally it was observed how this process has also reshaped Hezbollah’s relations with 
the authority of the state imposing the presence of the LAF and the reinforced UNIFIL 
contingent in south Lebanon. 
As in the previous cases, Hezbollah’s self-referential character and Islamist 
foundations are increasingly challenged by its socialisation in international society. The 
phenomena described in this chapter compelled Hezbollah to revise its Islamist identity 
in a way that is increasingly receptive towards international norms and can be 
interpreted as a form of international socialisation externally induced but also leading to 
a normative shift in the legitimacy paradigm on the basis of which it justifies its political 
action. 
Chapter 9  
 
International Norms and Hezbollah’s Political 
Vocabulary 
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9.1 Introduction 
The previous chapters have highlighted the impact of international norms on 
Hezbollah’s Islamist identity analysing its interaction with international actors. This 
chapter focuses on an analysis of the language of Hezbollah, in particular with regard 
to the kind of vocabulary used. 
It carries out a comparison of the frequency of key terms between two fundamental 
documents for Hezbollah. The first is the already mentioned Open Letter to the 
Downtrodden (OLD) which was introduced in Section 5.5. The second is the Political 
Charter of Hezbollah (PCH)
1
, publicly announced by the Secretary-General Nasrallah 
on Hezbollah’s satellite channel al-Manār in October 2009.
2
 These documents (which 
are of comparable length) have been chosen for their central importance in the overall 
discourse of Hezbollah. The first, as already seen,
3
 is the founding declaration of the 
movement, while the second is the main programmatic political document that has 
been released by Hezbollah. 
The analysis refers to the categories of person and community (presented in Chapter 4 
and mentioned in the other chapters) as the terms of comparison between the two 
texts. Section 9.2 discusses the concept of community and shows how Hezbollah 
initially defines this concept in religious terms, especially referring to the idea of umma, 
and then shifts towards an increasing use of the term nation (waṭān). Section 9.3 looks 
at persons, and shows a transition in Hezbollah’s political vocabulary from the 
identification of persons on the basis of religious parameters to their definition as 
members of a national political community, especially as citizens of the Lebanese 
nation state. Section 9.4 focuses on the role of international norms and claims that the 
transition of Hezbollah’s political language is characterised by an increasing reference 
                                               
1
 Al-Wathῑqa al-Siyasiyya li Ḥizbu  llāh (the Political Document of Hezbollah) is part of a larger document entitled 
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September 2011). 
2
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3
 See Section 5.5. 
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to key normative concepts, widely overlapping with international norms such as: 
sovereignty, rights, development and others.  
International norms are influential in the way Hezbollah redefines Lebanese statehood. 
From the Islamic paradigm, sketchily outlined in the 1985 document, Hezbollah moves 
towards the idea of a modern state, which to a certain extent has a liberal connotation. 
Hezbollah in the 2009 document depicts a state where citizens have rights and in 
which institutions deliver justice, promote economic development, do not interfere with 
personal ideas of moral righteousness and rely on some form of democratic 
accountability. Although with a different methodological approach, this chapter 
integrates the analysis of the process of socialisation that has been described in the 
previous chapters, and illustrates how international norms have influenced certain 
aspects of Hezbollah’s political identity with reference to its political language. 
9.2 From Umma to Nation (Waṭān): Hezbollah’s Shift in Terms of 
Collective Entities 
A fundamental concept in Islamic and Arabic vocabulary is that of umma. The term, 
which roughly corresponds to ‘community’, is characterised by a remarkable semantic 
uncertainty rendering its definition and translation difficult in certain occasions. It is for 
this reason that the author did not translate, but transliterated the term in the OLD and 
the PCH. 
To fully appreciate the relevance of this concept, it is necessary to elaborate its 
meanings in more detail. The origins of the word are not confirmed: Bernard Lewis and 
Halliday argue that it is related to a similar term in Hebrew or Aramaic;
4
 Tamim al-
Barghouti says that it comes from the Arabic root umm which means ‘to lead’;
5
 whereas 
Said Bensaid argues that it is possible to connect this term with the Arabic term for 
                                               
4
 Lewis, Political Language p. 17. Fred Halliday, 'The Politics of the Umma: States and Community in Islamic 
Movements', Mediterranean Politics, 7/3 (2002), 20-41 at p. 23. 
5
 Tamim Al-Barghouti, The Umma and the Dawla: The Nation State and the Arab Middle East (London ; Ann 
Arbor, MI: Pluto Press, 2008) p. 37. 
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‘mother’.
6
 The term appears in the Qurʾān at least 62 times
7
 and several other times in 
the  adīth, often with different meanings. In certain cases it even refers to an individual 
rather than a group.
8
 
More relevant than its origins are its different meanings. As is widely accepted, the 
most important, but by no means the only one, is that of community of believers. In 
particular when referring to the Islamic community, the umma is further qualified by the 
adjective ‘Islamic’ that together forms the locution al-umma al-islāmiyya. In this case 
umma refers to a group of persons sharing a religious belief in the message of Islam 
and, as a consequence, a shared commitment to its values and principles. Although 
there are many different interpretations of Islam, the umma entails a sense of unity 
among the believers, a sense that is further confirmed by the harsh condemnation of 
sectarian division in Islam epitomised by the abhorrence of strife among Muslims 
(fitna).
9
 As Halliday says:  
The assertion of a Muslim community is intimately related to the strength of shared 
norms, that is umma entails not only a common Muslim community facing other 
non-Muslim people, but is dependent upon the espousal by that community of its 
internal values and faith, and the fulfilment of duty.
10
   
Barghouti proposes a similar definition of umma when he says that ‘a physical 
existence of individuals is called an umma when these individuals have an image of 
themselves as a collective, and when this image is guiding them to do things in certain 
ways distinct from others.’
11
A further aspect is how this concept becomes politically 
relevant as a source of legitimacy for political and judicial institutions. As Lewis says: 
‘the polity or community over which this sovereign rules is the umma, the single 
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 Said Bensaid, 'Al Watan and Al Umma in Contemporary Arab Use' in Ghassane Salamé (ed.), The Foundations 
of the Arab State: Nation, State, and Integration in the Arab World (London ; New York: Croom Helm, 1987) p. 
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 Halliday, 'Politics of the Umma' p. 23. 
8
 Al-Barghouti, Umma and Dawla p. 39. 
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See for example Hamzeh’s discussion of the unity of the Islamic Umma, Hamzeh, In the Path of Hizbullah pp. 
39-42.  
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 Halliday, 'Politics of the Umma' p. 25. 
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 Al-Barghouti, Umma and Dawla p. 39. 
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universal community embracing all the lands in which Muslim rule is established and 
the Islamic law prevails.’
12
 Also, Halliday observes that:  
The very definition of an umma as a community of shared values, religious or not, 
has political implications: one is that it should, where possible, coincide with a 
political authority, as was the case of the Prophet in Medina and was to continue 
to be the case for his four immediate successors.
13
  
The relationship between umma and political institutions, thus, is a close one, and will 
be further investigated below. In addition to its meaning of religious community, umma 
is associated with ethnic groups. In particular with the rise of pan-Arabism, the political 
discourse often resorted to the idea of an Arabic umma (al-umma al-ʿarabiyya). In this 
case, the term is emptied of its religious connotation and redefined on the basis of a 
shared Arab identity corresponding to a set of values such as self-determination, the 
formation of a unified Arab state and the revival of Arab culture and inner strength
14
 as 
opposed to foreign domination. This meaning, however, is not of particular importance 
in the Islamist political vocabulary, which criticises the ethnic conception as being in 
contradiction with the universalist aspirations of the Islamic umma.
15
 Throughout its 
universal call to belief in Islam (dʿawa), the umma aims to become as widespread and 
inclusive as possible inviting conversion to Islam in complete disregard of ethnic, 
national or allegedly racial borders.  
This is also attested in both the OLD and the PCH where the Arab nation as al-umma 
al-ʿarabiyya is never mentioned.
16
 In the more recent PCH the notion of an Arab 
political constituency is often referred to as ‘our Arab and Islamic world’ (ʿālamna al-
ʿarabī wa al-islāmῑ)
17
 but not as umma. This indicates how Hezbollah seems to attach a 
religious and universalist meaning to the concept of umma consistently with the more 
general Islamist trend. 
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 Lewis, Political Language p. 32. 
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 Halliday, 'Politics of the Umma' p. 24.  
14
 Ibid., p. 28. 
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 As will be explained below a more appropriate term identifying national or ethnic groups is waṭān or qawm.  
16
 There is only one exception in § 139 of PCH in which the word umma is used in the locution ‘Arab and Islamic 
umma.’ 
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 § 8,40,41,100,110,130 of the PCH. 
231 
 
Another interpretation of umma is put forward by Lewis who, in addition to its religious 
and ethnic meaning, identifies a moral meaning of umma which seems to apply to both 
the previous cases. According to Lewis the umma ‘can be moral, since the Qurʾān 
speaks of the umma of good people, as opposed to the umma of bad people.’
18
 With 
reference to the case in question, this notion seems to become relevant if we consider 
the expression: ‘sons of Hezbollah’s umma’ (abnaʾ ummat  izbu Allāhi) which is used 
only in the OLD.
19
 Qāsim reports that ‘Umma of Hezbollah’ was originally intended to be 
the name of the movement but eventually the name adopted was the shorter 
‘Hezbollah’. The meaning of umma in this case is that of a moral community that 
literally could be translated as: ‘the community of the partisans of God.’
20
 
In addition to these variations in meaning, a further confusing factor is that umma has 
often been translated as ‘nation’. A common example is that of the name of the United 
Nations, which in Arabic is al-Ummam al-Mutta ida, literally the ‘united ummas’.
21
 As it 
has been pointed out, however, translating umma as nation is rather misleading since it 
has been shown how different shades of meaning characterise this term, while the 
concept of nation itself (equally problematic to define) does not seem to correspond 
fully to the idea of umma. Al-Barghouti observes that translating umma as nation 
necessitates forcing into the concept of umma an alien idea avulse from its more 
traditional meaning raising the suspicion of a neo-colonial bias. He says that: 
In translating non-European terms into European languages the conceptual 
richness and thus the true operative meaning and function of political ideas are 
distorted and muted. The translation of ‘Umma’ into ‘nation’ and ‘Dawla’ into ‘state’ 
holds such biases.
22
 
Whether this is the actual case or not, translating umma as ‘nation’ in Hezbollah’s OLD, 
as Norton does,
23
 is ambiguous because this translation does not actually describe 
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 Lewis, Political Language p. 32. 
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 Qassem, Hizbullah p. 59.  
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what Hezbollah refers to when it refers to an umma. Translating the locution 
‘Hezbollah’s umma’ as ‘Hezbollah’s nation’ is unconvincing.
24
 The same problem 
applies to the translation of Qāsim’s Hezbollah: the History from Within in which umma 
is also translated as nation.
25
  
Nonetheless, al-Barghouti’s view quoted above advances a form of cultural 
essentialism which is not convincing. While certain uses of umma might be problematic 
to translate, the term dawla (as I will illustrate below) fully reflects the idea of a modern 
state, at least in Hezbollah’s PCH. On the basis of what has been observed then, it is 
reasonable to argue that Hezbollah refers to the concept of umma as a religious 
community of believers, universal in its extension (hence different from a nation) and 
with both moral and political implications. 
Similar to the ambiguous translation of umma as nation, is the translation of Ḥizbuʾ 
Allāhi as ‘party of God’. The locution comes from the Qurʾān (5. 56)
26
 which was 
revealed to the Prophet in the seventh century, a time in which the idea of a ‘party’ 
(Ḥizb) in the modern political sense suggested by the translation ‘party of God’, would 
have been obviously anachronistic. Furthermore, in the OLD, Hezbollah itself does not 
accept the definition of party when it declares that ‘we in Lebanon are neither a closed 
organizational party nor a narrow political structure.’
27
  The translation of Hezbollah as 
‘party of God’ does not seem to accurately capture the reality at least until 1992, when 
it also developed a political office becoming part of the political scenery of Lebanon.
28
 In 
this case, the idea of Hezbollah as a party covers only part of a more complex reality 
including a military apparatus and a widespread social services network. 
                                               
24
 Note, for example, that also Olivier Carré translates the locution ‘the sons of Hezbollah’s Umma’ found in OLD 
as the ‘fils de la communauté du Parti du Dieux’ that is ‘the sons of the community of the Party of God.’ He also 
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27 
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Having considered the concept of umma and  izb, it is possible to briefly consider the 
idea of dawla.  
The translation of this term is not as problematic as umma and is generally accepted as 
‘state’. As Lewis observes, ‘by far the commonest term for the state and the polity, from 
the eighth century onwards, is dawla, which, with its phonetic variation in other Islamic 
languages, is now the almost universal word for the state.’
29
 There are, nonetheless, 
some specifications to take into account. The first is that dawla is a term with a long 
history that refers to ‘any authoritative political arrangement. It is temporary not 
territorially fixed and usually associated with the ruling elite.’
30
 In this more general 
sense, the concept does not refer only to the state as it developed in the modern era 
(i.e. a sovereign government ruling a people over a territory) but also to other polities 
such as the Caliphate or the Wilāyat al-Faqῑh, in which sovereignty is only recognised 
with God and law making is not derived from the will of the people but from the 
interpretation of the sharῑʿa. Also, the temporality of the dawla is considered in contrast 
with the eternity of the rule of God. A common saying in popular Islamist discourse is 
that Islam is ‘dῑn wa dawla’ which means it is both religion (din) and administration of 
immanent power. Furthermore, the concept of dawla is different from the term balad 
which is often translated as ‘country’. A further distinction regards the more general 
term niẓām which can be translated as ‘system’ or ‘regime’ and is used in the phrase 
al-niẓām al-islāmῑ, meaning ‘the Islamic system’ to which many Islamist thinkers refer to 
and that is also mentioned in the OLD.
31
 The term is often a matter of discussion 
because it is not clear how an Islamic system would look in its institutional 
arrangements, while an Islamic dawla would be associated with the idea of an Islamic 
state. 
A further term that needs to be introduced before coming to the analysis of the OLD 
and the PCH is waṭān, commonly associated with the idea of nation as it developed 
originally in the European context. Lewis introduces this term as follows:  
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In modern times a new word has entered the political vocabulary and is now in 
almost universal use. It is the Arabic term waṭan meaning ‘one’s place of birth or 
residence.’ It is often used in the sense of ‘homeland’ or ‘birthplace’. […] In the 
course of the nineteenth century, the word waṭan, with its derivatives for ‘patriot’ 
and ‘patriotism’, passed into common use as part of the new nationalist 
terminology
32
.  
Nonetheless, Lewis argues, the term nation was imported into the Middle East from an 
allegedly disconnected cultural context and its application is therefore difficult in these 
circumstances. As in the case of umma, the ambivalence of waṭān remains unsolved. 
Al-Barghouti takes a more definite stance and reminds us that waṭān is also the term 
that indicates the concept of nationalism in its derived word waṭāniyya. He further 
refines the meaning making a distinction which will also be relevant for this analysis. 
He points out that waṭān refers to the idea of nation as the local nation, basically 
derived from the administrative partitions imposed at the end of the colonial period in 
the Middle East.  
Differently, the term ‘qawm’ refers more often to the pan-Arab sense of nation which is 
an analogous form of nationalism but goes beyond the borders of Sykes-Picot’s map of 
the Middle East. As he observes:  
Qawmiyya means to belong to a certain group of people, ‘qawm’, and is therefore 
usually associated with Arab nationalism; Arabs have the same origin, the same 
language, and the overwhelming majority of them have the same religion and the 
same collective memory.
33
 
Moreover, Bensaid observes that waṭān refers to localised nationality even though he 
points out that the same term, occasionally, refers to Arab nation as (al-waṭān al-ʿarabῑ) 
just like in the case of umma. The last term that needs to be mentioned is shʿab which 
corresponds simply to ‘people’. Differently from waṭān, shʿab is not strictly related to 
patriotic values and, differently from umma, does not necessarily entail ethical bonds 
between its members. As Halliday says, ‘the term shʿab (people) could be used 
interchangeably, depending on the preference of the speaker, to refer to all Arabs, or, if 
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more wary of pan-Arabism to denote specific Arab people, such as the Egyptians, 
Yemenis, or Tunisians.’
34
 
Table  9.1 overview of the terms defined in Section 9.2 
Term Translation Description 
umma community Terms primarily of religious connotation with both political and moral implications. It 
refers to a group of persons sharing a belief and a set of moral principles 
dawla state Does not have a religious connotation in a strong sense. Primarily refers to an 
institutional structure administering material power. Used to translate the modern 
concept of state. 
 izb group of 
partisans 
Often translates as party only captures part of a more complex social, political and 
religious reality in the case of Hezbollah. Hezbollah explicitly refers to this term in 
its Qurʾanic origins.
35
 
waṭān nation The term that has been used to translate the national community in a modern 
sense, as a people sharing a territory, a language and a history. Translating umma 
as nation is often misleading. 
qawm nation This term is used more often to indicate national identity in a more ethnic and 
beyond-national-borders sense.  
shʿab people Can be properly translated as people, without specific characterisations 
On the basis of the vocabulary that has just been analysed, it is now interesting to turn 
to a comparative analysis of its use in the OLD and the PCH to then propose some 
concluding observations in the final part of the paper. 
Consideration of the term umma shows that Hezbollah has become keener in adopting 
a political language that more insistently refers to the Lebanese nation rather than the 
Islamic community only as its community of reference. In the OLD the term umma is 
frequently used with two main meanings. The first meaning was already mentioned and 
it refers to Hezbollah as a community of partisans of God. But the document makes 
clear that this community is part of a broader Islamic umma (that is its second 
meaning) as it says: ‘We, the sons of Hezbollah's umma, consider ourselves a part of 
                                               
34
 Halliday, 'Politics of the Umma' p. 28. 
35
 Hezbollah’s motto from the Quran (5.56) contains its name and goes: ‘faʾinna  izbu  llāhi hum al-ghālibūn’ 
translated ‘God’s party is sure to triumph’. Abdel Haleem, Qurʾan p. 73. 
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the Islamic umma in the world’
36
 and further specifies that ‘we are a umma tied to the 
Muslims in every part of the world by a dogmatic and political bond, namely Islam.’
37
 
Indeed the rest of the document refers to the concept of umma as a universal religious 
community which aims to protect the downtrodden people
38
 according to the principles 
of Islamism against the threats of ‘imperialism’ and ‘Zionism’.
39
 The main guides of the 
community are the ʿulamaʾ who have the duty of leading the religious community on 
the path of Islam.
40
 This idea of umma is reiterated all across the document in which it 
is mentioned 24 times
41
 and inevitably becomes a key definitional term for this early 
stage in Hezbollah’s political vocabulary. Quite differently in the PCH, 24 years later 
than the OLD, the term umma appears 11 times.
42
 The locution ‘Hezbollah’s Umma’ is 
absent, but the concept maintains its meaning of transnational religious community 
committed to Islam for which the Islamic resistance have fought Zionism and imperialist 
domination
43
 and maintaining its enmity against the US and Israel as the main threat for 
the unity and well-being of the community. Nonetheless, although umma remains 
relevant, the idea of nation acquires prominence, being mentioned as waṭān in 23 
occasions,
44
 all of them referring to Lebanon.
45
 
In the OLD, the term nation (waṭān) was not used at all, while in the PCH it is obviously 
of central importance. The second chapter of the PCH goes under the title ‘Lebanon’ 
and its first section is ‘the nation’ thus giving a clear sign of how Hezbollah’s political 
identity has become concerned with the national dimension of the political process. 
While the reference to the idea of umma as the Islamic community is maintained in 
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 §13 of the OLD. 
37
 §15 of the  OLD. 
38
 §72 of the OLD. 
39
 §128 of the OLD. 
40
 §191 of the OLD. 
41
 §12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 23, 26, 28, 46, 72, 78, 125, 146, 158, 172, 191, 200, 208 of the OLD.  
42
 § 11, 18, 44, 52, 92, 118, 132, 133, 159, 144, 161 of the PCH. 
43
 § 132, 133 of the PCH. 
44 
§2, 54, 55, 57, 58, 59, 60, 64, 65, 66, 68, 70, 79, 80, 82 of the PCH. 
45
 The figure would be 49 cases if we consider derived terms such as ‘national’. 
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general terms, the concept of nation is reiterated on a number of occasions signalling a 
shift from the centrality of umma to the importance of waṭān. This phenomenon has 
been widely reported in the scholarship on Hezbollah and defined as the 
‘Lebanonisation’ of the movement.
46
 Considerations in terms of vocabulary analysis 
corroborate the more general observation of a nationalised Hezbollah.  
As mentioned before, the term waṭān denotes an idea of nation in a clearer manner 
than umma. Waṭān is used with reference to the local nation and not the Arab nation. In 
addition to the frequent use of waṭān (which is correlated to a decrease in the use of 
umma) it can be seen a more common use of ‘people’ and ‘peoples’ in the PCH. In 
different cases the concept is used to indicate national peoples as sub-units of a wider 
umma. For example the term is used to refer to the Palestinian or Lebanese people, 
while in other occasions it is clearly distinguished from the term umma when the text for 
example says: ‘Here lies over the shoulder of the umma and its peoples’
47
 or ‘has not 
left choice to our umma and its peoples’
48
 thus indicating how the two concepts are 
differentiated.  
The term people (shʿab) occurs in the OLD 11 times,
49
 and in most of the cases, does 
not refer to a national people but is used in looser locutions such as the ‘oppressed 
people’ or the Muslim ‘people’. Differently, ‘people’ is used as referring to a national 
population in almost all 20 cases
50
 of the PCH thus confirming the trend that was 
already clear with reference to the term waṭān. The first observation, then, is that this 
shift in Hezbollah’s vocabulary clearly indicates how the political community to which it 
refers in more recent times is primarily the Lebanese nation. The umma, understood as 
the universal community of Muslims, maintains relevance but not as much as at the 
origins of the movement. The recurrent reference to waṭān and similarly the use of 
                                               
46 
Literature on the ‘Lebanonisation’ of Hezbollah is vast; scholarship is almost unanimous in recognising this 
phenomenon. See for example Saad-Ghorayeb, Hizbullah pp. 82-7. among others. See Section 1.3. 
47
 § 133 of the PCH. 
48
 § 52 of the PCH. 
49
  § 42, 44, 45, 52, 76, 78, 81, 129, 134, 149, 151. 
50
 § 15, 18, 57, 61, 62, 66, 71, 80, 86, 97, 130, 142, 150, 153, 159, 161 of the PCH. 
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shʿab in the PCH of Hezbollah is a clear break with the OLD, which almost exclusively 
refers to the umma as the main community of reference. 
This fact also has some important political implications in the kind of institutional 
system that Hezbollah envisages and these are clearly reflected in another vocabulary 
shift between the OLD and the PCH. As already discussed above, the nature of the 
political community to which an actor refers inevitably influences the type of polity 
which the actor envisions as its political ideal. If we consider the OLD, Hezbollah does 
not endorse clearly an institutional system as part of its programme of action. The word 
‘state’ (dawla) is used to refer to other states that are not Lebanon, and, on one 
occasion, to refer to the Islamic Republic of Iran.
51
 Iran is referred to as the ‘nucleus of 
the world’s central state of Islam’,
52
 it is unclear what this means and whether Hezbollah 
imagines the establishment of a transnational Islamic state. The ambiguity continues 
when the term dawla is abandoned, and the text refers to the concept of the ‘Islamic 
system’ (al-niẓām al-islāmῑ).
53
 
In these occasions Hezbollah clearly endorses the idea of promoting an Islamic system 
as the only one that can guarantee justice and dignity, a project that is central for most 
of the Islamist actors especially at their early stage. In a sentence of the OLD, it 
declares that they aspire ‘to see Lebanon ruled by Islam and its just leadership’
54
 
although the text then specifies that this will only happen with the consensus of the 
majority of the people. Nonetheless, Hezbollah does not specify what this means 
exactly, especially considering the fact that the relative majority of the population at that 
time was Christian, and the OLD reader is left with doubt about whether Hezbollah is 
thinking of a global Islamic state with a centre in Teheran or something else. On a 
similar note, the Wilāyat al-Faqῑh is mentioned in three instances in the OLD
55
 but in 
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 § 14 of the OLD. 
52
 Ibid.  
53
 § 52 and 77 of the OLD. 
54
 § 78 of the OLD. 
55
 § 7, 16, 18 of the OLD. 
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none of these cases is it proposed as an institutional arrangement to be applied to the 
Lebanese context, rather it is considered the centre of the spiritual/religious community. 
Hezbollah’s undetermined political vision changes sharply in the more recent PCH, 
where the institutional system prefigured by the party is defined in more detail. The 
term dawla (to be understood as the concept of state in the modern sense) is used 32 
times with reference to Lebanon.
56
 Entire sections of the document are dedicated to 
explaining which principles this state should rely on.
57
 It can be argued that the shift 
from umma to nation outlined above corresponds in terms of institutions to a shift from 
a vague reference to an Islamic system in the OLD, to a more precisely defined idea of 
state in the PCH. The idea of an Islamic system is never mentioned in the PCH, 
whereas reference to the Islamic Republic of Iran assumes a slightly different meaning. 
Although it maintains a privileged relationship in the foreign relations of Hezbollah, 
what was defined in the OLD as ‘the nucleus of the state of Islam in the world’ in the 
PCH is defined as ‘a state of central importance in the world of Islam.’
58
  
From these observations it is possible to deduce a transition in Hezbollah’s political 
identity from a fundamental emphasis on the umma as its central community of 
reference towards the Lebanese nation. The umma maintains a relevant degree of 
importance in the newer document as well, but the concept of nation acquires a 
comparable value.
59
 This shift has important consequences with regard to the polity that 
Hezbollah endorses. From a vague reference to the idea of an Islamic system in 
Lebanon, Hezbollah moves towards the affirmation of an accomplished form of 
statehood, widely overlapping with the principle proposed by international norms, as 
discussed in Section 8.5. (See Figure 9.1)
60
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§ 2, 18, 37, 38, 62, 63, 67, 70, 72, 79, 80, 81, 106, 133 of the PCH.  
57
 See among others § 80 of the PCH. See Section 4 of the document for more details related to which principles 
are relevant for Hezbollah’s political agenda in relation to Lebanese statehood. 
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§ 14 of OLD § 106 of the PCH. 
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 See Tab. 1. 
60 
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value. 
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Figure  9.1 Frequency of key terms on collective entities in the OLD (Violet) and the PCH (Purple) 
9.3 From the Person as Downtrodden (Mustaḍʿaf) to Citizens 
(Muwātin) 
Before discussing more specifically the role of international norms in the dynamics of 
change in Hezbollah’s vocabulary, it shall be considered how persons are identified 
through different parameters in the OLD and the PCH. The shift highlighted in this 
section fully matches with the change that was described in the previous section with 
reference to collective entities as umma and nation. 
As can be observed from its title, the OLD is addressed specifically to an audience that 
is the ‘downtrodden of Lebanon and the world’. The term ‘downtrodden’ is a translation 
for mustaḍʿafῑn (singular: mustaḍʿaf) which is a key concept in Islamist rhetoric. The 
term is used usually in opposition to mustakbārῑn indicating persons characterised by 
arrogance or abusing their power. These two concepts are also found in the Qurʾān 
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referring to the victims of injustice and those who abuse their powers.
61
 According to 
Lewis:  
The Arabic word da‘if, with the primary meaning of ‘physically weak’ or ‘deemed 
weak’, has been used since ancient times to denote those who are socially weak, 
i.e. in a socially inferior position. A derived participle form, mustaḍ‘af, ‘made weak’ 
or ‘deemed weak’, has acquired the meaning of ‘deprived’ or ‘oppressed’ and has 
been used from medieval times to the present day in revolutionary appeals.
62
    
The distinction between ‘the oppressed’ and ‘the arrogant’ became of central 
importance in Khomeini’s rhetoric, which is highly influential in Hezbollah’s discourse. 
As Halliday observes, ‘Khomeini divided societies into two categories of people – the 
mostazafin and the mostakbarin (literally those made weak and those made big) – two 
Qurʾanic terms which began to be used in the populist sense of “oppressed” and 
“oppressor”.’
63
 
The same dichotomy can be observed in Hezbollah’s OLD where mustaḍʿafῑn recurs 
31 times
64
 and mustakbārῑn and other terms from the same semantic field are found 19 
times, thus showing the centrality of these concepts.
65
 Olivier Carré observes how the 
term mustaḍʿafῑn has a particular importance ‘because it is to them [the downtrodden] 
who especially have to be addressed with the Quran’s predicament since potentially 
they have, after all, a greater internal force.’
66
 Indeed, it is also for this reason that 
Hezbollah’s OLD is specifically addressed to the downtrodden people in the attempt to 
mobilise them. Previous stages of the Shiʿī mobilisation in Lebanon referred to the 
‘dispossessed’, such as in the case of the Movement of the Dispossessed headed by 
Musa al-Ṣadr.
67
 But in that case, the term used was ma rumin. According to Mona 
Harb and Reinoud Leenders, the shift from ma rumin to mustadh‘afin is important 
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 ‘But we wished to favour those who were oppressed [ustuẓʿifū] in the land, to make them leaders, the ones to 
survive’
 
(Qurʾān 28. 5). Lewis indicates how in particular Qurʾān 4. 76–77 is a call for resistance and revolution to 
fight for the cause of the downtrodden. Lewis, Political Language p. 124. 
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 Ibid., p. 15. 
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 Halliday, The Myth of Confrontation p. 62. 
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 § 1, 4, 8, 12, 21, 22, 41, 42, 54, 68, 72, 88, 92, 109, 113, 120, 121, 152, 168, 171, 174, 177, 178, 179, 211, 
213, 215 of the OLD. 
65
 § 5, 13, 20, 21, 22, 30, 64, 78, 84, 87, 112, 113, 119, 123, 155, 178, 186, 211, 213 of the OLD. 
66
 Carré, 'Quelques Mots-Clefs' p. 490. Author’s translation. 
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 See Section 5.3. 
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because ‘the latter invokes an opportunity for transformation and change, whereas the 
former involves stagnation.’
68
 
As in the case of the concept of umma the term is ambiguous in certain respects. For 
example, Asʿad AbuKhalil observes how the reference to a category of oppressed and 
the call to rise and resist the oppressors echoes Leninist ideology in addition to its 
religious connotation.
69
 The overlap between two ideological paradigms, on one hand 
the religious call to social justice, on the other the Marxist theme of class struggle, was 
indeed common in the Islamist revolution in Iran which Hezbollah considers exemplar. 
Addressing this specific audience, Hezbollah positioned itself not only in the religious 
discourse of Khomeini but, as Ghorayeb points out, also embraced the wider third 
word-list rhetoric of the Wretched of the Earth.
70
  
In 1985, Hezbollah’s political identity, as that of other Islamist groups, was in 
competition with socialist and nationalist competitors. The capacity of combining an 
appeal to social justice and conveying a message of communitarian affiliation within the 
framework of Islam was a powerful means of expanding its appeal to spheres in which 
Islamism did not yet have sway. The religious component nonetheless remains the 
priority. As Hamzeh says, ‘when Hizbullah’s ideology speaks of the downtrodden 
(mustad’afin) versus the arrogant (mustakbirin), the party does not call for one segment 
of the Shi’ite or Muslim community to engage in a class conflict with another. Rather, 
the party calls for transcendence of all class differences to be archived by the Islamic 
just order.’
71
 
The religious dimension of Hezbollah’s political identity also maintains its centrality 
when observing the other terms referring to persons in the OLD. A prominent role is 
attributed to the ʿulamaʾ, a term that appears nine times in the text.  The OLD appeals 
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Mona Harb and Reinoud Leenders, 'Know Thy Enemy: Hizbullah, 'Terrorism' and the Politics of Perception', 
Third World Quarterly, 26/1 (2005), 173-97 at p. 189.  
69
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repeatedly to religious scholars as ʿulamaʾ asking them to assume the leadership of 
the community and lead the downtrodden on the path of Islam.
72
 Furthermore, the text 
refers more generally to Muslims on 25 occasions.
73
 They are asked to unite and take 
part by any means in the resistance struggle against the enemy. The insistent 
reference to persons as Muslims and the appeal to ʿulamaʾ as their guides are 
indicative of a perspective in which religious parameters are the main criteria in 
identifying persons and their socio-political role.  
Combining an understanding of the oppressed that stems mainly from a religious 
parameter (mustaḍʿaf) with the reference to Muslims and ʿulamaʾ, the vocabulary 
analysis of the OLD clearly shows how Hezbollah identified persons, at that time, with 
reference to religious criteria thus highlighting their moral duties as a result of their 
religious affiliation. Two more terms need to be mentioned before looking at the more 
recent PCH. Within the wider framework of the concept of jihād (which is mentioned 
five times in the OLD),
74
 two words referring to persons become relevant: mujāhid (a 
fighter for jihād) and martyr
75
 (shahῑd). The term mujāhid has been used on several 
occasions in Arabic political vocabulary to denote fighters, not only on a religious basis 
but also with regard to a struggle for national self-determination.  
For example in the public discourse of the Algerian independence war, the term was 
constructed around an understanding of jihād that is not only religious but also 
nationalist.
76
 In the case of the OLD, its religious connotation is obvious because to 
denote combatants without specific religious reference other terms are used such as 
mu ārib.
77
  ujāhid appears eight times
78
 and is also specified that all the members of 
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 The word recurs in plural or singular (ʿālim): § 185,189, 190, 197, 199, 200, 204, 206, and 207 of the OLD.  
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244 
 
Hezbollah are trained to take part in military jihād
79
 thus confirming the importance of 
being a mujāhid for Hezbollah. 
The concept of martyr (shahῑd) refers to the most morally valued idea of person by 
Hezbollah and Islam in general. A martyr in the Shiʿī tradition is the paramount virtuous 
person, who gave his or her life as a witness of faith in Islam.
80
 The OLD itself is 
dedicated to a shahῑd (Rāghib Ḥarb).  The OLD mentions the term martyr and other 
terms in the same semantic field on nine occasions.
81
 
As previously seen, in the OLD Hezbollah identifies its friends and allies as the 
‘mustaḍʿafῑn of the world’ and then repeatedly identifies persons throughout a religious 
paradigm; this also happens in the categorisation of its enemies. The enemies are 
primarily the Israelis along with their main ally the United States, and more generally 
‘the West’. On the domestic front, the Phalangists (katāʾeb) also have a preeminent 
role. From a regional perspective, the text critically elaborates against Arab regimes 
accused of collaborating with the enemy. Also in this case, the reference to the enemy 
combines religious and ideological aspects. The category of mustakbārῑn works as the 
term identifying the promoters of imperialism and Zionism that are the US, its allies in 
the region and above all Israel. In certain instances, the reference is also strictly 
religious and disturbingly discriminating as in the case in which the Qurʾanic verse is 
quoted, which identifies Jews and pagans as the bitterest of the enemy of the believer 
in Islam.
82
 
A different case is that of the ‘Christians’ (al-masi iun) who are mentioned in the OLD 
eight times and one time referred to as Maronites.
83
 The text differentiates between 
Christians in general and the Phalangists (katāʾeb). The latter are considered allies of 
Israel in Lebanon. They are defined as ‘fundamentalist Christians’(al-mas iūn al-
                                                                                                                                         
78
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 § 18 of the OLD. 
80
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mutʿaṣibūn)
84
 and identified as enemies pursuing political Maronism.
85
 Nonetheless, the 
OLD makes a distinction and claims that not all the Christians in Lebanon are 
considered enemies and calls for their collaboration in the struggle against the enemy. 
Towards the Christians, Hezbollah develops a minimalist and a maximalist approach in 
the OLD. In the minimalist case, it calls for a compromise and a pact of collaboration 
and coexistence whereas, in the maximalist case, it makes a dʿawa appeal for them to 
join Islam as the true faith.
86
 The document makes clear that Hezbollah, though 
promoting Islam, does not intend to impose it by force to anyone under any 
circumstances.
87
 
Vocabulary analysis of the OLD reveals that Hezbollah widely relies on its own 
religious paradigm in identifying persons both as allies or enemies; this is not the case 
of the PCH, or at least not to the same extent. In the PCH of 2009, the dichotomy 
between oppressed and oppressor persists but is not as relevant as in the OLD. The 
distinction between mustaḍʿafῑn and mustakbārῑn among others becomes relevant 
when the document says: 
The criteria of divergence, dispute and conflict in the vision of Hezbollah and its 
methods are based upon political-moral grounds, primarily between the arrogant 
(mustakbar) and downtrodden (mustadh‘af), the oppressor and oppressed, the 
usurper and the subject and between the occupier and pursuer of freedom and 
independence.
88
 
Overall, the term mustaḍʿafῑn and its derivatives occur only three times
89
 compared to 
31 times in the OLD and its use is related to aspects of secondary importance, such as 
Hezbollah’s appreciation for the liberation movements in South America.
90
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 § 95 of the OLD. 
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 §74 and 93 of the OLD. 
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The term mustakbārῑn and its related words such as arrogance (istikbār) recur in 11 
cases,
91
 fewer than the 19 cases of the OLD, although not a sharp difference. What 
might be interesting to point out in this regard is that along with the term arrogance 
(which is used to refer to the foreign policies of US and Israel) another term gains 
prominence in the text. Hegemony (haymana) occurs in the PCH 24 times
92
 compared 
to only two cases found in the OLD. Whereas mustakbār is a term with religious 
connotations, hegemony, to the knowledge of the author, does not bear a comparable 
religious connotation, and is more commonly associated with a strictly political and 
somewhat secular vocabulary. 
 A major indicator of change from the OLD is the emergence of a term that was virtually 
absent in the OLD
93
 and that makes a greater appearance in the PCH. The appearance 
of the concept of citizen (muwātin) is a remarkable shift in how Hezbollah refers to 
persons in its political discourse. As Lewis observes, this term was not entirely part of 
the Arabic language until modern times, when the need to find a term that reflected its 
meaning in Western political culture emerged. As he says:  
It was not until the general adoption of Western ideas of nationality and citizenship 
in the Islamic world that a term was needed and was found. It is now in common 
administrative usage in virtually all Muslim states. The choice that was made 
among the rich lexical resources of the Arabic language is significant. The Arabic 
term is muwāṭin its Persian and Turkish equivalents are hamvatan and vatandaş. 
All three come from the Arabic watan .
94
  
Perhaps Lewis is not entirely convincing in describing this process as the ‘choice’ of a 
term for a concept that was allegedly inexistent before. Languages develop through 
shared use by their users and not through choices. Nonetheless, the use of this term in 
the PCH was a choice of the author of the text. Considering the political significance 
that this term carries with it, its use is a relevant shift in Hezbollah’s political vocabulary. 
From a political vocabulary in which persons were referred to on the basis of a 
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traditional religious paradigm, the text adopts a term which characterises persons as 
members of a national political community. 
Table  9.2 Key terms of Section 9.3 
Term Translation Description 
mustaḍʿaf downtrodden Generally indicating a victim of oppression, this is a term that has been 
widely incorporated in social/religious discourse and is also to be found in 
the Qurʾān.  
mustakbār arrogant  Contrary to the term above, its literal meaning indicates someone who 
‘makes himself bigger’. It refers to an oppressor, or someone abusing their 
power and is also present in the Qurʾān. 
masi ῑ Christians Term probably originating from the term ‘messiah’, referring to Christians as 
those who believe in the messiah. 
muslim Muslims The term literally means ‘submitted’ and refers to persons adhering to the 
faith in Islam. 
kataʾib Falangist  Term indicating the Christian paramilitary factions, especially active during 
the Lebanese civil war. 
muwātin citizen Term originating from the root wa-ta-nun, indicating one’s place of birth and 
also used to refer to nation as watan. Its modern translation fully 
corresponds to the concept of citizen. 
mujāhid a person 
carrying out 
jihad 
The term indicates a person carrying out jihād, not necessarily jihād bil saif, 
i.e. military jihād, but also the greater jihād that is the effort of a person to 
abide by the path of virtue 
shahῑd martyr The term can be more literally translated as ‘witness’, meaning primarily 
witness of faith. Its translation as ‘martyr’ is nonetheless entirely correct 
since martyr also comes from the ancient Greek term meaning ‘to witness’ 
and maintains the same meaning.  
 
Citizen (muwātin) appears six times in the PCH
95
 and only once in the OLD, where it is 
used with a rather derogatory tone. The appearance of this term is implicitly linked to 
the emergence of the concept of nation and state observed in the previous section. The 
term muwātin stems from the same root of the word waṭān (nation) and in conceptual 
terms is directly linked to the existence of a state which, as pointed out in the previous 
section, emerged as a central concept in Hezbollah’s political vocabulary in the PCH. If 
the recurrence figure related to the term citizen is not particularly high, this trend is 
nonetheless confirmed by the fact that the term ‘Lebanese’ referring to Lebanese 
citizens recurs in the PCH 12 times,
96
 whereas the same term does not appear as 
identifying persons in the OLD in any circumstances. More generally, the term 
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Lebanese is used in 31 cases, thus confirming the emphasis of the PCH on the 
national character of Hezbollah’s political identity. 
 
Figure  9.2 Compared frequency of terms referring to persons in the OLD (Violet) and the PCH (Purple) 
This confirms how the paradigm of nationality and citizenship became increasingly 
relevant in recent times for Hezbollah, although its religious dimension maintains a 
fundamental role (See Figure 9.2).
97
 A further relevant aspect is related to the issue of 
Palestinian refugees.
98
 Hezbollah declares that Palestinians should not become 
Lebanese citizens. This is a complicated matter of Lebanese politics, in which the 
possibility of naturalisation
99
 of Palestinian refugees has been a long-standing issue. 
The fact that Hezbollah opposes Palestinian naturalisation in Lebanon further confirms 
                                               
97
 The elaboration in this figure does not take into account the distinction between the use of ‘Lebanese’ when 
referred to persons or to things. The reader should consider the statistics in the text for more accurate figures. 
98
 I will further develop this in Section 9.4. 
99 
The term used in Lebanese politics is tawatῑn which stems from the same root of nation and citizen and literally 
could be translated as ‘to nationalise’. 
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the importance that it attaches to the idea of citizenship.
100
 The decline of merely 
traditional and strictly religious criteria in identifying persons also appears from the less 
regular references to ‘Christians’. The term appears only four times and in none of 
these cases refers to persons. It is used along with the term ‘Islamic’ to describe the 
holy places in Palestine and Jerusalem in particular.
101
 A final observation that further 
distinguishes the PCH from the OLD is the fact that also the term ‘Muslims’ does not 
appear as prominently as in the OLD: where the OLD refers to Muslims on 26 
occasions, the PCH does so only nine times.
102
 
The observations above, then, should be enough to conclude that a vocabulary 
analysis of these two documents reveals a consistent change in Hezbollah’s political 
identity. None of the paradigms of reference, whether religious or ideological, is 
completely abandoned but the extent to which Hezbollah resorts to terms such as 
‘arrogant’ (mustakbārῑn) and ‘downtrodden’ (mustaḍʿaf) and the emergence of other 
terms such as ‘citizen’ (muwātin) or ‘Lebanese’ are indicators of a shift in its 
vocabulary. What was noticed in the previous section with reference to a shift from 
umma (religious community) to waṭān (nation) and then dawla (state) is similarly 
reproduced in the terms referring to persons. The primarily religious character of these 
terms is subsituted by more secular and national terms such as ‘citizen’. 
                                               
100
 This explanation can be complemented by the fact that the Palestinian population in Lebanon is almost 
entirely Sunni and their naturalisation in Lebanon may on a longer term alter the sectarian balance of the 
country. 
101 
The document fails to mention, rather deceivingly, that those places are also holy for the Judaic tradition. 
102
 § 49, 107, 113, 130, 132, 135, 136, 140 and 159 of the PCH. 
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Figure  9.3 Aggregated frequency of religious (blue) and national (yellow) vocabulary  
This modification inevitably reflects a change in Hezbollah’s political identity. Reference 
to imperialism and enmity towards Israel remain substantially unvaried but the 
approach to internal Lebanese politics changes. In a way, this is consistent with what 
has been observed about collective denominations in the previous section. Hezbollah 
assimilates a vocabulary apt to a national political organisation which sees values in a 
nation and a state to be preserved and politically promoted. From a vocabulary mainly 
derived from a distinction between imperialists and downtrodden people, in its more 
recent document Hezbollah goes as far as to say that among its aims there is the 
achievement of a society in which ‘the citizen becomes a value in itself.’
103
 The change 
from umma to waṭān matches with a shift of focus from downtrodden (mustaḍʿafῑn) to 
citizens (muwātinῑn). 
9.4 The Role of International Norms: Redefining Statehood 
To what extent did international norms influence Hezbollah’s transition outlined in the 
previous sections? The question is legitimate because if we look at the 1985 OLD text, 
the dynamics of change that could have been reasonably expected are certainly 
                                               
103
 § 77 of the PCH. 
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different from the kind of mutation described in the previous sections. The Islamist 
hard-line movement advocating the establishment of a an Islamic system justifying and 
legitimising its actions through a constant reference to Islamic principles could have 
hardly been imagined as launching a political manifesto such as the PCH of 2009 
characterised by constant reference to a modern conception of statehood mentioning 
ideas as rights, democracy, freedom, justice and state building. 
The claim is that international norms have influenced Hezbollah’s political identity 
transformation, which progressively assimilated the vocabulary of international norms 
as a constitutive element of its identity. The text analysis provides confirmation of how 
Hezbollah has assimilated a set of norms previously absent from its identity. Thus, it 
confirms a trend of socialisation within international society. This is not only the result 
of externally induced constraints but is a more spontaneous choice of the movement, 
which is indicative of how socialisation at this stage seems to influence Hezbollah at a 
deeper level within its identity.  
In different parts of the OLD, Hezbollah (as also seen in the previous chapters) asserts 
that its sources are exclusively Islamic. It makes clear that it is committed to the 
leadership of the Walī al-Faqῑh of Iran,
104
 it states that it is bound to the precepts of the 
Islamic community,
105
 and declares that:  
The main sources of our culture are the venerable Qurʾān, the infallible Sunna, 
and the decisions and fatwas made by the faqῑh our marjʿa al-taqlīd. These 
sources are clear, uncomplicated, and accessible to all without exception and they 
need no theorization or philosophy. All they need is abidance and application.
106
 
This kind of stance is a clear delimitation of its sources of political and military 
legitimacy. They confirm the idea that Hezbollah, at least in its early stage, saw itself as 
a self-referential entity relying on its hierarchies and traditions when defining its identity 
                                               
104 
§ 14 of the OLD. 
105 
§ 15 of the OLD. 
106
 § 17 of the OLD. 
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and justifying the legitimacy of its political actions. This is particularly clear in the 
following statement, which is a reference to Quṭb’s concept of jāhiliyya
107
.  
It is time for us to realize that all the western ideas concerning human origin and 
nature cannot respond to human aspirations or rescue us from the darkness of 
misguidedness and jāhiliyya (ignorance). Only Islam can bring about human 
renaissance, progress, and creativity.
108
 
This kind of declaration, as a matter of fact, eliminates any possible space for the 
inclusion of principles considered external to the ethical perimeter of Islam. The overall 
document relies on the contraposition between a ‘world of downtrodden’ and a ‘world of 
arrogance’ led by the US and its regional proxy, Israel. International organisations and 
the kind of norms on which they rely: 
are not podiums for the downtrodden communities (ummas) generally and they 
continue to be ineffective due to the hegemony of their decisions by the states of 
world arrogance, whether in terms of the implementation or the obstruction of such 
decisions. 
109
 
This view, which echoes a realist understanding of international relations, was 
profoundly critical of international norms and perceived these as manipulated by the 
interests of hegemonic powers. This is further confirmed by the kind of political 
institutions which Hezbollah envisions in the OLD and by the religious perspective that 
it adopts referring to collective groups and to individuals. This kind of self-referentiality 
renders unlikely the influence of international norms on the political identity of 
Hezbollah, since these norms are deemed external to the ethical boundaries of Islam.  
But the text analysis presented in this chapter shows the contrary. Hezbollah has 
assimilated many elements of the vocabulary of international norms. Although at its 
inception Hezbollah relied exclusively on sources of legitimacy stemming from its 
interpretations of the Islamic tradition, looking at its more recent documents such as the 
2009 PCH it is possible to notice the assimilation of a vocabulary widely inclusive of the 
key concepts of international norms. A comparison of the OLD and the PCH shows 
                                               
107
 See Section 3.3.4. 
108
 § 180–1 of the OLD. 
109
 § 211 of the OLD. 
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how the latter document is punctuated by terms typical of the international normative 
language absent in the OLD. (See Figures 9.4 and 9.5.) 
 
Figure  9.4 Frequency of International Norms Vocabulary in the OLD (violet) and the PCH (purple) 
Among the most evident cases there is the term sovereignty (syāda), which refers to 
the international norm par excellence whose adoption is consistent with Hezbollah’s 
endorsement of a modern form of statehood. This term in the PCH recurs 9 times
110
 
whereas in the OLD is absent. Hezbollah reiterates the message that a solid 
institutional system needs to benefit from a degree of internationally recognised 
sovereignty which protects it from foreign interference within the affairs of the state.  
Another term, which stands out for the frequency of its use in the PCH and is virtually 
absent from the OLD, is that of ‘rights’ (huqūq singular haqq). The term occurs on 15 
occasions.
111
 The concept is mentioned  in different circumstances, for example is 
applied to the case of Palestinians with reference to their civil and social rights in 
                                               
110
§ 33, 34, 55, 64, 65, 66, 70, 80, 111 of the PCH. 
111
§ 18, 23, 33, 34, 62, 78, 80, 85, 88, 122, 132, 133, 143, 144 of the PCH. 
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Lebanon, but also asserting their ‘right to return’ to their homeland.
112
 An interesting 
reference regards the idea of a ‘right to resistance’. Hezbollah in the PCH complains 
that its definition as a terrorist organisation is a political manipulation aiming at 
delegitimizing the cause of the Islamic resistance.
113
 It then subsequently claims that 
resistance is legitimate from an international normative perspective (literally 
‘humanitarian and rights based legitimacy’)
114
 and that George W. Bush’s equation of 
terrorism with resistance is an arbitrary justification of the ‘war on terror’.
115
 
The document goes as far as to mention the case of the Guantanamo Bay detention 
facilities arguing that such detention conditions and other cases are a violation of the 
rights of prisoners who are arbitrarily detained, unfairly tried or simply under detention 
without trial. Although no explicit mention of the locution of ‘human rights’ (huqūq al-
insān) is made, this part of the PCH is obviously referring to human rights principles 
such as right to fair trial, prohibition of arbitrary detention and torture and widely echoes 
similar concerns raised by many human rights organisations
116
 and the international civil 
society. Another example refers to the question of crimes of war. In the OLD Hezbollah 
denounces the indifference and the responsibility of the international public towards the 
massacre of Ṣabrā and Shātilā in Beirut in September 1982.
117
 But, differently from the 
PCH, rather than pointing out the crime in terms of human rights violation the text then 
refers to a verse of the Qurʾān which asserts the enmity between Muslims, Jews and 
unbelievers.
118
 This is an indicator of how the ethical paradigm throughout which 
Hezbollah judges crimes is changed, while originally reference was made exclusively to 
principles of Islam; at a later stage Hezbollah has assimilated a vocabulary that links 
also to the international normative framework. 
                                               
112
 § 88. 
113
 A similar point was discussed in Chapter 8, with regard to UNSC Res. 1559. See Section 8.2.1. 
114
 § 33. 
115 
With reference to the legitimacy of the use of force against occupying military army see for example the 
discussion proposed by Harik See Harik, Hezbollah p. 165. 
116
 § 34 of the PCH. 
117
 See Section 5.4. The relevant verse of the Qurʾān goes: ‘You [Prophet] are sure to find that the most hostile 
to the believers are the Jews and those who associate other deities with God’ (5. 80). Abdel Haleem, Qurʾan p. 
75. 
118
 § 32 of the OLD. 
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In a similar case, the impact of international norms on Hezbollah’s vocabulary also 
appears in the use of the locution ‘crime against humanity’ which is used with reference 
to ‘the West’.
119
 The term crime is recurrent also in the OLD, but is not defined as 
‘against humanity’ (ḍud al-insaniyya) which is a phrase clearly derived from the 
international normative vocabulary. A further indicator, relevant from the point of view 
of international norms, is the qualification of Palestinians in Lebanon as ‘refugees’ 
(lājaʾin). The term recurs 3 times in the PCH
120
 and although the problem of Palestinian 
refugees represented a dramatic reality also at the time of the OLD, this term is not 
used in such context, confirming also in this case how the adoption of an international 
norms-specific vocabulary is relevant at a later stage of Hezbollah’s history. In a similar 
way Palestinians are described as ‘asylum seekers’ and as entitled to minimum 
standards of living. Also in these cases the terminology is derived from international 
norms principles being the concept of asylum seeking an international norm itself, and 
the principle of adequate standard of living a human rights principle guaranteed in 
international human rights law. 
The influence of international norms is not limited to matters of international nature but 
affects also the way Hezbollah envisions the Lebanese state in the PCH. The kind of 
statehood which Hezbollah delineates in the new charter is widely overlapping with 
international norms standards. Among other aspects, for example, Hezbollah declares 
its commitment to safeguarding freedom, sovereignty and self-determination. Its 
conception of Lebanese statehood includes the promotion of principles of non-
discrimination on religious and territorial ground. Hezbollah then voices support for a 
parliamentary representative system, independence of the judicial power, 
implementation of the rule of law, commitment to equal development, provision of 
education, health and housing, fight against corruption and other principles. 
                                               
119
 § 130 of the PCH. 
120
 § 82, 84, 159 of the PCH.  
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All of the above are constitutive elements of modern liberal statehood widely 
overlapping with the standards of international society, a long section
121
 of the PCH is 
dedicated to these; differently from the OLD which does not contain such references. It 
is safe to argue that the process of Lebanonisation of Hezbollah brought about the 
assimilation of national values; but the way statehood is conceived: its qualities, 
principles and aims, are defined not through particularist national or Islamist 
parameters (such as sharῑʿa, Wilāyat al-Faqῑh etc.), but consistently with principles 
which enjoy widespread legitimacy in international society (democracy, rights, justice, 
non-discrimination and so on). Although national traditional forms of statehood in 
Lebanon have always relied on political confessionalism, Hezbollah criticises this 
system. In the OLD the form of state prefigured is mainly inspired to a vague idea of 
Islamic state (al-niẓām al-islāmῑ), however this concept is completely absent in the 
2009 document. Hezbollah’s adoption of a political language that assimilates 
international norms terminology brings about a conception of statehood which widely 
reflects international normative and liberal parameters, and breaks with the Islamist 
stance. The impact of international norms becomes particularly relevant not as a cause 
of the transition of Hezbollah’s political identity, but rather as the factor that directs 
Hezbollah’s political transformation towards international normative standards. 
Another example is the principle of democracy mentioned on five occasions in the PCH 
text
122
 although with various limitations. Hezbollah, also in the OLD, made clear that it 
did not intend to impose political choices that are not approved by a majority of the 
population although the term democracy is never mentioned. The PCH seems to 
assimilate the concept with a stronger commitment but also specifies that, until when 
political sectarianism is abolished (an aim for which Hezbollah is longing for), 
democracy in the country can only be ‘consociational democracy’.
123
 Hamzeh argues 
that the concept of democracy seems to be reduced by Hezbollah to a minimal 
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See Chapter 3 of the PCH. 
122
 § 74, 75, 76, 77, 79 of the PCH.  
123
 § 76. 
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conception corresponding to a principle of majority-rule over the minority.
124
 
Nonetheless in an interview with the author, Hezbollah’s MP Fayyāḍ has specified that 
Hezbollah considers as a possibility the model of consociational democracy with 
mutual veto described by Arend Lijphart, thus making clear that Hezbollah’s democratic 
commitment has become increasingly more sophisticated.
125
  
There are important areas, however, where Hezbollah’s discourse clashes with the 
ethical underpinnings of international norms. For example, the principle of non-
discrimination towards women is mentioned in a qualified manner in the PCH. Women 
should be empowered, according to Hezbollah, but only ‘within the scope of the benefit 
of her particular characteristics and its effects and with respect to her capacities.’
126
 
Moreover, fundamental aspects of the domestic and international political debate are 
left unaddressed.  Hezbollah, for example, does not mention secularism as a principle 
informing its conception of statehood, and does not address the issue of personal 
status law reform, which in the Lebanese system is under the control of religious 
authorities and represents a major limitation from a human rights perspective.
127
 These 
are not problems without solutions, but the silence of Hezbollah on such issues leaves 
several questions unanswered about its political agenda.
128
 
International norms vocabulary does not appear in the more recent Hezbollah 
document as the sharp increase of one single term replacing another (as in the 
previous cases), but can be perceived as a diffused assimilation of terms punctuating 
the entire document and its language differently from the OLD in which this vocabulary 
is irrelevant. None, of the previous paradigms of reference of Hezbollah’s identity, 
whether Islamism or its Lebanese affiliation is dropped or completely neglected, but all 
                                               
124
 Interview with the author. 'Author's Interview with ʿAlῑ Fayyāḍ, Member of Parliament, Republic of Lebanon 
(Loyalty to the Resistance Block- Hezbollah)', (Beirut, Lebanon: 29 September 2011).See Arend Lijphart, 
Democracy in Plural Societies: A Comparative Exploration (New Haven ; London: Yale University Press, 1980) 
pp. 36-8.  
125
 Hamzeh, In the Path of Hizbullah p. 29. 
126
 § 80 and 13 of the PCH. 
127
 On the issue of personal status law see Section 7. 6. 
128
 As it was already said, nonetheless, the PCH is an extract of a longer document under the title: Towards a 
Capable and Just State [Na u al-Dawla al-Qudra wa al-ʿ dala] which has not been released yet. 
258 
 
of them are reinterpreted with reference to a terminology that is influenced by the 
vocabulary of international norms.  
The adversarial Islamist political identity of the movement presented in the 1985 
document is softened in the 2009 declaration by the adoption of concepts and terms 
borrowed by the international normative framework. The adoption of this language is an 
indicator of a process of socialisation of Hezbollah within international society and can 
be seen also as indicative of a degree of internalisation of these norms in its political 
identity. Although no specific scholarly literature has highlighted language shifts as 
indicators of international socialisation, is safe to claim how the shift presented in this 
section is indicative of a progressive internalisation of international norms in the 
political language of Hezbollah. Wendt has observed that in constitutive theories ‘the 
answers to constitutive questions must support a counterfactual claim of necessity, 
namely that in the absence of the structures to which we are appealing the properties 
in question would not exist.’ 
129
 The counterfactual claim in this case would be whether 
we can explain the emergence of the vocabulary of international norms within 
Hezbollah’s political language if not on the basis of the fact that the ‘structure’ of 
international norms did become influential in shaping Hezbollah’s political identity. In 
fact, is hard to imagine alternative explanations to this phenomenon if not as the result 
of international norms influence on Islamist politics. 
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 Wendt, 'Constitution and Causation' p. 106. 
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Figure  9.5  Compared frequency of international norms vocabulary in the OLD (left) and the PCH (right) 
9.5 Conclusions 
The observations proposed in this chapter sum up the process of socialisation that this 
study has attempted to capture in the previous three chapters with regard to the 
influence of international norms on Hezbollah. The previous pages have outlined a 
comparative analysis of two milestones of Hezbollah’s political discourse, the OLD and 
the PCH, emphasising how the differences between these two documents are 
particularly evident if we look at the evolutions of the concepts of community and 
person and how the vocabulary of international norms is a significant variable in this 
comparison.  
Section 9.2 has shown that Hezbollah has increasingly shifted towards a consideration 
of the national community as the main reference of its political project, leaving behind 
the religiously based concept of umma although not abandoning it completely. Section 
9.3 has drawn the attention of the reader to an analogous transition, but with reference 
to the concept of person, which shifts from its primarily religious identification in the 
OLD to the acknowledgment of the status of Lebanese citizens in the PCH. The role of 
international norms in this process has been traced with regard to the consistent 
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emergence of a vocabulary that, rather than drawing on traditional Islamic notions, is 
receptive towards concepts and principles widely overlapping with the norms of 
international society. The transition from umma to nation and the emergence of the 
concept of citizen are matched with the development of a political project and a form of 
statehood for Lebanon inclusive of principles that can hardly result from a traditionalist 
interpretation of Islam as proposed in Islamism. 
Although reference to Islam is still present and antagonism with certain international 
actors remains central, Hezbollah envisions a political project and a form of statehood 
that partly reflects liberal parameters in contrast with the older concept that was highly 
self-referential and exclusively Islamist. Consistently with what has been discussed in 
the previous chapters, the analysis proposed herein confirms how Hezbollah is 
involved in a process of progressive socialisation within the international normative 
system. Comparing the texts of these two documents of Hezbollah provides further 
evidence of this process. 
The comparative analysis of these texts has also more clearly shown how the 
communitarian assumptions of person and community are challenged by the rising 
influence of international norms. Hezbollah does not rely exclusively on Islamic 
principles in founding the legitimacy of its political project but expanded its vocabulary 
to include concepts that are also found in the international ethical system. Analogously, 
the person is not seen only as part of a religious community anymore but is also 
conceived as part of a national political community. Both of these shifts in Hezbollah’s 
language mark a departure from the more radical and conservative communitarian 
views of Islamism as they were conceptualised in Chapter 4, and open the space for a 
less confrontational approach to liberal norms. The next chapter will provide an overall 
assessment of this process of change in Hezbollah’s political identity. 
 Chapter 10  
 
Conclusion: the Impact of International Norms on 
Islamist Politics  
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10.1 A Recapitulation 
This chapter presents the concluding remarks of this study preceded by a 
recapitulation of the previous chapters. 
The initial three chapters of this study have shown how liberalism and liberal norms 
have always been subject to criticism. Chapters 2 and 3 presented an overview of this 
criticism, referring respectively to the communitarian and Islamist critiques of liberalism. 
Chapter 4 has shown that communitarianism and Islamism are critical of liberalism in 
similar ways not by a coincidence, but because they rely on analogous conceptions of 
community and the person. Chapter 4 proposed a comparative analysis of these 
conceptions highlighting their commonalities and concluded that Islamism can be 
understood as part of the wider tradition of communitarian political theory. 
The thesis showed how community is conceived as constitutive of the moral identity of 
the person, how it acts as the source of legitimacy for norms and institutions, and how 
is characterised by self-referentiality. This conception influences how communitarians 
and Islamist thinkers conceptualise the person. I highlighted the deep sense of 
communal affiliation the person has in communitarian and Islamist theory. The 
realisation of persons and their freedom is accomplished, in this conception, through 
assimilation within the ethical community, rather than through individual emancipation. 
Following this, the person is primarily understood as responsible towards the moral 
integrity of the community. Based on these assumptions (more of a meta-theoretical 
rather than a theoretical nature) Islamism and communitarianism built their critical 
stances against liberalism.  
Chapter 5 bridged the theoretical discussion of Islamism with the empirical analysis of 
Islamist politics, introducing Shiʿī Islamism to then focus on the case of Hezbollah. Four 
instances representative of interaction between Hezbollah and international norms 
were then discussed. Chapter 6 referred to non-combatant immunity, Chapter 7 
considered Hezbollah’s approach to human rights legislation, Chapter 8 looked at 
UNSC resolutions (especially with regard to state sovereignty and international peace) 
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and the previous chapter proposed a comparative analysis of the transformation of 
Hezbollah’s political language looking to the vocabulary related to international norms. 
Contrarily from what could have been expected from a hard-line Islamist movement, 
the political theory of which relies on communitarian assumptions; these examples 
have shown that liberally inspired international norms have had an impact on 
Hezbollah’s political identity. The thesis will conclude by presenting some of the most 
important respects in which Islamist politics and its assumptions have been modified by 
interacting with international norms. 
10.2 The Impact on the Person 
Islamism share with communitarianism an idea of the person as profoundly 
interconnected with the community; specifically, in the case of Hezbollah, the relevant 
community would be the Shiʿī community. For this reason, if we consider the 
declarations of Hezbollah in the Open Letter, we will find extensive reference to 
persons as Muslims or anyway identified through the lenses of religious affiliation. We 
can also find various occasions in which Hezbollah call for a sense of moral 
responsibility towards the community, which becomes even a duty to fight for its 
defence. The thesis also highlighted how, on the same basis, the only just institutions 
that can be established are those based on the principles of the Islamic community. 
Hezbollah, for example, declared how an Islamic political system was its political ideal 
in this early stage of its activity, and how international organisations as well as foreign 
states should not have interfered within the realm of its community. 
Notwithstanding this consistent Islamist communitarian stance, the examples of 
interaction with international norms presented in the previous chapters had a significant 
impact. Although, at an earlier stage, Hezbollah’s political profile was entirely aligned 
with the more general Islamist discourse discussed in Chapters 3 and 4; the cases of 
the April Understanding, its approach to human rights legislation and the political 
vocabulary used in the 2009 declaration, were symptomatic of a change in the way it 
conceives persons as moral and political subjects. 
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The case of the April Understanding has shown how Hezbollah became receptive of 
the non-combatant immunity principle also towards Israeli non-combatants, a 
distinction previously absent in its ideas about warfare. This turn is indicative of how it 
became receptive of an idea of person not exclusively defined by its communal 
affiliation. What has been defined as the constitutive role of the community in Chapter 
4, does not seem to apply anymore (or at least not in an equal measure) in this context, 
as the result of the influence of an international normative principle.  
Although in the past Hezbollah identified Israelis and Zionists as enemies and 
fundamentally de-humanised them, by applying the principle of non-combatant 
immunity, it began to acknowledge (deliberately or not) the equal moral value of the 
person qua human being, independently from their communal affiliation whether 
Muslim, Christian, Lebanese, Jew or Zionist. It is worth reconsidering Slim’s reflection 
with regard to the idea of the person that underlies the principle of non-combatant 
immunity. According to Slim:  
the civilian idea argues for what social psychologists call a ‘super-ordinate identity’ 
– a belief that all of us, no matter what side we are on, have a greater common 
identity as human beings than the particular identities that war bestows on us as 
‘enemies’ or ‘allies’. Belief in the idea of the civilian turns, therefore, on issues of 
personal identity and social relationship. It requires us to allow people a 
fundamental and vulnerable human identity that is not determined by their 
immediate relationship with politics, economics or social structure of war. Their 
human value transcends their social connections with the war.
1
  
The events described in Chapter 6 relate to a dynamic of change in which international 
norms changed the conception of person that underlies to the Islamist stance against 
their enemies. From the Islamist-communitarian conception, Hezbollah progressively 
internalises an idea of person that is closer to the liberal conception, which puts less 
emphasis on communal affiliation and rather values the person individually and 
universally as a human being. 
Chapter 7, with regard to human rights legislation, suggested a similar transition from a 
conception of person as presented in Sections 3.5 to 3.7, to a conception that more 
closely resembles the liberal idea. Human rights are norms fully representative of the 
                                               
1
 Slim, 'Why Protect Civilians?' p. 483. 
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liberal tradition. There was nonetheless occasion to point out how this universality and 
their possible application beyond the borders of liberal societies is problematic for 
communitarians as well as for Islamists, since they only acknowledge the legitimacy of 
institutions that are part of their own specific tradition. 
The analysis of Hezbollah’s approach to human rights has revealed that Hezbollah did 
not raise significant objections to the parliamentary approval of this legislation, 
notwithstanding its Islamist ideological matrix. It remained neutral towards the domestic 
legal implementation of much of this legislation and, in a few cases, even proactively 
promoted the implementation of certain human rights legislation. Admittedly, the same 
case highlighted instances in which Hezbollah opposed to human rights measures 
allegedly disruptive of traditional moral institutions and in contradiction with the 
authority of the moral community.
2
 
Notwithstanding the resilience of certain Islamist-communitarian stances, it is clear how 
Hezbollah was fundamentally receptive towards this legislation. This permeability to 
international norms contrasts with the traditional Islamist stance, which would have 
naturally posed objections to human rights as ‘non-Islamic’ individualist norms 
endangering the integrity of the ethical community and incompatible with the purely 
Islamic inspiration of its political project. Nonetheless, Hezbollah’s participation to the 
parliament has produced a rethinking of its approach to secular legislation in general, 
including to human rights legislation. Acquiescence towards human rights legislation 
entails recognition of rights to persons indistinctively of their communal affiliation, 
gender, age or political opinions. As in the case of non-combatant immunity, human 
rights are international norms that facilitate the affirmation of a conception of the person 
where moral value, and then entitlement to rights, does not originate from communal 
affiliation, but from a broader sense of shared humanity.  
The shift in Hezbollah’s way of thinking of persons was noticed also in the comparative 
analysis proposed in Chapter 9 with regard to the 1985 and 2009 declarations. The 
thesis highlighted how Hezbollah has become keener to identify persons not much with 
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reference to a religious paradigm, as in the case of 1985, but with increasing reference 
to the idea of citizenship. The comparative analysis of Chapter 9 has documented how 
the idea of statehood and consequently of citizenship that Hezbollah proposes in its 
more recent document, is not informed by an Islamic model of statehood but converges 
towards international normative standards. Hezbollah’s 2009 Political Document refers 
to principles as democracy, equal access to justice, development, and many others. It 
describes a form of citizenship according to which persons are entitled to rights and to 
participate to political and social life as citizens of a modern state. 
In a sense, this transition from ‘Shiʿī Muslim’ to ‘national citizen’ is not a departure from 
a certain communitarian perspective. As it was indicated in Chapter 2, nationalism and 
the identification of the political community as the national community is indeed one of 
the ways in which communitarian political theory (consider for example Miller) has 
recently articulated its claims.
3
 But what marks a significant turn is the fact that, along 
with embracing a broader national political perspective, Hezbollah has also internalised 
the kind of institutions and norms that overlap with the idea of statehood of international 
society. The idea of an Islamic system, or a Wilāyat al-Faqῑh in Lebanon is replaced by 
an idea of statehood that widely overlaps with international normative standards. 
Hezbollah has often reiterated the fact that the social composition of Lebanon does not 
allow for the establishment of a strictly Islamic model of statehood in the country. Its 
endorsement of an idea of citizenship and statehood that converge with the principles 
of international society may have been dictated by the social circumstances of Lebanon 
and its pluralism, but international norms constituted the trajectory, which marked 
Hezbollah’s transition from a Wilāyat al-Faqῑh model to a quasi-liberal project. 
By becoming aware of the fact that the Lebanese political community extends beyond 
the borders of the Shiʿī Lebanese community, Hezbollah recognised that its political 
body cannot be identified only as the Shiʿī Muslim. It had to acknowledge that the 
person has a moral and then political value that goes beyond our particular communal 
affiliations and includes membership to a broader national political community, which is 
                                               
3
 See in particular Section 1.4.4. 
267 
 
in turn part of the international society.  In one part of its 2009 document, Hezbollah 
declares that it supports a state, which is characterised by ‘the effective exercise of 
democracy, where the citizen represents a value in and of himself.’
4
  
International norms play a significant role in the process of Hezbollah’s political identity 
transition modifying its conception of person; I think this has been clearly shown in the 
previous chapters. These norms not necessarily have the most prominent and 
influential role, but deserve to be taken into account as a factor. The communitarian 
assumptions of Islamism about the person do not hold in the circumstances of an 
increasingly interconnected global political sphere regulated by international norms, 
which influence the social and political realm in which Islamist politics operate. 
10.3 The Impact on the Community 
If international norms influence how an Islamist political actor thinks of persons, this 
also has consequences on the way he conceives of the community. Chapter 4 
highlighted how self-referentiality is a distinguishing feature of Islamist and 
communitarian political theory. The previous chapters, from the case of the Qānā 
Massacre and beyond, highlighted how Hezbollah’s self-referentiality has serious limits 
in legitimising its actions of Islamist political and military actor.  
The case of the April Understanding was an occasion to show how Hezbollah modified 
its principles of Islamic warfare in a way that included the fundamental principle of non-
combatant immunity. Chapter 7 discussed Hezbollah’s integration in the Lebanese 
parliamentary system and showed how this process prompted a rethinking of 
Hezbollah’s role as Islamist actor, so that it could justify its inclusion in a secular 
institutional system.  
In this latter case, Hezbollah had to find a way to harmonise its Islamic thinking with the 
secularised law-making process of the Lebanese state.
5
 Even more relevant was the 
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connection established between Hezbollah’s participation to the Lebanese parliament 
and the implementation of international norms as human rights. This issue raised 
internal debate within Hezbollah. It required a judgement from the Walῑ al-Faqῑh and 
even caused splits within its hierarchy as in the case of former Secretary General al-
Ṭufaylῑ. At stake, in this process, was the identity of Hezbollah as an Islamist 
movement; in the sense that its political decisions would have not been exclusively 
based on the Islamic traditional way of thinking anymore, but would have opened it up 
to the influence of more liberal and secular procedures and norms. In other words, the 
constitutive principles of its political identity would have included also non-religiously 
sanctioned norms as the international norms with which the movement began to 
interact in the instances discussed above.  
The Islamic community, its tradition, and hierarchical structures, ceased to be the only 
source of legitimacy for Hezbollah’s political action. The Islamist movement found itself 
in a condition in which it had to justify its practices with reference to norms that were 
not only Islamic anymore. Chapter 3 highlighted how Islamism derives legitimacy in 
particular from concepts as the ‘sovereignty of God’. But by becoming part of a 
parliamentary and quasi-democratic system, Hezbollah has fundamentally accepted 
the sovereignty of the Lebanese parliament, hence of the Lebanese people.  
The fact that Hezbollah’s political and military decisions began to incorporate aspects 
dictated by the requirements of international norms affected its self-referential political 
identity according to which only Islamic traditional values and its hierarchical structures 
legitimately rule over the Islamic community. In the case of the April Understanding, 
Hezbollah was directly exposed to an international norm by becoming part of an 
international agreement.
6
 In the case presented in Chapter 7, integration within state 
institutions was the main factor exposing it to the influence of international norms as 
human rights and international treaties. The conception according to which the only 
Islamic norms that can legitimise the actions of an Islamist actor was complemented by 
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a progressive internalisation of heteronomous norms harmonised with the Islamic 
tradition throughout concepts as maṣla a or tazā um.
7
  
One of the most telling cases in this respect was the analysis of how Hezbollah 
interacted with the process of drafting and the implementation of UNSC resolutions as 
part of the Lebanese government presented in Chapter 8. Under the pressure of 
international actors and within the context of a devastating military attack; Hezbollah 
fended off accusations of being a ‘militia’ and justified its military operations during the 
2006 war not only referring to Islamic principles as jihād but with reference to principles 
of international law as self-defence and the right to liberate an occupied territory. This 
marks a significant shift in the paradigm throughout which Hezbollah build its legitimacy 
of political and military actor. Becoming entangled in a process of obvious regional and 
international relevance and being identified as a threat to international peace, 
Hezbollah was drawn on the ground of international society where exclusive reference 
to Islamic norms could have not been sufficient to legitimise its actions and where 
international norms are the relevant ethical framework, which constitutes international 
social practices.  
Participation in the government did allow Hezbollah to put its weight in the decision 
making process, but also brought it on a political ground in which international norms 
became an essential source of legitimacy. From a typical non-state actor entity, 
Hezbollah was progressively being integrated within the state and as such needed to 
abide to the restraints that international norms impose on states. Operating outside the 
canons imposed by the principles of international norms (for example not being 
recognised as a legitimate resistance movement), or not justifying its military 
operations in 2006 as a legitimate act of self-defence within the parameters established 
by international law, would have meant to be labelled as a ‘rogue’ actor, exactly the 
kind of vilifying label that Hezbollah was trying to avoid.  
In order to rely on these sources of international legitimacy, nonetheless, it would have 
been obviously insufficient to appeal to the Islamic norms, which were the constitutive 
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principles of its traditional community, and it was necessary broader reference to the 
normative principles of international society. By declaring its commitment to UNSC 
resolution 1701, Hezbollah was committing to the norm of international peace and state 
sovereignty on which this resolution is based.
8
 By criticising its identification as a 
‘militia’, rather than legitimate resistance movement, Hezbollah was appealing to the 
principles of self-defence and the fighting of occupying forces as sources of legitimacy 
for its actions and then as constitutive elements of its political identity.
9
  
There is no dispute that this reference to international norms was only partially 
legitimate for Hezbollah, and that its argumentations of legitimacy in terms of 
international norms can be criticised in many respects. The relevant aspect, 
nonetheless, is how Hezbollah has begun to see itself as an actor part of the broader 
international society framework rather than remaining accountable only to the Shiʿī 
tradition. At least two of the parameters which defined the communitarian and Islamist 
conception of community seem to be challenged by the influence of international norms 
on Hezbollah: its self-referentiality and its reference to Islamic norms as the exclusive 
source of legitimacy.
10
 
Its self-referentiality of Islamist movement was left behind to internalise norms that 
would have allowed wider international recognition but at the same time would have 
also bound Hezbollah to the limits imposed by these norms (not bombing Israeli 
civilians, abiding by human rights treaties, going along with UNSC resolutions, and 
proposing a more liberal political project). Islamic principles were, at least in part, 
replaced or integrated with international norms as sources of legitimacy, and the moral 
and legal obligations that rose from commitment to these norms were not exclusively 
towards the Shiʿī community anymore but generally towards the Lebanese state and 
international society. International norms have produced an idea of community in 
Hezbollah’s political identity that is not exclusively based on particularistic Islamic 
views, but is increasingly socialised within the international normative framework. Its 
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political identity is not that of an actor accountable only to the Shiʿī community but 
refers broadly to its location in the international society.  
This is also reflected in the transition that was shown in the previous chapter from the 
idea of community as umma to community as ‘nation’ (waṭān).
11
 It shall be conceded, 
that this amounts more to a process of nationalisation rather than internationalisation 
and it may seem appropriate to conclude that international norms do not play a role in 
this process. However, this is not entirely the case because, as it was observed in the 
section above, this form of nationalisation corresponds to the endorsement of a form of 
statehood that widely reflects international normative standards rather than motivating 
claims of ‘authenticity’ or particularity. By expanding its reference from the more strictly 
religious community to a national political community, Hezbollah in the 2009 document 
adjusts its political ideal to a form of statehood, which is inclusive of the standards of 
international norms rather than alternative Islamic models. By entering parliamentary 
politics (Chapter 7), and then the government (Chapter 8), Hezbollah eventually 
appealed to the national political community and became subject to the ethical norms 
which regulate international society rather than maintaining exclusive reference to 
traditional communitarian values. 
Reference to international norms, then, has served Hezbollah’s purposes of 
legitimating both its political project as planned in the 2009 Political Document and its 
military activity as in the 2006 events. The self-referential conception of community and 
the exclusive source of legitimacy of Islamic norms have been expanded to include 
also international norms and inevitably locate Hezbollah in the wider context of 
international society where non-combatant immunity, human rights, state sovereignty, 
self-defence and international peace are widely acknowledged as international norms.  
As it was mentioned at the beginning of this study, norms are not only rules producing 
expectations of normal behaviour of a political actor, but also have a constitutive value, 
in the sense that they increasingly become a definitional aspect of the identity of a 
political actor. As Wendt says ‘social structures also constitute actors with certain 
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identities and interests’
12
 and this is the case of international norms becoming 
constitutive of Hezbollah’s political identity making it an international political actor 
more responsive to international normative principles and conceiving persons not only 
as member of ethical communities but also as connected to a broader sense of shared 
humanity. The following section shows how this process can be understood as a form 
of international socialisation.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                   
10.4 International Socialisation of an Islamist Actor 
This study has highlighted a modification, not only on the surface, but also in the 
underlying assumptions, of Islamist politics. The thesis has shown that international 
norms influenced the transition of the political identity of an Islamist movement. There 
have already been various occasions to observe that this transformation can be 
understood as a process of international socialisation.  
Understanding the phenomena described in this enquiry as the international 
socialisation of an Islamist actor challenges opposite considerations of the kind 
proposed by Dennis Ross and David Makovsky for example. Ross and Makovsky claim 
that ‘The Lebanese arena requires understanding that Hizbollah is driven more by 
ideology and its ties to Iran than any accountability to either the Lebanese government 
or public sentiment.’
13
 Based on this, they conclude that engagement with non-state 
actors as Hamas and Hezbollah is bound to fail, because these will empower their 
legitimacy whereas their ideological stances remain unvaried and their political role is 
cynically self-interested. This study has argued the contrary. Interaction with 
international norms influences Hezbollah’s political identity, increases its accountability 
to international society, as well as to the Lebanese people, and modifies its political 
identity. The chapters above have shown that Hezbollah is more pragmatic than Ross 
and Makovsky maintain. Contrarily to their claim, it is reasonable to believe that 
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Hezbollah’s isolation and forced marginalisation feeds its alienation from international 
society and push it towards conservative Islamist stances  
In the introduction I discussed how two main types of socialisation would have been 
useful in explaining Hezbollah’s interaction with international norms.
14
 The conceptions 
in question were Ikenberry and Kupchan’s idea of hegemonic socialisation and the 
constructivist approach. The definition given by Ikenberry and Kupchan seems to fit the 
reality of war in which Hezbollah was embedded in the cases of Chapter 6, with regard 
to non-combatant immunity, and Chapter 8 with regard UNSC resolutions 1559 and 
1701. In these cases, crisis, the use of force and power politics seem to be the factors 
that imposed over Hezbollah the acceptance of restraints over its military activity, and 
in particular the acceptance of the distinction between combatants and non-combatants 
in Israel and the deployment of the LAF and the UNIFIL peacekeeping troops in south 
Lebanon.  
Under the pressure of war and by paying a high price in civilian lives, Hezbollah 
eventually accepted the restraints imposed by international norms on its military 
activity. Nonetheless, this bitter consideration by no means entails that this could have 
been the only way nor the most effective by which Hezbollah could have been 
socialised in international society. However, the thesis claimed that another 
fundamental factor was Hezbollah’s inclusion in the government in 2005. Integration in 
state institutions, not only enabled it to advance its political stances, but also exposed it 
to a form of accountability in relation to the UNSC resolutions to which it committed as 
part of the Lebanese cabinet. As noted with regard to the April Understanding and 
UNSC resolution 1701, the inclusion of Hezbollah in these international agreements 
increased its exposition to international norms, such as non-combatant immunity, state 
sovereignty and international peace, and made it more accountable towards their 
implementation. In this way, through its integration into the wider political process, 
Hezbollah became exposed to the influence of these norms with the consequences 
that were discussed in the previous sections of this chapter. 
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Socialisation by force only covers part of the story.  If war and crisis, along with 
integration in the political process, are among the determinants for socialisation in the 
cases analysed in Chapter 6 and 8; the cases of human rights legislation and the 
adoption of a more liberally oriented political document presented in Chapters 7 and 9, 
are better understood through the lenses of the constructivist conception of 
socialisation. These phenomena signal a deeper level of socialisation involving a shift 
in moral reasoning. 
Chapter 7 has shown how Hezbollah engaged primarily in a dialogical process both 
within its organisation, and more importantly with Lebanese institutions, leading it to 
develop a moral reasoning, which could have harmonised norms and in particular 
legislation not based on Islamic principles. The reiterated participation in state 
institutions and the related political processes brought an Islamist movement 
(previously critical of non-Islamic, and above all liberal, norms) on the ground of more 
secularised politics. Section 7.3 has shown the way of reasoning and the internal 
arrangements adopted to harmonise Hezbollah’s participation to parliamentary activity. 
Sections 7.4 to 7.6 have shown that (although problems of assimilation remain in 
various respects) Hezbollah has been either neutral but sometimes even proactive, 
with regard to the majority of human rights legislation approved in the parliament. 
The analysis that has been proposed in Chapter 9 with regard to the 2009 political 
document of Hezbollah represents a turning point in this process. The fact that an 
Islamist movement begins to articulate its political stances with a vocabulary 
characterised more by its reference to terms as democracy, rights, sovereignty, 
development, justice and so on, rather than exclusive reference to religious norms, is 
indicative of how it has been socialised within international society. The need to resort 
to these concepts is symptomatic of the acquisition of a logic and the becoming part of 
a discourse in which this vocabulary, and its related norms, become sources of 
legitimacy for political action. 
Hezbollah has been socialised in the sense that the society it addresses in its political 
action is not only the Shiʿī community of Lebanon anymore (for which reference to 
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religious Islamic values would have been sufficient and perhaps even more effective), 
but also includes the broader Lebanese society and the international society. This 
aspect is indicative of an unprecedented degree of internalisation of international 
norms for Hezbollah, since these have become part of the political language of the 
movement and signals how it sees itself as part of a broader social context which goes 
well beyond the borders of its traditional community.  
As Wendt argues, ‘answers to constitutive questions must support a counterfactual 
claim of necessity, namely that in the absence of structures to which we are appealing 
the properties in question would not exist.’
15
 This applies to our case confirming the 
relevance of international norms in shaping Hezbollah’s political identity transition. 
Counterfactually, if Hezbollah were to remain the alienated Islamist actor accountable 
only to the Shiʿī community; it would have not needed neither to pass human rights 
legislation; nor to announce a political project referring to principles and norms as 
democracy, rights, justice, freedom and citizenship, departing from its Islamist political 
identity. 
It remains nonetheless problematic to come to the constructivist conclusion which 
suggests an irreversible pattern of socialisation from ‘talking the talk’ to ‘walking the 
walk’ of international norms.
16
 Although supported by a vast constructivist scholarship, 
this is a deterministic way of looking at socialisation, which may not necessarily apply 
to this case. At this stage, the considerations and the examples discussed in previous 
chapters are significant indicators of a process that is only in its initial phase. This 
process is embedded in a regional environment characterised by instability and wars 
that can easily reverse this pattern. Furthermore, major political actors, such as the 
USA, have exerted enormous pressure encouraging Islamist alienation, rather than 
socialisation, for similar reasons to those claimed by Ross and Makovsky above.
17
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Nonetheless, it is important to reiterate that the criterion for the choice of this case 
study was its unlikeliness of being subject to the influence of international norms.
18
 This 
means that, having shown how international norms affect Hezbollah’s political identity, 
and even though Hezbollah’s socialisation in international society may seem 
precarious; the socialisation of Islamist actors with less hostile profiles, more easily 
integrated in state institutions, and possibly not ‘armed to the teeth’ as Hezbollah, can 
be expected to take place more easily. These cases (consider al-Nahḍa in Tunisia, the 
Islamic Action Front in Jordan and perhaps the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt) by being 
integrated into the international political framework are likely to display a higher degree 
of permeability to international norms than was the case of Hezbollah.  
10.5 Perspectives for Further Research  
Looking at how international norms influence Islamist politics, this enquiry has 
proposed three main concluding observations. First, international norms have 
prompted a rethinking in Islamist politics of how to conceive the idea of the person, and 
second, a reconsideration of what it means to be part of an ethical community. With 
regard to these two aspects, the thesis claimed that the communitarian assumptions of 
Islamism have been modified in a way that progressively converges towards a model 
more compatible with the principles of international society. The third consideration is 
that the process of assimilation of international norms comes down to a form of 
international socialisation of Islamist actors, determined by the increasing interactions 
of these political movements with the international society. By focusing on a process of 
interaction between political actors and drawing attention on the shifts in political 
identity of an Islamist movement, I primarily relied on a constructivist and also a 
constitutive approach. I thereby tried to advance an understanding of Islamism that 
does not relegate it to the realm of culturally specific studies but rather approached the 
phenomenon in universal analytical terms. By understanding Islamism as a form of 
communitarianism I claimed that, in fact, Islamist political theory does not raise any 
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particularly original critical point to liberalism but widely overlaps in its assumptions with 
the communitarian political theory tradition. 
The conclusions of this thesis, by no means, exhaust the wide range of considerations 
that could be advanced as answers to the question of the enquiry. Introducing other 
comparative cases could be an interesting way to understand which factors facilitate 
the international socialisation of Islamist actors. A few were mentioned herein: 
interaction and integration within state and international institutions play a relevant role, 
but more work needs to be done to draw sounder conclusions. The role of war in this 
process deserves comparisons with more peaceful (although still violent) phenomena, 
for example, Islamism in Egypt, Jordan but also Indonesia. Comparisons with these 
cases could help us understand whether alternative, less violent, processes can 
produce international socialisation through moral persuasion and creating incentives. 
The social context in which Islamist movements operate is also a relevant factor. 
Expanding the focus of this research will contribute to a deeper  understanding of 
whether, for instance, a more religiously mixed society such as Lebanon or a more 
secularised society (for example Tunisia) are factors which render Islamist movements 
more permeable to the influence of international norms. 
Islamism is far from being a static political reality. As Maxime Rodinson argued: 
We can assume, on the contrary, that religious ideologies, like all ideologies, have 
a concrete and real basis in the constantly competing human groups who share 
out the planet between themselves or form different strata of a society. We can 
take into account the constant interaction of these groups and the fact that their 
primary consideration must be the demands of material and social life. 
19
  
I have argued that in the process of interaction to which Rodinson refers, international 
norms have a significant impact and shape a trajectory of change towards the 
socialisation of Islamist political actors in international society. Further scholarly 
research will contribute to a better understanding of these phenomena and, perhaps, 
be conducive to a more just and peaceful international political sphere.
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Appendix 1 
The following text is an edited translation of the Open Letter to the Downtrodden of 
Lebanon and the World, the first official declaration of Hezbollah to which this thesis 
refers on several occasions. The original Arabic text has been provided by the 
Consultative Centre for Study and Documentation of Beirut, a research and 
documentation centre affiliated with Hezbollah.  
The translation provided herein is primarily that of August Richard Norton.
1
 
Nonetheless, this translation was sometimes incomplete or not entirely satisfactory and 
has been complemented or cross-checked with the translation of Alagha
2
. Also 
Alagha’s translation has been re-edited in certain respects. Certain parts have been 
entirely retranslated. Furthermore, the author has edited the translation to be consistent 
with the translation of the Political Document of Hezbollah available in Appendix 2, so 
that the two translations could be compared with regard to key-terms frequency with 
Wordstat (See Chapter 9). For example, the term waṭān has been translated as ‘nation’ 
in both texts and the same applies to other key terms. In addition to this, the translation 
below aims at being as literal as possible, so that it could be processed in Wordstat 
providing accurate statistics of the usage of a specific vocabulary reflecting the original 
text. This, inevitably, affected the quality of the English used for this translation and the 
reader is invited to refer to the other translations aforementioned to access a more 
readable text. The author used Haleem’s translation for the quotation of the Qurʾān 
present in the text.
3
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English ةيبرعلا 
§ 
No. 
Text of the open letter addressed by 
Hezbollah to the downtrodden in Lebanon 
and the world, describing its projects and 
path on the occasion of the first 
anniversary of the martyrdom of sheikh 
martyr Raghib Ḥarb (peace be upon him), 
the symbol of Islamic resistance and the 
paramount martyr. 
Date 26 of First Jumada 1405 in the Hijra 
calendar corresponding to February 16, 
1985 in the Christian Calendar. 
لا ىلإ الله بزح اههجو يتلا ةحوتفملا ةلاسر
 هتاروصت اهيف ًانيبم ملاعلاو نانبل يف نيفعضتسملا
 داهشتسلا ىلولأا ةيونسلا ىركذلا ةبسانمب هجهنمو
 برح بغار ءادهشلا خيش ةيملاسلإا ةمواقملا زمر
 خيراتب .)مهيلع الله ناوضر(02  لولأا ىدامج
5221 قفاوملا ـه52  طابش5891 .م 
1 
In the name of God, the merciful and the 
compassionate 
{Those who put their trust in God, His 
prophet, and the faithful are God's party 
and they shall prevail. God almighty is 
always true} (sura al-Ma’ida: 56) 
  سّرو الله َّلّوّتّي نّمّو{ ميحرلا نمحرلا الله مسب  ّهلو
 :ةدئاملا( }ّنو ٌبلاّغلا  م  ه الله ّبًزٌح َّنإّف او نّمآ ّنيٌذَّلاو
12.) 
2 
Dedication ءادـــهإ 3 
To the torch that burned bright, lit for the 
downtrodden in Lebanon the path to free 
and honourable life and burned with the 
blaze of his innocent blood the tyranny and 
myth of the Zionist entity. 
 رانأف ًاءايضو ًاقلأت دادزا يذلا لعشملا ىلإ
 ،ةميركلا ةرحلا ةايحلا برد نانبل يف نيفعضتسملل
 نايكلا توربج ةرهاطلا هئامد جهوب قرحأو
.هتروطسأو ينويهصلا 
4 
To the pioneer who was faithful to his 
kinsmen, who offered them the model for 
jihad and who did not spare his own life 
until he died a martyr in supporting them 
and a witness to the injustice of world 
arrogance and its insolence. 
 يف مهل ةودق ناكف ؛هلهأ قدص يذلا دئارلا ىلإ
 ًاديهش ىضق ىتح هحورب مهيلع لخبي ملو ،داهجلا 
 رابكتسلاا ملظ ىلع ًادهاشو ،مهترصن ليبس يف
.هتسرطغو يملاعلا 
5 
To the symbol of the triumphant Islamic 
resistance and of the splendid Intifada 
through which our kinsmen are still 
recording their most magnificent Husainite 
(Shiʿī) epics in the South and in Western 
al-Biqa'a. 
 ةضافتنلااو ةرفاظلا ةيملاسلإا ةمواقملا زمر ىلإ
 اهمحلام عورأ نورطسي انلهأ لازي لا يتلا ةعئارلا
.يبرغلا عاقبلاو بونجلا يف ةينيسحلا 
6 
To him who scattered America's dreams in 
Lebanon and who resisted the Israeli 
occupation, carrying the banner of action of 
the leader of the Wilāyat al Faqῑh ʿAbd 
Allah Khomeini who was always cherished 
and described as the ʿāmῑr of the Muslims. 
 مواقو ،نانبل يف اكيرمأ ملاحأ ددب يذلا ىلإ
 هيقفلا ةيلاوب لمعلا ءاول ًاعفار يليئارسلإا للاتحلاا
ل ولحي ناك يذلا دئاقلا ريمأب هفصي نأ ًامئاد ه
.ينيمخلا الله دبع نيملسملا 
7 
To the venerable among the martyrs 
Raghib Ḥarb, (may God be pleased with 
him), on whose anniversary we present this 
open letter to the downtrodden in the world, 
including in its lines the revolutionary 
Islamic political plan embodied by the 
 )هيلع الله ناوضر( برح بغار ءادهشلا خيش ىلإ
 ىلإ ةحوتفملا ةلاسرلا هذه ةيونسلا هاركذ يف يدهن
يف نيفعضتسملا  اهروطس ايانث نيب نيتبثم ،ملاعلا
 ديهشلا هدسج يذلا يروثلا يملاسلإا يسايسلا طخلا
 ًلايلدو ًانيب ًاجهن نوكيل ءادهشلا هناوخإ عم ديعسلا
8 
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happy martyr and his brother martyrs so 
that it may act as a clear path and guide to 
all the mujāhidīn in Lebanon. 
 .نانبل يف نيدهاجملا لكل ًاحضاو 
We beseech the Lord, may He be praised, 
to grant us steadfastness, to strengthen us, 
and to give us victory over the group of the 
wrongdoers. 
 انيلع غرفي نأ ـ ىلاعتو هناحبس ـ ىلوملا نيلئاس
.نيملاظلا موقلا ىلع انرصنيو انمادقأ تبثيو ًاربص 
9 
God's peace, mercy, and blessings be with 
you. 
 
Hezbollah 
هتاكربو الله ةمحرو مكيلع ملاسلاو 
 
الله بزح  
10 
In the name of God, the compassionate 
and the merciful 
{Say, ‘ ow the truth has come from your 
Lord: let those who wish to believe in it to 
do so, and let those who wish to reject it do 
so’ We have prepared a Fire for the 
wrongdoers that will envelop them from all 
sides. If they call for relief, they will be 
relieved with water like molten metal, 
scalding their faces. What a terrible drink! 
What a painful resting place!} (Sura, al-
kahf:29) 
 ًم  ك َ ٌب َّر نٌم َقّحلا ٌل قّو{ ميحرلا نمحرلا الله مسب
 اّنًدّتًّعأ ا َّنإ ًر فًكًّيلّف ّءاّش نّمو نٌمًؤ ًيلّف ّءاّش نّمّف
 او ثيٌغّتًسّي نإو اّه قٌداّر  س ًمٌهٌب ّطاّّحأ اْراّن ّنيٌٌملا َّظٌلل
  باّرَّشپ ّسًئٌب ّهو ج  ولا يٌوًشّي ٌلًه  مًلاّك ُءاّمٌب او ثاّغ ي
اّسو }اْقّفّتًر  م ًتّء) :فهكلا08( . 
 
11 
Who Are We and What Is Our Identity? ؟انتيوه يه امو نحن نم 12 
Free downtrodden men, 
 
We are the sons of Hezbollah's umma in 
Lebanon. We greet you and address the 
entire world through you: persons, 
institutions, parties, organizations and 
political, humanitarian, and information 
associations. 
.رارحلأا نوفعضتسملا اهيأ 
 بطاخنو مكييحن نانبل يف الله بزح ةمأ ءانبأ اننإ
 ،تاسسؤمو تايصخش :هرسأب ملاعلا مكللاخ نم
 ةيناسنإو ةيسايس تائيهو تامظنمو ًابازحأ
..ةيملاعإو 
 
We exclude nobody because we are eager 
for all to hear our voice, understand our 
message, comprehend our projections, and 
study our plan. 
We, the sons of Hezbollah's umma, 
consider ourselves a part of the umma of 
Islam in the world; which is facing the most 
tyrannical arrogant assault from both the 
West and the East - an assault intended to 
deprive it of the content of the Message 
with which God has blessed it; so that it 
may be the best umma known to the 
people that encourages virtue and 
discourages vice and that believes in God.  
The assault is also aimed at usurping its 
wealth and resources, at exploiting the 
capabilities and skills of its sons, and at 
controlling all its affairs. 
 عمسي نأ ىلع نوصيرح اننلأ ً؛ادحأ ينثتسن لاو
 اوبعوتسيو ،انتلاقم اومهفيف ،عيمجلا انتوص
انتاحورط ةمأ ءانبأ اننإ .انعورشم اوسرادتيو ،
 يف ملاسلإا ةمأ نم ًاءزج انسفنأ ربتعن الله بزح
 برغلا نم ةيرابكتسا ةمجه ىتعأ هجاوت يتلا ملاعلا
 اهنومضم نم اهغيرفت فدهب ءاوسلا ىلع قرشلاو
 ةمأ ريخ نوكتل اهيلع هب الله معنأ يذلا يلاسرلا
نملا نع ىهنتو فورعملاب رمأت سانلل تجرخأ رك
 اهتاورثو اهتاريخ بلاتسا فدهبو ،للهاب نمؤتو
 ىلع ةرطيسلاو ،اهئانبأ تاءافكو اهتاقاط رامثتساو
.اهنوؤش ةفاك 
13 
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We, the sons of Hezbollah's umma, whose 
vanguard God has given victory in Iran and 
which has established newly the nucleus of 
the world's central state of Islam in the 
world. We are committed to the orders of a 
single, wise, and just authority, represented 
in  the Walī al-Faqῑh  and presently 
embodied in the rightly guided imam 
Grand-Ayatollah Ruhollah al-Musavi al-
Khomeini (long life to him), who combines 
all the qualities of the total imām, who has 
prompted the Muslim's revolution, and who 
is bringing about their glorious 
renaissance. 
 يف اهتعيلط الله رصن يتلا الله بزح ةمأ ءانبأ اننإ
 ملاسلإا ةلود ةاون ديدج نم تسسأو ،ناريإ
 مزتلن ..ملاعلا يف ةيزكرملا ةدحاو ةدايق رماوأب
 ،طئارشلل عماجلا هيقفلا يلولاب لثمتت ةلداعو ةميكح
 حور ىمظعلا الله ةيآ ددسملا ماملإاب ًارضاح دسجتتو
 ةروث رجفم ..هلظ ماد ينيمخلا يوسوملا الله
.ةديجملا مهتضهن ثعابو نيملسملا 
14 
Therefore, we in Lebanon are neither a 
closed organizational party nor a narrow 
political structure. Rather, we are a umma 
tied to the Muslims in every part of the 
world by a dogmatic and political bond, 
namely Islam, whose message God 
completed at the hands of the last of His 
prophets, Muḥammad (may God's peace 
and prayers be upon him and upon his 
kinsmen) who has established it as a 
religion for the worlds to follow, saying in 
the venerable Quran: {Today I have 
perfected your religion for you, completed 
My blessing upon you, and chosen as your 
religion Islam.} (Sura al-Maida: 3) 
 َابزح انسل نانبل يف نحنف ساسلأا اذه ىلعو
 نحن لب ..ًاقيض ًايسايس ًاراطإ انسلو ،ًاقلغم ًايميظنت
 طابرب ملاعلا ءاحنأ ةفاك يف نيملسملا عم طبترت ةمأ
 الله لمكأ يذلا ملاسلإا وه نيتم يسايسو يدئاقع
 هيلع الله ىلص( دمحم هئايبنأ متاخ دي ىلع هتلاسر
يملاعلل هاضتراو )ملسو يف لاق ذإ ؛هب نودبعتي ًانيد ن
 ًم  كًّيلّع  تًمّمًّتأو ًم  كّنيٌد ًم  ّكل  ًتلّمًّكأ ّمًوّيلا{:ميركلا نآرقلا
 :ةدئاملا( }اْنيٌد ّملاًسلإا  م  ّكل  تيٌضّرو يٌتّمًعٌن3.) 
15 
Therefore, what befalls the Muslims in 
Afghanistan, Iraq, the Philippines, or 
elsewhere befalls the body of our Islamic 
umma of which we are an indivisible part 
and we move to confront it out of a 
shariatic fundamental duty and in the light 
of a general political vision decided by the 
leading Wilāyat al-Faqῑh. 
أ يف نيملسملا بيصي ام نإف انه نمو وأ ناتسناغف
 انتمأ مسج بيصي امنإ اهريغ وأ نيبيلفلا وأ قارعلا
 كرحتنو ،اهنم أزجتي لا ءزج نحن يتلا ةيملاسلإا
 يفو ،ًاساسأ يعرش بجاو نم ًاقلاطنا هتهجاومل
.دئاقلا هيقفلا ةيلاو هررقت ماع يسايس روصت ءوض 
16 
The fundamental sources of our culture are 
the venerable Qurʾān, the infallible Sunna, 
and the decisions and fatwa issued by the 
Faqῑh, our marjʿa al-taqlīd (reference of 
emulation). These sources are clear, 
uncomplicated, and accessible to all 
without exception and they need no 
theorization or philosophy. All they need is 
abidance and application. 
 ةّنسلاو ،ميركلا نآرقلا :ةيساسلأا اهعبانمف انتفاقث امأ
 هيقفلا نع ةرداصلا ىواتفلاو ماكحلأاو ،ةموصعملا
 ةدقعم ريغ ةحضاو يهو ..اندنع ديلقتلا عجرم
 ريظنت ىلإ جاتحي لاو ،ءانثتسا نود عيمجلل ةرسيمو
لاا وه هجاتحت ام لج لب ،ةفسلف وأ.قيبطتلاو مازتل 
17 
As to our military power, nobody can 
imagine its dimensions because we do not 
have a military agency separate from the 
other parts of our body. Each of us is a 
combat soldier when the call of jihād 
demands it and each of us undertakes his 
task in the battle in accordance with his 
 ذإو ،اهمجح دحأ َّنَليختي لاف ةيركسعلا انتردق امأو
 فارطأ ةيقب نع لصفنم يركسع زاهج انيدل سيل
 انم دحاو لك نإ لب ،انمسج نيح لتاقم يدنج وه
 يف هتمهم ىلوتي اّنم دحاو لكو ،داهجلا يعاد وعدي
 ةيلاوب لمعلا راطإ يف يعرشلا هفيلكتل ًاقفو ةكرعملا
..دئاقلا هيقفلا 
18 
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shariatic duty within the framework of 
action under the guardianship of the 
Wilāyat al-Faqῑh. 
God is behind us, supporting us with His 
care, putting fear in our enemies' hearts, 
and giving us His dear and resounding 
victory against them. 
 يف بعرلا يقليو هتياعرب انديؤي انئارو نم وه اللهو
 زيزعلا هرصنب مهيلع انرصنيو انئادعأ بولق
.رزؤملا 
19 
The Arrogant World Is in Agreement on 
Fighting Us 
انبرح ىلع قفتم ربكتسملا ملاعلا 20 
Free downtrodden men, 
The countries of the tyrannical arrogant 
world in the West and the East, have 
agreed to fight us and have been 
instigating their agents against us, trying to 
distort our reputation and to fabricate lies 
against us in a malicious attempt to drive a 
wedge between us and good and 
downtrodden men, and in an endeavour to 
dwarf and deface the important major 
accomplishments we have made at the 
level of our confrontation with America and 
its allies. 
 ربكتسملا ملاعلا لود نإ :رارحلأا نوفعضتسملا اهيأ
ىلع اوعمتجا دق قرشلاو برغلا يف ملاظلا 
اندض مهءلامع نوض ِّرحي اوحارو ،انتبراحم 
 يف ..انيلع بيذاكلأا ءارتفاو انتعمس هيوشت نولواحي
 نيفعضتسملا نيبو اننيب لصفلل ةثيبخ ةلواحم
زاجنلإا خسمو ميزقتل ثيثح يعس يفو ،نيبيطلا تا
 اكيرملأ انتهجاوم ىوتسم ىلع ىربكلاو ةمهملا
...اهئافلحو 
21 
Through its local agents, America has tried 
to give people the impression that those 
who have put an end to its arrogance in 
Lebanon, who drove it out humiliated and 
frustrated, and who crushed its plot against 
the downtrodden in this country are no 
more than a handful of fundamentalist 
terrorists who are only concerned with 
blowing up drinking, gambling, and 
entertainment spots and other such 
activities. 
ت نأ نييلحملا اهئلامع ربع اكيرمأ تلواح دقل يحو
 نانبل يف اهتسرطغ ىلع ىضق نم نأب سانلل
 ىلع اهترماؤم قحسو ةبئاخ ةليلذ اهجرخأو
 نم ةنفح لاإ اوسيل مه ،دلابلا هذه يف نيفعضتسملا
 ريجفتب لاإ مهل نأش لا نيذلا نيباهرلإا نيبصعتملا
.كلذ ريغو وهللا تلاآو رامقلاو رومخلا تلاحم 
22 
But we are confident that such insinuations 
will never deceive our umma because the 
entire world knows that whoever thinks of 
confronting America and world arrogance 
does not resort to such peripheral acts that 
preoccupy them with the tail and make 
them forget the head. 
 نيقي ىلع اّنك نكلو نل تاءاحيلإا هذه لثم نأب
 ركفي نم نأ ملعي هرسأب ملاعلا نلأ ؛انتمأ عدخت
 لثم ىلإ أجلي لا يملاعلا رابكتسلااو اكيرمأ ةهجاومب
 .سأرلا نع ليذلاب هلغشت يتلا ةيشماهلا لامعلأا هذه 
23 
America behind all our Catastrophes انبئاصم لك ءارو اكيرمأ 24 
We are moving in the direction of fighting 
the roots of vice and the first root of vice is 
America. All the endeavours to drag us into 
marginal action will be futile when 
compared with the confrontation with the 
United States. 
Imam Khomeini, the leader, has repeatedly 
 لوأو ...هروذج نم ركنملا ةبراحمل نوهجوتم اننإ
 تلاواحملا لك عفنت نلو ..اكيرمأ ركنملا روذج
 ةهجاوملاب تسيق ام اذإ ةيشماه تاسرامم ىلإ انرجل
 تارملو دكأ دئاقلا ينيمخلا ماملإاف .اكيرمأ عم
 مأ يهو انبئاصم لك ببس يه اكيرمأ نأ ةديدع
..ثئابخلا 
25 
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stressed that America is the reason for all 
our catastrophes and the mother of all 
evils. 
By fighting it, we are only exercising our 
legitimate right to defend our Islam and the 
dignity of our umma. 
We declare frankly and clearly that we are 
a umma that fears only God and that does 
not accept tyranny, aggression, and 
humiliation. 
 انقح لاإ سرامن لاف اهبراحن ذإ نحنو يف عورشملا
 ةحارصب نلعن اننإ .انتمأ ةزعو انملاسإ نع عافدلا
 يضترت لاو ،الله لاإ فاخت لا ةمأ اننأ حوضوو
..ةناهملاو ناودعلاو ملظلا 
26 
America and its allies from the countries of 
the North Atlantic Alliance (NATO) and the 
Zionist entity that has usurped the sacred 
Islamic land of Palestine, have engaged 
and continue to engage in constant 
aggression against us, and are working 
constantly to humiliate us. 
 لامش فلح لود نم اهءافلحو اكيرمأ نإو
 ضرلأ بصاغلا ينويهصلا نايكلاو ،يسلطلأا
ءلاؤه لك ،ةسدقملا ةيملاسلإا نيطسلف  اوسرام دق
 ىلع نولمعيو رارمتساب انيلع ناودعلا نوسراميو
..رارمتساب انللاذإ 
27 
Therefore, we are in a condition of constant 
and escalating preparedness to repel the 
aggression and to defend our religion, 
existence, and dignity. 
They have attacked our country, destroyed 
our villages, massacred our children, 
violated our holy places, and installed over 
our heads criminal henchmen who have 
perpetrated terrible massacres against our 
umma. They are still supporting these 
butchers, who are Israel's allies and 
preventing us from determining our destiny 
with our free will. 
 لجأ نم دعاصتمو رمتسم بهأت ةلاح يف اننإف اذلو
 .ةماركلاو دوجولاو نيدلا نع عافدلاو ناودعلا در 
 انلافطأ اوحبذو انارق اورمدو اندلاب اومجاه دقل
 نيدلاج انباقر ىلع اوطلسو ،انتامرح اوكتهو
 لاو ،انتمأ قحب ةبيهر رزاجم اوبكترا نيمرجم
 ءافلح نيرازجلا ءلاؤه نومعدي نولازي ،ليئارسإ
.انرايتخا ضحمب انريصم ريرقت نم اننوعنميو 
28 
Their bombs fell on our kinsmen like rain 
during the Zionist invasion of our country 
and the Beirut blockade. Their planes 
raided our civilians, children, women, and 
wounded day and night whereas the areas 
of the agent Phalangists remained safe 
from the enemy's bombardment and a 
centre for directing and guiding the enemy 
forces. 
 ءانثأ رطملاك انلهأ ىلع طقاستت تناك مهلبانق نإ
 ..توريب ةرصاحمو اندلابل ينويهصلا حايتجلاا
يللا يف لصاوتم لكشب ريغت تناك مهتارئاطو ل
 انئاسنو انلافطأ ىلعو انلهأ نم نييندملا ىلع راهنلاو
 ةنمآ ءلامعلا نييبئاتكلا قطانم تناكو ..اناحرجو
هتاوق داشرإو هيجوتل ًازكرمو ودعلا فصق نم. 
29 
We appealed to the world's conscience but 
heard nothing from it and found no trace of 
it. 
This conscience that we missed in the days 
of tribulation is the same conscience that 
was mobilized and alerted when the 
criminal Phalangists were blockaded in the 
city of Zahle, in the Biqʿa and when the 
allies of Israel were besieged in Dair al-
Qamar, in the Shuf,. 
We were horrified and then realized that 
this world conscience stirs only at the 
request of the strong and in response to 
 ًاسح هل عمسن ملف كاذنآ ملاعلا ريمض خرصتسن انكو
 مايأ هاندقتفا يذلا ريمضلا اذه .ًارثأ هل دجن ملو
م ناك هسفن وه ةنحملا رصوح موي ًاظقيو ًارفنتس
 مويو ،ةيعاقبلا ةلحز ةنيدم يف نومرجملا نويبئاتكلا
 رمقلا ريد يف ليئارسإ عم نوفلاحتملا رصوح
 يملاعلا ريمضلا اذه نأ انقيأو رملأا انلاهف ..ةيفوشلا
 حلاصمل ةباجتساو ءايوقلأا بلطل ءانب لاإ زتهي لا
.رابكتسلاا 
30 
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the interests of arrogance. 
The Israelis and Phalangists massacred 
several thousands of our fathers, children, 
women, and brothers in Sabra and Shatila 
in a single night, but no practical 
renunciation or condemnation was 
expressed by any international 
organization or authority against this 
heinous massacre that was perpetrated in 
coordination with the NATO forces, which, 
only a few days, rather hours, earlier, had 
departed from the camps that the defeatist 
[government] agreed to put under the 
protection of the wolf in response to the 
manoeuvre of Philip Habib, the American 
fox. 
 نم فلاآ ةدع نويبئاتكلاو نويليئارسلإا حبذ دقل
 لايتاشو اربص يف انناوخإو انئاسنو انلافطأو انئابآ
 ةئيه وأ ةمظنم ةيأ نع ردصي ملف ةدحاو ةليل للاخ
 ةرزجملا هذهل يلمع بجش وأ راكنتسا يأ ةلود
 ةيسلطلأا تاوقلا عم قيسنتب تبكترا يتلا ةعشبلا
لبق ترداغ يتلا  يتلا تاميخملا ،تاعاس لب مايأ
 بئذلا ةيامح تحت اهوعضي نأ نومزهنملا َلِبَق
.بيبح بيليف يكيرملأا بلعثلا ةروانمل ةباجتسا 
31 
Those criminal attacks came only to 
reaffirm our firm belief that {You (Prophet) 
are sure to find that the most hostile to the 
believers are the Jews and those who 
associate other deities with God} (Sura al-
Ma’ida: 82) 
 يف درو ام دكؤتل ةمرجملا تاءادتعلاا هذه تءاجو
 ّنيٌذٌَّلل ْةّواّدّع ٌساَّنلا َّدّّشأ َّنّدٌجّّتل{ هنأ ةتباثلا انتادقتعم
 :ةدئاملا( }او  كّرًّشأ ّنيٌذَّلاو ّدو هّيلا او نّمآ90). 
32 
There is No Choice for us but 
Confrontation 
ةهجاوملا لاإ انل رايخ لا 33 
Thus, we have seen that aggression can 
be repelled only with sacrifices and there 
cannot be dignity if not with the sacrifice of 
blood, and that freedom is not given but 
regained with the sacrifice of both heart 
and soul. 
 لاإ دري لا ناودعلا نأ انيأر ساسلأا اذه ىلعو
 ،ءامدلا لذبب لاإ نوكت لا ةماركلاو ..تايحضتلاب
 جهملا لذبب درتست امنإو ىطعت لا ةيرحلاو
.حاورلأاو 
34 
We have opted for religion, freedom, and 
dignity over a despicable life and constant 
submission to America and its allies and to 
Zionism and their Phalangist allies. 
 ليلذلا شيعلا ىلع ةماركلاو ةيرحلاو نيدلا انرثآف
 ةنياهصللو اهئافلحو اكيرملأ رمتسملا عوضخلاو
...نييبئاتكلا مهئافلحو 
35 
We have risen to liberate our country 
(balad), to drive the imperialists and the 
invasion out of it, and to determine our fate 
by our own hands. 
 ةازغلاو نيرمعتسملا درطو اندلاب ريرحتل انضفتناو
.انيديأب انريصم ريرقتو اهنم 
36 
We could not endure more than we have 
endured. Our tragedy is more than ten 
years old and all we have seen so far are 
the covetous, hypocritical, and incapable. 
 ،هيلع انربص امم رثكأ ربصن نأ انعسوب نكي ملو
 لك لاإ َرن ملو ًارشع نينسلا نم تزواجت انتنحمف
.زجاع وأ قلمتم وأ عماط 
37 
Zionist-Phalange Coordination يبئاتك ينويهص قيسنت 37 
Nearly 100.000 is the number of the victims 
of the crimes perpetrated against us by 
America, Israel, and the Phalange. 
 اكيرمأ مئارجل يبيرقتلا ددعلا وه ةيحض فلأ ةئم
.انيف بئاتكلاو ليئارسإو 
38 
Nearly one half million Muslims have been 
displaced and their quarters of al-Nabʿa, 
 لماك هبش ريمدتو ًابيرقت ملسم نويلم فصنل ريجهت 39 
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Burj Hammūd, al-Dikwāna, Tall al-Zaʿtar, 
Sibniya, al-Ghawārina and in Jabail, have 
been almost totally destroyed. Our kinsmen 
staying in Jabail are still exposed to the 
tragedy without a single international 
organization moving to rescue them. 
 لتو ةناوكدلاو دومح جربو ةعبنلا يف مهئايحلأ
 لا يتلا ليبج دلابو ةنراوغلا يحو هينبسو رتعزلا
 نود ةنحملل نوضرعتي اهيف انلهأ نم ىقبت نم لازي
.مهذاقنلإ ةدحاو ةيملاع ةئيه كرحتت نأ 
The Zionist occupation continues to usurp 
the lands of the Muslims, extending over 
more than one-third of Lebanon's area in 
prior coordination and full agreement with 
the Phalange, who have denounced the 
attempts to confront the invading forces 
and have taken part in implementing some 
of Israel's schemes so as to complete 
Israel's plan and to give it what it wishes in 
return of their achievement of the 
premiership of the government. 
 يضارلأ هباصتغا يف رمتسا ينويهص للاتحاو
 ثلث نم رثكلأ للاتحا ىلإ لصو ىتح نيملسملا
 عم لماك قافتاو قبسم قيسنتب نانبل ةحاسم
 تاوقلل يدصتلا تلاواحم اوركنتسا نيذلا نييبئاتكلا
 ليئارسإ ططخ ضعب ذيفنت يف اوكراشو ..ةيزاغلا
مهلاصيلإ ًانمث ديرت ام اهوطعيو اهعورشم اولمكيل 
.مكحلا ةسائر ىلإ 
40 
Thus, butcher Bashir al-Jumayyil had 
attained the presidency with the help of 
Israel, of the Arab oil countries, and of the 
Muslim deputies who are subservient to the 
Phalange. He gained this presidency in the 
wake of a skilful manoeuvre to beautify his 
image in a surgery room called the 
“Salvation Committee”-a committee that is 
no more than an American-Israeli bridge 
over which the Phalange crossed to 
oppress the downtrodden. 
 ىلإ ليمجلا ريشب رازجلا لصو دقلف ؛ناك اذكهو
عتسم ةسائرلا ةدس برعلا نييطفنلاو ليئارسإب ًاني
 نيملسملا باون نم بئاتكلل نيملزتسملا ءامعزلابو
 راطإ يف ةعشبلا هتروص ليمجتل ةنقتم ةلواحم رثأو
 لاإ نكت ملو "ذاقنلإا ةنجل" ـب تيمس تايلمع ةفرغ
 نويبئاتكلا هيلع ربع ًايليئارسإ ـ ًايكيرمأ ًارسج
.نيفعضتسملا باقر ىلع طلستلا هاجتاب 
41 
But our people were not willing to endure 
this humiliation and they wiped out the 
dreams of the Zionists and their allies. But 
America persisted in its rashness and 
brought Amīn al-Jumayil to succeed his 
buried brother. Amin's first accomplishment 
was to destroy the homes of the evacuees, 
to attack the Muslims' mosques, to order 
the army to demolish the quarters of the 
downtrodden on the heads of their 
occupants, to enlist the help of NATO 
forces against us, and to conclude the ill-
fated May I7 accord that turned Lebanon 
into an Israeli protectorate and an 
American colony. 
 دابأف ،ةناهملا هذه ىلع ربصلا عطتسي مل انبعش نكل
 ترصأ اكيرمأ نأ لاإ ..مهئافلحو ةنياهصلا ملاحأ
 هيخأ ةفلاخل ليمجلا نيمأ تلصوأف اهتقامح ىلع
 لزانم ريمدت هتازاجنإ لو أ تناكو ،روبقملا
 ،نيملسملا دجاسم ىلع ءادتعلااو ،نيرجهملا
ةيحاضلا ءايحأ فصقب شيجلل رماولأا ءاطعإو 
 فلح تاوق ءاعدتساو ،اهلهأ ىلع ةفعضتسملا
 ةيقافتا عيقوتو ،انيلع مهب ةناعتسلال يسلطلأا51 
 ةيليئارسإ ةيمحم نانبل نم لعجي يذلا موؤشملا رايأ
.ةيكيرمأ ةرمعتسمو 
42 
Our Fundamental Enemies نويساسلأا انؤادعأ 43 
Our people could not withstand all this 
treason and decided to confront the imams 
of infidelity of America, France, and Israel. 
 ررقف ةنايخلا هذه لك لمحتي نأ انبعش عطتسي ملو
.ليئارسإو اسنرفو اكيرمأ :رفكلا ةمئأ ةهجاوم 
44 
The first punishment against these forces 
was carried out on April 8 and the second 
on October 29, 1983. By that time, a real 
war had started against the Israeli 
 يف مهل ةبوقع لوأ مهقحب ذفنو59  يف مث ،ناسين
08  لوأ نيرشت5893 ةيقيقح ًابرح أدب دق ناكو م
 ىلإ اهللاخ ىقترا يليئارسلإا للاتحلاا تاوق دض
45 
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occupation forces, rising to the level of 
destroying two main centres of the enemy's 
military rulers. From a popular and military 
resistance it escalated to a point in which 
the enemy  had to make its decision on 
phased withdrawal - a decision that Israel 
was compelled to adopt for the first time in 
the history of the so-called Arab-Israeli 
conflict. 
 هماكحل نييساسأ نيزكرم ريمدت ىوتسم
 ًايبعش ةيملاسلإا هتمواقم نم دعصو ،نييركسعلا
ارفلاب رارق ذاختا ىلع ودعلا مغرأ ىتح ًايركسعو ر
 ةرم لولأ ليئارسإ هيلإ رطضت رارق وهو يلحرملا
.يليئارسلإا ـ يبرعلا عارصلاب يمس ام خيرات يف 
For the sake of the truth, we declare that 
the sons of Hezbollah's umma have come 
to know well their basic enemies in the 
area: Israel, America, France, and the 
Phalange. 
 نلآا اوتاب الله بزح ةمأ ءانبأ نأ نلعن ةقيقحللو
 :ةقطنملا يف ًاديج نييساسلأا مهءادعأ نوفرعي
.بئاتكلاو ،اسنرف ،اكيرمأ ،ليئارسإ 
46 
Our Objectives in Lebanon نانبل يف انفادهأ 47 
And  now they are in a condition of ever-
escalating confrontation against these 
enemies until the following objectives are 
achieved: 
مهدض ةدعاصتم ةهجاوم ةلاح يف نلآا مهو  ىتح
:ةيلاتلا فادهلأا ققحتت 
48 
Expel Israel from Lebanon as a prelude to 
its final obliteration from existence and the 
liberation of venerable Jerusalem from the 
talons of occupation. 
 اهتلازلإ ةمدقمك نانبل نم ًايئاهن ليئارسإ جرخت ـ
 نثارب نم فيرشلا سدقلا ريرحتو دوجولا نم ًايئاهن
.للاتحلاا 
49 
Expel America, France, and their allies 
from Lebanon and the termination of the 
influence of any imperialist state in the 
country. 
 نانبل نم ًايئاهن امهؤافلحو اسنرفو اكيرمأ جرخت ـ
.دلابلا يف ةيرامعتسا ةلود ةيلأ ذوفن يأ يهتنيو 
50 
Submission by the Phalange to just rule 
and their trial for the crimes they have 
committed against the right of Muslims and 
Christians with the encouragement of 
America and Israel. 
 ًاعيمج نومكاحيو لداعلا مكحلل نويبئاتكلا خضري ـ
 نيملسملا قحب اهوبكترا يتلا مئارجلا ىلع
.ليئارسإو اكيرمأ نم عيجشتب نييحيسملاو 
51 
Giving to all our people the opportunity to 
determine their fate and to choose with full 
freedom the system of government they 
want, keeping in mind that we do not hide 
our commitment to the rule of Islam and 
that we call to choose the Islamic system 
that alone guarantees justice and dignity 
for all and prevents any new imperialist 
attempt to infiltrate our country. 
 مهريصم اوررقي نأ انبعش ءانبأ عيمجل حاتي ـ
 يذلا مكحلا ماظن لكش مهتيرح لماكب اوراتخيو
 ملاسلإا مكحب انمازتلا يفخن لا اننأب ًاملع ،هنوديري
 يذلا يملاسلإا ماظنلا رايتخا ىلإ عيمجلا وعدنو
 ةيأ هدحو عنميو ،عيمجلل ةماركلاو لدعلا هدحو لفكي
ىلإ يرامعتسلاا للستلل ةلواحم  .ديدج نم اندلاب 
52 
Friends ءاقدصلأا اهيأ 53 
These are our objectives in Lebanon and 
those are our enemies. As for our friends, 
they are all the world's downtrodden 
peoples and all those who fight our 
enemies and who are eager not to harm 
us, be they individuals, parties, or 
 ،انؤادعأ مه ءلاؤهو نانبل يف انفادهأ يه هذه ... ًاذإ
 يف ةفعضتسملا بوعشلا لك مهف انؤاقدصأ امأ
 ىلع صرحيو انءادعأ براحي نم لك مهو ،ملاعلا
 وأ ًابازحأ وأ اوناك ًادارفأ ..انيلإ ةءاسلإا مدع
...تامظنم 
54 
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organizations. 
We especially address this letter to them to 
say: 
:لوقنف باطخلا اذهب مهصخنو مهيلإ هجوتن اننإو 55 
combatants and those of you in an 
organization, wherever you are in Lebanon 
and whatever your ideas, 
 ًايأو نانبل يف متنك امنيأ نومظنملاو نوبراحملا اهيأ
..مكراكفأ تناك 
56 
we agree with you on major and important 
goals embodied in the need to topple the 
American hegemony of the country, to 
expel the Zionist occupation that bears 
down heavily on the people's lives, 
 لثمتت ..ةمهمو ةريبك فادهأ ىلع مكايإو نوقفتم اننإ
نميهلا طاقسإ ةرورض يف ..دلابلا ىلع ةيكيرملأا ة
 باقر ىلع مثاجلا ينويهصلا للاتحلاا درطو
..دابعلا 
57 
and to strike all the Phalangist endeavours 
to control government and administrative 
affairs, even though we may disagree with 
you on the methods and level of 
confrontation. 
 برضو نوؤش ىلع يبئاتكلا طلستلا تلاواحم لك
 بيلاسأ يف فلتخن اّنك نإو ..ةرادلإاو مكحلا
.ةهجاوملا ىوتسمو ةهجاوملا 
58 
Come, let us rise above quarrelling over 
minor issues and let us open wide the 
doors of competition for achieving the 
major goals. 
 نع عفرتن اولاعتف روملأا ىلع اننيب اميف مصاختلا
 قيقحت مامأ ةعساو سفانتلا باوبأ حتفنو ةريغصلا
.ةريبكلا فادهلأا 
59 
It is not important that a certain party 
control the street. What is important is that 
the masses interact with this party. 
إو ،عراش ىلع بزح رطيسي نأ ًامهم سيلف امن
.بزحلا اذه عم ريهامجلا لعافتت نأ مهملا 
60 
It is not important that many military 
parades be held for the citizens. What is 
important is to increase the operations 
against Israel. 
 ىلع ةيركسعلا تاضارعتسلاا رثكت نأ مهملا سيلو
رثكت نأ مهملا لب ..نينطاوملا  دض تايلمعلا
.ليئارسإ 
61 
It is not important that we draft statements 
and call for conferences. What is important 
is that we turn Lebanon into a graveyard 
for American schemes. 
 ىلإ وعدنو تانايبلا غيصن نأ مهملا سيلو
ةربقم نانبل نم لعجن نأ مهملا لب ،تارمتؤم 
.ةيكيرملأا عيراشملل 
62 
You carry ideas that do not stem from 
Islam. This should not prevent cooperation 
between us for these objectives, especially 
since we feel that the motives urging you to 
engage in the struggle are fundamentally 
Islamic motives emanating from the 
injustice inflicted upon you by tyranny and 
the oppression exercised against you by it. 
 يف سيلو ...ملاسلإا نم تسيل ًاراكفأ نولمحت مكنإ
 هذه لجأ نم مكعم نواعتلا نيبو اننيب لوحي ام اذه
 يتلا عفاودلا نأب رعشن اننأ ًاصوصخ ؛فادهلأا
لا لجأ نم مكضرحت يف ةيملاسإ عفاود يه لاضن
 ،توغاطلا نم مكب قحلالا ملظلا اهؤشنم ،لصلأا
..هلَبِق نم مكيلع سرامي يذلا فاعضتسلااو 
63 
Though formed through non-Islamic ideas, 
these motives must inevitably revert to their 
essence when you find that revolutionary 
Islam is the force leading the struggle and 
the resistance to oppression and 
arrogance. 
 ّدب لاف ةيملاسإ ريغ راكفأب تلكشت نإ عفاودلا هذهو
 يروثلا ملاسلإا نورت نيح اهرهوج ىلإ دوعت نأ
 ملظلا ةمواقملو ،عارصلا ةدايقل ىدصتي يذلا وه
.رابكتسلااو 
64 
However, we shall accept no provocation, 
instigation, or aggression from you against 
مكنم يضترن لا اننإ ىلع  لاو ًازازفتسا لاو ًاشرحت
 ةجلاعمب مكعم مزتلنو ،انتماركو اننمأ ىلع تاءادتعا
65 
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our security or our dignity, we are obliged 
with you to deal with any problem with the 
good word first, and we are eager not to let 
you obstruct our movement toward our 
objectives. 
 نأ ىلع صرحنو ،ًلاوأ نسحأ يه يتلاب سابتلا يأ
.انفادهلأ انكرحت قيعي امب انولغشت لا 
You will find us eager to open up to you. 
You will also find that our relationship with 
you will grow stronger the closer our ideas 
move toward each other, 
 دادزتسو ،مكيلع حاتفنلاا ىلع نيصيرح اننودجتسو
 اننيب اميف يركفلا براقتلا دادزا املك مكعم ةقلاعلا
،مكنيبو 
66 
the more we feel that your decision making 
is independent, and the more the interest 
of Islam and the Muslims dictates that this 
relationship be bolstered and developed. 
 تضتقا املكو ،مكرارق ةيللاقتساب انرعش املكو
 ةقلاعلا هذه زيزعت نيملسملاو ملاسلإا ةحلصم
.اهريوطتو 
67 
Downtrodden partisans, .نوفعضتسملا نوبزاحملا اهيأ 68 
You have sought what is right but have 
missed it, and those who seek what is right 
and miss it are not like those who seek 
what is false and hit it. 
 دصق نم سيلو ..هومتأطخأف قحلا متدصق نمم متنأ
.هباصأف لطابلا دصق نمك هأطخأف قحلا 
69 
Therefore, we extend our hand to you and 
tell you sincerely: {Our People respond to 
the one who calls you to God} (Sura al-
Ahqaf: 31) and {and respond to God and 
His Messenger when he calls you to that 
which gives you life.} (Sura al-Anfal: 24) 
 اي{ نيصلخم مكل لوقنو مكيلإ انيديأ دمن اننإف اذلو
جأ انموق :فاقحلأا( }الله يعاد اوبي30 { و )
}مكييحي امل مكاعد اذإ لوسرللو لله اوبيجتساو 
لافنلأا( :02 .) 
70 
We Are Committed to Islam But We Do 
Not Impose It by Force 
ةوقلاب هضرفن لاو ملاسلإاب مزتلن 71 
Free, downtrodden, 
We are a umma committed to the message 
of Islam and that wishes the downtrodden 
and all the persons to study this divine 
message because it will bring about justice, 
peace, and serenity in the world. 
 ةلاسرب تمزتلا ةمأ اننإ !رارحلأا نوفعضتسملا اهيأ
 نأ ةفاك سانللو نيفعضتسملل تبحأو ملاسلإا
هذه اوسرادتي  قيقحتل حلصت اهنلأ ؛ةيوامسلا ةلاسرلا
.ملاعلا يف ةنينأمطلاو ملاسلاو لدعلا 
72 
God, may He be praised, says: {There is 
no compulsion in religion: true guidance 
has become distinct from error, so whoever 
rejects false gods and believes in God has 
grasped the firmest hand-hold, one that will 
never break. God is all hearing and all 
knowing. God is the ally of those who 
believe: He brings them out of the depths 
of the darkness and into the light. But close 
to the disbelievers are their false gods, who 
take them into depths of darkness, they are 
the inhabitants of the Fire, and there they 
remain.} (Surah al-Baqra: 256-7) 
{ :لوقي ـ انبر ىلاعت ـ اللهو َنَّيَبَت ْدَق ِني ِّدلا يِف َهاَرِْكإ َلا
 ِ َّللهاِب ْنِمْؤُيَو ِتوُغا َّطلاِب ْرُفْكَي ْنَمَف ِّيَغْلا َنِم ُدْش ُّرلا
 ُ َّاللهَو اََهل َماَصِفْنا َلا ٰىَقْثُوْلا ِةَوْرُعْلاِب َكَسْمَتْسا ِدَقَف
 ٌمِيلَع ٌعيِمَس 
 َّلا ُّيِلَو ُ َّالله ِروُّنلا ىَِلإ ِتاَُمل ُّظلا َنِم ْمُهُجِرْخُي اوُنَمآ َنيِذ
 َنِم ْمُهَنوُجِرْخُي ُتوُغا َّطلا ُمُهُؤاَِيلَْوأ اوُرَفَك َنيِذَّلاَو
 اَهيِف ْمُهِرا َّنلا ُباَحَْصأ َكِئ َٰلُوأ ِتاَُمل ُّظلا ىَِلإ ِروُّنلا
 َنوُدِلاَخ :ةرقبلا( .}012 ،011) 
73 
Therefore, we do not wish to impose Islam 
on anybody and we hate to see others 
impose on us their convictions and their 
systems. 
 ،دحأ ىلع ملاسلإا ضرفن نأ ديرن لا اننإف اذلو
أ هركنو مهتمظنأو مهتاعانق نورخلآا ضرفي ن
 امك ةوقلاب نانبل يف ملاسلإا مكحي نأ ديرن لاو ،انيلع
74 
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We do not want Islam to rule in Lebanon by 
force, as political Maronism is ruling at 
present. 
.نلآا ةيسايسلا ةينوراملا مكحت 
But we stress that we are convinced of 
Islam as a faith, system, thought, and rule 
and we urge all to recognize it and to resort 
to the sharīʿa. We also urge them to adopt 
it and abide by its teachings at the 
individual, political, and social levels. 
 ًاركف ،ًاماظنو ةديقع ملاسلإاب نوعنتقم اننأ دكؤن اننكل
 ماكتحلااو هيلع فرعتلا ىلإ عيمجلا وعدنو ،ًامكحو
ازتللااو هينبت ىلإ مهوعدن امك ،هتعيرش ىلإ م
 يسايسلاو يدرفلا ىوتسملا ىلع هميلاعتب
.يعامتجلااو 
75 
If our people get the opportunity to choose 
Lebanon's system of government freely, 
they will favour no alternative to Islam. 
 ماظن لكش هتيرحب راتخي نأ انبعشل حيتأ ام اذإو
ىلع حجري نل هنإف نانبل يف مكحلا .ًلايدب ملاسلإا 
76 
Therefore, we urge adoption of the Islamic 
system on the basis of free and direct 
selection by the people, not the basis of 
forceful imposition, as some people 
imagine. 
 يملاسلإا ماظنلا دامتعا ىلإ وعدن اننإف انه نمو
ا رايتخلاا ةدعاق ىلع ،سانلا ِلَبِق نم رشابملاو رحل
.ضعبلل ليخي امك ةوقلاب ضرفلا ةدعاق ىلع لا 
77 
We declare that we aspire to see Lebanon 
as an indivisible part of the political map 
opposed to America, world arrogance, and 
world Zionism and to see Lebanon ruled by 
Islam and its just leadership. 
This is the aspiration of a umma, not of a 
party, and the choice of a people, not of a 
gang. 
 نم أزجتي لا ًاءزج نانبل نوكي نأ حمطن اننأ نلعنو
 رابكتسلااو اكيرملأ ةيداعملا ةيسايسلا ةطراخلا
 ملاسلإا اهمكحي يتلاو ،ةيملاعلا ةينويهصللو يملاعلا
و سيلو ةمأ حومط وه حومطلا اذهو .ةلداعلا هتدايق
.ةباصع رايتخا لا بعش رايتخاو ،بزح حومط 
78 
Our Minimum Aspiration in Lebanon نانبل يف انحومطل ىندلأا دحلا 79 
Therefore, the minimum we shall accept in 
terms of achieving this aspiration, which we 
are religiously bound (sharʿan) to achieve, 
is: 
 نأ نكمي يذلا ىندلأا دحلا نإف ساسلأا اذه ىلعو
 نيفلكملا حومطلا اذه قيقحت قيرط ىلع هب لبقن
:وه ،ًاعرش هقيقحتل يعسلاب 
80 
rescuing Lebanon from subservience to 
either the West or the East, expelling the 
Zionist occupation from its territories finally 
and adopting a system that the people 
established out of their free will and choice. 
 درطو قرشلل وأ برغلل ةيعبتلا نم نانبل ذاقنإ(
 دامتعاو ًايئاهن هيضارأ نم ينويهصلا للاتحلاا
.)هتيرحو هرايتخا ضحمب ،بعشلا هررقي ماظن 
81 
Why Do We Confront the Existing 
Regime? 
؟مئاقلا ماظنلا هجاون اذامل 82 
This is our visualization and these are our 
projections of what we want in Lebanon. In 
the light of this visualization and these 
projections, we confront the existing regime 
due to two main considerations: 
 ،نانبل يف هديرن اّمع انتاروصتو انتيؤر يه هذه
 ماظنلا هجاون تاروصتلاو ةيؤرلا هذه ءوض ىلعو
 :نييساسأ نيرابتعلا مئاقلا 
83 
1. Because it is a product of world 
arrogance and a part of the political map 
that is hostile to Islam. 
5  رابكتسلاا ةعينص هنوكل ـ نم ءزجو يملاعلا
 .ملاسلإل ةيداعملا ةيسايسلا ةطراخلا 
84 
2. Because it is a fundamentally oppressive 
structure that no reform or patchwork 
0  يأ اهعم عفني لا اهساسأ يف ةملاظ ةبيكرت هنوكل ـ
 اهروذج نم اهرييغت نم دب لا لب ،عيقرت وأ حلاصإ
85 
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improvement would do any good and that 
must be changed from the roots {those 
who do not judge according to what God 
has revealed are doing grave wrong.} 
(Sura al-Maida: 45) 
 .}ّنو  ٌملا َّظلا  م  ه ّكٌّئلًو أّف  
َّالله ّلّزّنأ اّمٌب م  كًحّي ًمَّل نّمو{
 :ةدئاملا(21) 
Our Position toward the Opposition ةضراعملا نم انفقوم 86 
We determine our stance vis-a-vis any 
opposition to the Lebanese regime in light 
of the two above-mentioned 
considerations. 
We consider any opposition moving within 
red lines imposed by the arrogant forces a 
scarecrow opposition that will ultimately 
agree with the existing regime. 
 ةيأ نم انفقوم ددحن نيفنلآا نيرابتعلاا ءوض يفو
 ةضراعم لك نأ ربتعنف .ينانبللا ماظنلل ةضراعم
 ىوقلا اهتضرف رمح طوطخ نمض كرحتت
 يف يقتلت نأو دب لا ةيلكش ةضراعم يه ةربكتسملا
ا عم فاطملا ةياهن.مئاقلا ماظنل 
87 
Any opposition moving within the sphere of 
protecting and safeguarding the 
constitution currently in force and not 
committed to making fundamental changes 
in the system's roots is also a scarecrow 
opposition that will not achieve the 
interests of the downtrodden masses. 
 ظافحلا ةرئاد نمض كرحتت ةضراعم لكو
 مزتلتو ،ًايلاح هب لومعملا روتسدلا ىلع صرحلاو
 يه ،ماظنلا روذج يف يساسأ رييغت يأ ءارجإ مدع
 ريهامجلا ةحلصم ققحت لا ًاضيأ ةيلكش ةضراعم
.ةفعضتسملا 
88 
Moreover, any opposition moving within the 
positions where the regime wants it to 
move is an imaginary opposition that 
serves only the regime. 
 يتلا عقاوملا يف كرحتت ةضراعم لك نإف كلذكو
 ةضراعم يه ،اهللاخ نم كرحتت نأ ماظنلا اهديري
.ماظنلا ةمدخل لاإ تسيل ةيمهو 
89 
On the other hand, we are not at all 
interested in any projection for political 
reform within the framework of the rotten 
sectarian system, just exactly as we are 
not interested in the formation of any 
cabinet or the participation of any figure in 
any ministry representing a part of the 
oppressive regime. 
 يسايسلا حلاصلإل حرط لك نإف ،ىرخأ ةيحان نمو
 ،ءيش هيف انينعي لا نفعلا يفئاطلا ماظنلا ءوض ىلع
 ةيأ كارتشا وأ ةموكح ةيأ ليكشت انينعي لا امك ًامامت
 ماظنلا نم ًاءزج لثمت ةرازو ةيأ يف ةيصخش
 .ملاظلا 
90 
Words to the Christians in Lebanon بل يف نييحيسملا مسرب تاملكنان 91 
Honourable, downtrodden men! 
We wish to address through you a few 
words intended for the Christians in 
Lebanon, especially intended for the 
Maronites. 
 مكللاخ نم هجوتن اننإ !ءافرشلا نوفعضتسملا اهيأ
 نانبل يف نييحيسملا مسرب اهعضن ةليلق تاملكب
لا مسربو.صوصخلا هجو ىلع ةنراوم 
92 
The policy followed by the leaders 
(zuʿama) of political Maronism through the 
Lebanese Front and the Lebanese Forces 
is incapable of achieving peace and 
stability for the Christians in Lebanon 
because it is a policy founded on bigotry, 
sectarian privileges, and alliance with 
imperialism and Israel. 
 ةيسايسلا ةينوراملا ءامعز اهجهتني يتلا ةسايسلا نإ
 لا "ةينانبللا تاوقلا" و "ةينانبللا ةهبجلا" للاخ نم
 يف نييحيسملل رارقتسلااو ملاسلا ققحت نأ نكمي
لااو ةيبصعلا ىلع ةمئاق ةسايس اهنلأ ؛نانبل تازايتم
.ليئارسإو رامعتسلاا عم فلاحتلاو ةيفئاطلا 
93 
The Lebanese tragedy has proven that the  ةيفئاطلا تازايتملاا نأ ةينانبللا ةنحملا تتبثأ دقلو 94 
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sectarian privileges are one of the main 
causes of the big explosion that has 
brought about the collapse of the country 
and that the alliance with America, France, 
and Israel did the Christians no good when 
they needed the support of these forces. 
 يذلا ريبكلا راجفنلاا بابسأ نم ًايسيئر ًاببس تناك
 اسنرفو اكيرمأ عم فلاحتلا نإو ،دلابلا ضوق
سملل ًاعفن ِدْجُي مل ليئارسإو معدل اوجاتحا موي نييحي
.ءلاؤه 
Moreover, the time has come for the 
fundamentalist Christians to come out of 
the tunnel of sectarian loyalty and of the 
illusions of monopolizing privileges at the 
expense of others. 
تملا نويحيسملا جرخيل نآ دق ناولأا نإ مث نوبصع
 راثئتسلاا ماهوأ نمو يفئاطلا ءلاولا قفن نم
،نيرخلآا باسح ىلع تازايتملااب 
95 
It is time for them to respond to the divine 
call (dʿawa) and to resort to reason instead 
of arms and to moderation instead of 
partisanship. 
ومكتحيف ءامسلا ةوعدل اوبيجتسي نأو لدب لقعلا ىلإ ا
.ةفئاطلا لدب ةعانقلا ىلإو حلاسلا 
96 
We are confident that the Christian prophet 
of God, peace be upon him, is not 
responsible of the massacres perpetrated 
by the Phalange in his name and yours. 
صلا هيلع ـ حيسملا الله لوسر نأب نيقي ىلع اننإ ةلا
 نويبئاتكلا اهبكترا يتلا رزاجملا نم ءارب ـ ملاسلاو
.مكمسابو همساب 
97 
Is not responsible of the stupid policy 
adopted by your leaders to oppress you 
and oppress us. 
Muḥammad, God's prophet, peace and 
mercy be upon him, is also not responsible 
of those who are considered Muslims and 
who do not observe God's law and who do 
not seek to apply God's rules to you and to 
us. 
 مكؤامعز اهدمتعي يتلا ءاقمحلا ةسايسلا نم ءاربو
 ىلص( دمحم الله لوسر نأو امك .مكبو انب مكحتلل
 ىلع بسحي نمم ًاضيأ ءارب وه )ملسو هيلع الله
سملا ىلإ نوعسي لاو الله عرشب نومزتلي لا نمم نيمل
.مكيلعو انيلع هماكحأ قيبطت 
98 
If you reconsider your calculations and you 
realize that your interest lies in what you 
decide with your own free will and not in 
what is imposed on you with iron and fire, 
then we will renew our call (dʿawa) to you 
in response to God's words: 
 يه مكتحلصم نأ متفرعو مكتاباسح متعجار ام اذإف
 ضرفي ام لا مكرايتخا ضحمب متنأ هنوررقت ام
 مكل انتوعد ددجن  ذئنيح ،رانلاو ديدحلاب مكيلع
:ـ ىلاعت ـ الله لوقل ةباجتسا 
99 
{Say, 'people of the Book! Let us arrive at a 
statement that is common to us all: we 
worship God alone, we ascribe no partner 
to Him, and none of us takes others beside 
God as lords.' If they turn away, say, 
‘Witness our devotion to Him.} (al-Imran: 
64) 
 ّعّت ٌباّتٌكلا ّلًّهأ اّي ًل ق{ اّنّنًيّب ُءاّوّس ُةٌّملّك "ّىلإ اًّولا
 ّذٌخ َّتّي لاو اْئًيّش ٌهٌب ّكٌرًش ن لاو الله َّلاإ ّد بًعّن َّّلاأ ًم  كّنًيّبو
 او لو قّف اًوَّلّوّت نإّف الله ٌنو  د نٌم اْباّبًّرأ اْضًعّب اّن  ضًعّب
 :نارمع لآ(}ّنو  ٌملًس  م ا َّّنأٌب او  دّهًشا22) 
100 
Oh Christians of Lebanon, 
If you find it too much for the Muslims to 
share with you some government affairs, 
then God also finds it an excess for us to 
do so because the Muslims would be 
taking part in a government that is unjust to 
you and to us and that is not founded on 
the basis of the sharīʿa that was completed 
by the last of the prophets. 
 مككراشي نأ مكيلع ربك ناك نإ ...نانبل ييحيسم اي
 ربك اللهو هنإف ..مكحلا نوؤش ضعب يف نوملسملا
 انل ملاظ مكح يف نوكراشي مهنلأ ً؛اضيأ كلذ انيلع
 سسأ لاو نيدلا ماكحأ ىلع مئاق ريغو ...مكلو
 تلمتكا يتلا ةعيرشلا.نييبنلا متاخب 
101 
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If you want justice, then who is more just 
than God? Is He who revealed from 
heaven the message of Islam alongside 
the prophets so that they may rule among 
men justly and may give each his due 
right? 
 نم ىلْوأ نمف ،ًلادع نوديرت متنك نإو ؟لدعلاب الله
 ىلع ملاسلإا ةلاسر ءامسلا نم لزنأ يذلا وهو
 سانلا نيب اومكحي نأ لجأ نم ءايبنلأا تاثعب دادتما
.هقح قح يذ لكل اوذخأيو طسقلاب 
102 
If somebody has misled you, exaggerated 
matters for you, and made you afraid of 
reactions on our part to the crimes the 
Phalange have committed against us, then 
this is completely unjustifiable. 
 مكفوخو روملأا مكل مظعو مكللض دق دحأ ناك نإو
 نويبئاتكلا هبكترا ام ىلع لعف دودر اّنم مكلاني نأ
ً؛ادبأ هيف مكل رربم لا ام اذهف ،انقحب مئارج نم 
103 
Because those who are peaceful among 
you are still living among us without being 
disturbed by anybody. 
 نأ نود اننيب نوشيعي اولاز لا مكنم نيملاسملا نإ ذإ
.دحأ مهوفص ركعي 
104 
If we are fighting the Phalange, it is 
because they are blocking your view of the 
truth, they turn you away from the way of 
God, and they desire on the earth improper 
deviation and they have waxed proud with 
great insolence. 
 مامأ ًازجاح نولكشي مهنلأف نييبئاتكلا لتاقن اّنك نإو
 اهنوغبيو الله ليبس نع مكنودصيو ةقيقحلل مكتيؤر
 اوتعو اوربكتسا دقو ،قح ريغب ًاجوع ضرلأا يف
 ًاوتع .ًاريبك 
105 
We wish you well and we call you to Islam 
so that you may enjoy this world and the 
hereafter. 
 اودعستل ملاسلإا ىلإ مكوعدنو ريخلا مكل ديرن اننإو
،ةرخلآاو ايندلا يف 
106 
If you refuse, then all we want of you is to 
uphold your covenants with the Muslims 
and not to participate in aggression against 
them. 
 اوظفحت نأ لاإ ليبس نم مكيلع انل امف متيبأ نإف
 ناودعلا يف اوكراشت لاو نيملسملا عم مكدوهع
 .مهيلع 
107 
Oh Christians, free your thoughts of the 
residues of hateful sectarianism, liberate 
your minds from the shackle of 
fundamentalism and insularity, and open 
your hearts to our invitation to you to join 
Islam because in it lies your salvation, 
happiness and your good in this world and 
in the hereafter. 
 بساور نم مكراكفأ اوررح ..نويحيسملا اهيأ
ا ةيفئاطلا رسأ نم مكلوقع اودرجو ،ةضيغبل
 ام ىلع مكرئاصب اوحتفاو ،قلاغنلااو بصعتلا
 مكتداعسو مكتاجن هيفف ؛ملاسلإا نم هيلإ مكوعدن
.ةرخلآاو ايندلا ريخو 
108 
We extend this call (dʿawa) of ours to all 
the downtrodden non-Muslims. As for 
those who belong to Islam 
denominationally, we urge them to commit 
to Islam practically and to rise above 
fundamentalisms that are hateful to the 
religion. 
 نم نيفعضتسملا لك مسرب اهعضن هذه انتوعدو
 ًايفئاط ملاسلإل نوبستنملا امأ ،نيملسملا ريغ
 نع عفرتلاو ،ًايلمع ملاسلإاب مازتللال مهوعدنف
ايبصعلا.نيدلا اهتقمي يتلا ت 
109 
We assure all that this is the age of the 
victory of Islam and of right and of the 
defeat of infidelity and falsehood. 
 راصتنا رصع وه رصعلا اذه نأب عيمجلل دكؤنو
،لطابلاو رفكلا ةميزهو ،قحلاو ملاسلإا 
110 
Join with right before the {day the evildoer 
will bite his own hand and say, ‘If only I had 
taken the same path as the  essenger’. 
Woe is me! If only I had not taken so and 
ق قحلا بكرب اوقحتلاف َضّعّي ّمًوّيو{ يتأي نأ لب
 ٌلو  س َّرپ ّعّم  تًذّخَّتا يٌنّتًّيل اّي  لو قّي ٌهًيّدّي "ّىلّع  ٌملا
َّظپ
 يٌنَّلّّضأ ًدّّقل ْلاٌيلّخ اْنلا ف ًذٌخ َّّتأ ًّمل يٌنّتًّيل "ىّّتلًيو اّي ْلايٌبّس
111 
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so as a friend –he let me away from the 
Revelation after it reached me.} (al-Furqan: 
27-9) 
 ٌناّسنٌلإل  ناّطًي َّشلا ّناّكو يٌنّءاّج ًذإ ّدًعّب ٌرًكٌذلا ٌنّع
 ْلاو  ذّخ :ناقرفلا( .}01 - 08.) 
Our Story with World Arrogance يملاعلا رابكتسلاا عم انتصق 112 
Honourable, downtrodden men, 
As for our story with world arrogance, we 
shall sum it up for you in these words: 
 عم انتصق امأو ...ءافرشلا نوفعضتسملا اهيأ
لا رابكتسلاا:تاملكلا هذهب مكل اهزجونف يملاع 
113 
We believe that the struggle of principles 
between the United States and the Soviet 
Union ended forever a long time ago. 
 داحتلااو اكيرمأ نيب ئدابملا عارص نأ دقتعن اننإ
...ةعجر ريغ ىلإو ديعب نمز ذنم ىلو دق يتييفوسلا 
114 
The two sides have failed to achieve 
happiness for mankind because the idea 
they have offered mankind, though 
assuming the different forms of capitalism 
and communism, agrees in material 
content and fails to deal with the problems 
of mankind. 
لا قفخأ دقلف نلأ ؛ةيرشبلل ةداعسلا قيقحت يف نافرط
 ثيح نم تفلتخا نإو سانلل اهامدق يتلا ةركفلا
 يف تقتلا اهنأ لاإ ةيعويشو ةيلامسأر ىلإ لكشلا
 لكاشم جلاع نع ترصقو يداملا نومضملا
.ةيناسنلإا 
115 
Neither western capitalism nor eastern 
socialism has succeeded in establishing 
the rules of the just and serene society, nor 
have they been able to establish a balance 
between the individual and society or 
between human nature and public interest. 
 ةيقرشلا ةيكارتشلاا لاو ةيبرغلا ةيلامسأرلا لاف
ئمطملاو لداعلا عمتجملا دعاوق ءاسرإ يف اتحجن ،ن
 درــفــلا نيب نزاوتلا اققحت نأ اتعاطتسا لاو
 ةحلصملاو ةيرشبلا ةرطفلا نيب لاو عمتجملاو
.ةماعلا 
116 
The two sides have mutually recognized 
this fact and have realized that there is no 
more place for ideological struggle 
between the two camps. 
افرطلا لصوتو هذهب لدابتم فارتعاو رارقإ ىلإ ن
 عارصلل لاجم نم دعي مل هنأ اكردأو ،ةقيقحلا
...نيركسعملا نيب اميف يركفلا 
117 
They have both turned to struggle for 
influence and interest, hiding from public 
opinion behind the mask of disagreement 
on principles. 
 ًايوس افطعناو  حلاصملاو ذوفنلا لوح عارصلا ىلإ
 يف فلاتخلاا ءارو ماعلا يأرلا مامأ نيرتتسم
.ئدابملا 
118 
In the light of this understanding, we 
believe that the ideological struggle 
between the two camps has been folded 
forever and been replaced by the struggle 
for influence and interests between the 
countries of the arrogant world that are led 
today by America and the Soviet Union. 
 يركفلا عارصلا نأ ىرن اننإف مهفلا اذه ءوض يفو
 عارص هلحم لحو ،ًايئاهن يوط دق نيركسعملا نيب
 يتلا ربكتسملا ملاعلا لود نيب ذوفنلاو حلاصملا
 اهمعزتي.يتييفوسلا داحتلااو اكيرمأ مويلا 
119 
Consequently, the downtrodden countries 
have become the struggle's bone of 
contention and the downtrodden peoples 
have become its fuel. 
 يه تتاب ةفعضتسملا نادلبلاف ساسلأا اذه ىلعو
 تحبصأ ةفعضتسملا بوعشلاو ،عارصلا مكحم
قو.هدو 
120 
While we consider the struggle between 
the two superpowers a natural outcome of 
the material content that motivates each of 
them, we cannot agree to have this 
struggle conducted at the expense of the 
interests of the downtrodden and their 
 ًايعيبط ًاجتان نيرابجلا نيب عارصلا ربتعن ذ إ نحنو
 لا اننأ لاإ .. امهنم ًلاك عفدي يذلا يداملا نومضملل
 حلاصم باسح ىلع عارصلا اذهب لبقن نأ عيطتسن
 يف لخدتو عامطأ لك هجاونو مهدلابو نيفعضتسملا
وؤش.انن 
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countries and we oppose to any ambition 
and interference in our affairs. 
While denouncing America's crimes in 
Vietnam, Iran, Nicaragua, Grenada, 
Palestine, Lebanon, and other countries, 
we also denounce the Soviet invasion of 
Afghanistan, the intervention in Iran's 
affairs, the support for Iraqi aggression, 
and so forth. 
 مانتيف يف اكيرمأ مئارج هيف نيدن يذلا تقولا يفو
 نانبلو نيطسلفو ادانيرغو اوغاراكينو ناريإو
يتييفوسلا وزغلا ًاضيأ نيدن ...امهريغو 
 معدو ،ناريإ نوؤش يف لخدتلاو ،ناتسناغفلأ
.كلذ ريغو يقارعلا ناودعلا 
122 
In Lebanon and in the Palestine area, we 
are mainly concerned with confronting 
America because it is the party with the 
greatest influence among the countries of 
world arrogance, and also with confronting 
Israel, the ulcerous growth of world 
Zionism. 
 نوينعم اننإف ،نيطسلف ةقطنمو نانبل يف امأ
كشب اكيرمأ ةهجاومب ذوفنلا ةبحاص اهنلأ ؛يسيئر ل
 ليئارسإ كلذكو ،يملاعلا رابكتسلاا لود نيب ىوقلأا
ةيملاعلا ةينويهصلا ةبيبر… 
123 
Therefore, we are concerned with 
confronting America's allies in NATO who 
have gotten embroiled in helping America 
against the area's peoples. 
مث نمو  لود نم اكيرمأ ءافلح ةهجاومب نوينعم اننإف
 ةدعاسم يف تطروت يتلا يسلطلأا لامش فلح
..ةقطنملا بوعش دض اكيرمأ 
124 
We warn the countries that have not gotten 
involved yet against being dragged into 
serving American interests at the expense 
of our umma's freedom and interests. 
 ىلإ رارجنلاا نم دعب طروتت مل يتلا لودلا رذحنو
 انتمأ ةيرح باسح ىلع ةيكيرملأا حلاصملا ةمدخ
 .اهحلاصمو 
125 
Israel Must Be Wiped Out of Existence دوجولا نم لوزت نأ بجي ليئارسإ 126 
As for Israel, we consider it the American 
spearhead in our Islamic world. It is a 
usurping enemy that must be fought until 
the usurped right is returned to its owners. 
 يف ةيكيرملأا ةبرحلا سأر اهربتعنف ليئارسإ امأ
 هتبراحم بجت بصاغ ودع يهو يملاسلإا انملاع
.هلهأ ىلإ بوصغملا قحلا دوعي ىتح 
127 
This enemy poses a great danger to our 
future generations and to the destiny of our 
umma, especially since it embraces a 
settlement oriented and expansionist idea 
that it has already begun to apply in 
occupied Palestine and it is extending and 
expanding to build Greater Israel, from the 
Euphrates to the Nile. 
 انلايجأ لبقتسم ىلع ًاريبك ًارطخ لكشي ودعلا اذهو
 ةيناطيتسا ةركف لمحي هنأ ًاصوصخ انتمأ ريصمو
 لواحيو ةلتحملا نيطسلف يف اهقيبطت أدب ةيعسوت
 نم ىربكلا ليئارسإ ةلود ينبيل عسوتلاو ددمتلا
.لينلا ىلإ تارفلا 
128 
Our struggle with usurping Israel emanates 
from an ideological and historical 
awareness that this Zionist entity is 
aggressive in its origins and structure and 
is built on usurped land and at the expense 
of the rights of a Muslim people. 
 مهف نم قلطني ةبصاغلا ليئارسإ عم انعارصو
يكلا اذه نأ هادؤم يخيراتو يدئاقع ينويهصلا نا
 ضرأ ىلع مئاقو هنيوكتو هتأشن يف يناودع
.ملسم بعش قوقح باسح ىلعو ةبوصغم 
129 
Therefore, our confrontation of this entity 
must end with its obliteration from 
existence. This is why we do not recognize 
any ceasefire agreement, any truce, or any 
separate or non-separate peace treaty with 
it. 
 هتلازإب يهتنت نأ بجي نايكلا اذهل انتهجاوم نإف اذلو
 قافتا يأب فرتعن لا اننإف انه نمو ،دوجولا نم
 ،هعم ةنده ةيقافتا ةيأ وأ ،هدض رانلا قلاطإ فقول
.ةدرفنم ريغ وأ ةدرفنم ملاس ةدهاعم ةيأ وأ 
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We condemn strongly all the plans for 
mediation between us and Israel and we 
consider the mediators a hostile party 
because their mediation will only serve to 
acknowledge the legitimacy of the Zionist 
occupation of Palestine. 
 نيبو اننيب ةطاسولا عيراشم لك ةدشب نيدنو
بتعنو ،ليئارسإ نلأ ً؛ايداعم ًافرط ءاطسولا ر
 للاتحلاا ةيعرشب رارقلإا لاإ مدخت نل مهتطاسو
.نيطسلفل ينويهصلا 
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Therefore, we reject the Camp David 
treaty, the (King) Fahd plan, the Fez plan, 
the Reagan plan, the Brezhnev plan, the 
French-Egyptian plan, and any plan 
including even tacit recognition of the 
Zionist entity. 
 ،ديفيد بماك ةدهاعم ضفرن ساسلأا اذه ىلعو
 عورشمو ،ساف عورشمو ،دهف عورشم ضفرنو
 ـ يسنرفلا عورشملاو ،فينجيرب عورشمو ،ناغير
 ًاينمض ولو ًافارتعا نمضتي عورشم لكو ،يرصملا
.ينويهصلا نايكلاب 
132 
We underline in this regard our 
condemnation of all the deviant countries 
and organizations that chase after 
capitulationist solutions with the enemy 
breathlessly and that agree to "barter land 
for peace." 
 تامظنملاو لودلا لكل انتنادإ قايسلا اذه يف لجسنو
ارو ثهلت يتلا ةفرحنملا عم ةيملاستسلاا لولحلا ء
"ملاسلاب ضرلأا ةضياقمب" لبقتو ودعلا 
133 
We consider this a betrayal of the Muslim 
Palestinian people's blood and of the 
sacred Palestinian cause. 
 ملسملا ينيطسلفلا بعشلا ءامدل ةنايخ كلذ ربتعنو
.ةسدقملا نيطسلف ةيضقلو 
134 
On the other hand, we view the recently 
voiced Jewish call for settlement in south 
Lebanon and the immigration of the 
Ethiopian Jews and others to occupied 
Palestine as a part of the expansionist 
Israeli scheme in the Islamic world and as 
an actual indicator of the danger emanating 
from the recognition of or coexistence with 
this entity. 
 تقلُطأ يتلا ةيدوهيلا ةوعدلا نإف ىرخأ ةهج نمو
 ةرجه كلذكو ،نانبل بونج يف ناطيتسلال ًاريخأ
 نيطسلف لخاد ىلإ مهريغو نييبويثلأا دوهيلا
 عورشملا نم ءزج اهنأ ىلع اهيلإ رظنن،ةلتحملا
 رشؤمو ،يملاسلإا ملاعلا يف يعسوتلا يليئارسلإا
 اذهب فارتعلاا نم مجانلا رطخلا ىلع يلعف نايكلا
.هعم شياعتلا وأ 
135 
Escalating Islamic Resistance ةدعاصتملا ةيملاسلإا ةمواقملا 136 
When speaking of usurping Israel, we must 
pause before the phenomenon of Islamic 
resistance that sprang from the occupied 
Lebanese territories to impose a new 
historic and cultural turn on the course of 
the struggle against the Zionist enemy. 
 فقوتن نأ دب لا ةبصاغلا ليئارسإ نع ثدحتن نيحو
 نم تقلطنا يتلا ةيملاسلإا ةمواقملا ةرهاظ دنع
 ًايخيرات ًلاوحت ضرفتل ةلتحملا ةينانبللا قطانملا
ودعلا دض عارصلا ىرجم ىلع ًاديدج ًايراضحو 
.ينويهصلا 
137 
The honourable Islamic resistance that has 
inscribed and continues to inscribe the 
most magnificent sagas against the Zionist 
invasion forces; that has destroyed by the 
faith of its mujāhidīn the myth of invincible 
Israel; that has been able to place the 
usurping entity into a real dilemma as a 
result of the daily military, economic, and 
human attrition it inflicts on this entity, 
forcing its leaders to acknowledge the 
severe resistance they face at the hands of 
the Muslims. 
لاسلإا ةمواقملاف لازت لاو ترطس يتلا ةفرشملا ةيم
 وزغلا تاوق دض تلاوطبلاو محلاملا عورأ
 ةروــطسأ اهيدهاجم ناــميإب تمطحو ،ينويهصلا
 نايكلا عقوت نأ تعاطتساو ،رهقت لا يتلا ليئارسإ
 فازنتسلاا ءارج نم يقيقح قزأم يف بصاغلا
 هتداق رطضا ًايداصتقاو ًايرشبو ًايركسع هل يمويلا
ب اوفرتعي نأ يديأ ىلع اهنوقلي يتلا ةهجاوملا ةواسق
.نيملسملا 
138 
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This Islamic resistance must continue, 
grow, and escalate, with God's help, and 
must receive from all Muslims in all parts of 
the world utter support, aid, backing, and 
participation so that we may be able to 
uproot this cancerous germ and obliterate it 
from existence. 
 ومنتو لصاوتت نأ دب لا ةيملاسلإا ةمواقملا هذه
 نيملسملا نم ىقلت نأو ـ ىلاعت ـ الله نوعب دعاصتتو
 دييأتلاو معدلا لك ملاعلا راطقأ ةفاك يف ًاعيمج
 ثتجن نأ عيطتسن ىتح ةكراشملاو ةدناسملاو
لا ةموثرجلا.دوجولا نم اهعلتقنو ةيناطرس 
139 
While underlining the Islamic character of 
this resistance, we do so out of 
compatibility with its reality, which is clearly 
Islamic in motive, objective, course, and 
depth of confrontation. This does not at all 
negate its patriotism, but confirms it. On 
the contrary, if this resistance's Islamic 
character were effaced, its patriotism would 
become extremely fragile. 
 كلذ نوكي امنإف اهتيملاسإ ديكأت ىلع رصن ذإو
 هنأ ًاحضاو ودبي يذلا اهعقاو عم انم ًاماجسنا
فدهلاو عفادلا يف يملاسإ  قمعو كلسملاو
 ..اهدكؤي لب ًادبأ اهتينطو يغلي لا اذهو ..ةهجاوملا
 اهتينطو نإف اهتيملاسإ تسمط ول امم سكعلا ىلع
 .ريبك دح ىلإ ةشه حبصت 
140 
Appeal for Broad Islamic Participation ةعساو ةيملاسإ ةكراشم لجأ نم ءادن 141 
We take this opportunity to address a warm 
appeal to all the Muslim sons in the world, 
we call them to share with their brothers in 
Lebanon the honour of fighting the 
occupying Zionists, 
 ءانبأ ةفاك ىلإ ًاراح ًاءادن هجونل ةصرفلا زهتنن اننإ
 ةكراشم ىلإ هللاخ نم مهوعدن ملاعلا يف نيملسملا
نبل يف مهناوخإ ةنياهصلا دض لاتقلا فرشب نا
،نيلتحملا 
142 
either directly or by supporting and 
assisting the mujāhidīn, because fighting 
Israel is the responsibility of all Muslims in 
all parts of the world and not only the 
responsibility of the sons of Jebel ʿĀmil and 
Western al-Biqʿa. 
 نيدهاجملا معد للاخ نم وأ ةرشابم امإ
 ةيلوؤسم يه ليئارسإ ةلتاقم نأ كلذ .مهتدعاسمو
 تسيلو قطانملاو راطقلأا ةفاك يف نيملسملا لك
.مهدحو يبرغلا عاقبلاو لماع لبج ءانبأ ةيلوؤسم 
143 
With the blood of its martyrs and the jihād 
of its heroes, the Islamic resistance has 
been able to force the enemy for the first 
time in the history of the conflict against it 
to make a decision to retreat and withdraw 
from Lebanon without any American or 
other influence. 
 اهئادهش ءامدب ةيملاسلإا ةمواقملا تعاطتسا دقل
داهجو  خيرات يف ةرم لولأو ودعلا مغرت نأ اهلاطبأ
عجارتلاب رارق ذاختا ىلع هدض عارصلا  باحسنلااو
،هريغ وأ يكيرمأ ريثأت يأ نود نانبل نم 
144 
On the contrary, the Israeli withdrawal 
decision has revealed real American worry 
and has formed a historic turning point in 
the course of the struggle against the 
usurping Zionists. 
 باحسنلاا رارق نإف ً؛امامت سكعلا ىلع لب
 ةطقن لكشو ًايقيقح ًايكيرمأ ًاقلق رهظأ يليئارسلإا
 ةنياهصلا دض عارصلا ىرجم يف ةيخيرات فاطعنا
 .نيبصاغلا 
145 
Through their Islamic resistance, the 
mujāhidīn -the women with rocks and 
boiling oil for their weapons, the children 
with their shouts and their bare fists for 
their weapons, the old men with their weak 
bodies and their thick sticks for their 
weapons, and the youth with their rifles and 
their firm and faithful will for their weapons; 
have all proven that, if the umma is allowed 
نودهاجملا تبثأو… ةيملاسلإا مهتمواقم للاخ نم
 ةراجحلا اهحلاس ثيح ءاسنلا اهيف تكراش يتلا
 خارصلا مهحلاس ثيح لافطلأاو ،يلغملا تيزلاو
 دسجلا مهحلاس ثيح خويشلاو ،ةيراعلا تاضبقلاو
 مهحلاس ثيح بابشلاو ..ةظيلغلا اصعلاو فيعضلا
يمج ءلاؤه :ةنمؤملا ةبلصلا ةدارلإاو ةيقدنبلا ًاع
 اهتيرحب اهرمأ ريدت تكِرُت ام اذإ ةملأا نأ اوتبثأ
 نم مهوتملا ريغتو تازجعملا عنصت نأ ىلع ةرداق
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to manage its affairs freely, it is capable of 
making miracles and of changing the 
imaginary fates. 
.رادقلأا 
The Governmental Politics of 
Avariciousness and Treasonous 
Negotiation 
ينايخلا ضوافتلاو يموكحلا قازترلاا ةسايس 147 
Let us pause a little before the government 
parades that emerge seasonally in an 
attempt to mislead the people into believing 
that the government supports the 
resistance against the occupation to 
declare clearly: 
 يتلا ةيموكحلا تاضارعتسلاا دنع ًلايلق فقوتنو
وت نأ ةلواحم مساوملا يف زربت ةكراشمب سانلا مه
 نلعنل للاتحلاا دض ةمواقملا معد يف مكحلا
:حوضوب 
148 
Our people have come to loathe verbal and 
media support and to despise those who 
offer it. If some statements have been 
issued by some pillars of the existing 
regime, let nobody imagine that the 
masses are unaware of the fact that these 
statements do not represent the position of 
the entire regime, especially since the 
regime is not about to throw its army into 
the battle to share the honour of liberation. 
عش تاب يملاكلاو يملاعلإا معدلا نأ هجمي انب
 تاحيرصتلا ضعب تردص نإو ..هباحصأ رقتحيو
 نأ دحأ نمهوتي لاف ،مئاقلا مكحلا ناكرأ ضعب نع
 لثمت لا تاحيرصتلا هذه نأ نع ةلفغ يف ريهامجلا
 يف سيل مكحلا نإو ًاصوصخ هتمرب مكحلا فقوم
 يف ةكراشملا فرش لانيل هشيج جزي نأ دراو
.ريرحتلا 
149 
As for the (regime's) financial support for 
the resistance, it is insignificant and it has 
not reached the mujāhidīn in the form of 
weapons, munitions, combat costs, and so 
forth. 
 لصي مل ذإ ؛ةميق اذ سيلف ةمواقملل يلاملا معدلا امأ
 لاتق تاقفنو ةريخذو ًاحلاس نيدهاجملا يديأ ىلإ
ش امو.ههبا 
150 
Our people reject the policy of 
avariciousness at the expense of the 
resistance. The day will come when all 
those who have traded in the blood of our 
heroic martyrs and who have glorified 
themselves at the expense of the 
mujāhidīn’ s wounds will be judged. 
 باسح ىلع قازترلاا ةسايس ضفري انبعش نإو
 اورجات نيذلا لك هيف مكاحي موي يتأيسو ،ةمواقملا
 ىلع ًاداجمأ مهسفنلأ اونبو لاطبلأا ءادهشلا ءامدب
.نيدهاجملا حورج باسح 
151 
We cannot but stress that the policy of 
negotiating with the enemy is high treason 
against the resistance, which the regime 
claims to support and aid; and that the 
government’s determination to enter into 
negotiations with the enemy was nothing 
but a plot aimed at recognizing the 
legitimacy of the Zionist occupation and 
giving it privileges for the crimes it has 
committed against the downtrodden in 
Lebanon. 
 عم ضوافتلا ةسايس نأب دكؤن نأ لاإ اننكمي لاو
 ماظنلا يعدي يتلا ةمواقملل ىربك ةنايخ يهو ،ودعلا
 لوخد ىلع مكحلا رارصإ نإو ،اهدييأتو اهمعد
 فدهتست ةرماؤم لاإ نكي مل ودعلا عم تاضوافملا
 هحنمو ينويهصلا للاتحلاا ةيعرشب فارتعلاا
ملا قحب مئارج نم هبكترا ام ىلع ًازايتما نيفعضتس
.نانبل يف 
152 
We add that the Islamic resistance, which 
declared its refusal to abide by any results 
emanating from the negotiations, reaffirms 
that the jihad will continue until the Zionists 
withdraw from the occupied territories as a 
 يتلا ةيملاسلإا ةمواقملا نإ ..ًادارطتسا لوقنو
 نع ردصت ةجيتن ةيأب مازتللاا اهضفر تنلعأ
 ءلاج ىتح داهجلا رارمتسا ىلع دكؤت ،ت اضوافملا
 نم مهتلازلإ ةمدقمك ةلتحملا قطانملا نع ةنياهصلا
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prelude to their obliteration from existence. .دوجولا 
International Forces and Suspect Role هوبشملا رودلاو ةيلودلا تاوقلا 154 
The international forces that world 
arrogance is trying to deploy in the 
Muslims' territories from which the enemy 
will withdraw so that they may form a 
security barrier obstructing the resistance 
movement and protecting the security of 
Israel and of its invasion forces are 
collusive and rejected forces. 
 يملاعلا رابكتسلاا ىعسي يتلا ةيلودلا تاوقلا نإو
 يتلا قطانملا يف نيملسملا يضارأ ىلع اهللاحلإ
 ًاينمأ ًازجاح لكشت ثيحب ودعلا اهنم بحسنيس
إ نمأ ظفحيو ةمواقملا كرحت لقرعي اهتاوقو ليئارس
...ةضوفرمو ةئطاوتم تاوق يه ةيزاغلا 
155 
We may be forced to deal with them 
exactly as we deal with the Zionist invasion 
forces. 
Let all know that the commitments of the 
imposed Phalangist regime are not in any 
way binding to the Islamic resistance 
mujāhidīn. Other countries must think 
carefully before they get immersed in the 
swamp in which Israel has drowned. 
 وزغلا تاوق لماعن امك اهتلماعم ىلإ رطضن دقو
 نأ عيمجلا ملعيلو .ءاوس دح ىلع ينويهصلا
 يأب مزلت لا ضورفملا يبئاتكلا ماظنلا تامازتلا
 نم لكش ،ةيملاسلإا ةمواقملا يدهاجم لاكشلأا
 يف طروتت نأ لبق ًايلم ركفت نأ لودلا ىلعو
.ليئارسإ هيف تقرغ يذلا عقنتسملا 
156 
Defeatist Arab Regimes يبرعلا مازهنلاا ةمظنأ 157 
As for the Arab regimes falling over 
themselves for reconciliation with the 
Zionist enemy, they are decrepit regimes 
incapable of keeping up with the umma's 
ambitions and aspirations 
 ودعلا عم حلصلا ىلع ةتفاهتملا ةيبرعلا ةمظنلأا امأو
 ةبكاوم نع ةرصاقو ةزجاع ةمظنأ يهف ينويهصلا
،اهتاعلطتو ةملأا حومط 
158 
and they cannot think of confronting the 
Zionist entity usurping Palestine because 
these regimes came into existence under a 
colonialist guardianship that played the 
major role in the creation of these eroded 
regimes. 
 ينويهصلا نايكلا ةهجاومب ركفت نأ عيطتست لاو
 ةياصو لظ يف تأشن اهنلأ ؛نيطسلفل بصاغلا
تسا هذه نيوكت يف ربكلأا رودلا اهل ناك ةيرامع
.ةئرتهملا ةمظنلأا 
159 
Some reactionary rulers, especially in the 
oil countries, are not reluctant to turn their 
countries into military bases for America 
and Britain and are not ashamed to rely on 
foreign experts, appointing them to top 
official positions. 
 لودلا يف ًاصوصخ نييعجرلا ماكحلا ضعب نإ
 دعاوق مهنادلب نم اولعجي نأ نوعروتي لا ،ةيطفنلا
 نم نولجخي لاو ،ايناطيربو اكيرملأ ةيركسع
 بصانم يف مهنونيعي بناجأ ءاربخ ىلع دامتعلاا
،ايلع ةيمسر 
160 
They are implementing the policies set for 
them by the White House circles to 
smuggle their countries' wealth and divide 
it among the imperialists by various means. 
 نم "ضيبلأا تيبلا" رئاود مهل هررقت ام نوذفنيو
 نيرمعتسملا ىلع اهعيزوتو تاورثلا بيرهت ةسايس
.ىتش بيلاسأب 
161 
Some of them claim to be protectors of the 
Islamic sharīʿa so that they may cover up 
their treason and may justify their 
submission to America's will while, at the 
same time, considering the entry of a 
single revolutionary Islamic book into their 
country something banned and prohibited. 
 يطغيل ةيملاسلإا ةعيرشلا يماح هنأ مهضعب يعديو
 تقولا يفو ،اكيرمأ ةدارلإ هملاستسا رربيلو هتنايخ
 ىلإ دحاو يروث يملاسإ باتك روبع ربتعي هسفن
.ًاعونممو ًامرحم ًارمأ هدلاب 
162 
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As a result of the defeatist policy followed 
by these reactionary regimes vis-a-vis 
Israel; the latter has been able to persuade 
many of them that it has become a fait 
accompli that cannot go unrecognized, not 
to mention the necessity of acknowledging 
the need to ensure its security. 
ذه اهعبتت يتلا مازهنلاا ةسايسل ةجيتنو ةمظنلأا ه
 ةريخلأا هذه تعاطتسا دقف ،ليئارسإ هاجت ةيعجرلا
 لا ،ًاعقاو ًارمأ تحبصأ اهنأب اهنم نيريثكلا عنقت نأ
 رارقلإا نع ًلاضف اهب فارتعلاا مدعل لاجم
.اهنمأ ريفوتب مازتللاا ةرورضب 
163 
This defeatist policy is what encouraged 
the buried al-Sadat to commit his high 
treason and proceed to conclude peace 
with Israel and sign the humiliation treaty 
with it. 
 تاداسلا تعجش يتلا يه هذه مازهنلاا ةسايسو
 ىلإ ردابيف ىربكلا هتنايخ بكتري نأ روبقملا
.اهعم لذلا ةدهاعم عيقوتو ليئارسإ ةحلاصم 
164 
The policy of defeatism is what is now 
governing the movement of the Gulf 
Cooperation Council, the Jordan-Egypt 
axis, Iraq, and the Arafat organization. 
 نواعتلا سلجم مكحت يتلا يه هذه مازهنلاا ةسايسو
 ةمظنملاو قارعلاو رصم ـ ندرلأا روحمو يجيلخلا
.ةيتافرعلا 
165 
The defeatist policy toward America is what 
is directing the position of the reactionary 
rulers toward the war of aggression 
imposed on the Islamic Republic of Iran 
and is standing behind the boundless 
financial, economic, and military support for 
the agent Saddam out of the belief that the 
Zionized al-Tikriti regime can destroy the 
Islamic Revolution and can prevent the 
dissemination of its revolutionary blaze and 
concepts. 
 فقوم هجوت يتلا يه اكيرمأ مامأ مازهنلاا ةسايسو
 ةضورفملا ةيناودعلا برحلا نم نييعجرلا ماكحلا
 ءارو فقتو ،ناريإ يف ملاسلإا ةيروهمج ىلع
 ىوتسم ىلع ،ليمعلا مادصل دودحملا ريغ معدلا
 مهنم ًانظ يركسعلاو يداصتقلاا نيومتلاو ليومتلا
ي نأ هنكمي نيهصتملا يتيركتلا ماظنلا نأ ىلع يضق
 يروثلا اهجهو راشتنا نم عنميو ةيملاسلإا ةروثلا
.اهميهافمو 
166 
This defeatist policy is what motivates the 
reactionary regimes to keep their peoples 
ignorant, to water down and dissolve their 
Islamic identity, and to suppress in their 
countries any Islamic movement opposed 
to America and its allies. 
 ةمظنلأا عفدت يتلا يه هذه مازهنلاا ةسايسو
 بيوذتو مهعييمتو سانلا ليهجت ىلإ ةيعجرلا
 يملاسإ كرحت يأ عمقو ةيملاسلإا مهتيصخش
،مهدلاب يف اهئافلحو اكيرملأ ضهانم 
167 
It is also the policy that causes these 
regimes to fear the awakening of the 
downtrodden and to prevent their 
involvement in political affairs, because of 
the big danger posed to the survival of 
these regimes by awareness on the part of 
peoples of the corruption of their 
governments and of their suspect ties and 
by sympathy from these peoples for the 
liberation movements in all parts of the 
Islamic world and of the world generally. 
 ةظقي نم فوخلا ىلإ اهعفدت يتلا يه اهنأ امك
 ةسايسلا نوؤش يف لخدتلا نم مهعنمو نيفعضتسملا
 ةمظنلأا كلت ءاقب ىلع ريبك رطخ نم كلذ يف امل
 اهتاموكح داسف ىلع بوعشلا يعو نع جتان
 بوعشلا هذه فطاعت نعو ،ةهوبشملا اهتاطابتراو
 يملاسلإا ملاعلا ءاحنأ ةفاك يف ررحتلا تاكرح عم
.ملاعلاو 
168 
We find in the reactionary Arab regimes a 
barrier blocking the development of the 
awareness and unity of the Islamic peoples 
and we consider these regimes responsible 
for obstructing the attempts to keep the 
wound open and the struggle continued 
 لكشي ام ةيعجرلا ةيبرعلا ةمظنلأا يف دجن اننإ
 ةيملاسلإا بوعشلا يعو يمانت مامأ ًازجاح
 تلاواحملا ةلقرع نع ةلوؤسم اهربتعنو ،اهتدحوو
 عارصلاو ًاحوتفم حرجلا ءاقبإ فدهتست يتلا
169 
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against the Zionist enemy. .ينويهصلا ودعلا عم ًارمتسم 
We have great hope in the Muslim peoples 
that clearly have begun to complain in most 
of the Islamic countries and have been 
able to infiltrate into the world of revolutions 
to learn from its experiences, especially 
from the triumphant Islamic Revolution. 
ةملسملا بوعشلاب ريبك انلمأو  يدبت تأدب يتلا
 ،ةيملاسلإا دلابلا مظعم يف حوضوب اهرمذت
 نم ديفتستل تاروثلا ملاع ىلإ للستت نأ تعاطتساو
...ةرفاظلا ةيملاسلإا ةروثلا نم ًاصوصخو اهبراجت 
170 
The day will come when all these brittle 
regimes will collapse under the blows of 
the downtrodden, as the throne of the 
tyrant in Iran has already collapsed. 
 ةشهلا ةمظنلأا هذه هيف طقاستت يذلا مويلا يتأيسو
 شرع طقاست امك نيفعضتسملا تاضبق مامأ
.ناريإ يف توغاطلا 
171 
While waging a ferocious battle against 
America and Israel and their schemes in 
the area, we cannot but warn these 
regimes of working against the umma’s 
rising tide of resistance to imperialism and 
Zionism. These regimes must learn from 
the Islamic resistance in Lebanon great 
lessons in determination on fighting the 
enemy and on defeating it. 
دب لاو  اكيرمأ دض ةسرش ةكرعم ضوخن نحنو
 رذحن نأ لاإ ،ةقطنملا يف امهتاططخمو ليئارسإو
 سكاعملا لكشلاب لمعلا نم ةيعجرلا ةمظنلأا هذه
 رامعتسلال مواقملاو ضهانلا ةملأا رايتل
 ةمواقملا نم ملعتت نأ اهيلعو ،ةينويهصلاو
 ىلع رارصلإا يف ةريبك ًاسورد نانبل يف ةيملاسلإا
دعلا ةلتاقم.هب ةميزهلا قاحلإ ىتح و 
172 
We also warn these regimes against 
getting involved in new submission plans 
and in aggressive schemes aimed against 
the young Islamic revolution because such 
involvement will lead the leaders of these 
regimes to the same fate faced by Anwar 
al-Sadat and by Nurī al-Sʿaīd [last Iraqi 
prime minister under the monarchy] and 
others before them. 
 عيراشمب طروتلا نم ةمظنلأا هذه رذحن اننأ امك
 ةروثلا فدهتست ةيناودع عيراشمبو ،ةديدج ملاستسا
 هذه باطقأب لوؤيس كلذ نلأ ..ةيتفلا ةيملاسلإا
ةمظنلأا  تاداسلا رونأ هاقلا يذلا ريصملا سفن ىلإ
.امهريغو ديعسلا يرون هلبق نمو 
173 
World Front for Downtrodden نيفعضتسملل ةيملاع ةهبج 174 
We address all the Arab and Islamic 
peoples to declare to them that the 
Muslims' experience in Islamic Iran left no 
one any excuse since it proved beyond all 
doubt that bare chests motivated by faith 
are capable, with the great God's help, of 
breaking the iron and oppression of 
tyrannical regimes. 
 نلعنل ةيملاسلإاو ةيبرعلا بوعشلا ةفاك ىلإ هجوتنو
لإا ناريإ يف نيملسملا ةبرجت نأ اهل قبت مل ملاس
 نأ كشلل ًلااجم عدي لا امب تتبثأ نيح ،دحلأ ًارذع
 ةرداق ناميلإا ةدارإب ةعوفدملا ةيراعلا رودصلا
 ةمظنلأا ديدح لك مطحت نأ ريبكلا الله نوعب
.اهتوربجو ةيتوغاطلا 
175 
Therefore, we urge the peoples to unite 
their ranks, to chart their objectives, and to 
rise to break the shackle that curbs their 
will and to overthrow the agent 
governments that oppress them. 
 مسرتو اهفوفص دحوتل بوعشلا هذه وعدن اننإف اذل
 ،اهتدارإ قوطي يذلا ديقلا رسكل ضهنتو اهفادهأ
.اهيلع طلستت يتلا ةليمعلا تاموكحلا طقستو 
176 
We strongly urge on all the downtrodden of 
the world the need to form a world front 
that encompasses all their liberation 
movements so that they may establish full 
and comprehensive coordination among 
 ةرورضب ملاعلا يف نيفعضتسملا عيمج ىلع حلنو
 مهتاكرح ةفاك مضت مهل ةيملاع ةهبج ليكشت
 ًلاماك ًاقيسنت اهنيب اميف قيسنتلا فدهب ةيررحتلا
 زيكرتلاو اهكرحتل ةيلاعفلا نيمأت لجأ نم ًلاماش
177 
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these movements in order to achieve 
effectiveness in their activity and to focus 
on their enemies' weak points. 
.اهئادعأ فعض طاقن ىلع 
Considering that the imperialist world with 
all its states and regimes is uniting today in 
fighting the downtrodden, then the 
downtrodden must get together to confront 
the plots of the forces of arrogance in the 
world. 
 هتمظنأو هلود ةفاكب رمعتسملا ملاعلا ناك اذإف
 ىلع نإف ...نيفعضتسملا برح ىلع مويلا نوعمتجي
ملا ىوق تارماؤم ةهجاومل اوعمتجي نأ نيفعضتس
.ملاعلا يف رابكتسلاا 
178 
All the downtrodden peoples, especially the 
Arab and Muslim peoples, must realize that 
Islam alone is capable of being the idea to 
resist aggression, since experiences have 
proven that all the positivist ideas have 
been folded forever in the interest of 
American-Soviet détente and other forms 
of détente. 
 ًاصوصخو ةفعضتسملا بوعشلا ةفاك ىلعو
 ملاسلإا نأب كردت نأ ةيملاسلإاو ةيبرعلا بوعشلا
 امدعب ناودعلل مواقملا ركفلا نوكيل لهؤملا وه هدحو
اجتلا تتبثأ تيوط دق ةيعضولا راكفلأا لك نأ بر
 تايفوسلا عم يكيرملأا قفاوتلا ةحلصمل دبلأا ىلإ
.مهريغو 
179 
It is time for us to realize that all the 
western ideas concerning human origin 
and nature cannot respond to his 
aspirations or rescue him from the 
darkness of misguidedness and jāhiliyya. 
 نع ةيبرغلا راكفلأا لك نأ كردنل ناولأا نآ دقو
 بيجتست نأ نكمي لا هترطفو ناسنلإا ةلاصأ
..ةيلهاجلاو للاضلا تاملظ نم هذقنت وأ هتاحومطل 
180 
Only Islam can bring about human 
renaissance, progress, and creativity 
because is {fuelled from a blessed olive 
tree from neither east nor west, whose oil 
almost gives light even when no fire 
touches it –light upon light- God guides 
whoever He will to His light} (Sura al-Nur: 
35) 
 هعادبإو همدقتو ناسنلإا ضوهن ققحي ملاسلإا هدحو
 ُةّرّجّش نٌم  دّقو ي{ هنلأ  لاو ُة ٌَّيقًرّش َّلا ُةّنو تًيّز ُةّكّراّبَم
 ِروَن ِراّن  هًسّسًمّت ًّمل ًّولو  ءيٌض ي اّه تًيّز  داّكّي ُة َّيٌبًرّغ
 :رونلا( }  ءاّشّي نّم ٌهٌرو ٌنل  َّالله يٌدًهّي ُرو ن "ّىلّع31.) 
181 
God Is with Unity of Muslims  نيملسملا ةدحو يف الله 182 
Muslim peoples, beware the malicious 
imperialist fitna (sedition) that seeks to 
divide your unity, to sow division among 
you, and to arouse Sunni and Shiʿī 
sectarian fundamentalisms. 
 ةنتفلا نم يرذاح ةملسملا بوعشلا اهتيأ اي
كتدحو قيزمت فدهتست يتلا ةثيبخلا ةيرامعتسلاا 
 ةيبهذملا تايبصعلا ريثتو كنيب اميف قاقشلا عرزتل
 .ةيعيشلاو ةينسلا 
183 
Know that colonialism was able to control 
the wealth of the Muslims only after it 
divided and fragmented their ranks, 
instigating the Sunnis against the Shiʿites 
and the Shiʿites against the Sunnis, 
 ىلع رطيسي نأ عاطتسا ام رامعتسلاا نأ يملعاو
 مهفوفص يف ىعس نأ دعب لاإ نيملسملا تاورث
 ضرحيو ،ةعيشلا ىلع ةنسلا ريثي ..ًاقيرفتو ًاقيزمت
،ةنسلا ىلع ةعيشلا 
184 
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entrusting this task afterward to its agents 
among the mediators of the countries, to 
evil ʿulamāʾ at times, and to leaders 
(zuʿamāt) that imposed it on the neck of  
slaves. 
 ماكح نم هئلامع ىلإ دعب اميف ةمهملا هذه لكوأو
 تاماعزلا نمو ًانايحأ ءوسلا ءاملع نمو ًانيح دلابلا
.دابعلا باقر ىلع اهطلس يتلا 
185 
God is with the unity of the Muslims and 
because is the rock on which the schemes 
of the arrogant are smashed and the 
hammer that crushes the plots of the 
oppressors. 
 يتلا ةرخصلا اهنإف ... نيملسملا ةدحو يف َللهاف
 يتلا ةقرطملاو نيربكتسملا ططخ اهيلع مطحتت
.نيملاظلا تارماؤم قحست 
186 
Do not allow the policy of "divide and rule" 
to be practiced in your countries and fight 
this policy by rallying behind the venerable 
Qurʾān: 
 مكدلاب يف سَرامت نأ "دست قرف" ةسايسل اوعَدَت لاف
.ميركلا نآرقلا لوح فافتللااب اهومواقو 
187 
{Hold fast, to God’s rope all together and 
do not spit into factions" (al ‘Imran: 103) 
"As for those who have divided their 
religion and broken up into factions, have 
nothing to do with them (Prophet)"  (al 
’ nam: 159) 
"Remember God’s favour to you: you were 
enemies and then He brought your hearts 
together and you became brothers by His 
grace: you were about to fall into a pit of 
Fire and He saved you from it.} (Sura al-
ʿImrān: 103). 
 لآ( }او ق َّرّفّت لاو اْعيٌمّج الله ٌلًبّحٌب او  مٌصّتًعاو{
 :نارمع523 اْعّيٌش او ناّكو ًم  هّنيٌد او ق َّرّف ّنيٌذلا َّنإ{ .)
 :ماعنلأا( }ًم  هًنٌم ّتًسَّل518 الله ّتّمًعٌن او  ر  كًذاو{ .)
 ّنًيّب ّفَّّلأّف ْءاّدًّعأ ًم تن  ك ًذإ ًم  كًّيلّع  م تًحّبًّصأّف ًم  كٌبو ل ق
 ٌرا َّنپ ّنٌم ُةّرًف ح اّفّش "ّىلّع ًم تن  كو اْناّوًخإ ٌهٌتّمًعٌنٌب
 :نارمع لآ( }اّهًنٌم م  كّذّقّنأّف523.) 
188 
 Ulama of Islam, ملاسلإا ءاملع اي 189 
As for you, ʿulamāʾ of Islam, your 
responsibility is as big as the tragedies that 
have befallen the Muslims. 
 ًادج ةريبك مكتيلوؤسم نإف ملاسلإا ءاملع اي متنأو
...نيملسملاب لحت يتلا بئاصملا مجحب 
190 
You are best qualified to perform your duty 
of leading the umma toward Islam and of 
alerting it to the plots that its enemies are 
hatching in order to dominate it, plunder its 
wealth, and enslave it. 
 وحن ةملأا ةدايق يف هبجاوب موقي نم ريخ متنأو
 ءادعلأا هل ططخي ام ىلع اهتيعوت يفو ...ملاسلإا
..اهدابعتساو اهتاورث بهنو اهيلع ةرطيسلل 
191 
There is no doubt that you are aware that 
the Muslims look up to you in your capacity 
as bearers of the trust given by God's 
prophet (may God's peace and prayers be 
upon him) and as heirs of the prophets and 
the messengers. 
 مكيلإ نورظني نيملسملا نأ نوكردت مكنأ كش لاو
 الله لوسر نم ةناملأا ةلمح مكتفصب)هيلع الله ىلص 
ملسو(  .. نيلسرملاو ءايبنلأا ةثرو مكتفصبو 
192 
Be the hope and offer the good example by 
declaring what is right and by standing in 
the face of the oppressors and the tyrants. 
 و قحلاب ةرهاجلا يف ,ةنسحلا ةودقلا و لملأا اونوكف
,نيربجتملاو ةاغطلا هجوب فوقولا 
193 
Be the model in rising above the frippery of   ايندلا ةايحلا جراهب نع عفرتلا يف ةودقلا اونوكو 194 
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this world's life ornaments and by yearning 
for paradise and martyrdom for the sake of 
God. 
.الله ليبس يف ةداهشلاو ةنجلا ىلإ قوتلاو اهفرخزو 
You have in God's prophet a good model 
of how he fasted with the people and how 
he ate when they ate, of how he led the 
faithful in prayer, and how he led their 
ranks in the arenas of the jihad. 
 عم عوجي ناك ثيح ةنسح ةوسأ الله لوسر يف مكلو
ؤي ناكو ،سانلا عم عبشيو سانلا يف نيلصملا م
.داهجلا تاحاس يف مهفوفص مدقتيو دجسملا 
195 
He was their refuge in their hard times, he 
warmed their lives with his instructions and 
solutions, and they followed him with 
confidence and assurance. 
 هتاهيجوتب نوئفدتسي تامهملا يف مهل أجلم ناكو
لحو.نينئمطم نيقثاو هل نوداقنيو هلو 
196 
Muslim ʿulamāʾ, ...ملاسلإا ءاملع اي 197 
Imam Khomeini, the leader, has stressed 
repeatedly the need for the piousness of 
the  ʿālim and the importance of the 
integrity of himself before the others, and 
he said in several occasions: 
 ةرورض ىلع ًارارم دكأ دئاقلا ينيمخلا ماملإا نإ
 ،نيرخلآا لبق هسفن ةيكزتب همامتهاو مِلاعلا حلاص
:ماقم نم رثكأ يف لاقو 
197 
“If they find out that a ship-owner is not 
upright, they say that so and so is not 
upright and if they find that a merchant 
cheats, they say that so and so is a cheat. 
But if they find, God forbid, that a religious 
ʿālim is not upright, then they will say that 
religion is not right.” 
 ريغ توناح بحاص نأ اوفرع اذإ سانلا نإ"
 نأ اوفرع اذإو ،حلاص ريغ ًانلاف نإ نولوقيف ،حلاص
 ًارجات اذإ امأ ،شاشغ ًانلاف نإ نولوقيف ،سانلا شغي
 حلاص ريغ ـ الله حمس لا ـ نيدلا ملاع نأ اوفرع
."حلاص ريغ نيدلا نإ نولوقيس مهنإف 
198 
Muslim ʿulamāʾ, 
Because of this and other things, your 
responsibility is very heavy. 
Ask for God's help to perform this duty and 
beseech God (may He be praised, with the 
invocation Imam ʿAlī, may God be pleased 
with Him) "God, we do not ask you for a 
light burden but for strong backs." 
 نإف ...هريغو رمأ لا اذهل ...ملاسلإا ءاملع ايف
اهب مايقلا ىلع للهاب اونيعتساف ،ًادج ةريبك مكتيلوؤسم 
 هيلع( يلع ماملإا ءاعدب ـ لجو زع ـ الله اوعداو
 لب ًافيفخ ًلامح كلأسن لا انإ مهللا" :)ملاسلاو ةلاصلا
"ًايوق ًارهظ كلأسن 
199 
You will then find out that the umma is 
most responsive to your appeals, 
instructions, and leadership. Know that the 
imperialist is aware of the importance of 
your position in the umma and that this is 
why he has directed his strongest stabs to 
the hearts of the mujāhidīn ʿulamāʾ, 
 مكتاهيجوتو مكتاءادنل بيجتسم ريخ ةملأا نودجتسو
 فرع دق ةملأا يف مكتيعقوم نأ اوملعاو .مكتدايقو
تيمهأ رمعتسملا ىلإ هتانعط ىوقأ ه َّجو هنإف اذلو اه
...نيدهاجملا ءاملعلا رودص 
200 
hatching an infernal plot to conceal Imam 
al-Sayyd Musa al-Sadr when this 
imperialist felt that the he was an 
insurmountable obstacle in the face of his 
aggressive schemes, 
ناطيش ةرماؤم ربدف ىسوم ديسلا ماملإا ءافخلإ ةي
 هجو يف ءادأك ةبقع هنأ سحأ امدعب ردصلا
...ةيناودعلا هتاططخم 
201 
killing the Islamic philosopher Sheikh 
Murtaḍa Maṭary, and executing the great 
Marjʿa Ayatollah al-Sayyd Muḥammad 
Bāqir al-Ṣadr  when the imperialist felt the 
 ىضترم خيشلا يملاسلإا فوسليفلا لتقو
 الله ةيآ ريبكلا يملاسلإا عجرملا مدعأو ...يرهطم
 ةروطخب هنم سحأ ثيح ردصلا رقاب دمحم ديسلا
203 
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danger imam's stance posed a danger 
embodied in Imam Bāqir's words: "Fuse 
with Imam Khomeini as he has fused with 
Islam." 
 هدسج يذلا هفقوم ماملإا يف اوبوذ" :تاملكلا هذهب
"ملاسلإا يف باذ امك ينيمخلا 
The imperialist is lurking for every religious 
ʿālim performing his Islamic duty in the best 
manner possible. 
 هبجاوب موقي ينيد ملاع لكب رئاودلا صبرتي وه اهو
.مايق ريخ يملاسلإا 
204 
On the other hand, imperialism has been 
penetrating the Muslims with glib preachers 
who have no fear of God, who issue fatwas 
where there is no possibility to issue a 
fatwa, who sanction peace with Israel, 
prohibit fighting it, and justify the treason of 
the oppressive rulers. 
 نيملسملا قرـتخي رامعتسلاا حار ىرخأ ةيحان نـمو
 لا امب نوتفيو الله نوفاخي لا نيطلاسلل ظاعوـب
 ليئارسإ عم حلصلا نوزيجيف ىوتفلل هيف لاجم
.نيملاظلا ماكحلا ةنايخ نورربيو اهلاتق نومرحيو 
205 
The imperialist would not have done all this 
if it were not for the importance of the 
religious ʿulamāʾ's influence over the 
people. 
 ملاعلا ريثأت ةيمهأ لاول كلذ لعفيل رمعتسملا ناك امو
.سانلا ىلع ينيدلا 
206 
Therefore, one of your most important 
responsibilities, oh ʿulamāʾ of Islam, is to 
educate the Muslims to abide by the 
dictates of religion, 
 ـ ملاسلإا ءاملع اي ـ مكتايلوؤسم مهأ نم نإف انه نم
،نيدلا ماكحأب مازتللاا ىلع نيملسملا اوبرت نأ 
207 
to point out to them the political line they 
should follow, to lead them toward glory 
and honour, and to devote attention to the 
 awza for ʿulamāʾ so that they may 
graduate leaders faithful to God and eager 
to uphold religion and the umma. 
 ىلع نوريسي يذلا يسايسلا طخلا مهل اوحضوتو
 اومتهتو ...ةعفرلاو ةزعلا وحن مهودوقتو ،هيده
 ةداق ج ِّرخت نأ عيطتست ثيحب ةيملعلا تازوحلاب
ن ىلع نيصيرحو لله نيصلخم.ةملأاو نيدلا ةرص 
208 
Final Word Regarding International 
Organizations 
ةيلودلا تامظنملا لوح ةريخأ ةملك 209 
Finally, a word must be said regarding 
international organizations and institutions, 
such as the United Nations, the Security 
Council, and others. 
 تائيهلاو تامظنملا لوح ةملك نم دب لا ًاريخأو
 يلودلا نملأا سلجمو ةدحتملا مملأا ةمظنمك ةيلودلا
 .كلذ ريغو 
210 
We note that these organizations are not 
podiums for the downtrodden communities 
(ummas) generally and they continue to be 
ineffective due to the hegemony of their 
decisions by the states of world arrogance, 
whether in terms of the implementation or 
the obstruction of such decisions. 
 مملأل ًاربنم تسيل تامظنملا هذه نأ لجسن اننإف
 ببسب ةـيلعافلا ةـميدع ىقبتو ماع لكشب ةفعضتسملا
ـملاعلا رابكتسلاا لود ةنميه ًاءارجإ اهتارارق ىلع ي
.ًلايطعت وأ 
211 
What is the right to contradiction (the veto) 
enjoyed by some states if not a proof of the 
soundness of what we are saying. 
 ضعب هب ىظحت يذلا ـ وتيفلا ـ ضقنلا قح امو
..لوقن ام ةحص ىلع ًلايلد لاأ لودلا 
212 
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Therefore, we do not expect anything to 
come out of these organizations would 
serve the interest of the downtrodden and 
we urge all the self-respecting countries to 
adopt the plan to abolish the veto right 
enjoyed by the states of arrogance. 
نأ عقوتن لا اننإف انه نمو  تامظنملا هذه نع ردصي
 لودلا لك وعدنو ،نيفعضتسملا ةحلصم مدخي ام
 قح ءاغلإ عورشم ينبت ىلإ اهسفن مرتحت يتلا
..رابكتسلاا لودل وتيفلا ضقنلا 
213 
We also urge these countries to embrace 
the plan to expel Israel from the United 
Nations by virtue of its being a usurping 
and illegal entity, in addition to its being an 
entity hostile to human inclinations 
 نم ليئارسإ درط عورشم ينبت ىلإ مهوعدن امك
 عورشم ريغو ًابصاغ ًانايك اهرابتعاب ةدحتملا مملأا
.ةيناسنلإا ةعزنلل ًايداعم هنوك نع ًلاضف 
214 
Free, downtrodden people, 
These are our visualizations and objectives 
and these are the rules that govern our 
course. 
 انتاروصت يه هذه ...رارحلأا نوفعضتسملا اهيأ
؛انتريسم مكحت يتلا دعاوقلا يه هذهو ،انفادهأو 
215 
Those who accept us by accepting right, 
and God is the only truth. As for those who 
reject us, we will endure until God issues 
his judgment on us and on the group of 
oppressors. 
 در نمو ،قحلاب ىلْوأ للهاف قحلا لوبقب انلبق نمف
 موقلا نيبو اننيب الله مكحي ىتح ربصن انيلع
.نيملاظلا 
216 
God's peace, mercy, and blessings be 
upon you. 
اوهتاكربو الله ةمحرو مكيلع ملاسل 217 
Hezbollah الله بزح 218 
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Appendix 2 
The following is a translation of the Political Charter of Hezbollah. This translation is 
primarily the work of the author, with reference to other translations available and has 
been proofread by a professional translator of the LSE Language Centre. The main 
translation available was provided on the website of the Islamic Resistance in 
Lebanon
4
, this translation although widely quoted in the press, is only partial and often 
inexact. Another translation has been recently proposed by Alagha, but this was not 
available at the time of writing.
5
  
As in the previous case, the following translation has been done taking into account the 
needs of comparative vocabulary analysis, i.e. key terms have been either 
transliterated (for example umma) or translated always in the same way as far as 
logical sense holds (for example waṭān as nation). 
The quotes from the Qurʾān are within brackets and the English translation provided is 
from Haleem’s translation.
6
 
                                               
4
 <http://www.moqawama.org/essaydetailsf.php?eid=16245&fid=47> Last access 18 April 2012. 
5
 Alagha, Documents pp. 115-38. 
6
 Abdel Haleem, Qurʾan. 
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English ةيبرعلا § 
No. 
The Political Charter of Hezbollah الله بزحل ةيسايسلا ةقيثولا 1 
Introduction 
First Chapter: Hegemony and 
Awakening 
First: The World and the Western-American 
Hegemony 
Second: Our Region and the American 
Project 
Second Chapter: Lebanon  
First: the Nation (waṭān) 
Second: the Resistance 
Third: the State (dawla) and the Political 
System 
Fourth: Lebanon and the Lebanese-
Palestinian Relations 
Fifth: Lebanon and the Arab Relations 
Sixth: Lebanon and the Islamic Relations 
Seventh: Lebanon and the International 
Relations  
Third Chapter: Palestine and the 
Negotiations of Settlement 
First: The Palestinian Issue and the Zionist 
Entity 
Second: Jerusalem and the Al-Aqsa 
Mosque 
Third: The Palestinian Resistance 
Fourth: Negotiations of Settlement 
Conclusion 
ةمدقملا 
ةنميهلا :لولأا لصفلا و ضاهنتسلاا 
يكريملأاو ةيبرغلا ةنميهلاو ملاعلا :ًلاوأة 
يكريملأا عورشملاو انتقطنم :ًايناث 
نانـبل :يناثلا لصفلا 
نطولا :ًلاوأ  
ةمواقملا :ًايناث  
يسايسلا ماظنلاو ةلودلا :ًاثلاث  
 ةينانبللا تاقلاعلاو نانبل :ًاعبار- ةينيطسلفلا  
 ًاسماخةيبرعلا تاقلاعلاو نانبل :  
ةيملاسلإا تاقلاعلاو نانبل :ًاسداس  
ةيلو ُّدلا تاقلاعلاو نانبل :ًاعباس 
ةيوستلا تاضوافمو نيطسلف :ثلاثلا لصفلا 
ينويهصلا نايكلاو نيطسلف ةيضق :ًلاوأ  
ىصقلأا دجسملاو سدقلا :ًايناث  
ةينيطسلفلا ةمواقملا :ًاثلاث  
ةيوستلا تاضوافم :ًاعبار 
لاةمتاخ 
2 
In the name of God the merciful and 
compassionate, praise be to God the lord of 
the two worlds, the prayer and peace, to the 
seal of the prophets of our Lord, 
Muḥammad and to his pure family and his 
noble companions and to all the prophets 
and the messenger. 
 نيملاعلا بر لله دمحلاو ميحرلا نمحرلا الله مسب
 دمحم انديس نييبنلا متاخ ىلع ملاسلاو ةلاصلاو
 عيمج ىلعو نيبجتنملا هبحصو نيرهاطلا هلآ ىلعو
نيلسرملاو ءايبنلأا. 
3 
God the almighty said in his most excellent 
book: {But We shall be sure to guide to Our 
ways those who strive hard for Our cause: 
God is with those who do good} (Sura al-
 اَنيِف اوُدَهاَج َنيِذَّلاَو{ :ديجملا هباتك يف ىلاعت الله لاق
}.نيِنِسْحُمْلا َعََمل َ َّالله َِّنإَو اََنلُبُس ْمُه َّنَيِدْهََنل 
4 
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ankbut: 69) 
And the Almighty said: {You who believe be 
mindful of God, seek ways to come closer 
to Him and strive for His cause so that you 
may prosper} 
(Sura al-māʾida: 35) 
 :توبكنعلا(28) 
 ِهَيِلإ ْاوُغَتْباَو َّالله ْاُوق َّتا ْاوُنَمآ َنيِذَّلا اَه َُّيأ اَي{ :ىلاعت لاقو
 ِف ْاوُدِهاَجَو َةَليِسَوْلا}.َنوُِحلْفُت ْمُكَّلََعل ِهِليِبَس ي 
:ةدئاملا(35) 
Introduction ةمدقملا 5 
This political document aims at presenting 
the political vision of Hezbollah and 
includes its visions, stands, and ambitions. 
It also comes –before any other thing- as a 
result of what we have well experienced 
from the priority of action and the 
precedence of sacrifice. 
In an extraordinary political phase full of 
changes, it is no longer possible to address 
such transformations without noting the 
special position our resistance has reached 
or the set of achievements that we have 
realized in our journey. 
And it will be a necessity to address these 
transformations through the process of 
comparison between two mutually 
contradicting paths and what is between 
these two of an increasingly adverse 
agreement/harmony. 
 بزحل ةيسايسلا ةيؤرلا ريهظت ىلإ ةقيثولا هذه فدهت
 تاروصت نم هارن ام ىلع يوطنت ثيح ،الله
 ،سجاوهو تاحومطو لامآ نم هنزتخن امو فقاومو
 يتأت يهو-  رخآ ءيش يأ لبق-  هانربخ امل ًاجاتن
.ةيحضتلا ةيقبسأو لعفلا ةيولوأ نم ًاديج 
ايس ةلحرم يفف مل ،تلاوحتلاب ةلفاحو ةيئانثتسإ ةيس
 ةظحلام نود نم تلاوحتلا كلت ةبراقم ًانكمم دعي
 كلت وأ ،انتمواقم اهلغشت تتاب يتلا ةصاخلا ةناكملا
.انتريسم اهتققح يتلا تازاجنلإا نم ةمزرلا 
 قايس يف تلاوحتلا كلت جاردإ ًايرورض نوكيسو
 نم امهنيب امو نيَضقانتم نيراسم نيب ةنراقملا
  مانتم يسكع بسانت:  
6 
1- the path of resistance and opposition in 
its phase of ascendance, which relies on 
the military victories and the political 
successes and established in terms of 
popularity and politically the resistance 
paradigm; and stabilized the political 
positions and stances, despite the enormity 
of the objectives and the gravity of 
challenges, in order to reach a change in 
the balance of power in the regional 
equation beneficial to the resistance and its 
supporters. 
  1 -  ةمواقملا راسمامملاوةعن  هروط يف
 ةيركسع تاراصتنا ىلإ دنتسي يذلا يدعاصتلا
 ًايبعش ةمواقملا جذومنأ خ ُّسرتو ،ةيسايس تاحاجنو
 ةيسايسلا فقاوملاو عقاوملا يف تابثلاو ،ًايسايسو
 ةماخض مغرفادهتسلإا  ،..تايدحتلا ةماسجو
 ًلاوصوىلإ ةيمارلا رييغت نازيم  ةلداعملا يف ىوقلا
واقملا حلاصل ةيميلقلإا ةماهيمعادو. 
7 
2- The path of the American-Israeli 
arrogance and supremacy in its different 
dimensions, alliances and direct and 
indirect outreaches, which is witnessing   
defeats as well as military and political 
failures  reflecting a continuous failure 
 2- لإاو طلستلا راسم يكريملأا رابكتس- يليئارسلإا
 ريغو ةرشابملا هتادادتماو هتافلاحتو ةفلتخملا هداعبأب
 تامازهنا وأ تاراسكنا دهشي يذلاو ،ةرشابملا
 ًاقحلاتم ًلاشف ترهظأ ،ًةيسايس تاقافخإو ًةيركسع
 ولت ًادحاو اهعيراشمو ةيكريملأا تايجيتارتسلإل
8 
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collapse of the American strategies and its 
plans one after the other. All this has led to 
a condition of confusion, decline and 
inefficiency in the ability to control the path 
of developments and events in our Arab 
and Islamic world.  
 طبختلا نم ةلاح ىلإ ىضفأ كلذ لك ،رخلآا
لاو راسم يف مكحتلا ىلع ةردقلا يف زجعلاو عجارت
يملاسلإاو يبرعلا انملاع يف ثادحلأاو تاروطتلا. 
These data coalesce in a broader 
international scene which itself exposes the 
American impasse and the decline of the 
unipolar hegemony in favour of a multi-
polarity whose features have not been 
drawn yet.  
 ،عسوأ ّيلوُد دهشم راطإ يف تايطعملا هذه لماكتت
 عجارتو يكريملأا قزأملا فشك يف هرودب مهسُي
 رقتست مل ةيددعت حلاصل دحاولا بطقلا ةنميه
دعب اهحملام.  
9 
What deepens the crisis of the international 
arrogant system is the meltdown in the 
American and global financial markets as 
well as the entrance of the American 
economy in a condition of turmoil and 
inefficiency which reflects the peak of the 
structural crisis in the haughty capitalist 
model. 
بكتسلإا ماظنلا ةمزأ قّمعي امو يملاعلا يرا
 ،ةيملاعلاو ةيكريملأا ةيلاملا قاوسلأا يف تارايهنلإا
 ،زجعو طّبخت ةلاح يف يكريملأا داصتقلإا لوخدو
 يف يوينبلا قزأملا مقافت ةورذ نع رِّبعت يتلاو
سرطغتملا يلامسأرلا جذومنلأا. 
10 
Therefore, it's possible to say that we are 
amid historical a transformation which 
signals the decline of the United States of 
America as an hegemonic power, the 
disintegration of the unipolar domination 
and the beginning of the historical process 
of the decline of the Zionist entity. 
خيرات تلاوحت قايس يف اننإ :لوقلا نكمي اذل رذنُت ةي
 ،ةنميهم ةوقك ةيكريملأا ةدحتملا تايلاولا عجارتب
 لّكشت ِةيادبو ،نميهملا دحاولا بطقلا ماظن ِلُّلحتو
ينويهصلا نايكلل عراستملا يخيراتلا لوفلأا راسم. 
11 
The resistance movements stand at the 
heart of these international transformations 
and they represent a fundamental strategic 
factor in the international scene after 
performing a central role in producing or 
catalyzing the transformations that have 
been achieved in our region. 
 ،تلاوحتلا هذه بلُص يف ةمواقملا تاكرح فقت
ذه يف يساسأ يجيتارتسإ ىًطعمك زُربَتو دهشملا ا
 زيفحت وأ جاتنإ يف ًايزكرم ًارود تدأ نأ دعب ،يلو ُّدلا
انتقطنمب تلاوحتلا كلت نم لصتي ام. 
12 
The resistance in Lebanon, which our 
Islamic resistance is part of, was a 
forerunner in confronting the hegemony and 
the occupation more than two decades and 
a half ago. And it maintained this choice in 
a time that seemed it was the peak of the 
American era during which attempts were 
made to describe it as the end of history. 
 انتمواقم اهنمض نمو ،نانبل يف ةمواقملا تناك دقل
ةنميهلا ةهجاوم ىلإ ًةقاّبس ،ةيملاسلإا  لبق للاتحلإاو
 يهو ،نمزلا نم فصنو نيدقع ىلع ديزي ام
 ٌنيشدت هنأكو ادب تقو يف رايخلا اذهب تكسمت
 هريوصت تلاواحم ترج يذلا يكريملأا رصعلل
خيراتلل ةياهن هنأكو. 
13 
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Under the conditions of the balance of 
power and the circumstances prevailing at 
the time some considered the option of 
resistance as a kind of illusion, or a political 
recklessness or a tendency that goes 
against rationality and realism. 
 كاذنآ ةدئاسلا فورظلاو ىوقلا نيزاوم لظ يفو
 وأ ،  مهو ُبرض هنأكو ةمواقملا رايخ ضعبلا ربتعإ
 ٌضقانم ٌحونج وأ ،يسايس ٌروهت  ةينلاقعلا تابجومل
ةيعقاولاو.  
14 
Despite all of this, the resistance 
progressed in its jihadist march, believing in 
the rightfulness of its cause and in its power 
to make victory through having faith in God 
the almighty, being part of the umma as a 
whole, and through commitment to the 
Lebanon's national interests, trusting its 
people and cherishing humanitarian values 
with respect to right, justice, and freedom. 
 ،ةيداهجلا اهتريسم يف ةمواقملا تضم كلذ مغر
 ىلع اهتردقو اهتيضق ةيقحأ نم نيقي ىلع يهو
صتنلإا عنص ىلاعت للهاب ناميلإا للاخ نم ،را
 مازتللإاو ،ءاعمج ةملأل ءامتنلإاو ،هيلع لكوتلاو
 اهئلاعإو ،اهبعشب ةقثلاو ،ةينانبللا ةينطولا حلاصملاب
ةيرحلاو ةلادعلاو قحلا يف ةيناسنلإا ميقلا. 
15 
Through its long jihadist march and its 
aforementioned victories, starting from the 
end of the Israeli occupation in Beirut and 
Al-Jabal to its retreat  from Sidon, Tyre, and 
Nabatieh, the aggressions of July 1993 and 
April 1996, and the liberation of May 2000, 
ending with the July 2006 war; this 
resistance laid down its credibility and 
paradigm before achieving its victories. 
Thus the cumulative stages of its project 
evolved from a liberation force to a force of 
balance and confrontation, and then to a 
defense and deterrence one, in addition to 
its internal political role as an influential 
factor in building the just and capable state. 
 ربعو ليوطلا يداهجلا اهراسم ىدم ىلعف
 للاتحلإا رحد نم ًاءدب ،ةفوصوملا اهتاراصتنا
 اديص نم هبوره ىلإ لبجلاو توريب يف يليئارسلإا
 زومت ناودعو ةيطبنلاو روصو1993  ناودعو
 ناسين1996  رايأ يف ريرحتلاو2000  برحف
مت زو2006 اهتيقدص ةمواقملا هذه تسرأ ،
 تمكارف ،اهتاراصتنا عنصت نأ لبق اهجذومنأو
 ةوق ىلإ ريرحت ةوق نم اهِعورشم ر ُّوطت تابقح
 ،عافدو  عدر ةوق ىلإ ّمَث نمو ةهجاومو نزاوت
 يف رّثؤم نكرك يلخادلا يسايسلا اهرود ىلإ ًافاضم
ةلداعلاو ةرداقلا ةلودلا ءانب. 
16 
In relation to this, the resistance was in the 
position to develop its political and 
humanitarian position, and it progressed 
from being a national Lebanese value to 
also become an Arab and Islamic prominent 
value. Today it has become a universal and 
human value whose model is followed and 
built upon its gains in the experiences and 
literature of all those who strive for freedom 
and independence all over the world. 
 اهتناكم روطت نأ ةمواقملل ر ِّدُق ،كلذ عم نمازتلاب
 ًةينطو ًةميق اهنوك نم تقتراف ،ةيناسنلإاو ةيسايسلا
 اهنوك ىلإ ًةينانبل-  ًاضيأ-  ًةيملاسإو ًةيبرع ًةميق
 ًةيناسنإو ًةيملاع ًةميق مويلا تحبصأ دقو ،ًةقلأتم
 يف اهتازاجنإ ىلع ءانبلاو اهجذومنأ ماهلتسا يرجي
دأو براجت ةيرحلا لجأ نم نيعاسلا لك تايب
ةرومعملا ءاحنأ ىتش يف للاقتسلإاو. 
17 
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Though Hezbollah is aware of those 
promising changes and what it sees as the 
persistence of the enemy between failure in 
his war strategy and failure in imposing 
solutions in its own way, does no belittle in 
scale of the challenges and the on-going 
risks and it does not underestimate the 
difficulty of the process of confrontation and 
the magnitude of the sacrifices required by 
the resistance march towards regaining 
rights and participating in mobilizing the 
umma. However –in the face of that- it has 
become clearer in its choices, more willing 
in its determination and more confident in 
God, in itself and its people. 
 ،ةدعاولا تلاوحتلا كلتل هكاردإ مغر الله بزح ّنإ
 ةيجيتارتسا زجع نيب ودعلا ةحوارم نم هاري امو
 ،هطورشب تايوستلا ضرف نع زجعلاو هيدل برحلا
 لا يتلا رطاخملاو تايدحتلا مجحب نيهتسي لا هنإف
 ةهجاوملا راسم ةروعو نم لِّلَقُي لاو ،ًةلثام لازت
 اهبجوتست يتلا تايحضتلا مجحو ةمواقملا ةريسم
 ،ةملأا ضاهنتسا يف ةمهاسملاو قوقحلا دادرتساو
 هنأ ّلاإ-  كلذ لابق يف-  يف ًاحوضو دشأ تاب دق
 هّبرب ًةقث رثكأو هتدارإ يف ًةميزع ىضمأو هتارايخ
هبعشو هسفنو. 
18 
In this context, Hezbollah sets the founding 
lines of a theoretical and political framework 
of its vision and stances towards the posed 
challenges. 
 ةيساسلأا طوطخلا الله بزح د ِّدحي ،قايسلا اذه يف
 ًايركف ًاراطإ لّكشت يتلا-  هفقاومو هتيؤرل ًايسايس
ةحورطملا تايدحتلا هاجت. 
19 
First Chapter 
Hegemony and Awakening 
لولأا لصفلا 
ضاـهنتسلإاو ةـنميهلا 
20 
First: The World and the Western-
American Hegemony 
 ةيكريملأاو ةيبرغلا ةنميهلاو ملاعلا : ًلاوأ 
21 
Following World War II, the United States 
became the master of a central and primary 
project of hegemony; under their control the 
project experienced an appalling 
development on the levels of domination 
and subjugation unprecedented in history, 
benefiting in this from a combined result of 
achievements of many kinds and several 
planes: in science, culture, knowledge, 
technology, economy and in the military 
plane supported by an economic-political 
system that views the world only as open 
markets governed their own laws. 
 ةدحتملا تايلاولا تتاب ةيناثلا ةيملاعلا برحلا دعب
 ىلعو ،لولأاو يزكرملا ةنميهلا عورشم َةبحاص
 تايلآ يف ًلائاه ًاروطت عورشملا اذه دهش اهيدي
 ًةديفتسم ،ًايخيرات ةقوبسملا ريغ عاضخلإاو طلستلا
 ةددعتملا تازاجنلإا نم ةبّكرم ةليصح نم كلذ يف
و ةيملعلا تايوتسملاو هجولأا ةيفرعملاو ةيفاقثلا
 ةموعدملاو ،ةيركسعلاو ةيداصتقلإاو ةيجولونكتلاو
 ّلاإ ملاعلا ىلإ رظني لا يداصتقإ يسايس عورشمب
ةصاخلا اهنيناوقل ًةموكحمو ًةحوتفم ًاقاوسأ هفصوب. 
22 
Indeed, what is most dangerous in the logic 
of Western hegemony generally, and in 
particular in the American case, is that they 
consider themselves basically the owner of 
the world, and that they have the right to 
hegemony on the basis of their superiority 
in more than a field. For this reason, the 
Western (in particular American) expanding 
 ،ًامومع يبرغلا ةنميهلا قطنم يف ام رطخأ ّنإ
 هنأ ساسلأا ذنم هرابتعا وه ،ًاديدحت يكريملأاو
 قوفتلا قلطنم نم ةنميهلا قح هل ّنأو ،ملاعلا كلتمي
 ةيعسوتلا ةيجيتارتسلإا تتاب اذلو ،لاجم نم رثكأ يف
 ةيبرغلا-  ةيكريملأا ةصاخبو-  اهنارتقا عمو
يلامسأرلا يداصتقلإا عورشملاب  َةيملاع ًةيجيتارتسإ
23 
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strategy combined with the project of 
capitalist economy has become a strategy 
of global nature without limits to its 
ambitions and greed. 
اهعشجو اهعامطلأ دودح لا ،عباطلا. 
Savage capitalism forces- represented 
mainly in international monopoly networks 
of companies that cross the nations 
(qawmiaat) and continents, networks of 
various international enterprises, especially 
the financial ones among these, backed by 
superior military force, have led to more 
antagonisms and conflicts, of which, not 
less important, are the conflicts of identities, 
cultures, civilizations, in addition to the 
conflicts between poverty and wealth. 
 ىلع ةلثمتملا ،ةشحوتملا ةيلامسأرلا ىوق مّكحت ّنإ
 تاكرش نم ةيلو ُّدلا تاراكتحلإا تاكبشب  سيئر  وحن
 ةيلو ُّدلا تاسسؤملاو ،تاراقللو لب تايموقلل ةرباع
 ةوقب ةموعدملاو ،اهنم ةيلاملا ًاصوصخو ،ةعونتملا
 تاضقانتلا نم ديزملا ىلا ىدأ ،ًايركسع ةقئاف
سيل ،ةيرذجلا تاعارصلاو  تاعارص :مويلا اهلقأ
 بناج ىلإ ،تاراضحلا طامنأو تافاقثلاو تايوهلا
رقفلاو ىنغلا تاعارص. 
24 
This savage global capitalism have turned 
into a mechanisms to spread division, plant 
dissent and destroy identities as well as 
imposing the most dangerous types of 
cultural, civil, economic and social 
alienation. 
 ثبل ةيلآ ىلإ َةملوعلا ةشحوتملا ةيلامسأرلا تلوح دقل
 ضرفو تايوهلا ريمدتو قاقشلا عرزو ةقرفتلا
 يراضحلاو يفاقثلا بلاتسلإا عاونأ رطخأ
يعامتجلإاو يداصتقلإاو. 
25 
Globalization has reached its most 
dangerous   evolution when it turned into a 
military one, led by those following the 
Western scheme of hegemony; of which we 
have witnessed most of its manifestations in 
the Middle East, Afghanistan, Iraq, 
Palestine and Lebanon, where the latter's 
share was the July 2006 aggression by 
Israel. 
 ةملوع ىلإ اهلوحت عم رطخلأا اه َّدح ةملوعلا تغلب
 ،يبرغلا ةنميهلا عورشم يلماح يديأ ىلع ةيركسع
 قرشلا ةقطنم يف اهتاريبعت رثكأ اندهش يتلاو
 نيطسلفو قارعلا ىلإ ناتسناغفأ نم ًاءدب ،طسولأا
 زومت يف ًلاماش ًاناودع اهنم هبيصن ناك يذلا ،نانبلف
 ماعلا2006 سلإا ديلاب كلذوةيليئار. 
26 
The project of American hegemony and 
domination did not ever reach the levels of 
danger which it reached recently, and in 
particular in the last decade of the twentieth 
century till today, which is the one that 
brought about the mounting downfall of the 
Soviet Union and the beginning of its 
disintegration, which was the historical 
opportunity in the American calculations to 
appoint themselves at the head of the world 
hegemonic project, and on the behalf of 
historical responsibility and this is why it 
does not distinguish between the interest of 
the world and the interest of America which 
is what I call the “marketing” of hegemony 
as the interest of other countries and 
peoples and not as exclusively American 
interest. 
  تايوتسم يكريملأا طلستلاو ةنميهلا عورشم غلبي مل
 ريخلأا دقعلا ذنم اميس لا ،ًارخؤم اهغلب امك ًةرطخ
 راسم يف كلذو ،مويلا ىتحو نيرشعلا نرقلا نم
 هككفتو يتايفوسلا داحتلإا طوقس نم ذختإ يدعاصت
 يف ةيخيرات ةصرف نم هلّكش امل ،قلاطنا ةطقن
ب دارفتسلإل ةيكريملأا تاباسحلا ةنميهلا عورشم ةدايق
 لا ّنأبو ةيخيراتلا ةيلوؤسملا مساب كلذو ،ًايملاع
 ام ،ةيكريملأا ةحلصملاو ملاعلا ةحلصم نيب زييمت
لاو لودلا يقابل ةحلصمك ةنميهلا قيوست ينعي 
  ًةتحب ًةيكريمأ ًةحلصم اهفصوب لا. 
27 
314 
 
This path found its peak with the 
neoconservative grip under the 
administration of Bush the son; this is the 
movement that stated its specific vision in 
the document “Project for the New 
American Century”. 
 نيظفاحملا رايت كاسمإ عم هتورذ راسملا اذه غلب دقل
 يذلا رايتلا اذه ،نبلاا "شوب" ةرادإ لصافمب ددجلا
لا هاؤر نع رّبع عورشم" ةقيثو للاخ نم ةصاخ
ديدجلا يكريملأا نرقلا". 
28 
It was neither strange nor surprising that 
what the charter focused on, was the 
question of rebuilding the US capacities; 
which reflected a new strategic vision of 
national (qawmī) American security it 
seemed quite clear that it was based on 
building a military capacity not only to be 
reputed a deterrence force but also to be 
considered capable of action and 
intervention. Whether to conduct 
“defensive” operations by carrying out pre-
emptive strikes or for therapeutic purposes 
by interacting with crisis situations after they 
took place. 
 تدكأ ام ُرثكأ نوكي نأ ًائجافم لاو ًابيرغ نكي مل
 تاردقلا ءانب ةداعإ َةلأسم ةقيثولا هذه هيلع
 ًةديدج ًةيجيتارتسا ًةيؤر تسكع يتلاو ،ةيكريملأا
 اهنأ ًامامت ًاحضاو ادب ،يكريملأا يموقلا نملأل
 ةوق اهرابتعاب سيل ةيركسع تاردق ءانب ىلع زكترت
ابتعاب ًاضيأ امنإو طقف عدر ،لّخدتو لعف ةوق اهر
 هيجوت قيرط نع "ةيئاقو" تايلمعب مايقلل ءاوس
 للاخ نم ةيجلاع ضارغلأ مأ ةيقابتسإ تابرض
اهعوقو دعب تامزلأا عم لماعتلا. 
29 
Following the September 11 attacks, the 
Bush administration found that the 
opportunity was appropriate to exercise the 
largest possible power and influence by 
way of expanding its strategic vision of 
single-handed hegemony over the world in 
practice and under the slogan: "global war 
against terrorism".  
Thus this administration relied on efforts 
which at the beginning were considered 
successful, these are: 
 ثادحأ ديعُب "شوب" ةرادإ تدجو11  لوليأ2001 ،
 ذوفنلا نم رْدَق ربكأ ةسراممل ةحناس ةصرف مامأ اهنأ
 ةيجيتارتسلإا اهتيؤر عضو للاخ نم ،ريثأتلاو
 تحت قيبطتلا عضوم ملاعلا ىلع ةدرفنملا ةنميهلل
 تماق اذكهو "باهرلإا ىلع ةينوكلا برحلا" راعش
ان تربُتعإ تلاواحمب ةرادلإا هذه اهتيادب يف ًةحج
يلاتلا قفو:  
30 
1. Militarizing foreign relations and 
policies as much as possible (to the 
highest level). 
2.  Monopolizing decision-making, 
taking strategic decisions single-
handedly, relying on coordination 
only at times of necessity and 
exclusively with allies that can be 
trusted. 
3. Rapidly ending the war in 
Afghanistan to give its entire 
attention to the next and more 
important step, i.e. taking over Iraq 
which is considered as the 
foundation of establishing the New 
Middle East in conformity with the 
1.  ىلإ ةيجراخلا اهتاسايسو اهتاقلاع ةركسع
ىصقلأا دحلا. 
2.  ةددعتملا رطلأا ىلع دامتعلإا بّنجت
 تارارقلا ذاختاب دارفنلإاو ،فارطلأا
 كانه ثيح قيسنتلاو ،ةيجيتارتسلإا
مهيلإ نوكرلا نكمي ءافلح عمو ،ةرورض.  
3.  غرفتلل ةعرسب ناتسناغفأ يف برحلا مسح
ف مهلأاو ةيلاتلا ةوطخلل كلذ دعب عورشم ي
 ،قارعلا ىلع ةرطيسلا :يهو لاأ ةنميهلا
 ةماقلإ ةسيئرلا زاكترلإا ةطقن ربُتعا يذلا
 تابلطتم عم بسانتي ديدج طسوأ قرش
 دعب ام ملاع11 لوليأ. 
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requirements of post September 11 
world. 
This administration was not hesitant in 
resorting to all means of deception, 
cheating, and diversion to justify its wars, 
particularly the war on Iraq, and against all 
those who fight its neo-colonialist project, 
whether countries, movements, forces or 
personalities.  
 بيلاسأ لك ىلإ ءوجللا نع ةرادلإا هذه عروتت ملو
 لا ،اهبورح ريربتل حيرصلا بذكلاو عادخلاو هيومتلا
 اميس مواقي نَم لك دضو ،قارعلا ىلع برحلا
 تاكرحو لود نم ديدجلا يرامعتسلإا اهَعورشم
تايصخشو ىوقو. 
32 
Furthermore, the Bush administration 
sought to establish conformity between 
"terrorism" and "resistance", in order to strip 
off the resistance of its humanitarian and 
rights based legitimacy and by that 
justifying waging all sorts of wars against 
these movements, seeking to deprive the 
bastions of defense of peoples and states 
of their right to life, freedom, dignity and 
pride and their right to a full sovereignty, 
and the development of their own specific 
experience and took their place and 
administration in the historical humanitarian, 
civilizational, and cultural process. 
  ةماقإ ىلإ ةرادلإا هذه تدمع راطلإا اذه يفو
 "ةمواقملا" ةلوقمو "باهرلإا" ةلوقم نيب قباطت
 ،ةيقوقحلاو ةيناسنلإا اهَتيعرش ةمواقملا نع عزنتل
 ،اهدض اهعاونأ ىلع بورحلا ضوخ يلاتلاب رّربتو
 لودلاو بوعشلا عافد نوصح رخآ ةلازإ قايس يف
عو ،ةزعو ةماركو ةيرحب شيعلاب اهقح نع اهقح ن
 ذخأو ةصاخلا اهبراجت ءانببو ةصوقنم ريغ ةدايسب
 يناسنلإا خيراتلا ةكرح يف اهراودأو اهعقاوم
 ًايفاقثو ًايراضح. 
33 
The so called “Terrorism” has turned into an 
American pretext of hegemony through 
many tools such as prosecution/detention, 
arbitrary detention/lacking the most basic 
elements of fair trials as we have seen in 
the camps of Guantanamo as well as 
through direct interference in the 
sovereignty of countries, and its conversion 
to “a registered trademark” for arbitrary 
incrimination,  and the imposition of  
punitive measures against entire peoples, 
giving itself an absolute right to launch 
destructive wars that distinguish between 
the guilty and the innocent and do not 
differentiate between man, woman, elderly 
or child. 
 ةيكريمأ ةعيرذ ىلإ "باهرلإا" ناونع لّوحت دقل
 طبضلا /ةقحلاملا :تاودأ للاخ نم ةنميهلل
 تامكاحملا تاموقم طسبأ داقتفإ /يفسعتلا لاقتعلإاو
 نمو ،"ومانتناوغ" تلاقتعم يف اهدجن امك ،ةلداعلا
 ىلإ اهليوحتو لودلا ةدايس يف رشابملا لخدتلا للاخ
او يفسعتلا ميرجتلل ةلجسم ةكرام تاءارجإ ذاخت
 اهسفن حنم ىلإ ًلاوصو ،اهرسأب ًابوعش لاطت ةبَقاعم
 نيب زيمت لا ةقحامو ةيريمدت بورح نشب ًاقلطم ًاقح
 ةأرملاو خيشلاو لفطلا نيب لاو ،مرجملاو ءيربلا
باشلاو. 
34 
The American wars of terrorism have 
reached at this point the cost of millions of 
lives as well as manifestations of overall 
destruction, that not only melted concrete 
and houses but also the structures and the 
components of societies themselves to the 
point of their disintegration and inverted the 
process of their historical development, in 
the process of degeneration caused to 
return the generation of civil wars along 
 نلآا ىتح ةيكريملأا باهرلإا بورح ةفلك تغلب دقل
 ،ةلماشلا رامدلا رهاظم نع ًلاضف رشبلا نم نييلاملا
 امنإو بسحف ةيتحتلا ىنبلاو رجحلا بِصُت مل يتلا
 ىرج ثيح ،اهسفن تاعمتجملا تانوكمو ةينب
 ةيلمع يف ،يخيراتلا اهروطت راسم سْكَعو ،اهكيكفت
يلهأ تاعارص جاتنإ تداعأ ساكترا داعبأ تاذ ة
 نأ ريغ نم اذه .يهتنت لا ةيقرعو ةيفئاطو ةيبهذم
 هذهل يراضحلاو يفاقثلا نوزخملا فادهتسا ىسنن
35 
316 
 
ideological, sectarian and ethnic groups 
with not end. All his in addition to the 
targeting of the cultural and civilizational 
heritage of these peoples. 
بوعشلا. 
There is no doubt that American Terrorism 
is the origin of all terrorism in the world. The 
“Bush” administration has turned the United 
States into a threat menacing the whole 
world on all levels and dimensions. If an 
international survey was to be made, the 
US would turn out to be the most hated 
state in the world. 
 باهرإ لك لصأ وه يكريملأا باهرلإا ّنأ كش لا
ايلاولا "شوب" ةرادإ تلوح دقو ،ملاعلا يف ةدحتملا ت
 دعصلا لك ىلع هرسأب ملاعلا ددهتي رطخ ىلإ
 يأرلل ٌّيملاع ٌعلاطتسا مويلا ىرج ولو .تايوتسملاو
 يف ةهوركم ةلود رثكأك ةدحتملا تايلاولا ترهظل
ملاعلا. 
36 
The failure of the war on Iraq and the 
development of a situation of resistance 
therein, in addition to the regional and 
international abhorrence to the results of 
the war, and the failure of the so called 
"War on Terrorism" especially in 
Afghanistan, as well as the complete failure 
of the catastrophic American war against 
the resistance in Lebanon and Palestine 
through using Israel as a tool, have led to 
the erosion of American international 
prestige as well as to a strategic decline in 
the capabilities of the United States to act 
or engage in new adventures. 
 ،قارعلا ىلع برحلا هب تينُم يذلا قافخلإا ّنإ
 يميلقلإا ضاعتملإاو هيف ةمواقملا ةلاح روطتو
 ىمسي ام لشفو ،برحلا هذه جئاتن نم يلو ُّدلاو
 ،ناتسناغفأ يف ًاصوصخ "باهرلإا ىلع برحلا"
 ةمواقملا ىلع ةيكريملأا برحلل عيرذلا لشفلا كلذكو
دأ ،ةيليئارسإ تاودأب نيطسلفو نانبل يف لكآت ىلإ ت
 يف يجيتارتسا عجارت ىلإو ًاّيلوُد ةيكريملأا ةبيهلا
 ضوخ وأ لعفلا ىلع ةدحتملا تايلاولا ةردق
ةديدجلا تارماغملا. 
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Yet what has been said does not mean that 
the United States will easily leave the 
scene, but it will use all necessary means to 
protect what it calls “its strategic interests", 
for the American hegemonic policies are 
based on ideological considerations and 
projects nourished by extremist tendencies 
allied with an industrial-military complex that 
knows no limit to greed and ambition. 
 ّلاإ  يلْخُتس ةدحتملا تايلاولا ّنأب ينعي لا م َّدقت ام ّنأ
 لجأ نم مزلي ام لكب موقتس لب ،ةلوهسب ةحاسلا
 ّنلأ كلذ ،"ةيجيتارتسلإا اهحلاصم" هيّمست ام ةيامح
 تارابتعا ىلع ضهنت ةيكريملأا ةنميهلا تاسايس
 ٌتاهاجتا اهيّذغت ،ةيركف عيراشمو ةيجولويديإ
 ّكرم عم ٌةفلاحتم ٌةفرطتم يعانص ب-  لا يركسع
هعامطأو هعشجل دودح. 
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Second: Our Region and the American 
Project 
يكريملأا عورشملاو انتقطنم : ًايناث 39 
If the whole world of the downtrodden is 
under the yoke of arrogant hegemony, then 
our Arab and Islamic world takes the 
biggest and the most costly share because 
of its history, civilization, resources and 
geographical location. 
 رين تحت حزري هرسأب فَعضتسملا ملاعلا ناك اذإ
 يبرعلا انملاع ّنإف ،ةيرابكتسلإا ةنميهلا هذه
 يعاودل ،لقثلأاو رفولأا طسقلا اهنم هلاني يملاسلإاو
اومو هتراضحو هخيراتيفارغجلا هعقومو هدر.  
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For centuries, our Arab and Islamic world 
has been subject to endless, wild and 
savage wars, but those wars took a higher 
plane with the planting of the Zionist entity 
in the region, as part of a project to 
fragment it into entities bearing all kinds of 
names and are in conflict and enmity. this 
phase of colonialism reached its peak with 
the US replacing classical colonialism in the 
region. 
 ٌةضرع نورق ذنم وه يملاسلإاو يبرعلا انملاع ّنإ
لحارم ّنأ ّلاإ ،يهتنت لا ةيشحو ةيرامعتسإ بورحل اه
 يف ينويهصلا نايكلا عرز عم تأدب ًامدقت رثكلأا
 تانايك ىلإ اهتيتفت عورشم نمض نمو ،ةقطنملا
 تغلب دقلو ،ىتش نيوانع تحت ةذبانتمو ةعراصتم
 تايلاولا ةثارو عم ةيرامعتسلإا ةلحرملا هذه ةورذ
ةقطنملا يف ميدقلا رامعتسلإل ةدحتملا. 
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The central aim of the American arrogance 
consists of spreading all forms of control 
over peoples: political, economic, cultural 
and plundering of their wealth, where the oil 
wealth occupies the top of the list for it is a 
main tool to control the levers of the world 
economy, as well as all the other means 
which do not require any moral or human 
constraints or criteria including the use of 
extreme military power whether directly or 
through a proxy power. 
 يكريملأا رابكتسلإل زربلأا يزكرملا فدهلا لثمتي
 ةيسايسلا :اهلاكشأ لكب بوعشلا ىلع ةرطيسلاب
 يف يتأيو ،اهتاورث بهنو ةيفاقثلاو ةيداصتقلإاو
 ةسيئر ةادأ يه امب ةيطفنلا ةورثلا بهن ةعيلطلا
 يتلا بيلاسلأا لكبو ،يملاعلا داصتقلإا حورب مكحتلل
أ ريياعم وأ طباوض يأ مزتلت لا ،ةيناسنإ وأ ةيقلاخ
 وأ ًةرشابم ،ةطِرفملا ةيركسعلا ةوقلا مادختسا اهيف امب
ةطساولاب. 
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To achieve this goal, America resorted to 
different general policies and work 
strategies, of which the most outstanding 
are: 
 ًةماع  تاسايس اهفده قيقحتل اكريمأ تدمتعإ
تساواهزربأ ،لمع تايجيتار: 43 
1. Providing the Zionist entity all the 
means to guarantee its stability for 
it is a forefront and a focal point for 
the American neo-colonial project 
to fragment the region, supporting it 
with all elements of power and 
continuity and providing a security 
network for its existence in such a 
way that allows this entity to play 
the role of a cancerous gland that 
consumes all the capabilities of the 
umma and its potentials, throws its 
abilities in disarray and shatter its 
hopes and expectations. 
1.  نايكلل رارقتسلإا نامض لبس لك ريفوت
 ةطقنو ةمدقتم ةدعاق وه امب ،ينويهصلا
 يرامعتسلإا يكريملأا عورشملل زاكترا
 لكب نايكلا اذه معدو ،ةقطنملل يتيتفتلا
 ةكبش ريفوتو ،رارمتسلإاو ةوقلا لماوع
 ةدغلا رود بعلل هلهؤي ام ،هدوجول نامأ
 ةملأا تاردق فزنتست يتلا ةيناطرسلا
اقاطو اَهلامآ تتشتو اهتاناكمإ رثعبتو اهت
اهتاعلطتو. 
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2. Undermining the spiritual, 
civilizational and cultural 
potentialities of our peoples and 
weakening their morale through 
media and psychological wars that 
affect their values, and their figures 
in jihad and resistance. 
2.  ةيراضحلاو ةيحورلا تاناكملإا ضيوقت
 فاعضإ ىلع لمعلاو انبوعشل ةيفاقثلاو
 ةيملاعإ بورح ثب ربع ،ةيونعملا اهحور
 اهِداهج َزومرو اهَميق لاطت ةيسفنو
اهِتمواقمو.  
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3. Supporting the dependent and 
tyrannical regimes in the region. 
3. بتسلإاو ةيعبتلا ةمظنأ معدةقطنملا يف داد.  46 
4. Taking control of the geographical 
strategic positions in the region for 
they represent conjunction points 
by land, air and sea, and spreading 
military bases in its vital 
intersections to back up its wars 
and support its means. 
4. كاسملإا  ةيجيتارتسلإا ةيفارغجلا عقاوملاب
  لْصَو ةدقع نم هلّكشت امل ،ةقطنملل
 دعاوقلا ُرشنو ،ًاوجو ًارحبو ًارب ،لصفو
 ًةمدخ ةيويحلا اهلصافم يف ةيركسعلا
اهتاودلأ ًامعدو اهبورحل. 
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5. Preventing the establishment of any 
renaissance in the region that 
allows the acquisition of the means 
of power and development or play a 
historical role on a global level. 
5.  حمست ةقطنملا يف ةضهن يأ مايق عنم
 ًارود بعلت وأ مدقتلاو ةوقلا بابسأ كلاتماب
ملاعلا ىوتسم ىلع ًايخيرات. 
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6. Planting the seed of seditions and 
divisions of various kinds, 
especially the religious strives 
among Muslims, to create endless 
internal civil conflicts. 
6.  لا ،اهعاونأ ىلع تاماسقنلإاو نتفلا عرز
 جاتنلإ ،نيملسملا نيب ةيبهذملا نتفلا اميس
يهتنت لا ةيلخاد ةيلهأ تاعارص. 
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It is clear that the only way to view any 
conflict in any region in the world is through 
the lenses of global strategy, for the 
American threat is not only a regional threat 
affecting one region. Therefore, the front of 
confrontation to this American threat should 
be global as well. 
ا لاجم لا هنأ حضاولا نم يف عارص يأ ةءارقل مويل
 راظنم نم ّلاإ ملاعلا قطانم نم ةقطنم يأ
 ًارطخ سيل يكريملأا رطخلاف ،يملاع يجيتارتسإ
 ّنإف يلاتلابو ،ىرخأ نود ةقطنمب ًاصتخم وأ ًايلحم
 نوكت نأ بجي يكريملأا رطخلا اذهل ةهجاوملا ةهبج
 ًاضيأ ًةيملاع. 
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There is no doubt that this confrontation is 
critical and difficult; it is a battle of a 
historical proportion, and therefore it is a 
battle for generations and requires 
employing any force available.  Indeed, our 
experience in Lebanon has taught us that 
difficulty does not mean the impossible but, 
on the contrary, lively and proactive 
peoples, a wise, conscious leadership 
prepared for all the possibilities and bets on 
the basis of accumulated achievements can 
achieve victory after victory. And as this is 
through vertically throughout history it is 
also true horizontally on the geographical 
and geo-political plane. 
 يهو ،ٌةقيقدو ٌةبعص ةهجاوملا هذه ّنأب كش لاو
 ُةكرعم يلاتلاب يهو ،يخيرات ىًدم تاذ ٌةكرعم
 دقلو ،ةضَرتفم ةوق لك نم ةدافتسلإا مزلتستو لايجأ
 ينعت لا ةبوعصلا ّنأ نانبل يف انتبرجت انتّملع
لإا ،ًةلِعافتمو ًةيح ًابوعش ّنإف سكعلاب لب ةلاحتس
 تلاامتحلإا لكل ًةدعتسمو ًةيعاوو ًةميكح ًةدايقو
 ولت رصنلا عنصت ،تازاجنلإا مكارت ىلع نهارتو
 ربع ًايدومع رملأا اذه حصي ام ردقبو .رصنلا
 يفارـغجلا دادـتملإاب ًاـيقفأ حـصي وهف خيراتلا
ويجلاو- ًاضيأ يسايس. 
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The American arrogance has left no option 
to our umma and its peoples but the option 
of resistance for a better life and for a better 
humane  future for humankind, a future 
governed by relations of fraternity, diversity, 
solidarity at the same time and in which 
peace and harmony prevail, in the same 
way the movement of the greatest prophets 
and reformers throughout history have 
drawn its features and as it is reflected in 
the expectations and desires of the true and 
transcendental human spirit.  
 نم اهبوعشو انتملأ يكريملأا رابكتسلإا كرتي مل
 نمو ،لضفأ ةايح لجأ نم ،ةمواقملا رايخ ّلاإ رايخ
 موكحم لبقتسم ،لضفأ يناسنإو يرشب لبقتسم لجأ
 هدوسيو ،نآ يف لفاكتلاو عونتلاو ةّوخلأا نم تاقلاعب
 ُةكرح هَِملاعم تَمَسَر امك ًامامت ،مائولاو ملاسلا
لا نيحلصملاو ءايبنلأا وه امكو ،خيراتلا ربع ماظع
 ةقحلا ةيناسنلإا حورلا قاوشأو تاعلطت يف
ةيماستملاو. 
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Second Chapter 
Lebanon 
يناثلا لصفلا 
نانـــــــــبل 
53 
First: the Nation نطولا : ًلاوأ 54 
Lebanon is our nation and the nation of our 
fathers and ancestors. It is also the nation 
of our children, grandchildren, and the 
future generations. It is the nation for whose 
sovereignty, pride and dignity and the 
liberation of its land we have given the 
dearest sacrifices and the dearest martyrs 
(shuhadaʾ). We want it to be the nation for 
all Lebanese equally, which embraces 
them, and shelters them and attains pride 
through them and their deeds. 
 وه امك ،دادجلأاو ءابلآا نطوو اننطو وه نانبل ّنإ
 وهو ،ةيتلآا لايجلأا لكو دافحلأاو ءانبلأا نطو
 هتماركو هتزعو هتدايس لجأ نم انمّدق يذلا نطولا
يرحتو اذه .ءادهشلا ّزعأو تايحضتلا ىلغأ هضرأ ر
 مهنضتحي ،ءاوس دح ىلع نيينانبللا لكل هديرن نطولا
مهتاءاطعبو مهب خمشيو مهل عستيو. 
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We want it to be single and unified in terms 
of land, people, state and institutions; we 
reject any form of division or “federation”, 
explicit or concealed. We want it sovereign, 
free, independent, strong, honourable, 
powerful, potent and capable, present in the 
regional equations, and a fundamental 
contributor in making the present and the 
future as it was always present in making 
history.  
 ةلودو ًابعشو ًاضرأ ،ًاد َّحوم ًادحاو هديرنو
 وأ ميسقتلا لاكشأ نم لكش يأ ضفرنو ،تاسسؤمو
 ًارح ًاديس هديرنو .ةعَّنقملا وأ ةحيرصلا ،"ةلردفلا"
 يف ًارضاح ،ًارداق ًايوق ًاعينم ًاميرك ًازيزع ًلاقتسم
 عنص يف ًايساسأ ًامهاسمو ،ةقطنملا تلاداعم
ح ناك امك لبقتسملاو رضاحلا عنص يف ًامئاد ًارضا
خيراتلا. 
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One of the most important conditions for the 
establishment of a nation of this type and its 
persistence is having a just, capable and 
strong state, a political system which truly 
represents the will of the people and their 
aspirations for justice and freedom, security 
and stability, well-being and dignity. This is 
what all the Lebanese look for and work to 
 عونلا اذه نم نطو مايقل طورشلا مهأ نمو
 ،ٌةيوقو ٌةرداقو ٌةلداع ةلود هل نوكت نأ هرارمتساو
ظنو ىلا هتاعلطتو بعشلا ةدارإ قحب لّثمي ٌيسايس ٌما
 هافرلاو رارقتسلإاو نملأاو ةيرحلاو ةلادعلا
 نم نولمعيو نيينانبللا لك هدشني ام اذهو ،ةماركلاو
مهنم نحنو هقيقحت لجأ. 
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achieve and we are with them. 
Second: the Resistance 
"Israel" represents an eternal threat to 
Lebanon - the state and the entity - and a 
real menace to the country in terms for its 
historical ambitions in its land and water 
and since it is a model of coexistence for 
the followers of the divine messages, in a 
unique formula, and a nation that opposes 
to the idea of a racial state which manifests 
itself in the Zionist entity. Moreover, 
Lebanon's position on borders of  the 
occupied Palestine and in a region troubled 
by the conflict with the Israeli enemy, 
compelled it to assume national and pan-
Arab (qawimiyya) responsibilities. 
ةـمواـقملا :ًايناث 
 نانبلل ًامئاد ًاديدهت "ليئارسإ" لّثمت-  نايكلاو ةلودلا- 
 يف ةيخيراتلا اهعامطأ ةهجل ،هيلع ًامهاد ًارطخو
 عابتأ شياعتل جذومنأ وه امبو ،ههايمو هضرأ
 ضيقن نطوو ،ةديرف ةغيص يف ،ةيوامسلا تلااسرلا
 نايكلا يف رهظمتت يتلا ةيرصنعلا ةلودلا ةركفل
يهصلا ىلع نانبل دوجو ّنإف ،كلذ نع ًلاضف .ينو
 ءارج ةبرطضم ةقطنم يفو ،ةلتحملا نيطسلف دودح
 لّمحت هيلع مّتح ،يليئارسلإا ودعلا عم عارصلا
 ًةيموقو ًةينطو تايلوؤسم. 
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The Israeli threats to this nation began with 
the establishment of the Zionist entity on 
the land of Palestine, an entity that did not 
hesitate to reveal its ambitions over the land 
of Lebanon to annex parts of it, and to take 
hold of its resources and wealth, and 
especially its water, and it has sought to 
gradually achieve these ambitions. 
ا ديدهتلا أدب عرُز نأ ذنم نطولا اذهل يليئارسلإ
 مل ٌنايك وهو ،نيطسلف ضرأ يف ينويهصلا ُنايكلا
 مضل نانبل ضرأب هعامطأ نع حاصفلإا نع َناوتي
 يفو ،هتاورثو هتاريخ ىلع ءلايتسلإاو ،هنم َءازجأ
 ًايجيردت عامطلأا هذه قيقحت لواحو ،ههايم اهتمدقم.  
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This entity began its aggression on 
Lebanon in 1948 from the border to the 
heart of the nation, from the Houla 
massacre in 1949 to the attack on Beirut 
International Airport in 1968, and in-
between there were long years of assaults 
on the border areas, its land, population 
and wealth, as a prelude to directly seize its 
land through recurring invasions, leading to 
the March 1978 invasion and the 
occupation of the border area, and 
subjecting to security, political and 
economic control within the framework of an 
integrated project, in preparation to the 
subjugation of the whole nation with the 
invasion of 1982. 
 ماعلا ذنم هناودع نايكلا اذه رشاب1948 نم ،
 ماع لاوح ةرزجم نم ،نطولا قمع ىلإ دودحلا
1949  ماع يلو ُّدلا توريب راطم ىلع ناودعلا ىلإ
1968 تاءادتعلإا نم ةليوط تاونس امهنيب امو ،
دودحلا قطانم ىلع ،اهتاورثو اهناكسو اهضرأب ،
 قيرط نع ضرلأا ىلع رشابملا ءلايتسلإل ةمدقمك
 راذآ حايتجا ىلإ ًلاوصو ،ةرركتملا تاحايتجلإا
1978  هتطلسل اهعاضخإو دودحلا ةقطنم للاتحاو
 عورشم راطإ يف ،ةيداصتقلإاو ةيسايسلاو ةينملأا
 ماعلا حايتجا يف ّهلك نطولا عاضخلإ ًاديهمت ،لماكتم
1982. 
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All of this was taking place with the full 
backing of the United States of America and 
the indifference to the level of collusion of 
the so-called “international community” 
(mujtamʿa) and its international institutions, 
with a suspicious official Arab silence and in 
the absence of the Lebanese authority 
ولا لَبِق نم لماك معدب يرجي ناك كلذ لك تايلا
 لَبِق نم ؤطاوتلا ّدح ىلإ لهاجتو ،ةيكريملأا ةدحتملا
 ،ةيلو ُّدلا هتاسسؤمو "يلو ُّدلا عمتجملا"ـب فرعُي ام
 بايغو ,بيرم يبرع يمسر تمص لظ يفو
 ًابهن اهَبعشو اهَضرأ تكرت يتلا ةينانبللا ةطلسلل
 لمحتت نأ نود نم يليئارسلإا للاتحلإاو رزاجملل
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which allowed its land and people to be 
subject to massacres and to the Israeli 
massacres occupation without assuming its 
responsibilities and its national duties. 
ولا اهتابجاوو اهتايلؤسمةينط. 
Under this tremendous national tragedy, the 
suffering of the people and the impotence of 
its state and being abandoned by the world; 
the Lebanese who are loyal to their nation 
could not but use their right and undertake 
their national, moral and religious duties to 
defend their land. Thus, their choice was: 
launching an armed popular resistance to 
face the Zionist threat and the constant 
aggressions against their lives, their means 
of living and their future. 
ناعمو ىربكلا ةينطولا ةاسأملا هذه لظ يف بعشلا ةا
 نوينانبللا دجي مل ،هنع ملاعلا ّيلختو هتلود بايغو
 قلاطنلإاو ،مهقح مادختسا ىوس مهنطول نوصلخملا
 عافدلا يف ينيدلاو يقلاخلأاو ينطولا مهبجاو نم
 ةيبعش ةمواقم قلاطإ :مهرايخ ناكف ،مهضرأ نع
 مئادلا ناودعلاو ينويهصلا رطخلا ةهجاومل ةّحلسم
و مهقازرأو مهتايح ىلعمهلبقتسم. 
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In such difficult circumstances, in which the 
Lebanese lacked a state, a process of 
regaining of the nation through the armed 
resistance began in order to liberate the 
land and the political decision from the 
control of the Israeli occupation as a step 
towards the restoration of the state and the 
building of its constitutional institutions. 
 نوينانبللا دقتفا ثيح ،ةبعصلا فورظلا كلت يف
 للاخ نم نطولا ةداعتسا ةريسم تأدب ،ةلودلا
 رارقلاو ضرلأا ريرحتب كلذو ،ةّحلسملا ةمواقملا
لإا للاتحلإا دي نم يسايسلا ةمدقمك يليئارس
ةيروتسدلا اهتاسسؤم ءانبو ةلودلا ةداعتسلا، 
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And most important of all this re-
establishing the national values which the 
nation is built upon and above all 
sovereignty and national dignity that gave  
the value of freedom its real meaning and it 
did not remain a mere unfulfilled slogan but 
confirmed by the resistance through the 
action of liberating the land and man. These 
national values transformed into a founding 
stone of the building of modern Lebanon, 
assured its position on the map of the world 
and restored its own reputation as a country 
that is respected and its people are proud of 
belonging to it as a nation of freedom, 
culture, knowledge and diversity as well as 
a nation of vigor, dignity, sacrifice and 
heroism. 
 يتلا ةينطولا ميقلا سيسأت ةداعإ ّهلك كلذ نم مهلأاو
 ةماركلاو ةدايسلا :اهتعيلط يفو نطولا اهيلع ىنبُي
 ،يقيقحلا اهَدعُب ةيرحلا ةميقل ىطعأ ام ،ناتينطولا
 لعفب ةمواقملا اهتسّرك لب قَّلعم راعش درجم َقبت ملف
 ةينطولا ميقلا هذه تلوحتو ،ناسنلإاو ضرلأا ريرحت
أ كامدم ىلإ تزجحف ،ثيدحلا نانبل ءانبل ساس
 دلبك هيلإ رابتعلإا تداعأو ملاعلا ةطراخ ىلع هعقوم
 وه امب هيلإ ءامتنلإاب هؤانبأ رختفيو هَمارتحا ضِرفَي
 نطو وه امك عونتلاو ملعلاو ةفاقثلاو ةيرحلل نطو
ةلوطبلاو ةيحضتلاو ةماركلاو ناوفنعلا. 
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These dimensions combined have been 
achieved by the resistance through the 
Liberation of 2000 and the historic victory of 
July 2006, offering to the whole world a 
living experience in defending the nation, an 
experience that has become a lesson from 
which peoples and states learn to protect 
their land, defend their independence and 
 ام للاخ نم ةمواقملا اهتجّوت ًةعمتجم داعبلأا هذه ّنإ
 ماعلا يف ريرحت نم هتزجنأ2000  راصتنا نمو
 ماع زومت برح يف يخيرات2006 تمّدق يذلاو ،
 تلّوحت ًةبرجت ،نطولا نع عافدلل ًةيح ًةبرجت امهيف
 عافدلا يف لودلاو بوعشلا اهنم ديفتست ةسردم ىلإ
و اهللاقتسا ةيامحو اهضرأ نعاهتدايس نوص.  
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preserve their sovereignty. 
This national achievement of the resistance 
was carried out hanks to the support of a 
loyal people and a national army, thus 
thwarting the enemy's ambitions and 
causing him a historical defeat, and for the 
resistance, with its mujahidin and martyrs 
(shuhadaʾ) and Lebanon with its people and 
army, to achieve a great victory that 
ushered in a new era in the region 
highlighting to the crucial role and function 
of the resistance to repel the enemy and 
secure the protection of the nation’s 
independence and its sovereignty, the 
defence of its people and the completion of 
liberating the rest of the occupied territory. 
 بعش ةرزاؤمب ةمواقملل ينطولا زاجنلإا اذه َقَّقحَت
 تعقَوأو ودعلا َفادهأ تطبَحأف ،ّينطو شيجو ّيفو
واقملا جُرْخَِتل ،ًةيخيرات ًةميزه هب اهيدهاجمب ُةم
 راصتناب ،هشيجو هبعشب نانبل اهعمو ،اهئادهشو
 اهناونع ةقطنملا يف ةديدج ةلحرمل سّسأ ميظع
 ودعلا عدر يف ًةفيظوو ًارود ةمواقملا ةيروحم
 نع عافدلاو هتدايسو نطولا للاقتسلا ةيامحلا نيمأتو
ةلتحملا ضرلأا ةيقب ريرحت لامكتساو هبعش.  
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Indeed this task and mission is a national 
requirement as long as the "Israeli" threat 
and the ambitions of the enemy over our 
land and waters remain,  and as long as a 
strong and a capable state is missing and 
within the imbalance of force between the 
state and the enemy -  
 ٌةمئاد ٌةينطو ٌةرورض ةفيظولا هذهو رودلا اذه ّنإ
 يف ودعلا عامطأ َماودو يليئارسلإا ديدهتلا َماود
 ،ةرداقلا ةيوقلا ةلودلا بايغ ماودو انهايمو انضرأ
 ةلودلا نيب ام ىوقلا نيزاوم يف للخلا لظ يفو
ودعلاو - 
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-the imbalance that usually compels weak 
states and  peoples targeted by the greed 
and threats of imperious and powerful 
states to seek ways to benefit from the 
available capabilities and possibilities.  The 
permanent "Israeli" threat requires from 
Lebanon to pursue a defensive strategy that 
combines a popular resistance that defends 
the nation against any Israeli aggression 
and a national army that protects the nation, 
and maintains its security and stability, in an 
integral operation which is proved to be 
successful in the last period in conducting 
the fight with the enemy and achieved 
victories for Lebanon and increased the 
means for its protection. 
 بوعشلاو ةفيعضلا لودلا ًةداع عفدي يذلا للخلا
 ةطلستملا لودلا تاديدهتو عامطأ نم ةفدهتسملا
 تاردقلا نم ديفتست غيص نع ثحبلا ىـلإ ،ةيوـقلاو
 ةحاتملا تاناكملإاو- دهتلا ّنإف مئادلا يليئارسلإا دي
 ىلع موقت ةيعافد ةغيص سيركت نانبل ىلع ضرفي
 عافدلا يف مهاست ةيبعش ةمواقم دوجو نيب ةجوازملا
 شيجو ،يليئارسإ وزغ يأ هجو يف نطولا نع
 يف ،هرارقتساو هنمأ تّبثيو نطولا يمحي ينطو
 يف اهحاجن ةيضاملا ةلحرملا تتبثأ لماكت ةيلمع
 ودعلا عم عارصلا ةرادإ نانبلل تاراصتنا تققحو
هل ةيامحلا لبس ترفوو. 
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This formula, which is part of the defensive 
strategy, constitutes an umbrella for the 
protection of Lebanon, after the failure of 
the other ventures on other forms of 
protections, whether international or Arab, 
or through negotiation with the enemy. 
 ةيجيتارتسا نمض نم عضوت يتلا ،ةغيصلا هذه
 لشف دعب ،نانبلل ةيامحلا َّةلظم لّكشت ،ةيعافد
 ًةيلوُد تناكأ ءاوس ،ىرخلأا تلاظملا ىلع تاناهرلا
ودعلا عم ًةيضوافت مأ ًةيبرع مأ، 
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Adopting the option of resistance brought 
about to Lebanon the liberation of the land, 
restoration of the state institutions and 
protection of sovereignty resulting in the 
real independence. In this context, the 
Lebanese, with their political power, social 
strata,  cultural elites and economic 
organisations are concerned with protecting 
this formula and being part of it because the 
Israeli danger threatens Lebanon in all its 
components and constituents which 
requires the widest Lebanese participation 
in assuming the responsibilities in 
defending the nation and providing  the 
means for its protection. 
 ضرلأل ًاريرحت نانبلل قّقح ةمواقملا رايخ جاهتناف
لا تاسسؤمل ًةداعتساو# 
  اذه يف .يقيقحلا للاقتسلإل ًازاجنإو ةدايسلل ًةيامحو
 مهِحئارشو ةيسايسلا مهاوقب نيينانبللا ّنإف راطلإا
يهو ةيفاقثلا مهِبَخُنو ةيعامتجلإا ،ةيداصتقلإا مهِتائ
 ,اهيف طارخنلإاو ةغيصلا هذه ىلع ظافحلاب نوينعم
 هتانوكم لكب نانبل دّدهتي يليئارسلإا رطخلا ّنلأ
 يف ةينانبل ةكراشم عسوأ ّبلطتي ام اذهو ،هتاموقمو
 لبس ريفوتو نطولا نع عافدلا تايلوؤسم لّمحت
هل ةيامحلا. 
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Finally, the successful experience of the 
resistance in fighting the enemy and the 
failure of all plots and wars to destroy it or 
to strangle its option and disarm it on one 
hand and the on-going "Israeli" danger 
against Lebanon and the continuation of its 
threat on the other hand, requires from the 
Resistance to the relentless pursuit to 
acquire the means of power, reinforce its 
capacities and potential which enable it to 
exercise its duty, undertake its national 
responsibilities, and take part in carrying out 
the task in liberating of what remains of our 
land that is under the "Israeli" occupation in 
the Shibaʿa farms and Kfar Shouba hills 
and the Lebanese village of Ghajar as well 
as retrieving the detainees and missing 
people and martyrs' bodies (shuhadaʾ), and 
participating in the role of defending and 
protecting the land and the people. 
 لشفو ،ودعلل يدصتلا يف ةمواقملا ةبرجت حاجن ّنإ
 ةرصاحم وأ اهيلع ءاضقلل بورحلاو تاططخملا لك
 رطخلا رارمتساو ،ةهج نم اهحلاس عزنو اهرايخ
 نم هنع ديدهتلا لاوز مدعو نانبل ىلع يليئارسلإا
لا ةمواقملا ىلع ضرفَي ىرخأ ةهج بوؤدلا يعس
 امب اهتاناكمإو اهتاردق زيزعتو ةوقلا بابسأ كلاتملا
 اهتايلوؤسمب مايقلاو اهبجاو ةيدأت ىلع دعاسي
 ىّقبت ام ريرحت ةمهم لامكتسا يف ةمهاسملل ،ةينطولا
 للاتو اعبش عرازم يف للاتحلإا تحت انضرأ نم
 نم يقب نَم ذاقنتساو ،ةينانبللا رجغلا ةدلبو ابوشرفك
وقفمو ىرسأ يف ةكراشملاو ،ءادهشلا داسجأو نيد
بعشلاو ضرلأل ةيامحلاو عافدلا ةفيظو. 
71 
Third: the State and the Political System يسايسلا ماظنلاو ةلودلا : ًاثلاث 72 
The most fundamental problem in the 
Lebanese political system, which hinders its 
reform, development and modernisation, is 
political sectarianism. 
 ،ينانبللا يسايسلا ماظنلا يف ةيساسلأا ةلكشملا ّنإ
 رمتسم لكشب هثيدحتو هريوطتو هحلاصإ عنمت يتلاو
ةيسايسلا ةيفئاطلا يه. 
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The fact that the Lebanese political system 
is founded on a sectarian basis represents 
in itself a strong obstacle towards achieving 
true democracy through which an elected 
majority is able to govern and oppose an 
elected minority, opening the door for a 
proper alternation of power between those 
who govern and the opposition or the 
 ًاقئاع لّكشي ةيفئاط سسأ ىلع ماظنلا مايق ّنأ امك
 ىلع نكمي ةحيحص ةيطارقميد قيقحت مامأ ًايوق
 ةيلقلأا ضراعتو ةبَختنملا ةيرثكلأا مكحت نأ اهئوض
 نيب ةطلسلل ميلس لوادتل بابلا اهيف حتفُيو ،ةبَختنملا
ةفلتخملا ةيسايسلا تافلاتئلإا وأ ةضراعملاو ةلااوملا. 
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various political coalitions. 
For this reason the fundamental condition 
for the achievement of real democracy of 
this kind is the abolition of political 
sectarianism from the system, thus the 
“Ṭāʾif Agreement” stipulated forming a 
national committee to carry it through. 
ل ساسلأا طرشلا ّنإف كلذلو ةيقيقح ةيطارقميد قيبطت
 ،ماظنلا نم ةيسايسلا ةيفئاطلا ءاغلإ وه عونلا اذه نم
 ليكشت بوجو ىلع "فئاطلا قافتا" صن ام وهو
هزاجنلإ ايلع ةينطو ةئيه. 
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Until when the Lebanese, through their 
national dialogue will be able to achieve this 
historic and sensitive objective (the abolition 
of political sectarianism) and as long as the 
political system in Lebanon is based on 
sectarian foundations, then the 
consociational democracy remains the 
fundamental basis for governance in 
Lebanon, because it is the actual 
quintessence of the spirit of the constitution 
and the core of the pact of coexistence. 
 مهراوح للاخ نمو نوينانبللا نكمتي نأ ىلإو
 ساسحلاو يخيراتلا زاجنلإا اذه قيقحت نم ينطولا- 
 ةيسايسلا ةيفئاطلا ءاغلإ ينعن-  ماظنلا ّنأ املاطو
 ةيطارقميدلا ّنإف ةيفئاط سسأ ىلع موقي يسايسلا
 اهنلأ ،نانبل يف مكحلل ساسلأا ةدعاقلا ىقبت ةيقفاوتلا
لا حورل يلعفلا ديسجتلا شيعلا قاثيم رهوجلو روتسد
كرتشملا. 
76 
Thus, any approach to the national issues 
according to the equation of majority and 
minority remains dependent on meeting the 
historic and social conditions for the 
exercise of effective democracy the value of 
which is the citizen himself/herself. 
 ةلداعم قفو ةينطولا لئاسملل ةبراقم يأ ّنإف انه نم
 ةيخيراتلا طورشلا ققحت نهر ىقبت ةيلقلأاو ةيرثكلأا
 يتلا ةيلعفلا ةيطارقميدلا ةسراممل ةيعامتجلإاو
هتاذ دحب ًةميق نطاوملا اهيف حبصي. 
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The desire of the Lebanese to live together 
in dignity and equal rights and duties 
requires a constructive collaboration in 
order to consecrate real participation, which 
constitutes the most suitable formula to 
protect their complete diversity and stability 
after a period of instability caused by 
different policies based on the tendency 
towards monopoly, elimination and 
exclusion. 
 ةماركلا يروفوم ًاعم شيعلا يف نيينانبللا ةدارإ ّنإ
 ءاّنبلا نواعتلا مّتحت ،تابجاولاو قوقحلا يواستمو
 لّكشت يتلاو ةيقيقحلا ةكراشملا سيركت لجأ نم
 لماكلا مهرارقتساو مهعونت ةيامحل بسنلأا ةغيصلا
 ةفلتخملا تاسايسلا اهتبّبس رارقتسإلالا نم ةبقح دعب
 عوزنلا ىلع ةمئاقلا ءاغللإاو راثئتسلإا وحن
ءاصقلإاو. 
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The consociational democracy represents a 
proper political formula to assure real 
participation of everybody and an assuring 
factor to the elements of the homeland, and 
it contributes greatly towards a broad 
participation during the period of the 
establishment of a secure state which is 
considered by all its citizens to exist for 
them. 
 ًةمئلام ًةيسايس ًةغيص لّكشت ةيقفاوتلا ةيطارقميدلا ّنإ
 نِئْمَطم ةقث لماعو ،عيمجلا لَبِق نم ةيقيقح ةكراشمل
بك لكشب مهسُت يهو ،نطولا تانوكمل حتف يف ري
 يتلا ةنِئْمَطملا ةلودلا ءانب ةلحرم يف لوخدلل باوبلأا
مهلجأ نم ةمئاق اهنأ اهينطاوم لك رعشي. 
79 
The state that we look forward to 
collectively build with the rest of the 
 ةيقب عم اهئانب يف ةكراشملا ىلا علطتن يتلا ةلودلا ّنإ 80 
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Lebanese is: 
1. A state that safeguards the public 
freedoms and provides the suitable 
environment for the practice of 
these freedoms. 
2. A state that works for national unity 
and national cohesion. 
3. A state that is capable of protecting 
the land, people, sovereignty and 
independence and that has a 
national, strong, prepared and 
equipped army and efficient 
institutions of security seeks to 
ensure the security of people and 
their interests. 
4. A state the structure of which is 
built on modern, effective and 
collaborative institutions that relies 
on clear and well-defined 
authorities, functions and missions. 
5. A state that abides by implementing 
the laws on  everybody without 
discrimination in   respect of public 
freedoms and justice towards the 
rights and duties of the citizens 
regardless of their religion, region, 
or inclinations. 
6. A state that has a genuine 
parliamentary representation 
achievable only through a modern 
electoral law that allows the 
Lebanese voters to choose their 
representatives without the 
influence of money, kinship, and 
other pressures and realizes the 
widest possible representation of 
the different layers of the Lebanese 
people. 
7. A state that relies on those who 
have scientific competence, 
professional skills and trustworthy 
people regardless of their sectarian 
affiliations, and establishes  
effective and powerful mechanisms 
to clear the administration from 
corruption and corrupt people 
without compromise. 
8. A state that has a supreme judicial 
يه نيينانبللا:  
1. لا نوصت يتلا ةلودلا رفوتو ،ةماعلا تايرح
اهتسراممل ةمئلاملا ءاوجلأا لك. 
2.  ةينطولا ةدحولا ىلع صرحت يتلا ةلودلا
ينطولا كسامتلاو. 
3.  بعشلاو ضرلأا يمحت يتلا ةرداقلا ةلودلا
 ٌشيج اهل نوكيو ،للاقتسلإاو ةدايسلاو
 ٌتاسسؤمو ،ٌزَّهجمو ٌردتقمو ٌيوق ٌينطو
 سانلا نمأ ىلع ٌةصيرحو ٌةلعاف ٌةينمأ
اصمومهحل. 
4.  ةدعاق ىلع اهتينب يف ةمئاقلا ةلودلا
 ،ةنواعتملاو ةلعافلاو ةثيدحلا تاسسؤملا
 فئاظوو تايحلاص ىلا دنتست يتلاو
ةددحمو ةحضاو ماهمو. 
5.   ىلع نيناوقلا قيبطت مزتلت يتلا ةلودلا
 ةماعلا تايرحلا مارتحا راطإ يف ،عيمجلا
 ،نينطاوملا تابجاوو قوقح يف ةلادعلاو
اذم فلاتخا ىلع مهقطانمو مهبه
مهتاهاجتاو. 
6.   ميلس يباين ليثمت اهيف رفاوتي يتلا ةلودلا
 للاخ نم ّلاإ هقيقحت نكمي لا حيحصو
 بخانلل حيتي يرصع تاباختنا نوناق
 ةرطيس نع ًاديعب هيلثمم راتخي نأ ينانبللا
 ،ةفلتخملا طوغضلاو تايبصعلاو لاملا
 حئارش فلتخمل نكمم ليثمت َعسوأ ققحيو
نبللا بعشلاينا. 
7.  تاءافكلا باحصأ ىلع دمتعت يتلا ةلودلا
 ،ةهازنلا لهأو ةيلمعلا تاراهملاو ةيملعلا
 يتلاو ،ةيفئاطلا مهتاءامتنا نع رظنلا ضغب
 ةرادلإا ريهطتل ًةيوقو ًةلعاف تايلآ عضت
ةمواسم نود نيدسافلاو داسفلا نم. 
8.   ايلع ةيئاضق ةطلس اهيف رفاوتت يتلا ةلودلا
 ّكحت نع ةديعبو ةلقتسمو ،نييسايسلا م
 نوهيزنو نوُؤفَك ٌةاضق اهيف سرامي
 ةماقإ يف ةريطخلا مهِتايلوؤسم ٌرارحأو
سانلا نيب لدعلا. 
9.  سيئر لكشب اهداصتقا مْيِقُت يتلا ةلودلا
 ىلع لمعتو ،ةجِتنملا تاعاطقلا ةدعاق ىلع
 ًاصوصخو ،اهزيزعتو اهضاهنتسا
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power, independent of the control of 
the politicians, through which 
capable, impartial and independent 
judges exercise their critical 
responsibilities in implementing 
justice among people. 
9. A state that sets up its economy 
chiefly according to the productive 
sectors and works on strengthening 
and consolidating   these sectors 
especially the agricultural and 
industrial ones and giving them the 
appropriate scope in planning, 
programming and support that 
leads to improving production and 
its distribution and providing 
enough and suitable jobs, 
especially in the countryside. 
10. A state that adopts and implements 
the principle of balanced 
development among the regions, 
and work on closing the social and 
economic gap between them. 
11. A state that cares about its citizens 
and work for the provision of 
appropriate services for them 
including education, health and  
housing to guarantee a dignified 
life, solve the problem of poverty 
and provides employment 
opportunities etc. 
12. A state that takes care of the young 
and rising generations and help 
them develop  their potentials and 
talents, guides them towards 
national and humanitarian goals, 
and protects them from deviation 
and vice. 
13. A state that works to empower the 
role of the woman and develops her 
participation in all fields, in order to 
benefit of her individual 
characteristics, her influence and 
respecting her position. 
14. A state that gives the status of 
educational the appropriate 
importance, especially in regards to 
public schools, bolsters the 
Lebanese university at all levels, 
and implements a compulsory and 
 اهئاطعإو ،ةعانصلاو ةعارزلا تاعاطق
 بسانملا زّيحلا جماربلاو ططخلا نم
 جاتنلإا نيسحت ىلا يدؤي امب ،معدلاو
 ةيفاكلا لمعلا صرف رفوي امو ،هفيرصتو
فايرلأا يف ًةصاخو ،ةبسانملاو. 
11.  ءامنلإا أدبم قبطتو دمتعت يتلا ةلودلا
 مدر ىلع لمعتو ،قطانملا نيب نزاوتملا
اهنيب ةيعامتجلإاو ةيداصتقلإا ةّوهلا. 
11. ،اهينطاومب متهت يتلا ةلودلا  ىلع لمعتو
 ميلعتلا نم مهل ةبسانملا تامدخلا ريفوت
 ةايحلا نيمأت ىلا ،نكسلاو ةبابطلاو
 ريفوتو ،رقفلا ةلكشم ةجلاعمو ،ةميركلا
كلذ ريغو لمعلا صرف. 
12.   ةباشلا لايجلأاب ينتعت يتلا ةلودلا
 مهِتاقاط ةيمنت ىلع دعاستو ،ةدعاصلاو
 تاياغلا وحن مهِهيجوتو ،مهِبهاومو
او ةيناسنلإا نم مهِتيامحو ،ةينطول
ةليذرلاو فارحنلإا. 
13.   ةأرملا رود زيزعت ىلع لمعت يتلا ةلودلا
 يف ،ًةفاك تلااجملا يف اهتكراشم ريوطتو
 اهريثأتو اهتيصوصخ نم ةدافتسلإا راطإ
اهِتناكم مارتحاو. 
14.   ةيمهلأا يوبرتلا عضولا يلْوُت يتلا ةلودلا
 مامتهلإا ةهجل ًاصوصخ ،ةبسانملا
رلا ةسردملاب ةعماجلا زيزعتو ،ةيمس
 ةيمازلإ قيبطتو ،ديعص لك ىلع ةينانبللا
هتيناّجم بناج ىلا ميلعتلا. 
15.    ًايزكرم لا ًايرادإ ًاماظن دمتعت يتلا ةلودلا
 تادحولل ًةعساو ًةيرادإ  تاطلس يطعي
 ،)ةيدلب /ءاضق /ةظفاحم( ةفلتخملا ةيرادلإا
 نوؤش ليهستو ةيمنتلا صرف زيزعت فدهب
وملا تلاماعمو لّوحتب حامسلا نود ،نينطا
 نم عون ىلا ةيرادلإا ةيزكرملالا هذه
 ًاقحلا ةيلاردفلا. 
16.   نم ةرجهلا فقول ُدهجَت يتلا ةلودلا
 ةرجهو تلائاعلاو بابشلا ةرجه ،نطولا
 لماش ططخم نمض ،ةغمدلأاو تاءافكلا
يعقاوو. 
17.    يف نيبرتغملا اهينطاوم ىعرت يتلا ةلودلا
نع عفادتو ،ملاعلا عاقصأ لك ،مهيمحتو مه
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free education. 
15. A state that is based on an 
administrative rather than a 
centralised system which allows 
broad administrative powers to the 
different administrative units 
(province/district/municipality), in 
order to  boost development and 
facilitate the affairs and dealings of 
citizens without allowing the 
transformation of this decentralised 
administration  into a kind of 
federalism at a later. 
16. A state that does it best to stop the 
emigration from the nation of  
young people and families and 
human capital flight (“brain drain”) 
within a far-reaching and 
comprehensive programme. 
17. A state that supports its citizens 
and emigrants all over of the world, 
and defends and protects them, 
and benefits from their diffusion, 
positions, and connections in to 
serve the national causes. 
 مهعقاومو مهتناكمو مهراشتنا نم ديفتستو
ةينطولا اياضقلا ةمدخل. 
The establishment of a state on these 
specifications and conditions is our 
objective and the objective of every honest 
and sincere Lebanese. In Hezbollah, we will 
make all possible efforts, in collaboration 
with the different popular and political forces 
that share this vision with us, to realize this 
noble national objective. 
 انل ٌفده طورشلاو تافصاوملا هذهب ةلود مايق ّنإ
 الله بزح يف نحنو ،صلخمو قداص ينانبل لكلو
بو ،اندوهج لك لذبنس ةيسايسلا ىوقلا عم نواعتلا
 لجأ نم ،ةيؤرلا هذه انكراشت يتلا ةفلتخملا ةيبعشلاو
ليبنلا ينطولا فدهلا اذه قيقحت. 
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Fourth: Lebanon and the Lebanese-
Palestinian Relations 
 ةينانبللا تاقلاعلاو نانبل : ًاعبار- ةينيطسلفلا  
The problem of Palestinian refugees in 
Lebanon was and continues to be one of 
the tragic consequences of the emergence 
of the Zionist entity over the land of 
Palestine and the expulsion of its people 
from it. Those expelled moved to Lebanon 
to live there temporarily as guests with their 
Lebanese brothers until they return to their 
nation and their homes from which they 
were forced out. 
 لازت لاو نانبل يف نيينيطسلفلا نيئجلالا ُةلكشم تناك
 ينويهصلا نايكلا ءوشنل ةيواسأملا جئاتنلا نم ًةدحاو
 ءلاؤهف ،اهنم اهلهأ ديرشتو نيطسلف ضرأ ىلع
 ىدل فويضك ًاتقؤم هيف اوشيعيل نانبل ىلإ اولقتنا
 مهرايدو مهنطو ىلإ نودوعي امثير نيينانبللا مهناوخإ
اهنم اوجرُخأ يتلا. 
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What both the Palestinians and the 
Lebanese suffered because of this 
expulsion was in fact directly caused by the 
Israeli occupation of Palestine, and the 
calamities and tragedies that followed as a 
result of this affected  all the peoples of the 
region and not only Palestinians. 
 ءاوس دح ىلع نوينانبللاو نوينيطسلفلا هاناع امو
 وه رشابملاو يقيقحلا هببس ناك ،ءوجللا اذه ءارج
 نم هنع جتن امو ،نيطسلفل يليئارسلإا للاتحلإا
 ملو اهرسأب ةقطنملا بوعش تباصأ  تلايوو  سآم
طقف نيينيطسلفلا ىلع اهررض رصتقي. 
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And the suffering of the Palestinian 
refugees in Lebanon was not limited to the 
pain of forced migration and seeking 
asylum only, but also to the attacks and the 
savage Israeli massacres  
 مل نانبل يف نيينيطسلفلا نيئجلالا ةاناعم ّنأ امك
 امنإ طقف ءوجللاو ةيرسقلا ةرجهلا ملاآ ىلع رصتقت
 اهيلإ تفيُضأ ُةيشحولا ُرزاجملاو ُتاءادتعلإا
ةيليئارسلإا، 
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which destroyed people and properties like 
what happened in the camp of Nabatiya 
which was completely destroyed. The 
harshness of life in the camps in conditions 
that lack the minimum of a dignified life, the 
denial of civil and social rights and the 
failure of the successive Lebanese 
governments to do their duties towards 
them. 
 ميخم يف لصح امك ،رشبلاو رجحلا ترمد يتلا
 يف شيعلا ُةواسق /لماكلاب رّمُد يذلا ةيطبنلا
 نم ىندلأا دحلا ىلإ رقتفت فورظ لظ يف تاميخملا
موقم ةيندملا قوقحلا نم ُنامرحلا /ميركلا شيعلا تا
 ةبقاعتملا ةينانبللا تاموكحلا مايق ُمدع /ةيعامتجلإاو
مههاجت اهبجاوب. 
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This exceptional situation requires today 
from the responsible Lebanese authorities 
to assume their responsibilities and 
therefore build the Lebanese-Palestinian 
relations on a strong, solid and legal basis 
taking into account what is right, just and 
shared interests of both peoples and these 
circumstances and relations should not be 
governed by  whims and moods, political 
calculations, internal contentions, and 
international interventions. 
 ىلع مويلا مّتحي تاب يعيبطلا ريغ عقاولا اذه ّنإ
 لّمحت ةرورض ةلوؤسملا ةينانبللا تاطلسلا
 ةينانبللا تاقلاعلا ءانبو ،اهتيلوؤسم-  ىلع ةينيطسلفلا
 نيزاوم يعارت ،ةينوناقو ةنيتمو ةحيحص سُسأ
 نأو ،نيبعشلا لاكل ةكرتشملا َحلاصملاو لدعلاو قحلا
علا هذهو دوجولا اذه ىقبي لا ةجزملأل ًةموكحم تاقلا
 ةيلخادلا تابذاجتلاو ةيسايسلا تاباسحلاو ءاوهلأاو
ةيلو ُّدلا تلاخدتلاو. 
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And we believe that success in this 
important matter is achieved through the 
following points: 
 للاخ نم ققحتي ةمهملا هذه يف حاجنلا ّنأ ىرن اننإ
يلي ام: 
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1. Direct Lebanese-Palestinian dialogue. 
2.  Enabling the Palestinians in Lebanon to 
agree on a unified and voluntary authority to 
represent them in this dialogue, bypassing 
the current disagreements in the general 
Palestinian situation. 
3. Giving to the Palestinian in Lebanon their 
civil and social rights, in a way that respects 
their human status, protect their personality, 
5.  ينانبللا راوحلا- رشابملا ينيطسلفلا. 
0.  قفاوتلا نم نانبل يف نيينيطسلفلا نيكمت
 يف مهلثمت مهل ةد َّحوم ةيعجرم رايتخا ىلع
 ةلصاحلا تانيابتلا نيزواجتم ،راوحلا اذه
معلأا ينيطسلفلا عضولا يف. 
3.  مهقوقح نانبل يف نيينيطسلفلا ءاطعإ
 مهعضوب قيلي امب ،ةيعامتجلإاو ةيندملا
سنلإا مهتيوهو مهتيصخش ظفحيو ينا
88 
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identity and cause. 
4. Commitment to the right to return and 
rejection of  naturalization (al-tawatyn). 
مهتيضقو. 
2. نيطوتلا ضفرو ةدوعلا قحب كسمتلا. 
Fifth: Lebanon and Arab relations ةيبرعلا تاقلاعلاو نانبل : ًاسماخ 89 
Lebanon is of an Arab identity and affiliation 
and asserts its identity and affiliation for 
they are natural and genuine state within 
the dynamics of the Lebanese society. 
 هتيوه سرامي امنإ ءامتنلإاو ةيوهلا يبرعلا نانبل ّنإ
 نيوكتلا يف ًةليصأ ًةيعيبط ًةلاح امهفصوب هءامتناو
ينانبللا يعمتجملا. 
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In addition, the vital space, the geo-politics, 
the strategic depth, and the policies of 
regional integration and national 
(qawmiyya) interest, as strategic 
determinants of Lebanon’s political position 
and its major interests, requires from 
Lebanon its commitment to the just Arab 
causes and first and foremost the 
Palestinian question and the struggle 
against the Israeli enemy. 
 قمعلاو ةيسايسلا ايفارغجلاو يويحلا ىدملا ّنأ امك
 حلاصملاو يميلقلإا لماكتلا تاسايسو يجيتارتسلإا
 نانبل عقومل ةيجيتارتسإ تاد ِّدحم اهفصوب ،ةيموقلا
 مازتللإا هيلع مّتحت ،ىربكلا هحلاصمو يسايسلا
 نيطسلف ةيضق اهتعيلط يفو ،ةلداعلا ةيبرعلا اياضقلاب
لإا ودعلا عم عارصلاويليئارس. 
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Moreover, there is an urgent need for 
concerted efforts to overcome the conflicts 
that divide the Arab rank. The contradictory 
strategies and the different alliances, 
important and critical as they are, do not 
justify the policies of exertion or engaging in 
external plans aiming at deepening discord 
and inciting sectarian feuds, fomenting the 
elements of division and separation which 
leads to the exhaustion of the umma and 
therefore serving the Zionist enemy and 
fulfilling the American objectives. 
 زواجتل دوهجلا رفاضت ىلإ ٌةديكأ ٌةجاح ةمث ،كلذك
 ّنأ ذإ ،يبرعلا فصلا ّقشت يتلا تاعارصلا ةلاح
 مغر ،تافلاحتلا فلاتخاو تايجيتارتسلإا ضقانت
 تاسايس يف قايسنلإا رّربت لا ،اهت َّدِحو اهتيّدِج
 ةيجراخلا عيراشملا يف طارخنلإا وأ فادهتسلإا
راثإو ةقرُفلا قيمعت ىلع ةمئاقلا ةيفئاطلا تارعنلا ة
 ىلإ يدؤي امب ،تيتفتلاو ةئزجتلا لماوع كيرحتو
 برآملا ذيفنتو ينويهصلا ودعلا ةمدخو ةملأا كاهنإ
ةيكريملأا. 
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Developing the political approach that rests 
upon restricting conflicts, organizing or even 
preventing them from happening without 
getting to the level of  open conflicts, is an 
option  that should be adopted to  develop a 
distinctive and responsible approach in 
dealing with national (qawmiyya) issues and 
seeking common factors that enhance this 
approach and provide constructive 
communication between governments and 
peoples to establish the broadest platform 
of solidarity for our causes. 
 رصح ىلع مئاقلا يسايسلا جهنملا ريوطت ّنإ
 ىلإ اهتلافنا نود لوؤحلاو اهميظنت وأ تاعازنلا
 يّنبتلاب ٌريدج ٌرايخ وه ،ةحوتفملا تاعارصلا لاجم
 عم يطاعتلا يف  ةلوؤسمو  ةيعون  ةبراقم جاضنلإ
 تاكرتشملا نع ثحبلا كلذكو ،ةيموقلا اياضقلا
 ءاّنبلا لصاوتلا صرف ريفوتو اهزيزعتل ىوتسم ىلع
 ينماضت راطإ عسوأ قيقحتل ،بوعشلاو تاموكحلا
اناياضق مدخي. 
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In this context the option of resistance 
constitutes a fundamental need and an 
objective factor in strengthening the Arab 
stance and weakening the enemy, 
independently from the nature of strategies 
or the political stakes undertaken. 
 ًلاماعو ًةيرهوج ًةجاح ةمواقملا رايخ لّكشي انهو
 ،ودعلا فاعضإو يبرعلا فقوملا بيلصتل ًايعوضوم
 تاناهرلا وأ تايجيتارتسلإا ةعيبط نع لزعمب
ةذختملا ةيسايسلا. 
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On the basis of all what has been said 
above, the resistance finds nothing wrong in 
spreading out the advantages gained from 
pursuing the option of resistance so that it 
extends to the different Arab scenes as long 
as the outcome is part of the equation of 
weakening the enemy and strengthening 
and consolidating the Arab stand. 
 يف ًةضاضغ ُةمواقملا دجت لا ،مّدقت ام لك ىلع ًءانب
 لاطي ثيحب ،اهرايخ نم ةدافتسلإا دئاوع ميمعت
 يف جردنت جئاتنلا تماد ام ،ةيبرعلا عقاوملا َفلتخم
 فقوملا بيلصتو ةيوقتو ودعلا فاعضإ ةلداعم راطإ
يبرعلا. 
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In this context, Syria has taken a distinctive 
and firm stand in the fight against the Israeli 
enemy and supported the resistance 
movements in the region, and stood by 
them in the most difficult circumstances, 
and sought to unify the Arab efforts to 
secure the interest of the region and 
confront the challenges. 
 ًادماصو ًازيمم ًافقوم ايروس تلجس ،راطلإا اذه يفو
 تاكرح تمعدو ،يليئارسلإا ودعلا عم عارصلا يف
 بعصأ يف اهبناج ىلا تفقوو ،ةقطنملا يف ةمواقملا
 نيمأتل ةيبرعلا دوهجلا ديحوت ىلا تعسو ،فورظلا
تايدحتلا ةهجاومو ةقطنملا حلاصم. 
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Hence, we emphasize the need to maintain  
the special relationships between Lebanon 
and Syria as a common political, security, 
and economic need, dictated by the 
interests of the two countries and their 
peoples, by the imperatives of geopolitics, 
the requirements for Lebanon's stability and 
the confrontation of common challenges. 
 ةزيمملا تاقلاعلاب كسمتلا ةرورض ىلع دكؤن اننإ
 ًةينمأو ًةيسايس ًةجاح اهفصوب ،ايروسو نانبل نيب
 نيبعشلاو نيدلبلا حلاصم اهيلمُت ،ًةكرتشم ًةيداصتقاو
 رارقتسلإا تابجومو ةيسايسلا ايفارغجلا تارورضو
ةكرتشملا تايدحتلا ةهجاومو ينانبللا ، 
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We also call for an end to all the negative 
sentiments that have characterised the 
relations between the two countries in the 
past few years and to bring these 
relationships back to normal as soon as 
possible. 
 تباش يتلا ةيبلسلا ءاوجلأا لك ءاهنإ ىلا وعدن امك
تاونسلا يف نيدلبلا تاقلاع  ةدوعلاو ،ةيضاملا ةليلقلا
 تقو عرسأ يف يعيبطلا اهعضو ىلا تاقلاعلا هذهب
نكمم. 
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Sixth: Lebanon and the Islamic Relations ةيملاسلإا تاقلاعلاو نانبل : ً ً ً ً اسداس 99 
Our Arab and Islamic world is facing 
challenges reaching our societies and its 
different components and that shouldn't be 
neglected for they are critically important. 
 لاطت  تايدحت يملاسلإاو يبرعلا انَُملاع هجاوي
 مدع يضتقي ام ،ةفلتخملا اهتانوكمب ،انِتاعمتجم
اهتروطخب نواهتلا. 
100 
331 
 
Indeed, the confessional tension and the 
contriving sectarian troubles, especially 
between Sunnis and Shiʿites, the fabrication 
of national  (qawmiyya) conflicts between 
Arabs, Turkmen and Kurds as well as 
between Arabs and Iranians, the 
threatening and intimidation of minorities, 
the trickling out of Christians from the Arab 
Mashreq and particularly from Palestine 
and Iraq not to mention Lebanon, all  
threatens the cohesion of our societies, 
undermines its immunity and increases 
obstacles against its renaissance and 
development. 
لَعتفملا ةيبهذملا تارتوتلاو يفئاطلا ناقتحلإاف ،ة
 قلاتخاو ،ةعيشلاو ةّنسلا نيب صخلأا ىلعو
 ،برعو نامكرتو درُك نيب ةيموقلا تاضقانتلا
 ،اهبيهرتو تايلقلأا فيوختو ..برعو نييناريإو
 ،يبرعلا قرشملا نم رمتسملا يحيسملا فزنلاو
 لك ،نانبل نع ًلاضف قارعلاو نيطسلف نم ًةصاخو
 ،اهتعنم نم ّللقيو ،انتاعمتجم َكسامت ددهي كلذ مقافيو
اهروطتو اهتضهن قئاوع نم. 
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Therefore, instead of being a source of 
social enrichment and vitality, the ethnic 
and religious diversity has been misused 
and employed as factor of social division, 
incitement and destruction.  
 ُعونتلا َل ِّثمي نأ لدبو  ىًنغ ردصم يموقلاو ينيدلا
 همادختسا متو ،هُفيظوت ءيسأ دقف ًةيعامتجإ ًةيويحو
يعمتجم تيتفتو ةقرُفو قيزمت لماعك. 
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The situation resulting from this misuse 
seems to be the result of the intersection of 
Western deliberate policies, the American in 
particular, irresponsible internal and 
factional practices and visions, in addition to 
an unstable political environment. 
 يه ئيسلا مادختسلإا اذه نع ةمجانلا ةلاحلا ّنإ
 ةيكريمأو ،ةدمعتم ةيبرغ تاسايسل عطاقت ةليصح
 لا ةيوبصع ةيلخاد تاروصتو تاسرامم عم ،ًاديدحت
لإاب ،ةلوؤسمةرقتسم ريغ ةيسايس ةئيب ىلإ ةفاض. 
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It seems urgent to take these facts into 
consideration, and it is essential and 
necessary to include them as one of the 
core concerns of the program of the main 
forces and tendencies, including the Islamic 
movements, that have a special 
responsibility of facing these challenges 
and solving these problems. 
 نمو ،ًاّحلم ودبي رابتعلإا نيعب قئاقحلا هذه ذخأ ّنإ
 تامامتهلإا دحأك اهجاردإ يرورضلاو ريدجلا
 ،ةيساسلأا تاهاجتلإاو ىوقلا جمارب يف ةيرهوجلا
لا ،ةيملاسلإا تاكرحلا اهيف امب اهلهاك ىلع عقت يت
 ةجلاعمو تايدحتلا هذهل يدصتلا يف ٌةصاخ ٌةيلوؤسم
تلاكشملا كلت. 
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Hezbollah emphasizes the importance of 
cooperation between the Islamic states at 
all levels, which would give them a force of 
solidarity in confronting the arrogant plans, 
protect society from cultural and media 
invasion, and encourage them to take 
advantage of their resources in the 
exchange of the different benefits among 
these countries. 
 لودلا نيب نواعتلا ةيمهأ ىلع الله بزح دكؤي
 اهحنمي ام وهو ،ًةفاك تلااجملا يف ةيملاسلإا َةوق
 ًةيامحو ،ةيرابكتسلإا تاططخملا هجو يف نماضت
 اهّضحيو ،يملاعلإاو يفاقثلا وزغلا نم ًةيعمتجم
 ةفلتخملا عفانملا لدابت يف اهتاريخ نم ةدافتسلإا ىلع
لودلا هذه نيب. 
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Within this paradigm, Hezbollah considers 
Iran the Islam a state of central importance 
in the Islamic world, since it is the one that 
overthrew the Shah and its American-
Zionist projects through its revolution, and 
supported the resistance movements in our 
region, and stood with courage and 
determination by the Arab and Islamic 
causes and especially the Palestinian one. 
 ةلود ملاسلإا َناريإ الله بزح ربتعَي ،راطلإا اذه يفو
 يتلا يهف ،يملاسلإا ملاعلا يف ًةمهم ًةيزكرم
 ةينويهصلا هعيراشمو هاشلا ماظن اهتروثب تطقسأ- 
 ،انتقطنم يف ةمواقملا تاكرح تمعدو ،ةيكريملأا
 ةيبرعلا اياضقلا بناج ىلا ميمصتو ةعاجشب تفقوو
قلا اهسأر ىلعو ،ةيملاسلإاوةينيطسلفلا ةيض. 
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The policy of the Islamic Republic in Iran is 
clear and firm in supporting the central and 
main cause of the Arabs and Muslims: the 
Palestinian cause. 
 ٌةحضاو ناريإ يف ةيملاسلإا ةيروهمجلا ةسايس ّنإ
ىلُولأا ةيزكرملا ةيضقلا معد يف ٌةتباثو  مهلأاو
ةينيطسلفلا ةيضقلا يهو نيملسملاو برعلل، 
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Since the declaration of the great victory of 
the Islamic Revolution under the leadership 
of Walī Al-Faqῑh Imam Khomeini (may God 
honour his soul), and the opening of a 
Palestinian embassy in place of the Israeli 
embassy, this support has been on-going in 
different shapes and forms until today under 
the leadership of the Walī al-Faqῑh Imam 
Khamenei (may he live long). This led to the 
achievement of outstanding victories for the 
first time in the history of the struggle with 
the Zionist invaders. 
 ةدايقب ةكرابملا ةيملاسلإا ةروثلا راصتنا نلاعإ ذنم
 ةرافس لوأ حتفو ،)هدق( ينيمخلا ماملإا هيقفلا يلولا
 اذه رمتسا دقو ،ةيليئارسلإا ةرافسلا ناكم ةينيطسلف
 هيقفلا يلولا ةدايقب اذه انموي ىلا ًةفاك هلاكشأب معدلا
ماخلا ماملإا قيقحت ىلا ىدأ ام ،)ّهلظ ماد( يئن
 عم عارصلا خيرات يف ةرم لولأ  ةزراب  تاراصتنا
ةازغلا ةنياهصلا. 
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The fabrication of a conflict with the Islamic 
Republic of Iran by some Arab parties is a 
self-betrayal and sell out of the Arab causes 
and serves only "Israel" and the United 
States of America. 
 يف ةيملاسلإا ةيروهمجلا عم ضقانتلا قلاتخا ّنإ
 ًانعط لّثمي ةيبرعلا تاهجلا ضعب لَبِق نم ناريإ
 "ليئارسإ" ىوس مدخي لاو ،ةيبرعلا اياضقللو تاذلل
ةيكريملأا ةدحتملا تايلاولاو. 
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Thus, Iran that formulated its political 
ideology, built its vital space on the basis of 
“the centrality of the Palestinian cause”, 
enmity towards “Israel”,   confrontation with 
the  American policies and integration in the 
Arab and Islamic milieu,  
 اهادم ْتَنَبو ،ةيسايسلا اهَتديقع تغاص يتلا ناريإف
ا "ةينيطسلفلا ةيضقلا ةيزكرم" ةدعاق ىلع يويحل
 ةيكريملأا تاسايسلا ةهجاومو "ليئارسإ"ـل ءادعلاو
ةيملاسلإاو ةيبرعلا ةئيبلا عم لماكتلاو، 
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must be welcomed with the will of 
cooperation and brotherhood, and engaged 
with as a basis for awakening, a strategic 
barycentre and model of sovereignty, 
independence and liberation supporting the 
contemporary Arab-Islamic project of 
independence and as a force which bolsters 
the power of the countries and the peoples 
of our region. 
او ،ةّوخلأاو نواعتلا ةدارإب لَباقُت نأ بجي يطاعتل
 يجيتارتسا لقث ِزكرمو ضاهنتسا ةدعاقك اهعم
 عورشملل معاد يررحتو يللاقتساو يدايس  جذومنأو
 يبرعلا-  ديزت  ةوقو ،رصاعملا يللاقتسلإا يملاسلإا
 ًةعنمو ًةوق انتقطنم بوعشو لود. 
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The Islamic world gains strength through 
alliances and cooperation of its countries. 
And we stress the importance of benefiting 
from the elements of political, economic and 
human power present in every state of the 
Islamic world on the basis of integration, 
success and non-subordination to the 
arrogant. 
تب ىوْقَي يملاسلإا ملاعلا ّنإ .هلود نواعتو هتافلاح
 ةوقلا رصانع نم ةدافتسلإا ةيمهأ ىلع دكؤنو
 لك يف ةدوجوملا ..ةيرشبلاو ةيداصتقلإاو ةيسايسلا
 لماكتلا ةدعاق ىلع ،يملاسلإا ملاعلا لود نم ةلود
نيربكتسملل ةيعبتلا مدعو ةرصنلاو. 
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And we should remember the importance of 
unity among Muslims as Allah exalted be 
He says: {Hold fast to God’s rope all 
together; do not split into factions} (Soura 
Al-Imran: 103). 
 :ىلاعت لاق ،نيملسملا نيب ةدحولا ةيمهأب رّكذنو
}ْاُوق َّرَفَت َلاَو ًاعيِمَج ِّالله ِلْبَحِب ْاوُمِصَتْعاَو{ ، 113 
And to beware of what causes division 
among Muslims such as sectarian 
incitements, between the Sunna and the 
Shi‘a in particular, and we rely on the 
conscience of the Islamic peoples in 
resisting the plots and strives at this level. 
يبهذملا تاراثلإاك مهنيب ةقرفتلا ببسي امم رذحلاو ،ة
 يعو ىلع نهارن نحنو ،ةعيشلاو ةّنسلا نيب ًةصاخو
 نم كاحي امل يدصتلا يف ةيملاسلإا بوعشلا
ديعصلا اذه ىلع نتفو تارماؤم. 
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Seventh: Lebanon and International 
Relations 
ةيلو ُّدلا تاقلاعلاو نانبل :ًاعباس 115 
The criteria of divergence, conflict and 
struggle in the vision of Hezbollah and its 
approach are based primarily upon political-
moral grounds, between the arrogant and 
downtrodden, the oppressor and 
oppressed, and between the usurper and 
the subdued and between the occupier and 
pursuer of freedom and independence. 
 ةيؤر يف عارصلاو عازنلاو فلاتخلإا ريياعم ّنإ
 يسايس ساسأ ىلع موقت امنإ هجهنمو الله بزح- 
 ،فَعضتسمو رِبكتسم نيب ،ىلولأا ةجردلاب يقلاخأ
 بلاطو لتحم رّبجتم نيبو ،روهقمو طلستم نيبو
للاقتساو ةيرح. 
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Hezbollah considers that the unilateral 
hegemony in the world overturn the 
international balance of power and stability 
as well as the international peace and 
security. 
 حيطُت ةيداُحلأا ةنميهلا ّنأ الله بزح ربتعَي امك
 ملسلاو نملأابو نيَيملاعلا رارقتسلإاو نزاوتلاب
نيَيلو ُّدلا. 
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The unlimited support of the American 
administration for "Israel",  its 
encouragement of aggression and  
concealment of its occupation of Arab lands 
as well as the hegemony of the American 
administration over the international 
institutions, and the double standards in 
issuing and implementing international 
resolutions, and the interventionist policy in 
the affairs of other societies, the 
militarization of the world, the resort to the 
 ،"ليئارسإ"ـل دودحملالا ةيكريملأا ةرادلإا معد ّنإ
فدو يضارلأل اهتلالاتحا َةيطغتو ،ناودعلل اهَع
 ىلع ةيكريملأا ةرادلإا ةنميه ىلإ ةفاضلإاب ،ةيبرعلا
 رادصإ يف ريياعملا َةيجاودزاو ،ةيلو ُّدلا تاسسؤملا
 نوؤش يف لخدتلا َةسايسو ،ةيلو ُّدلا تارارقلا ذيفنتو
 قطنم َدامتعاو ملاعلا َةركسعو ،ىرخلأا تاعمتجملا
 يف ةلقنتملا بورحلا َةراثإو ،ةيلو ُّدلا تاعازنلا
 عضي ،ملاعلا ءاحنأ لك يف تابارطضلإاو لقلاقلا
 ،انبوعشو انتملأ يداعملا عقوم يف ةيكريملأا ةرادلإا
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logic of  proxy wars in international conflicts, 
and provoking unrest and tensions in all  
parts of the world, places the American 
administration in a position of an enemy to 
our umma and our peoples, and it also 
bears the main responsibility in creating the 
imbalance and the troubles in the 
international system. 
 جاتنإ يف ىلُوأو ًةيساسأ ًةيلوؤسم اهلّمحي امك
يلو ُّدلا ماظنلا يف بارطضلإاو للاتخلإا. 
As regards the European policies they 
oscillates between inability and lack of 
efficiency on one hand, and the unjustified 
side-lining with the American policies on the 
other hand, which effectively leads to  
channelling the Mediterranean tendency in 
Europe to the advantage of the Atlantic 
tendency hegemony with its colonial 
characters. 
 زجعلا نيب حجرأتت اهنإف ةيبورولأا تاسايسلا امأ
 قاحتللإاو ةيحان نم ةيلعافلا ةلقو-  ر َّربملا ريغ- 
 ًايلعف يدؤي ام ،ةيناث ةيحان نم ةيكريملأا تاسايسلاب
 حلاصل ابوروأ يف ةيطسوتملا ةعزنلا فيوجت ىلإ
ةيرامعتسلإا اهتايفلخب ،ةيسلطلأا ةعزنلا ةنميه. 
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Following American policies- especially in 
its phase of historic failure- represents a 
strategic mistake that will only lead to more 
problems and complications in the 
European-Arab relations. 
 ةيكريملأا تاسايسلاب قاحتللإا ّنإ-  يف ًةصاخو
 يخيراتلا اهقافخإ ةلحرم-  ًأطخ لّكشي  نل ًايجيتارتسا
 تاديقعتلاو رثعتلاو تلاكشملا نم ديزم ىلإ ّلاإ يدؤي
 ةيبورولأا تاقلاعلا يف- ةيبرعلا. 
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Europe has an important responsibility for 
the damage it has caused due to the 
colonial legacy it has inflicted on our region 
- of which our people still suffer from its 
consequences and impacts. 
 ثرلإا لعفب ًةصاخ ًةيلوؤسم ابوروأ ىلع ّنإ
 لا ًةحداف ًارارضأ انتقطنمب قحلأ يذلا يرامعتسلإا
اهتاريثأتو اهجئاتن نم يناعت انبوعش لازت. 
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And since certain European peoples have a 
history of resistance against the occupier 
then it is an ethical and humanistic, more 
than a political, duty of Europe  to 
acknowledge peoples' right  to resist the 
occupier on the basis of the distinction 
between resistance and terrorism. 
 لتحملا ةمواقم يف خيرات اهل ًةيبوروأ ًابوعش ّنلأو
ف يناسنلإاو يقلاخلأا ابوروأ بجاو ّنإ-  لبق
 يسايسلا-  يف بوعشلا قحب فارتعلإا اهيلع ضرفي
 ةمواقملا نيب زييمتلا ةدعاق ىلع ،لتحملا ةمواقم
باهرلإاو. 
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In our view the requirements of stability and 
cooperation in European-Arab relations 
necessitate establishing a European 
approach that is more independent, fairer, 
and more objective. 
 يف نواعتلاو رارقتسلإا تايضتقم ّنإ :انيأر بسحبو
 ةيبورولأا تاقلاعلا-  ةبراقم ءانب بجوتست ةيبرعلا
 ًةيعوضومو ًةلادع رثكأو ًةيللاقتسا رثكأ ةيبوروأ. 
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Building a common vital space would be 
unfeasible in terms of politics and security 
without this transformation that is able to 
tackle the sources of deficiency that spawn 
crises and instability. 
 ،كرتشملا يويحلا ىدملا ءانب ًارذعتم نوكيسو
 ةجلاعمب ليفكلا لوحتلا اذه نود نم ،ًاينمأو ًايسايس
 َمرارقتسإلالاو تامزلأل ةدِّلوملا للخلا نطاو. 
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On the other hand, we look with all interest 
and respect at the experience of 
independence and liberation that rejects 
hegemony in the countries of Latin America. 
We see big room for convergence between 
their project and the project of the 
resistance movements in our region, which 
leads to constructing a more just and 
balanced international system. 
 ريدقتلاو مامتهلإا نم ريثكب رظنن ،ىرخأ ةيحان نمو
 يف ةنميهلل ةضفارلا ةيررحتلاو ةيللاقتسلإا ةبرجتلل
تلالا اكريمأ لود نم ًةعساو  تاحاسم ىرنو ،ةيني
 ةمواقملا تاكرح عورشمو اهعورشم نيب يقلاتلا
 رثكأ ّيلوُد ماظن ءانب ىلإ يضفُي امب ،انتقطنم يف
 ًانزاوتو ًةلادع. 
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Encountering that experience is source of 
hope on a global level, in the light of a 
common humane identity and a common 
political and moral background. In this 
context, the slogan "the unity of the 
downtrodden" remains a major and basic 
pillar of our political thought in building our 
understanding, relations and stances of 
international issues. 
ت ةبرجتلا كلت ةاقلام ّنإ ىلع ةدعاو لاملآ ًاثعاب لّكش
 ةعماج ةيناسنإ ةيوه ىلإ دانتسلإاب ،يملاعلا ىوتسملا
 ،قايسلا اذه يفو .ةكرتشم ةيقلاخأو ةيسايس ةيفلخو
 تازكترم دحأ "نيفعضتسملا ةدحو" راعش ىقبيس
 هاجت انفقاومو انتاقلاعو انمهف ءانب يف يسايسلا انركف
ةيلو ُّدلا اياضقلا. 
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Chapter Three ثلاثلا لصفلا 127 
Palestine and the Negotiations of 
Compromise 
ةيوستلا تاضوافمو نيطسلف 128 
First: the Palestinian Question and the 
Zionist Entity 
ينويهصلا نايكلاو نيطسلف ةيضق : ًلاوأ 129 
The Zionist entity since its occupation of 
Palestine and the expulsion of its people 
from it in 1948, and with help support from 
the international hegemonic powers, has 
been a direct assault and a serious danger 
engulfing the whole Arab region and a real 
threat to its security, stability, and interests; 
its damage and detriment is not limited only 
to the Palestinians people or the countries 
and the peoples neighbouring Palestine. 
The attacks, the tensions and the wars the 
region has witnessed because of the hostile 
tendency and practices of Israel are 
evidence and proof of the degree of 
injustice that has inflicted the Palestinian 
people and the Arab and the Muslims 
because of the crime against humanity the 
West had committed when planted this 
extraneous entity in the heart of the Arab 
and Islamic world, to become a hostile 
infiltration and an outpost for the arrogant 
Western project in general and the basis for 
domination and hegemony over the region 
 نيطسلفل هباصتغا ذنم ينويهصلا نايكلا لّكش
 ماعلا يف اهنم اهلهأ ديرشتو1948 معدو ةياعرب ،
 ًارشابم ًاناودع ،كاذنآ ةيلو ُّدلا ةنميهلا ىوق نم
 ًاديدهتو ،اهلمكأب ةيبرعلا ةقطنملا لااط ًايّدِج ًارطخو
 رصتقي ملو ،اهحلاصمو اهرارقتساو اهنملأ ًايقيقح
ا بعشلا ىلع هررضو هاذأ لودلا وأ ينيطسلفل
 امو ،بسحف نيطسلفل ةرواجملا بوعشلاو
 اهتدهش يتلا بورحلاو تارتوتلاو تاءادتعلإا
 ةيناودعلا تاسرامملاو ةعزنلا لعفب ةقطنملا
 يذلا ملظلا رادقم ىلع دهاشلاو ليلدلا ّلاإ ةيليئارسلإا
 ءارج نيملسملاو برعلابو ينيطسلفلا بعشلاب قحل
تلا ةيناسنلإا دض ةميرجلا امدنع برغلا اهبكترا ي
 ملاعلا بلق يف بيرغلا نايكلا اذه عرز ىلع مدقأ
 ًاعقومو ًايداعم ًاقارتخا نوكيل ،يملاسلإاو يبرعلا
 ًةدعاقو ،ًةماع يبرغلا يرابكتسلإا عورشملل ًامدقتم
ةصاخ ةقطنملا ىلع ةنميهلاو ةرطيسلل. 
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in particular.  
The Zionist movement is a racist movement 
in theory and practice and it is a result of a 
mentality of arrogance, authoritarianism and 
domination. Its project in its roots and 
foundation is a project of occupation, 
judaization and expansion. The entity from 
which it emerged developed, established its 
roots and continued through occupation, 
aggression, massacres and , and terrorism , 
with the support , protection and nurturing 
by the colonial states, the United States of 
America in particular, which are associated 
with it through a strategic alliance making 
them real partners in all its wars, massacres  
and terrorist acts. 
 ًاركف ةيرصنع ةكرح يه ةينويهصلا ةكرحلا ّنإ
 ةيدادبتسإ ةيرابكتسإ ةيلقع جاتن يهو ،ًةسراممو
 عورشم وه هساسأو هلصأ يف اهَعورشمو ،ةيطلست
 قثبنا يذلا نايكلا ّنأ امك .يعسوت يديوهت يناطيتسإ
متو ماق اهنع ناودعلاو للاتحلإا ربع رمتساو نّك
 نم ناضتحاو ةياعرو معدب ،باهرلإاو رزاجملاو
 ةدحتملا تايلاولا اميس لا ،ةيرامعتسلإا لودلا
 يجيتارتسإ فلاحتب هعم طبترت يتلا ،ةيكريملأا
 هرزاجمو هبورح لك يف هل ًايقيقح ًاكيرش اهلعج
ةيباهرلإا هتاسراممو. 
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Certainly the fight that we and our umma 
are having against the Zionist-colonial 
project in Palestine is a duty of self-defence 
against the Israeli-imperialist occupation, 
aggression, and injustice that threatens our 
existence and endangers our rights and our 
future, and from our side this fight is not a 
religious or a racist or sectarian 
confrontation fight, even though the agents 
of this Zionist-arrogant project they have 
never refrained from using religion and 
exploiting religious sentiments to achieve 
their aims and objectives. And what the 
American president “Bush” and his 
successor “Obama”, along with the 
leadership of the Zionist entity, have done 
by asking  the Palestinians, the Arab and 
the Muslims to recognize the Jewishness of 
the “State of Israel” is merely the most 
evident proof of that. 
 دض انتمأ هضوختو هضوخن يذلا عارصلا ّنإ
 ينويهصلا عورشملا-  امنإ نيطسلف يف يرامعتسلإا
 للاتحلإا دض سفنلا نع عافدلا بجاوب ٌمايق وه
 يليئارسلإا ملظلاو ناودعلاو-  يذلا يرابكتسلإا
 سيل وهو ،انلبقتسمو انقوقح فدهتسيو اندوجو ددهتي
يرصنعلا وأ ةينيدلا ةهجاوملا ىلع ًامئاق ةيقرعلا وأ ة
 عورشملا اذه باحصأ ناك ْنإو ،انبناج نم
 ينويهصلا-  نع ًاموي اوعروتي مل يرامعتسلإا
 ًةليسو ةينيدلا رعاشملا فيظوتو نيدلا مادختسا
مهتاياغو مهفادهأ قيقحتل. 
 هَُفلَخو "شوب" يكريملأا سيئرلا هيلإ بهذ ام سيلو
لاطم نم ،امهعم ينويهصلا نايكلا ُةداقو "امابوأ" ةب
 ةيدوهيب فارتعلإاب نيملسملاو برعلاو نيينيطسلفلل
كلذ ىلع ليلد حضوأ ّلاإ "ليئارسإ ةلود". 
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The natural and inevitable outcome is that 
for this usurper and artificial entity to live an 
existential crisis that haunts its leadership 
and supporters, for it is an unnatural born 
and an entity that is unable to continue and 
exposed to extinction. Here lies the historic 
responsibility on the shoulder of the umma 
and its peoples to not to recognize this 
entity no matter the pressures and the 
challenges are, and to continue the fight for 
the liberation of all of the illegally occupied 
land and to regain all the rights that have 
been taken away no matter how long it 
 نايكلا اذه شيعي نأ ةيمتحلاو ةيعيبطلا ةجيتنلا ّنإ
 هَتداق ق ِّرؤي ًايدوجو ًاقزأم لَعتفملا بصاغلا
 لباق ريغ ًانايِكو يعيبط ريغ ًادولوم هنوكل ،هيمعادو
 عقت انهو .لاوزلل ًاض َّرعمو رارمتسلإاو ةايحلل
 لا ْنأ اهبوعشو ةملأا قتاع ىلع ةيخيراتلا ةيلوؤسملا
ايكلا اذهب فرتعت تاطوغضلا تناك امهم ن
 لك ريرحت لجأ نم لمعلا لصاوت ْنأو ،تايدحتلاو
 ةبولسملا قوقحلا لك ةداعتساو ةبصتغملا ضرلأا
تايحضتلا تمظعو نمزلا لاط امهم. 
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takes and how big the sacrifices are. 
Second: Jerusalem and the Al-Aqsa 
Mosque 
ىصقلأا دجسملاو سدقلا :ًايناث 134 
The whole world is aware of the status and 
sanctity of the city of Jerusalem and the al-
Aqsa mosque. The al-Aqsa mosque is the 
first of the two Qiblas and  the third holy 
place and the place of the ascension of the 
prophet to Allah (may Allah bless him and 
his family and peace be upon them) and a 
junction for  messengers and prophets (the 
blessing of Allah be on all of them), and no 
one denies the importance of Al-Aqsa 
Mosque status of sanctity for the Muslims 
as one a the most sacred monument for 
them and its profound relation to Islam as 
one of the most important Islamic symbols 
on the face of earth. 
 سدقلا ةنيدم َةسادقو َةناكم هرسأب ملاعلا كردي
 ىلُوأ وه ىصقلأا دجسملاف ،ىصقلأا دجسملاو
 ّىلص( الله لوسر ىرسمو نيمرحلا ُثلاثو نيتلبِقلا
 لسرلاو ءايبنلأا ىقتلمو ،)مَّلسو هلآ ىلعو هيلع الله
تاولص مهيلع(  َميظع ٌدحأ رِكنُي لاو ،)نيعمجأ الله
 ًةيسدق ملاعملا رثكأ نم  مَلْعَمك نيملسملا ىدل هتناكم
 مهأ نم دحاوك ملاسلإاب هتقلاع َقمعو ،مهدنع
ضرلأا هجو ىلع ةيملاسلإا زومرلا. 
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And the city of Jerusalem that embraces 
Islamic and Christian holy places enjoys a 
high reputation for both the Muslims and the 
Christians. 
 ةيملاسإ تاسدقم نم نضتحت امب سدقلا ةنيدمو
 نيملسملا ىدل ةعيفر ةناكمب عتمتت ،ةيحيسمو
ءاوس دح ىلع نييحيسملاو. 
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The continuing Israeli occupation of this 
holy city  along with plans and projects of 
Judaization, expulsion of its people, 
confiscation of their homes and properties 
and surrounding it with Jewish quarters, 
belts and blocks of settlements and its 
strangulation by the wall of racial separation 
in addition to the continuing American-
Israeli efforts to make it an eternal capital 
for the Zionist entity and recognized 
internationally are all aggressive measures 
which must be  rejected and condemned. 
 ةنيدملا هذهل يليئارسلإا للاتحلإا رارمتسا ّنإ
 عيراشمو ططخ نم كلذ قفاري ام عم ةسدقملا
 مهتاكلتممو مهتويب ةرداصمو اهئانبأ درطو ةيديوهت
 ةيناطيتسإ لتكو ةمزحأو ةيدوهي ءايحأب اهتطاحإو
 ىلإ ةفاضلإاب ،يرصنعلا لصفلا رادجب اهقنخو
 ةيكريملأا يعاسملا- صاوتملا ةيليئارسلإا ةل
 فارتعاب ينويهصلا نايكلل ًةيدبأ ًةمصاع اهسيركتل
ةنادمو ةضوفرم ةيناودع تاءارجإ اهلك ،ّيلوُد. 
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Furthermore, the continuing and repeated 
attacks on the blessed Al-Aqsa mosque and 
the excavations that have been carried out 
within its precinct and the  destruction 
projects under-way, constitute a serious 
and real danger threatening its existence 
and survival and warns of serious 
ramifications on the whole region. 
 ةرركتملاو ةلصاوتملا ةريطخلا تاءادتعلإا ّنأ امك
م هقاطن يف ذَّفني امو كرابملا ىصقلأا دجسملا ىلع ن
 ًارطخ لّكشت ،هريمدتل ططخ نم ّدَعُي امو تايرفح
 تايعادتب رذنُيو ،هءاقبو هَدوجو ددهي ًايقيقحو ًايّدِج
اهرسأب ةقطنملا ىلع ةريطخ. 
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The duty of defending Jerusalem and 
liberating it and the defence of Al-Aqsa 
mosque its protection is a religious, a 
humanitarian and moral responsibility that 
falls on the shoulders of all the free and 
virtuous persons of our Arabic and Islamic 
umma and all the free and virtuous persons 
of the world. 
 نع عافدلاو اهريرحتو سدقلا ةرصُن بجاو ّنإ
 ٌّينيد ٌبجاو وه ،هتيامحو ىصقلأا دجسملا 
 ّرح لك قنع يف ٌةيقلاخأو ٌةيناسنإ ٌةيلوؤسمو
 لكو ةيملاسلإاو ةيبرعلا انتمأ ءانبأ نم فيرشو
ملاعلا ءافرشو رارحأ. 
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We call upon the Arabs and the Muslims, 
on the official and popular level, and all the 
countries that are interested in peace in the 
world to make their efforts and use all 
means to free Jerusalem from the yoke of 
the Zionist occupation and to protect its real 
identity and its Islamic and Christian 
sanctity.  
 نيديعصلا ىلع نيملسملاو برعلا بلاطنو وعدن اننإ
ىلع ةصيرحلا لودلا عيمجو ،يبعشلاو يمسرلا 
 دوهجلا لذبل ،ملاعلا يف رارقتسلإاو ملاسلا
 للاتحلإا رين نم سدقلا ريرحتل تايناكملإاو
 ةيقيقحلا اهتيوه ىلع ةظفاحمللو ،ينويهصلا
ةيحيسملاو ةيملاسلإا اهتاسدقمو. 
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Third: The Palestinian Resistance ةينيطسلفلا ةمواقملا : ًاثلاث 141 
The Palestinian people, while waging the 
battle of self-defence and struggling to 
regain its legitimate national rights, in their 
historical meaning and geographical 
position, they are doing so only to exercise 
a legitimate right that has been sanctioned 
and made incumbent by divine messages, 
international laws and humanitarian values 
and customs. 
 عافدلا َةكرعم ضوخي وهو ينيطسلفلا بعشلا ّنإ
 ةينطولا هقوقح ةداعتسلا حفاكيو سفنلا نع
 اهعقاوو يخيراتلا اهانعمب نيطسلف يف ةعورشملا
 هبِجوُتو هّرِقُت ًاعورشم ًاقح سرامي امنإ ،يفارغجلا
 ميقلاو ةيلو ُّدلا نيناوقلاو ةيوامسلا تلااسرلا
ةيناسنلإا فارعلأاو. 
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This right includes resistance in all its 
forms, and primarily the armed struggle, 
and with all means the Palestinian 
resistance can use, especially given that 
the imbalance of power is favouring of the 
Zionist enemy that is armed with the latest 
atrocious and destructive weapons. 
 اهلاكشأ لكب ةمواقملا لمشي قحلا اذهو-  يفو
 ّحلسملا حافكلا اهتمدقم-  نكمتت يتلا لئاسولا لكبو
 ًةصاخ ،اهمادختسا نم ةينيطسلفلا ةمواقملا لئاصف
 ودعلا ةحلصمل ىوقلا نيزاوم للاتخا لظ يف
 رامدلاو كتفلا ةحلسأ ثدحأب حلستملا ينويهصلا
لتقلاو. 
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Experiences, which represented a striking 
evidence with no doubt at all throughout the 
struggle between our umma and the Zionist 
entity since its occupation of Palestine and 
till now, have proved the importance and 
significance of the option of the jihadi  
resistance and the armed struggle in 
confronting aggression, liberating the land, 
regaining the rights, 
 براجتلا تتبثأ دقلو-  عدي لا ًايعطق ًلايلد تلّكش يتلا
 عارصلا ةريسم دادتما ىلع بايترلإاو كشلل ًلااجم
 ذنم ينويهصلا نايكلا نيبو انتمأ نيب ةهجاوملاو
 اذه انموي ىتحو نيطسلفل هباصتغا-  ىودجو َةيمهأ
 ةهجاوم يف حلسملا حافكلاو ةيداهجلا ةمواقملا رايخ
لأا ريرحتو ناودعلاقوقحلا ةداعتساو ضر 
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attaining the balance of terror and closing 
the gap of strategic superiority through the 
equations imposed by the resistance with 
its available capabilities, its will, and its 
determination in the battle field. 
سو بعرلا نزاوت قيقحتو قوفتلا ةوجف د
 ةمواقملا اهتضرف يتلا تلاداعملا ربع يجيتارتسلإا
 ناديم يف اهتميزعو اهتدارإو ةحاتملا اهتايناكمإب
ةهجاوملا 
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The best witness and evidence on this is 
what the resistance achieved in Lebanon 
and what it has accumulated from its civil, 
military and moral accomplishments 
throughout  its jihadi experience, particularly 
when forcing the Zionists to the great Israeli 
withdrawal from most of the occupied 
Lebanese lands in May 2000, or through 
the complete failure of the Zionist army 
during the July War of 2006 during which 
the resistance achieved a divine, historic 
and strategic victory that radically changed 
the equation of the conflict and inflicted the 
first defeat on this scale on the Israeli 
enemy and refuted the myth of an army that 
is invincible. 
 يف ةمواقملا هتققح ام كلذ ىلع ليلدو دهاش ريخو
 نم هتمكار امو ،ةيلاتتم تاراصتنا نم نانبل
 دادتما ىلع ةيونعمو ةيركسعو ةيناديم تازاجنإ
 ىلع ةنياهصلا ماغرإ ربع اميس لا ،ةيداهجلا اهتبرجت
 ماعلا رايأ يف ريبكلا يليئارسلإا باحسنلإا2000 
حملا ةينانبللا يضارلأا مظعم نم لشفلا ربع وأ ،ةلت
 ماعلا زومت ناودع يف ينويهصلا شيجلل يودملا
2006 ًايهلإ ًاراصتنا ةمواقملا هيف تققح يذلاو ،
 لكشب عارصلا ةلداعم رّيغ ًايجيتارتساو ًايخيراتو
 ودعلاب ىوتسملا اذهب ةميزه لوأ قحلأو ،يرذج
رهقُي لا يذلا شيجلا ةروطسأ طقسأو ،يليئارسلإا. 
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Another evidence on this is what the 
resistance in Palestine has achieved of 
continuous accomplishments through the 
experience of the Palestinian revolution and 
the option of the armed struggle that has 
been pursued, and through the first 'Intifada 
of stones', and the second Al-Aqsa Intifada, 
reaching a major setback of the Israeli army 
during the complete withdrawal from the 
Gaza Strip in 2005, 
 يف ةمواقملا هتققح ام وه كلذ ىلع رخلآا ليلدلاو
 ةروثلا ةبرجت ربع ةلصاوتم تازاجنإ نم نيطسلف
 ربعو ،هتجهتنا يذلا ّحلسملا حافكلا رايخو ةينيطسلفلا
 ،ةيناثلا ىصقلأا ةضافتناو ىلُولأا ةراجحلا ةضافتنا
 ربع يليئارسلإا شيجلل يرهقلا راحدنلإا ىلإ ًلاوصو
 نم لماكلا باحسنلإا ماعلا يف ةزغ عاطق2005 
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without conditions, negotiations, or 
agreements, and without any political, 
security, or geographical gain, making it the 
first qualitative and geographic victory on 
the ground of this proportion and level. 
ت لابو طرش وأ ديق لاب نود نمو قافتا وأ ضواف
 ،يفارغج وأ ينمأ وأ يسايس بسكم يأ قيقحت
 يناديم راصتنا لوأ كلذ نوكيل-  يفارغج-  يعون
ىوتسملا اذهو مجحلا اذهب  
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The significance of the option of resistance 
in Palestine, as the first Israeli forced 
withdrawal by the effectiveness of the 
resistance, within the historical borders of 
Palestine. 
 َلوأ هنوك ،نيطسلف يف ةمواقملا رايخل ةللادلا هذهو
 نمض ،ةمواقملا لعفب يرارطضإ يليئارسإ باحسنا
ةيخيراتلا نيطسلف دودح، 
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The meanings of this is strategically of a 
high importance in our conflict with the 
Zionist entity. Furthermore, the brilliant 
resistance of  the fighting (mujāhid) 
Palestinian people and its Resistance in 
Gaza in facing the Zionist occupier in year 
 يف ةيمهلأا ةغلاب رملأا اذه اهلمحي يتلا تلالادلاو
 ىلع ينويهصلا نايكلا نيبو اننيب عارصلا ىرجم
 بعشلل عئارلا دومصلا ّنأ امك .يجيتارتسلإا ديعصلا
 ةهجاوم يف ةزغ يف هتمواقمو دهاجملا ينيطسلفلا
 ةنس ينويهصلا ناودعلا2008  لايجلأل ٌسرد
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2008 is a lesson to future generations and a 
warning to  invaders and  occupiers. 
نيدتعملاو ةازغلل ٌةربعو. 
If that was the efficacy of the resistance in 
Lebanon and Palestine, then what was the 
usefulness of the option of negotiations and 
settlement? 
 يفو نانبل يف ةمواقملا ىودج يه هذه تناك اذإف
 يضوافتلا رايخلا ىودج تناك اذامف ،نيطسلف
؟يووستلا 
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What are the outcomes, interests and the 
gains that the negotiations and the 
agreements achieved throughout all their 
stages but more Israeli superiority, 
domination and intransigence and more 
gains, interests and conditions for Israel? 
لا بساكملاو حلاصملاو جئاتنلا يه امو اهتققح يت
 يتلا تاقافتلإا لك ربعو اهلحارم لك يف تاضوافملا
 تنعتلاو طلستلاو ةسرطغلا نم ديزملا سيلأ ،اهتجتنأ
 حلاصملاو بساكملا نم ديزملاو يليئارسلإا
؟ةيليئارسلإا طورشلاو 
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While we assert our continuous and firm 
stand on the side of the Palestinian people 
and the Palestinian cause, along with its 
historical, geographical and political 
foundations, we categorically and firmly 
confirm our support, help and defence of 
the Palestinian people, the Palestinian 
resistance movements, and their struggle 
against the Israeli project. 
 بعشلا بناج ىلإ تباثلاو مئادلا انَفوقو دكؤن ذإ اننإ
 ةيخيراتلا اهتباوثب ،ةينيطسلفلا ةيضقلاو ينيطسلفلا
 مزاجو عطاق لكشب دكؤن ،ةيسايسلاو ةيفارغجلاو
 تاكرحو بعشلا اذهل انَمعدو انَدييأتو انَتدناسم
 عورشملا ةهجاوم يف اهلاضنو ةينيطسلفلا ةمواقملا
يليئارسلإا. 
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Fourth: Negotiations of Compromise ةـيوستلا تاضوافم :ًاعبار 154 
Our stance on the negotiations and 
agreements which the Madrid Negotiation 
Process achieved, through the " Wadi 
Araba Accord" and its extensions,  the 
"Oslo Accords" and its extensions and, 
before these two, the "Camp David Accord" 
and its extensions has been an absolute 
rejection of the foundation and principles of 
the option of compromise with the Zionist 
entity which is based on recognizing its 
legitimacy of existence and conceding to it 
what it illegally plundered from the Arab-
Islamic Palestinian land. 
 ةيوستلا ةيلمع هاجت ىقبيسو لازي لاو انفقوم ناك
 يضوافتلا ديردم راسم اهجتنأ يتلا تاقافتلإا هاجتو
 "ولسوأ قافتا"و هتاقحلمو "ةبرع يداو قافتا" ربع
 ،هتاقحلمو "ديفيد بماك قافتا" امهلبق نمو هتاقحلمو
 ةيوستلا رايخ أدبمو لصلأ قلطملا ضفرلا َفقوم
اقلا ،ينويهصلا نايكلا عم فارتعلإا ساسأ ىلع مئ
 ضرأ نم هبصتغا امع هل لزانتلاو ،هدوجو ةيعرشب
ةيملاسلإاو ةيبرعلا نيطسلف. 
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This stance is a firm, permanent and final 
stance; not subject to revision or 
negotiation, not even if the whole world 
recognized "Israel". 
 فقوم وه فقوملا اذه ريغ ،يئاهنو مئادو تباث
 ملاعلا فرتعا ول ىتح ،ةمواسملا وأ عجارتلل عضاخ
ليئارسإ"ـب هلك".  
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On that basis, and from a position of 
brotherhood, responsibility and persistence, 
we call upon all the  Arab officials to commit 
to the aspirations of their peoples by 
reconsidering the option of negotiation, re-
examining the results of the accords signed 
with the Zionist enemy and completely and 
definitely abandoning the illusory and unjust 
process of settlement called deceivingly 
and dishonestly "the Peace Process", 
especially that those who bet on the role of 
the consecutive American administrations 
as a honest and just partner and mediator 
in this process  have clearly seen that those 
administrations have abandoned them, 
exercised pressure and blackmailing 
against them, and showed enmity towards 
their peoples, their causes and their 
interests, and fully and blatantly stood on 
the side of its strategic ally: the Zionist 
entity. 
 ةيلوؤسملاو ةّوخلأا عقوم نمو ،قلطنملا اذه نمو
 نأ ىلإ برعلا نيلوؤسملا وعدن اننإف ،صرحلاو
 رايخلاب رظنلا ةداعإ ربع ،مهبوعش تارايخ اومزتلي
 ةعَّقوملا تاقافتلإا جئاتنل ةعجارم ءارجإو ،يضوافتلا
 نع يئاهنلاو مساحلا يلختلاو ،ينويهصلا ودعلا عم
 ًاناتهبو ًاروز ةاّمسملا ةملاظلا ةيمهولا ةيوستلا ةيلمع
 رود ىلع اونهار نَم ّنأو اميس لا ،"ملاسلا ةيلمع"
ا تارادلإل هيزن طيسوو كيرشك ةبقاعتملا ةيكريملأ
 اونياع دق ،ةيلمعلا هذه يف لداعو-  كشلا لبقي لا امب
-  ،زازتبلإاو طغضلا مهيلع تسرامو ،مهتلذخ اهنأ
 ،مهحلاصمو مهاياضقو مهبوعشل ءادعلا ترهظأو
 اهفيلح بناج ىلإ رفاسو لماك لكشب تزاحناو
ينويهصلا نايكلا يجيتارتسلإا. 
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As for the Zionist entity, which the Arab 
officials imagine there is a possibility to 
establish peace with, has showed 
throughout all the stages of negotiations, 
that nor does it  want peace or seeks it, that 
it uses negotiations to impose its conditions, 
consolidate its position and achieve its 
interests and to break the intense enmity 
and psychological barrier of their peoples 
towards it by achieving an official, popular, 
gratuitous and open normalization that 
guarantees normal co-existence and 
integration in the regional system and 
imposes itself as an accomplished fact in 
the region, accepted and its existence 
recognized as  legitimate after we give up 
the Palestinian land that it has robbed. 
 ِةماقإ َةيناكمإ نومهوتي يذلا ،ينويهصلا نايكلا امأ
هل رهظأ دقف ،هعم ملاس تاضوافملا لحارم لك يف م
 مدختسي هنأو ،هيلإ ىعسي لاو ملاسلا بلطي لا هنأ
 قيقحتو هعقوم زيزعتو هطورش ضرفل تاضوافملا
 ىدل يسفنلا زجاحلاو ءادعلا ةّدح رسكو هحلاصم
 يمسر عيبطت ىلع هلوصح ربع ،ههاجت مهبوعش
 يعيبطلا شياعتلا هل ققحي حوتفمو يناجم يبعشو
 ماظنلا يف جامدنلإاو رمأك هسفن ضرفو يميلقلإا
 ةيعرشب فارتعلإاو هب لوبقلاو ةقطنملا يف عقاو
 يتلا ةينيطسلفلا ضرلأا نع هل يلختلا دعب ،هدوجو
اهبصتغا. 
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Thus we call upon, expect and hope from 
all the Arabs and the Muslims, on the 
official the popular levels, to return to 
Palestine and Jerusalem as a central cause 
for all of them, to unite and commit to its 
liberation from the abominable and brutal 
Zionist occupation,  to do what their 
religious, ethical and humane duties urge 
them to do towards their holy places in 
Palestine and towards its deprived people, 
to provide all what is needed to support the 
resistance of the Palestinians people to be 
able to carry on their struggle, to reject and 
do away with all normalization processes 
 برعلا لك نم لمأنو عقوتنو وعدن اننإف ،انه نم
 ،يبعشلاو يمسرلا نيديعصلا ىلع ،نيملسملاو
 مهل ةيزكرم ةيضقك سدقلاو نيطسلف ىلإ َةدوعلا
 نم اهريرحت نومزتليو اهلوح نودحوتي ،ًاعيمج
 هيلمي امب َمايقلاو ،مشاغلا ينويهصلا للاتحلإا سجر
يناسنلإاو يوخلأاو ينيدلا مهُبجاو مهيلع  هاجت
 َريفوتو ،مولظملا اهبعش هاجتو نيطسلف يف مهتاسدقم
 بعشلا دومص زيزعتل معدلا تامزلتسم لك
 َضفرو ،هتمواقم ةلصاوم نم هنيكمتو ينيطسلفلا
 ،اهطاقسإو ينويهصلا ودعلا عم عيبطتلا عيراشم لك
 ىلإ نيينيطسلفلا نيئجلالا عيمج ةدوع قحب َكسمتلاو
 اوجرُخأ يتلا مهرايدو مهيضارأ َضفرلاو ،اهنم
159 
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with the Zionist enemy, to maintain the right 
of complete return of the Palestinian 
refugees to their land and homes from 
which they were expelled, to firmly reject  all 
proposed alternatives such as naturalization  
(al-tawtyn), compensation or relocation, to 
immediately break the siege imposed on 
the Palestinian people, and in particular the 
total siege on Gaza Strip and to support the 
cause of thousands of detainees and 
prisoners in the Israeli prisons and to come 
up with plans and  practical ways to set 
them free from detention. 
 ضيوعت وأ نيطوت نم ةحورطملا لئادبلا لكل َعطاقلا
 راصحلا كف ىلع َّيروفلا َلمعلاو ،ريجهت وأ
 راصحلا اميس لا ينيطسلفلا بعشلا ىلع ضورفملا
 ىرسلأا فلاآ ةيضق َيّنبتو ،ةزغ عاطقل لماشلا
 ططخلا َعضوو ،ةيليئارسلإا نوجسلا يف نيلقتعملاو
يرحتل ةيلمعلا جماربلاورسلأا نم مهر. 
Conclusion ةمتاخلا 160 
These are our vision and ideas which we 
have developed on seeking rightness and 
truth. These are our positions and 
commitments. We have sought to be people 
of sincerity and loyalty who believe in 
truthfulness and speak it up, defend it and 
sacrifice ourselves for it to the point of 
martyrdom (shahāda), seeking nothing but 
the favour of our Creator and Lord of the 
heavens and earth, and we do not expect 
anything from this but the blessing from our 
families, people and our umma and their 
well-being and happiness in this world and 
hereafter. 
 اهنع ثحبلا يف انْصِرَح ،انتاروصتو انتيؤر يه هذه
 انفقاوم يه هذهو .ةقيقحو قح َبلاط نوكن نأ
 ،ءافوو قدص َلهأ اهيف نوكن نأ انيعس ،انتامازتلاو
 نم يحضنو هنع عفادنو ،هب قطننو قحلاب نمؤن
جأ اضر ىوس كلذ يف يغبن لا ،ةداهشلا ىتح هل
 نم وجرن لاو ،ضرلأاو تاوامسلا بر انهلإو انقلاخ
 مهريخو انتمأو انبعشو انلهأ حلاص ىوس كلذ
ةرخلآاو ايندلا يف مهتداعسو. 
 
161 
Oh God, you certainly know that what we 
did was not for power or anything 
ephemeral, but it was to cherish truth and 
end oppression and to defend your 
wronged servants, establish justice on your 
earth and a  gain your gratification and win 
your company. For this our martyrs 
(shuhadaʾ) sacrificed themselves, and for 
this we carry on and continue our work and 
the jihad, and promised  us one of the good 
turns:  either victory or having the honour of 
meeting You imbued in our blood. 
 يف ًةسفانم اّنم ناك يذلا نكي مل هنأ ملعت كنإ مهللا
 ناك امنإو ،ماطُحلا نم ءيشل ًءاغتبا لاو ناطلس
دو لطابلل ًةتامإو قحلل ًءايحإ يمولظم نع ًاعاف
 كاضرل ًابلطو كضرأ يف لدعلل ًةماقإو كدابع
 اذه ىلعو ،انؤادهش ىضق اذه ىلع ،كنم برقلاو
 ىدحإ انتدعو دقو ،داهجلاو لمعلا لصاونو يضمن
 نيبّضخم كئاقلب فّرشتلا وأ رصنلا امإ نيينسُحلا
انئامدب. 
162 
And our promise to you Lord, and to all your 
wronged servants, is to remain faithful to 
the commitment, yearning for the promise, 
consistent and unwavering. 
 ىقبن نأ ،نيمولظملا كدابع لكلو ّبر اي كل انُدْعَوو
 ،دعولل نيرظتنملاو ،دهعلا يف نيقداصلا َلاجرلا
 ًلايدبت اولّدب ام نيذلا نيتباثلاو. 
163 
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Appendix 3 
Survey of Human Rights Legislation Approved in the Lebanese Parliament 1992- 2006 
and beyond. 
The following table includes a comprehensive overview of the laws that have been 
approved in the Lebanese parliament that are related to human rights principles directly 
or indirectly. The overview does not aim to be complete but representative of a 
consistent body of legislation in relation with human rights that has been approved in 
the parliament and then published on the al Jaridat al-Rasmiyya (the Official Gazette). 
Relation to human rights principles was primarily established on the basis of the 
reference of these laws to international documents on human rights such as the reports 
of the human rights treaty bodies to which Lebanon is a party and which are available 
in the relevant time frame. In addition to this, the author has considered laws self-
evidently relevant from a human rights point of view (for example accession or 
ratification to human rights treaties) or which are relevant from a human rights point of 
view on the basis of the discussion that they provoked in the Lebanese civil society. 
For the purposes of this research, observations are limited to the role of Hezbollah’s 
members of parliament in the parliamentary debate. The parliamentary debate was 
analysed through its records the Ma āḍir Jalasāt Majlis al-Nuwāb (Proceedings of the 
Sessions of the Assembly of Representatives) which was possible to consult only from 
1992 to 2006 in the Library of the Lebanese Parliament. At the time of writing, 
proceedings after 2006 were not available according to the staff of the Lebanese 
Parliament Library. For the more recent period, unofficial summaries of the 
parliamentary debate were available from the web-site of the Lebanese Parliament. 
These are less accurate and sometimes very short, but still informative sources. For 
2003, no relevant human rights laws were found. In 2007 the Parliament was 
substantially inoperative in terms of law making. No records of legislative sessions are 
available for 2009 probably because being an election year no legislative sessions 
were held.  Other useful sources were provided by the cooperation project of the UNDP 
and the Lebanese Parliament. Further information was collected through interviews 
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with members of parliament, UN officers of OHCHR and UNDP, non-governmental 
human rights organizations and journalist specialized in the topic. (Sections in grey are 
cases of human rights norms that have been criticised by Hezbollah).
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Year Law Law Content Source Observations Law relevance 
1992 Law 182 of 
1992 
Law amending some provisions of 
the legislative decree no 119 of 
16/9/1983 on the protection of 
juveniles criminal and the principles 
of its related tribunal. 
the law establishes for the detention 
of juvenile convicted in special centre 
for re-education or in jails for minors 
(see CRC Committee Report, 
CRC/C/70/Add.8, p. 164) 
The debate does not contain 
Hezbollah intervention and focuses 
on the fact that despite the law is 
considered important, there are no 
such centres as required by the 
law. The law is approved by 
majority. 
Rights of the Child 
1993 Law 243 of 
1993  
Law on persons with disabilities Law Establishing a permanent 
national body for the affairs of 
disabled persons within the Ministry of 
Social Affairs  
(See the CRC Committee Report 
CRC/C/15/ADD p.169) 
Discussed and approved on the 
basis of reports from committees. 
Neither objections nor debate only 
MP ‘Aly Khalil asking clarifications 
over the texts presented by the 
committees. 
Rights of Persons 
with Disabilities 
Law 275 of 
1993 
Women can take part in property 
transactions with no need for male 
witnesses. 
The law establish for the competence 
of women to attest in the Property 
Register and abrogates part of the 
text of Art 54 from Decree 188, 15
th
 of 
March 1962. (See CEDAW 
Committee Report CEDAW/C/LBN/3 
p. 83) 
The law is approved without 
objections and recording the 
contents of the Parliamentary 
Committee on Justice and 
Administration. 
Women’s Rights 
1994 Law 291 of 
1994 
Ratification of the International 
Convention on Psychotropic 
Substances. 
Mentioned by the CRC Committee a 
beneficial to the rights of the Children 
(see CRC/C/70/Add.8) 
Ratified on the basis of reports from 
the relevant Parliamentary 
Committees. 
International 
treaty 
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Law 302 of 
1994  
Establishing death penalty for 
intentional murder with political 
reasons or of political nature. 
 Law discussed extensively but no 
intervention by Hezbollah at the 
end Ra’ad makes some 
observation related to some 
procedural issues 
Penal Code 
Law 334 of 
1994 
Law requesting the presentation of 
a medical certificate before 
marriage 
Among the examples mentioned by 
el-Bizri as regards human rights and 
Hezbollah (see el Bizri op. cit. 1999, 
p. 15) 
Hezbollah intervenes criticizing the 
interference of non-religious officers 
in matrimonial affairs. 
Women’s Rights 
Law 380 of 
1994 
Law allowing to women of 18 and 
older to engage fully in commercial 
transactions without the 
authorization of the husband (as 
previously requested by the law) 
See above, the law is also mentioned 
in the state submitted report to the 
CCPR (see CCPR/C/42/Add.14) 
Hezbollah intervenes initially 
critically but then withdraw its 
objections considering that the law 
does not infringe on personal status 
law provisions. 
Women’s Rights 
Law 382 of 
1994 
Regarding TV and radio 
broadcasting.  
Criticized by UN Human Rights 
Committee for not establishing clear 
criteria over TV and Radio licensing 
(see Paragraph 24. 
CPR/C/79/Add.78) 
Approved without objections in the 
debate 
 
Information and 
communications 
1995 Law 426 of 
1995 
Ratification of the International 
Convention to Combat Illicit 
Trafficking in Narcotic Drugs and 
Psychotropic Substances  
Mentioned in the CRC Committee 
Report (see CRC/C/70/Add.8) 
Approved with reference to the 
reports of the relevant 
parliamentary committees. 
International 
Treaty 
1996 Law 536 of 
1996 
Amending various paragraphs of 
the Labour Law relating to child 
Amendment to Art 21 of the Labour 
Law, any worker under the age of 18 
During the parliamentary debate 
Fnaysh asks about the absence of 
Labour Law 
Rights of the Child 
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rights   is subject to the rules established by 
Chapter of the Labour Law. 
Amendment of Art. 22: Absolute 
Prohibition to employ minors under 13 
years old.  
Amendment to Art. 23 No minors of 
less than 15 years can do heavy work 
( with reference to Appendixes 1 and 
2) other limitation to work of minors in 
terms of hours of work and quality of 
work.  The law is mentioned by the 
CRC Committee (see 
CRC/C/70/Add.8 p. 119). 
tables in the text of the law 
presented in the parliament, but is 
being replied by Ahmed Sweid that 
the tables have been agreed with 
the minister of labour already and 
that the text presented in 
parliament is the same agreed with 
the minister of labour. The law 
passes without other objections and 
on the basis of the reports of the 
relevant committees. 
Law 572 of 
1996 
Permission to the government to 
ratify the Convention on the 
Elimination of Discrimination 
against Women (with various 
reservations) 
 
Ratification recommended in various 
international monitoring reports. 
Approved with the reports of the 
parliamentary committees. No 
member of the parliament raises 
concerns related to the reservations 
adopted on the treaty. The 
committee for administration and 
justice proposes the addition of a 
line specifying the need for 
consistency with Personal Status 
Law thus justifying reservations. 
 
Women’s rights 
UN Treaties 
1997 Law 613 of 
1997 
Law authorizing the government to 
join the two additional protocols to 
the Geneva treaties of 1949 on the 
protection of victims of war. 
 Approved without objections, report 
of the foreign affairs committee 
attached. 
International 
Treaty 
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Law 666 of 
1997 
General amnesty for drug dealers 
4000 individuals taking advantage 
of the act  
The law is praised by the CRC 
Committee as attenuating the social 
tension due to the persecution of  
young persons involved in drug 
trafficking and detained in poor 
conditions (see CRC/C/70/Add.8, p. 
154) 
The law is presented as an 
amended form of the amnesty 
given in 1991 by the Minster of 
justice Bahiyj Tabbara. No 
objections are raised by the 
assembly. 
Penal Code 
1998 Law 686 of 
1998 
Establishing free education for all 
Lebanese and compulsory until the 
age of 12 (later until the age of 15) 
but then excluding the sons of 
Lebanese women married to a non-
Lebanese. (AI in 
A/HRC/WG.6/9/LBN/3/Rev.1 p. 7) 
Amendment of Art 49 of the draft Law 
134/59  from the ministry of 
Education. 
A bill to raise compulsory education 
age is before the parliament but not 
approved at the time of writing. 
 
The law is passed with reference to 
human rights standards and no 
members of parliament raise 
objection or comments. The head 
of government clarifies that the 
government will not be liable of 
paying for benefits to private 
schools. 
Rights of Child 
Law 720 of 
1998 
Law Establishing the National 
Committee for Lebanese Women 
Following the Beijing World Forum 
and on the basis of its human rights 
constitutional commitment Lebanon 
Establishes a National Committee for 
Lebanese Women. 
Fnaysh intervenes to support 
Husseini’s object ion to the fact that 
the members of the organization 
cannot establish their own salary, 
the article is then abrogated.  
Rights of Women 
1999 Law 91 of 
1999 
Prohibition for employment for 
persons of less than 18 years old 
for more than 6 hours per day   
Amendments to Labour Law in 
Articles: 23 (on the conditions of 
employment of minors ) 25 (on 
vocational training). This law as the 
previous ones are mentioned in 
various CRC reports as positive steps 
in terms of human rights.) 
MP Ibrahim al Saiyed (member of 
Hezbollah) asks for clarifications 
over the minimum age of work 
when conditions apply to work 
under the age of 18. A reply is 
given by Nailah Mouʿawad (13 
under various conditions) the law is 
approved without further questions 
Labour Law 
Rights of the 
Children 
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from Hezbollah’s delegation. 
Law 116 of 
1999 
Authorizing accession to ILO 
treaties: 132, 139, 142, 159, 
172,172 
ILO treaties contain provisions 
overlapping with human rights 
standards. 
Most of treaties are accessed only 
with reference to parliamentary 
committees’ records. No relevant 
discussion takes place in the 
parliament.  
International 
Treaties 
2000 Law 185 of 
2000 
 
With this law, Lebanon accesses 
the Convention Against Torture a 
fundamental treaty in the 
international bill of human rights.  
 The law is passed with reference to 
the reports from the Parliamentary 
Committee on Human Rights and 
the Parliamentary Committee on 
Justice and Administration. There 
are no interventions from individual 
members of parliament. 
International 
Treaty 
Law 207 of 
2000 
Non-discrimination of men and 
women at work as regards salary, 
work duties promotions etc. 
Right to maternity leave 
Prohibition of making redundant a 
pregnant woman, or in maternity 
leave and to all persons in ordinary 
leave or in sickness leave.  
Amendments to Articles: 
26: non-discrimination of employer 
towards men and women 
28: “delivery holiday for pregnant 
women (7 weeks) 
29: payment of “delivery holiday” 
52: prohibition of dismissal notice for 
pregnant women, in “delivery holiday”, 
or any worker in leave or holiday. This 
law is mentioned in the state 
submitted report to the CRC see 
CRC/C/129/Add.7). 
No objections or comments are 
raised in the parliamentary debate. 
Law approval widely relies on 
parliamentary committees reports. 
Labour Law 
Women’s Rights 
 
Law 220 of 
2000 
Ratification of the Law Decree on 
the rights of persons with 
The law is mentioned in the Universal 
Periodic Review documentation but 
The law is passed as a single law 
as proposed by Naila Mouʿawad, 
Rights of Persons 
with Disabilities 
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disabilities  its actual implementation is still 
pending apparently (see 
A/HRC/WG.6/9/LBN/3/Rev.1, p. 4). 
 
Nasiyb Lahoud proposes one 
amendment relating to the 
percentage of buses equipped for 
disabled persons. No comments or 
objections from Hezbollah’s 
delegation. 
2001 Law 324 of 
2001 
Law giving equal rights to women 
employees in terms of social 
security especially as regards 
maternity leave. 
(See UNDP al Tashriy‘a fiy  hamsat 
‘ shra ‘ ama Vol. 19, Studies and 
Information Series, 2007, p. 99.) 
The law is approved on the basis of 
its discussion in the Parliamentary 
Committees (Parliamentary 
Committee on Justice and 
Administration, Parliamentary 
Committee on Public Health, Work 
and Social Affairs). The Law is 
approved without amendments and 
comments from members of the 
parliament. 
Labour Law, 
Rights of women 
Law 335 of 
2001 
Ratification of convention on Worst 
forms of child labour (ILO 182)  
The law is approved also as 
suggested by CRC Committee (see 
CRC/C/15/Add.169) and is mentioned 
by the Special Rapporteur on human 
trafficking (see 
E/CN.4/2006/62/Add.3) 
The law is approved on the basis of 
the discussions held in the 
Committee for Justice and 
Administration, the Committee for 
the Woman and the Child, the 
Committee for Public Health, Work 
and Social Affairs, and the 
Committee for Foreign Affairs and 
Migrants. No interventions are 
recorded and the law passes with a 
majority vote without amendments. 
Labour Law 
Rights of the Child 
Law 349 of Amending the penal code in favour The Code of Criminal Procedure, as The debate includes a discussion of Penal Code 
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2001  of rights of the detained person. amended by Act No. 359 of 16 August 
2001, defines the rights of all 
suspects under investigation. These 
rights, such as the right to legal 
counsel and the right to see a 
physician, are read out to suspects or 
accused persons. Officers who violate 
investigation procedures are subject 
to prosecution, and magistrates must 
take into account the principle that 
suspects must not be questioned 
under duress and ensure that his 
testimony is not subject to any 
external influences, whether 
psychological or physical. 
procedural matters as regards the 
way to approve the new code after 
being revised by the Council of 
ministers and the president of the 
republic. Hezbollah intervenes 
through Abdullah Qasir with 
reference to the issue of the time of 
validity of the indictment over 
investigations. The proposed period 
is ten days which can be extended 
on the basis of the kind of the crime 
and the decision of the attorney 
general. The amendment is being 
then approved on the basis of the 
form proposed by Boutros Ḥarb 
taking into account also Hezbollah’s 
requests.   
Law 387 of 
2001  
 
Gives the right to women to benefit 
from the allowances of the Civil 
Servants Cooperative    
The law is mentioned as an 
achievement in terms of women’s 
rights in a UNDP-Lebanese 
Parliament report (See UNDP al 
Tashriy‘a fiy  hamsat ‘ shra ‘ ama 
Vol. 19, Studies and Information 
Series, 2007, p. 19). 
The Law amends aspects of law 
343 of 2001 
 and is discussed thoroughly 
especially by Nayla Mouʿawad and 
others but no reports of Hezbollah 
participation to the  
Women’s Rights 
2002 
 
Law 400 of 
2002 
Ratification of ILO convention  138 
on minimum working age 
(10/6/2003)  
The treaty sets minimum age for 
admission to work and is mentioned 
by the Special Rapporteur on human 
trafficking (see 
E/CN.4/2006/62/Add.3). 
The ratification of the treaty is 
criticized by Bouṭros Ḥarb (March 
14) and Saleh Al-Khair. Because 
the state commits to a policy that 
requires serious responsibilities 
International 
Treaty 
Labour Law 
Rights of the Child 
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towards the children but as a matter 
of fact this commitment is far from 
being respect by state institutions. 
The law is approved by majority. 
Law 414 of 
2002 
Ratification of the Optional Protocol 
of the Convention on the Rights of 
the Child, on the Sale of Children, 
Child  
Prostitution, and Child 
Pornography. 
 The law is approved without debate 
and reservations on the treaty. The 
law has been previously discussed 
in the relevant parliamentary 
committees. 
Child Rights 
Law 422 of 
2002 
Law relating to the protection of 
Juveniles in conflict with the law or 
at risk  
 
 
Despite several flaws highlighted by 
the CRC committee, this law still 
represents progress in terms of rights 
of the child in Lebanon. The law is 
mentioned in the HR Committee 
session of 25/11/2002 and in the 
Women and Children committee of 
the Parliament. The same law is 
mentioned in the CRC Committee 
report and in the UPR state submitted 
report of 2010 (see 
CRC/C/LBN/CO/3,  and 
A/HRC/WG.6/9/LBN/1)  
The law intended to guarantee better 
conditions for the detention of 
juveniles its application is only partial 
according to many reports.  
The law is approved through article 
by article debate. Hezbollah’s MPs 
do not participate to the debate in 
which Bouṭros Ḥarb, Walid ‘Aido 
and few others are active in 
proposing minor amendments, 
linguistic changes and clarifications. 
Rights of the Child 
Penal Code 
Law 463 of Reduces penalty for certain crimes This law follows to the The law regards the possibility of Penal Code 
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2002 as an extraordinary measure to 
deal with the overcrowding of 
prisons. Its effective 
implementation will be only a few 
years later. 
recommendation made by the Human 
Rights Parliamentary Committee in 
the session of 3/3/ 2004 
reducing the application for certain 
legal sentences for minor crimes on 
the basis of good conduct and 
similar. The debate analyses 
proposals from MPs and the 
government. Part of the debate is 
dedicated to introducing a 
distinction between the commercial 
trafficking of drugs and its 
consumption or minor distribution 
(taruiyj) whereas the latters would 
not be considered major crimes. 
Hezbollah intervenes in two 
occasions in the debate. First 
through Muḥammad Ra‘ad who 
declares that their political 
delegation favours the law proposal 
as suggested by the Government. 
In a second occasion Muḥammad 
Fnaysh intervenes (p. 2142) trying 
to quicken the process of drafting of 
the law as regards the 
aforementioned distinction in art 15 
of the law proposal.   
Law 472 of 
2002 
Authorizing the government to join 
the  Agreement Establishing the 
Organization of Arab Women 
 Approved by majority no debate. Women’s Rights 
Law 483 of 
2002 
Amendments to article reforming 
social security law in favour of 
This law amends article 14 of the 
Social Security Code, where the 
Parliamentary debate is on an 
alternative law proposal by Ghanwa 
Women’s Rights 
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women and men equality. words “the male insured” have been 
amended to “the male and female 
insured equally, without 
discrimination” the law is mentioned in 
the state submitted report to the 
CEDAW committee (see 
CEDAW/C/LBN/3 p. 12). 
Jallul (of the March 14 coalition) 
whereas the law passed has been 
proposed by Bouṭros Ḥarb, Elie 
Skaff and Muḥammad Safadi. No 
interventions from Hezbollah are 
reported. 
2003 n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 
2004 Law 35 of 
2004 
Permission to the government to 
join the Arab labour treaty no 19 of 
1998 
 The treaty is approved by majority 
but with various reservations over 
its text. The approval of the law 
raises several observations 
regarding the issue of “labour 
inspectors” MP Moukhaiber of the 
Free Patriotic Movement and MP 
Ghanem (Member of the March 14 
Alliance) raise concerns over the 
reservations contained in the law. 
MP Mukhaiber also demands the 
need to use electronic vote system 
present in the assembly. Hezbollah 
does not intervene in the debate. 
Regional treaty, 
Labour rights. 
Law 567of 
2004 
Permission to the government to 
ratify the ILO treaty 152 on Safety 
and Health in Dock Work. 
 Approved with committees reports 
(at the end MP Moukhaiber of the 
Free Patriotic Movement complains 
about the fact that these laws are 
not being read by members of 
parliament). 
Labour Rights 
International 
Treaty. 
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Law 591 of 
2004 
Permission to the government to 
join the international labour treaty 
148  of 1988 
 The treaty is approved without 
parliamentary debate on the basis 
of the committees’ report.  
International 
Treaty Labour 
Law 
Law 598 of 
2004 
Permission to the government to 
join the international labour treaty 
174 of 1993 
 The treaty is approved by majority 
through reference to Parliamentary 
Committees’ debate. MP Fatoush 
notices that the treaty does not 
cover issues related to the 
protection of workers dealing with 
radioactive material. 
International 
Treaty Labour 
Law 
Law 608 of 
2004 
Permission to the government to 
join the international labour treaty 
150 of 1978 
 The law is approved by majority 
with reference to the reports 
provided by relevant parliamentary 
committees. 
International 
Treaty Labour 
Law. 
2005 Law 664 of 
2005 
Law ratifying the decree introducing 
the Ombudsman of the Republic.   
The law is mentioned in the Universal 
Periodic Review as a sign of progress 
in human rights standards (See 
A/HRC/WG.6/9/LBN/3/Rev.1, p.2) 
The effective implementation of the 
law is still pending nonetheless.  
The law debate is particularly long 
and being related to a technical 
legal issue it delves into 
complicated jurisprudential aspects 
to which primarily MP Moukhaiber 
and MP Ḥarb contribute. No 
participation of Hezbollah’s member 
is recorded.   
Civil and Political 
Rights 
Law 680 of 
2005 
Ratification of UN convention to 
combat transnational organized 
crime. 
 The law is approved by majority, no 
debate in the parliament but only 
reference to the reports of the 
relevant Parliamentary Committees. 
International 
Treaty 
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Law 681 of 
2005 
Accession to protocol against 
Smuggling of Migrants by Land 
Sea and Air (Supplement to UN 
Convention on Transnational 
Organized Crime) 
 The treaty is approved on the basis 
of the reports of the relevant 
parliamentary committees. 
International 
Treaty 
Law 682 of 
2005 
Law authorizing the government to 
accede the Protocol to Prevent 
Suppress and Punish Trafficking 
Persons, Especially Women and 
Children (optional protocol to 
Convention on Transnational 
Crime) 
In 2011 the parliament will adopt a 
law defining the crime of trafficking of 
persons accordingly to the 
requirements of this treaty.  
The law is approved by majority 
without objections and with 
reference to reports from relevant 
parliamentary committees. 
International 
Treaty 
Rights of the Child 
Rights of Women  
Rights of Migrants 
2006 Law 718 of 
2006 
Giving permission to join the 
Protocol against the Illicit 
Manufacturing of and Trafficking in 
Firearms, Their Parts and 
Components and Ammunition, 
supplementing the United Nations 
Convention against Transnational 
Organized Crime (PO A ISS) 
 The law is approved by majority in 
the parliament with reference to the 
reports of the relevant 
parliamentary committees.  
International 
Treaty 
Law 759 of 
2006 
Authorization to join the 
Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban 
Treaty. 
 The law is approved but details on 
the parliamentary discussion are 
not available. 
(Source the Lebanese Parliament 
Website unofficial report of the 
session held on: 31
st
 of October 
2006) 
International 
Treaty 
357 
 
Law 765 of 
2006 
Prohibition on the use of chemical 
weapons. 
 The law is approved but details on 
the parliamentary discussion are 
not available. (Source the 
Lebanese Parliament Website 
unofficial report of the session held 
on: 31
st
 of October 2006) 
International 
Treaty 
2007 n/a n/a n/a 
 
n/a n/a 
2008 Law 1 of 2008  Permission to the government to 
ratify the Arab Charter for Human 
Rights 
Discussion of approval of this law 
took place in the Human Rights 
Committee in 2003 and then was 
mentioned in the 2006 Legislative 
session. 
Approved on the basis of the 
committees’ reports. 
International 
Treaty 
Law 12 of 
2008  
 
Accession to the Optional Protocol 
to the Convention against Torture 
and other Cruel, Inhuman or 
Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment. 
On 22 December 2008 and that the 
Ministry of Justice had made a 
proposal for the establishment of an 
independent national mechanism to 
visit detention centres with a view to 
preventing torture and ill-treatment. 
The law is approved but details on 
the parliamentary discussion are 
not available. (Source the 
Lebanese Parliament Website 
unofficial report of the session held 
on: 25
th
 of September 2008) 
International 
Treaty 
Law 14 of 
2008 
 
 
Permission to the government to 
join Convention on Prohibitions or 
Restrictions on the Use of Certain 
Conventional Weapons Which May 
Be Deemed to be Excessively 
Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate 
Effects. 
 Same as above. International 
Treaty 
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 Law 49 of 
2008 
Ratification of the Arab Labour 
Conventions 1-9-13-15-17-18 
 Approved throughout parliamentary 
committees reports. 
International 
Treaty 
2009 n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 
2010 Law 127 of 
2010  
Ratification of the International 
Treaty for the prohibition of cluster 
ammunitions 
 Criticised by Hezbollah as altering 
the strategic military balance 
against Israel which did not sign the 
treaty. MP Ra‘ad argued that the 
Resistance cannot give 
reassurances to Israel over the kind 
of weaponry that is used by 
Lebanon. MP Mūsawī also criticises 
the ratification of the treaty not 
being reciprocated by Israel and 
also due to the fact that the costs 
tackle the issue of cluster bombs in 
Lebanon is particularly high and 
there is no international 
compensation for this cost. 
International 
Treaty 
Law 128 of 
2010 
Rights to social security for 
Palestinian workers 
Palestinian Refugees working in 
Lebanon and registered in the 
Directorate for Political Affairs of 
Refugees is subject to the Labour 
Code including indemnity at the end 
of employment and as regards 
accidents on the work place. 
Palestinians are exempts from 
conditions of reciprocity as regards 
social security. 
The law is discussed in the 
parliament also on the basis of 
various proposals made available 
by members of parliament. The 
main issue is related to the 
institution of a special fund for 
social security of Palestinians or 
rather the use of the regular 
national fund. Hezbollah 
participates actively to the 
Rights of 
Palestinian 
Refugees 
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discussion with MP Muḥammad 
Fnaysh and MP Nawwaf al-Mūsawī 
in favour of the expansion of 
Palestinian rights in this respect. 
The Christian component of the 
parliament presents minor criticism, 
especially as regards the risk that 
this law may pave the way to the 
naturalization of Palestinians in 
Lebanon and endanger the rights to 
return. The law is passed by the 
majority. 
Law 129 of 
2010 
Condition of reciprocity for foreign 
workers in Lebanon. And permit to 
work to Palestinians with a 
permission from the Ministry of 
Labour (mentioned by AI in 
A/HRC/WG.6/9/LBN/3/Rev.1 
(no41, p. 8) 
Exemption of Palestinian refugees as 
regards reciprocity and taxation over 
the working permit.  Although they still 
need to be registered in the 
Directorate of Political Affairs and of 
Refugees, Ministry of Interior and 
their access to the job market is 
limited to lesser qualified professions. 
The law is briefly discussed through 
but receives general support. 
According to interviews with the 
author Hezbollah was supporting 
the idea for unrestricted possibility 
of Palestinian to work in Lebanon 
but the Christian component only 
accepted limited possibility to work 
in jobs that were no highly qualified. 
Rights of 
Palestinian 
Refugees 
2011 Law 162 of 
2011 
Abrogation of Art. 562 of the 
Criminal Code establishing 
mitigating circumstances for 
violence related to “family honour”. 
Reported by Human Rights Watch 
and many other human rights 
organization as an important step. 
MP ‘Fayyāḍ demands the deferral 
of the law to the committees. 
Rights of Women. 
Law 164 of 
2011 
Law Punishing the Trafficking of 
Persons 
 Hezbollah’s MPs do not raise 
observations or concerns in this 
regard. 
Rights of women 
Rights of Child 
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